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ABSTRACT
The Western philosophic tradition has tended to tie the question of action to that of freedom, with the relationship structured around the free will/determinism opposition. In contrast, I show that in Being and Nothingness, Sartre offers a stringent and radical critique of these approaches. I briefly outline the conceptual parameters of Sartre’s early ontology, before showing that he rejects the free will tradition because of its underlying conception of freedom and insistence that action is reflective and will-based. According to Sartre, consciousness is not a sum of parts, with one aspect (will) guiding the rest. Consciousness is a differentiated whole, divided between reflective and pre-reflective levels. Will is tied to the reflective level of consciousness and so cannot be said to be foundational given that reflectivity depends upon pre-reflectivity. Instead, it is an expressive effect of consciousness’s spontaneous, pre-reflective, projection of itself towards a particular end and value.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 568.
2 Detmer, Freedom as a Value.
3 Heter, Sartre’s Ethics of Engagement.
4 Rae, Realizing Freedom.
5 Morris, “Sartre”.
6 Ibid., 573.
7 Ibid., 573.
8 Poellner, “Early Sartre on Freedom and Ethics”.
9 In Sartre’s Two Ethics, Thomas Anderson defends the former; while I defend the latter in Rae, Realizing Freedom.
10 See Due, “Freedom, Nothingness, Consciousness”; and Eshlemann, “On the Structure and Method of Being and Nothingness”.
11 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 569–628.
12 Ibid., 29.
13 Ibid., 87–117.
14 Fuller discussions of Sartrean nothingness are found in Richmond, “Nothingness and Negation”; and Rae, “Much Ado about Nothing”.
15 See, for example, Ayer, “Novelist Philosopher, V”; for a Sartrean defence see Manser, “Sartre and ‘Le Néant’”; and Wilson, “Too Much of Nothing”.
16 For a fuller discussion, see Erhard, “Negation, Nonbeing, and Nothingness”.
17 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 21.
18 This ties into the role that the imagination plays within Sartre’s thinking. For a discussion, see Rae, “All Power to the Imagination”.
19 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 223.
20 Ibid., 223.
21 Ibid., 223.
22 Ibid., 224.
23 Ibid., 223.
24 See, for example, Morelli, “Pure Reflection and Intentional Process”, and Williford, “Sartrean Reflection: Pure and Impure”.
25 Rowland, “Sartre on Intentionality and Pre-Reflective Consciousness”, 164.
26 Zheng, “On Pure Reflection in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness”, 24.
27 Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity, 182.
28 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 569.
29 Ibid., 569.
30 Ibid., 569–570.
31 Ibid., 570.
32 Ibid., 570.
33 Ibid., 570.
34 Ibid., 570.
35 Ibid., 570.
36 Ibid., 572.
37 Ibid., 572.
38 Ibid., 571.
39 Ibid., 573.
40 Ibid., 573–574.
41 Ibid., 585.
42 Ibid., 585.
43 Ibid., 585.
44 Ibid., 585.
45 Ibid., 586.
46 Ibid., 586.
47 Ibid., 574.
48 Ibid., 586.
49 Ibid., 574.
50 Ibid., 574.
51 Ibid., 574.
52 Ibid., 585–586.
53 Ibid., 589.
54 Ibid., 589.
55 Ibid., 589.
56 Ibid., 589.
57 Ibid., 439–440.
58 See Rae, Realizing Freedom, 25–28.
59 Sartre, War Diaries, 181.
60 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 626.
61 Ibid., 626.
62 On this issue, see Dilman, Free Will; Rae, Evil in the Western Philosophical Tradition; and O’Connor and Franklin, “Free Will”.
63 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 579.
64 Ibid., 580.
65 Ibid., 581.
66 Ibid., 581.
67 Ibid., 583.
68 Ibid., 583.
69 Ibid., 583.
70 Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions.
71 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 584.
72 Ibid., 584.
73 Ibid., 584.
74 Ibid., 584.
75 Ibid., 584. On the role that magic plays in Sartre’s thought, see Greaves, “Magic, Emotion and Practical Metabolism”; O’Shiel, Sartre and Magic; and Richmond, “Magic in Sartre’s Early Philosophy”.
76 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 584.
77 Ibid., 584.
78 Ibid., 591.
79 Ibid., 591.
80 Ibid., 591.
81 Ibid., 592.
82 Ibid., 591.
83 Ibid., 593.
84 Ibid., 608.
85 Ibid., 739.
86 Ibid., 739.
87 Sartre, Baudelaire; Sartre, Saint Genet, Actor and Martyr; Sartre, The Family Idiot.
88 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 739.
89 Ibid., 728.
90 Ibid., 734.
91 Ibid., 732.
92 Ibid., 626.
93 Borchers, “Revamping Sartre’s Original Project”, 6–7.
94 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 739.
95 On this issue, see Rae, “Traces of Identity in Deleuze’s Differential Ontology”.
96 On this issue, see Rae, Poststructuralist Agency. This difference however does not obviously negate the possibility that there are significant overlaps and points of similarity between Sartre’s project and Deleuze’s and Derrida’s. Although these relationships have not yet been fully explored, examples that have engaged them include Farrell Fox, The New Sartre; and Rae, “Disharmonious Continuity”.
97 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 148.
98 Ibid., 740.
99 Ibid., 604.
100 Ibid., 604.
101 Ibid., 723–724.
102 This paper forms part of the activities for the following research projects: (1) “Differential Ontology and the Politics of Reason”, funded by the Government of the Region of Madrid, as part of line 3 of the multi-year agreement with the Universidad Complutense de Madrid: V PRICIT Excellence Program for University Professors (Fifth Regional Plan for Scientific Investigation and Technological Innovation); (2) “The Crossroads of the Sexed Body: Cultural Matter and Material Cultures of Sexuality”, (PR27/21-020; 2022–2024), financed by the Government of the Region of Madrid, as part of the multi-year agreement with the Universidad Complutense de Madrid: V PRICIT Regional Plan for Scientific Investigation and Technological Innovation; and (3) “The Politics of Reason” (PID2020-117386GA-I00), financed by the Ministry of Science and Innovation, Government of Spain.