https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1298-6706
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Abstract
Since the Sahelian crisis broke out in 2012, Northern Mali and Northern Niger have been identified as the two potential epicentres of violence in the region. Nevertheless, while sharing very similar structural conditions and constraints, during the last decade these two subregions have scored very differently in terms of stability and armed conflict along the centre-periphery divide. Aiming to understand the divergent security patterns in Northern Mali and Northern Niger, this work highlights the importance of informal institutions as politically – and spatially contingent networks whose mechanisms for regulating authority and power are key for the appreciation of state capacity and political ordering, and essential for understanding statehood in the Sahel. We stress the importance of hybrid political orders and informality for the definition of political settlements which result in (a) the cooptation of political/economic competitors and the stabilisation of viable governance arrangements; or (b) an open contestation of authority and value-extraction that paves the way for destabilising dynamics. The diverging pattern exhibited by the two cases demonstrates that hybrid networks that straddle political and informal institutions are crucial in determining either the stabilisation or destabilisation of political settlements.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Joseph Helou and Abel Polese for their invaluable support.
Disclosure statement
The authors report there are no competing interests to declare.
Notes
1 Most of the uprisings that have taken place in Northern Mali and Niger have not been conducted only by Tuareg populations, instead involving other communities and ethnic groups that inhabit the area. Moreover, the various insurgencies have also seen deep divisions within the Tuareg community, or between different sectors and classes of the various groups who compose the complex sociopolitical galaxy of these regions. While underlining the need to maintain a nuanced approach to this issue, here, in line with much of the literature, we will refer to the various armed insurgencies in Mali and Niger as ‘Tuareg rebellions’.
2 While we consider the Islamization of Sahelian’s public sphere a crucial element shaping political dynamics, its assessment goes beyond the scope of this essay, which is instead focused on the analysis of the mechanisms of hybridization of power networks (mostly) through the mobilization of material resources like armed violence and economic capital.
3 The objective of the research and the way data had been collected, anonymized, and stored, have been clearly explained and exposed to all the participants, who have expressed their informed consent. With the only exception of those participants who felt a written record would present a potential harm to them (e.g. members of cross-border transport networks or members of armed groups) and whose consent was expressed verbally, consent has been given by signing a written form.
4 Leader of a Tuareg confederation.
5 Ag Gamou was one of the leaders of the Tuareg Imghad – a subaltern clan within the Tuareg political structure – who joined the Malian army in 1996. Today he is a general and the leader of the (until recently?) pro-government militia GATIA (Groupe d’Autodéfense des Touareg Imghad et Alliés). On ag Ghali, see further.
6 Interviews with two local security experts and researchers, Bamako, January 2023.
7 Ag Erlaf was then member of different governments from 2015 to 2020, as Minister for Decentralization, for Territorial Administration, and for State Reform.
8 Interviews with 1) a former employee of the French ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, June 2015; 2) a local security expert and employee of MINUSMA, Bamako, December 2019.
9 Interviews with: 1) member of the EU delegation in Mali, Bamako, September 2015; 2) employee of the Dutch embassy in Mali, Bamako, October 2015; 3) local security expert and former employee of the Spanish cooperation in Gao, Bamako, December 2019.
10 Interview with a local researcher and scholar, Bamako, January 2023.
11 For a reconstruction of Iyad ag Ghali’s career, see Bensimon et al. (Citation2018). Our information was confirmed by various experts and practitioners met in Bamako in December 2019 and January 2023.
12 Ag Boula was appointed Minister of Tourism from 1997 to 2004, was elected member of the Regional Council of Agadez (2011–15) and appointed as Advisor to the Presidency by former president Issoufou in 2011, a position he held until the July 2023 military coup.
13 Interview with researcher and member of the HACP, Agadez, November 2021.
14 Interview with a senior scholar, government consultant and NGO president, Agadez, November 2022.
15 Anacko was a Minister and High Commissioner for the Restoration of Peace in the North and is now the serving President of the Regional Council of Agadez.
16 Interviews with several local political representatives, including two former mayors, Agadez, October-November 2022.
17 Interviews with several local activists, local politicians, council members and journalists, Agadez, October-November 2022.
18 Interviews with artisanal gold miners and entrepreneurs, Agadez, November 2022.
19 Idem.
20 Aimed at combating human smuggling in the Sahara, this law reinforced police authority in Niger, framing migration as a security threat in relation to terrorism. Since its introduction the law, far from achieving its goal of halting mobility, has only had the effect of making migration routes increasingly perilous. See Dauchy (Citation2020). The military junta, in a move to captivate Northern socio-economic actors, abolished the contested law in November 2023.
21 Fieldwork notes from interviews with civil society activists, journalists, and former rebels, Agadez, October-November 2022.
22 Fieldwork notes from exchanges with Caravane members, local politicians, and former rebels, Agadez, October-November 2022.
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Notes on contributors
Alessio Iocchi
Alessio Iocchi is Research Fellow at the Department of Environmental and Cultural Heritage at the University of Milan. He obtained a PhD in African Studies at University of Naples “L’Orientale”, where he also teaches African International Relations. He has worked, and still collaborates, with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) researching on governance processes in the Sahel. Since 2014, he has conducted extensive fieldwork in different countries of the Sahel, including Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Chad, also collaborating with international NGOs as a consultant. His works have been published in specialised journals such as African Conflict & Peace-Building Review, Politique Africaine, International Spectator, etc. He is the author of Living through Crisis by Lake Chad. Violence, Labour and Resources (Routledge).
Edoardo Baldaro
Edoardo Baldaro is Assistant Professor in Political Science and International Relations at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations of the University of Palermo (Italy). Before Palermo, he served as FNRS postdoctoral researcher at the REPI Institute of the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB, Brussels, Belgium), and as postdoctoral research fellow at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies (Pisa, Italy) and at the University of Naples “L’Orientale”. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the Scuola Normale Superiore – Institute of Human and Social Sciences (Pisa and Florence, Italy). His main areas of interest and research include critical security studies, African politics and international relations, international interventions, and security regionalism. His works have been published, among the others, in specialised journals such as Security Dialogue and Territory, Politics, Governance.