1449 Resurrected

Abstract

The Tumu Crisis of 1449 was consequential for the developmental trajectory of the Ming court in almost every domain. Studies have shown that militarily, the Ming actively pursued defensive retrenchment thereafter; politically, Tumu provided incontrovertible evidence that martial modes of rulership were no longer legitimate. This article is interested in a domain of life in the Ming court that Tumu shaped, but which has received less attention: rhetoric. It offers a close study of invocations of the Tumu Crisis in early 16th century Ming political discourse, specifically in the years 1517–1518, when the peripatetic Zhengde emperor (r. 1506–1521) embarked on several controversial tours of the northern frontier. The article argues that Ming officials leveraged the memory of Tumu in an attempt to persuade Zhengde to conform to post-1449 modes of Ming rulership and, further, that Tumu should not only be viewed as a traumatic artifact of history but also as a rhetorical device. It concludes by positioning the Tumu Crisis as an integral part of Ming political culture more broadly.

1449年的土木之變對明朝宮廷在各個領域里的發展軌跡產生了深遠影響。一般認為，明朝宮廷在軍事上因土木事件而積極實施了內線防禦政策；政治上，土木之變為明廷群臣提供了武力統治已非合理的不可爭辯的證據。其實，土木之變對明廷政治文化也產生不可磨滅的影響，這一點從當時的宮廷論戰中就可見一斑。本文將探討明朝群臣在十六世紀政治辯論中對土木之變的幾次引述，特別是以喜愛巡遊的正德皇帝從1517到1518年數次北巡為時間範圍。本文認為，明廷群臣利用土木事件力勸正德皇帝遵從土木之後逐漸形成的統治方式，因此，土木之變不僅應當被視為一個慘重的歷史事件，而且也應當被視為一個論戰工具。最後，從更廣泛的歷史視角來看，本文認為土木之變是明代政治文化的一個重要組成部分。

Keywords:

• Tumu Crisis
• Yingzong emperor
• Zhengde emperor
• Northern Campaign

關鍵詞:

• 土木之變
• 英宗皇帝
• 正德皇帝
• 北巡

Notes

1 Franke – Liew-Herres 2011, vol. 1, p. 98.

2 For statistics pertaining to Tumu, see Cao Yongnian 2013, p. 259.

3 己巳之變，鸞輿北狩，狂虜復捲土重來，勢益震撼。一時文臣武將，魄喪膽落，無任張皇 … 我朝之不為趙宋，其機只爭毫髮。嗚呼，是豈人所能為也？天也. Huang Ming tongji, p. 677. A chronology of Tumu is detailed in Mote 1974, pp. 254–263.

4 A thorough narrative of events may be found in de Heer 1986, pp. 16–41.

5 The scholarship on this subject is thoroughly developed. See, for example Johnston 1998, pp. 234–235; Wang Yuankang 2011, p. 121; Swope 2015, p. 616; Mote 1974, p. 269.

6 Dardess 2020. Peter Lorge curiously argues that Tumu was “surprisingly unimportant in military and political terms,” a claim that cannot but collapse under further scrutiny. Lorge 2005, p. 121.

7 Further discussion is offered in Swope 2015, pp. 620–625; Swope 2008, p. 70; Swope 2009, pp. 294–297. For more on the Three Great Campaigns, see Fan Shuzhi 2020, pp. 261–293; Swope 2001.

8 Cf. Dardess 2010, pp. 66–72.

9 Lo Jung-Pang 1969, p. 70.

10 Dreyer 1982, pp. 221–236, 243–244. As Dreyer relates on p. 226 in reference to Xuande, the emperor indeed lacked “the desire to impose his will on the officialdom that his predecessors had all manifested.”

11 For further discussion of related issues, see Wang Zhaoning 2013, pp. 59–62, esp. p. 61.

12 For a gripping reconstruction of each incident, see Dardess 2003.

13 Robinson 2013, pp. 206, 235n88. The quotation appears on p. 206.

14 Robinson 2020, p. 161. An example of an early 15th century critique of imperial touring is described in Chang 2007, p. 68.

15 Daxue yanyi bu, j. 1, p. 4a, j. 3, p. 17b, j. 150, pp. 10b–11a. Qiu’s views in this regard were surely shaped by Tumu; he was living in the capital at the time and was traumatized by the event and its aftershocks. The trauma he sustained is seen in a poem he later composed: Chongbian Qiongtai huigao, j. 20, pp. 2ab. Qiu Jun would go on to recall the terrors of Tumu in his statecraft manual nearly four decades later: Daxue yanyi bu, j. 144, pp. 16b–17b.

16 De Heer 1986, p. 125.

17 While I refer to Ming emperors by their reign titles (nianhao 年號) in this article, I refer to Zhu Qizhen 朱祁鎮 (1427–1464) by his temple name (miaohao 廟號) in order to avoid any confusion created by his two reign titles, Zhengtong 正統 (r. 1436–1449) and Tianshun 天順 (r. 1457–1464). In the memorials cited in this article, Zhu Qizhen is also referred to as “Yingmiao” 英廟, which I leave unaltered.

18 我明傳序於帝九世。英宗而上皆嘗經武遏亂。至于憲祖、孝考，文教熙洽，息馬投戈. Mingshan cang, j. 21, p. 30a.

19 For instance, the Jiajing 嘉靖 emperor (r. 1522–1566) maintained an interest in military rituals, see Robinson 2013, pp. 245–253.

20 The quote reads in full: 東宮聰明，但年尚幼，好逸樂. Yan duilu, p. 33a. Interestingly, this remark is sanitized in the official record, with the shilu omitting Hongzhi’s warning about Zhengde’s being “fond of pleasure-seeking” in the corresponding entry: Xiaozong shilu 孝宗實錄, j. 224, p. 4244. All references to the Ming shilu 明實錄 (Veritable Records of Ming) employ the 1961–1966 Scripta Sinica edition and are referred to in the footnotes by the title of the reign period to which they are assigned; a consolidated citation is offered in the bibliography.

21 Cf. CHC, pp. 352–355.

22 WZSL, j. 12, p. 365.

23 WZSL, j. 14, pp. 439–440.

24 CHC, p. 344.

25 For a number of closely analyzed memorials submitted between 1506–1519, see Robinson 2013, pp. 215–225.

26 Geiss 1987, pp. 1–2, 10.

27 For a few examples, see Dardess 2020, pp. 99, 154, 171.

28 WZSL, j. 152, pp. 2950–2952, j. 154, pp. 2968–2970. For samples of memorials seeking his return, see Xianggao ji, j. 1, pp. 12a–14b.

29 WZSL, j. 158, pp. 3029–3030.

30 Yang Wenzhong sanlu, j. 1, pp. 15ab.

31 Yang Wenzhong sanlu, j. 1, p. 17a. The memorial can also be found in: WZSL, j. 175, p. 3404. For Zhengde’s intention to travel southward, see WZSL, j. 171, p. 3299.

32 The most thorough English-language treatment of this revolt remains Israel 2008. For an attempt to inspire Zhengde’s return, see Yuzhou yigao, j. 3, pp. 1a–2b.

33 Late imperial evaluations of the Zhengde emperor are surprisingly positive, probably because of officials’ obligation to praise, rather than blame, their emperors (cf. CHC, p. 439). See seven evaluations from Ming writers in Guoque, j. 51, pp. 3214–3216. The foregoing survey of Zhengde’s reign has consulted: CHC, pp. 403–439.

34 Shizong shilu 世宗實錄, j. 1, p. 10. When Jiajing later ordered the compilation of the shilu for Zhengde’s reign, he released for the compilers’ use over 860 unanswered memorials that had been kept in the palace. Xie Gui’an understands this to have been a maneuver to censure Zhengde, see Xie Gui’an 1995, p. 58. It has elsewhere been argued that Yang Tinghe played an important role in Jiajing’s decision, see Ji Hailong 2017, p. 70.

35 正德之世，不可以帝王經理論. Guoshi weiyi, j. 5, p. 81.

36 Cf. Li Xun 1993; Zhao Zifu 1991, pp. 194–216; Huai Xiaofeng 1989, pp. 14–17; Meng Sen 2002, pp. 185–207.

37 Huang 1981, pp. 95–96, 100–101. “Free monarchy” appears on p. 101.

38 Cf. Robinson 2008, pp. 49–50.

39 Robinson 2013, p. 204. Robinson cautions on p. 352 that it is still possible that many were discomforted by these practices.

40 Robinson 2013, pp. 204, 358–360.

41 As Thomas Allsen has relatedly observed, “the vast majority of the royal houses and aristocracies of Eurasia made some use of the chase in the pursuit and maintenance of their social and political power.” Allsen 2011, p. 14.

42 Phrasing borrowed from: Brook 2015, p. 191.

43 De Heer stresses the importance of the Ming emperor for the bureaucracy in spatial terms: for the emperor to be physically and visibly in the palace was a vital part of his political and cosmic functions. See de Heer 1986, pp. 126, 136.

44 Yang Wenzhong sanlu, j. 3, pp. 23b–24a.

45 A memorial dating to February 1516 lamented that court audiences were exceptionally lax, that Classics-mat sessions had fallen into neglect, and that imperial temple visits had been abandoned, WZSL, j. 133, pp. 2647–2648.

46 Cf. WZSL, j. 147, p. 2868. Translations of official titles generally follow Hucker 1995.

47 Lu was an ally of the Prince of Ning and had by this time already cooperated with him in trying to restore his bodyguard; Lu also helped the Prince of Ning gain authority to punish local imperial clansmen. See CHC, pp. 424–425. Lu was eventually disgraced following Jiajing’s ascent and was made to serve in a guard in Fujian for collaborating with the prince, MS, j. 187, p. 4957.

48 昔我英宗親出禦虜，彼時軍馬三十餘萬，尚有土木之變，陛下自視今日軍馬強弱何如往昔，而顧欲輕出耶！使虜果犯塞，惟宜命將禦之，脫欲親征以耀武，亦當明詔有司飭兵集糧使居者，足以守宗社行者、足以固牧圉，庶幾可耳. WZSL, j. 151, p. 2932.

49 Cf. WZSL, j. 151, p. 2932.

50 For a biography, see MS, j. 188, pp. 4998–5000.

51 Hucker 1966, pp. 86–90 (for the quotation, see p. 86). Also see Wang Tianyou 2014, p. 189.

52 In the years leading up to 1517, the northern frontier had suffered from both destructive Mongol raids and the steady deterioration of defensive infrastructure. 1515 and 1516, and even 1517, were especially violent years, see Dardess 2020, pp. 312–321.

53 我英宗不聽大臣之言，自出親征，遂有己巳之變，且匹夫尚不肯自輕。陛下以宗廟、社稷之身，又無太子、親王監國，而輕出遠遊。萬一不虞，將如之何？今天下之事言者寒心，陛下不是之思，而欲長驅觀兵。不謀之朝廷，而獨謀之宮中；不議之眾人，而獨斷之一已。使大小臣工莫知所措，恐非保國至計也. WZSL, j. 151, p. 2933.

54 See de Heer 1986, pp. 16–17.

55 It was customary for an emperor to appoint a first-degree prince – or even an heir apparent – to “supervise the state” (jianguo 監國) or “hold and defend” (jushou 居守) the capital during a campaign. Yongle ordered his eventual successor Zhu Gaochi 朱高熾 (1378–1425) to supervise Ming government on a number of occasions, namely during his northern campaigns, see Goodrich – Fang 1976, vol. 1, p. 338. In 1426, Xuande appointed his two younger brothers Prince of Zheng (Zheng wang 鄭王) Zhu Zhanjun 朱瞻埈 (1404–1466) and Prince of Xiang (Xiang wang 襄王) Zhu Zhanshan 朱瞻墡 (1406–1478) as interim administrators before departing for a campaign against the rebellious Prince of Han (Han wang 漢王) Zhu Gaoxu 朱高煦 (b. 1380): Xuanzong shilu 宣宗實錄, j. 20, p. 529. Finally, in 1449 Yingzong arranged for the Prince of Cheng (Cheng wang 郕王) Zhu Qiyu 朱祁鈺 (1428–1457), who would become the Jingtai emperor, to supervise the state in his absence, see Yingzong shilu 英宗實錄, j. 180, p. 3488.

56 Cf. a memorial of 15 September 1517 lamenting the absence of a supreme arbiter, WZSL, j. 152, p. 2952.

57 上下交則為泰，不交則為否。君臣之交，[關]係世道. Shizong shilu, j. 20, p. 589.

58 MS, j. 16, p. 209.

59 CHC, p. 420; MS, j. 16, p. 209.

60 Goodrich – Fang 1976, vol. 2, p. 1544.

61 CHC, p. 421.

62 Xianzong shilu 憲宗實錄, j. 288, p. 4875.

63 Diange cilin ji, j. 2, p. 30a. Jiang would also conduct the inaugural lecture for the young Jiajing emperor, see Chu Hung-lam 2008, pp. 190–191.

64 Diange cilin ji, j. 2, p. 30a; Xie Gui’an 1995, pp. 53–57, 146–148.

65 WZSL, j. 140, pp. 2770–2771, j. 151, p. 2924.

66 For an overview of Jiang’s political career, see Zhu Shengmin 2012.

67 MS, j. 16, p. 209; WZSL, j. 152, p. 2937.

68 Barfield 1989, pp. 35–36.

69 遠則漢高祖被圍白登，近則我英廟蒙塵土木，皆可為萬世之永鑒也 … 勿再遲疑，以蹈漢高祖及我英廟覆轍，此誠宗社安危所係，呼吸之間，有存有亡，誠不可不熟思也. Jiang’s memorial is contained in his collected works and is dated to the first lunar month of 1518, which spans 10 February to 10 March: Xianggao ji, j. 1, pp. 19b–20a. The text, however, is illegible in many places; I thus follow the version contained in the following work, the text of which is fully legible but which lacks a submission date: Huang Ming jingshi wenbian, vol. 23, j. 124, pp. 7b–8b.

70 Ng – Wang 2005, p. xi.

71 CHC, p. 421.

72 古者聖王居重馭輕，修內攘外。未聞重夷狄而輕中國，事外攘而忘內治者也. WZSL, j. 164, p. 3163.

73 WZSL, j. 164, p. 3166.

74 朕今巡視三邊，督理兵政，冀除虜患，以安兆民. WZSL, j. 164, p. 3166.

75 See for instance Xuande’s explicit linking of imperial hunts with border defense in Robinson 2013, pp. 59–60.

76 WZSL, j. 164, pp. 3167–3168.

77 盖上厭大內。初以豹房為家，至是，更以宣府為家矣. WZSL, j. 164, p. 3172.

78 For Jiang Mian’s complete memorial, see WZSL, j. 164, pp. 3177–3183.

79 若但假以征虜除盜為名，而欲周流天下，惟務嬉遊不恤政事，則自周穆王而下秦隋之君，殷鑒具存萬世永戒。臣又何忍使陛下蹈其覆轍乎! WZSL, j. 164, p. 3179.

80 Loewe – Shaughnessy 1999, pp. 323–324. For more on the absolute chronology of the king’s reign, see Shaughnessy 1991, pp. 248–254.

81 Twitchett – Loewe 1986, pp. 67–68. For several sites of Qin Shihuang’s travels, see Kern 2000, p. 108.

82 Twitchett 1979, pp. 122, 144–147 (the quotation appears on p. 122); Xiong 2006, pp. 217–218. Also see Ebrey 2014, p. 139.

83 Williams 1977, p. 116.

84 Wang Zhen, a powerful palace eunuch who wielded much influence over the youthful Yingzong, advocated for the campaign; one of his alleged motivations for this was to have the emperor pass through his native district. See Wang’s biography in: Goodrich – Fang 1976, vol. 2, pp. 1347–1349.

85 我英廟出塞征虜，誠欲為國為民剿除邊患，非事廵遊也。然虜未及征，已有土木之變。當時群臣非不力諫阨於姦臣，竟莫能止，卒至生靈塗炭，國勢危疑，彼姦臣者，初亦何嘗期於如此哉！特以家在邊境，欲邀駕往幸其家，以為鄉邦之榮，故凡群臣勸留不必親征者，一切不聽。豈知六飛北狩之後，彼即身膏草野、宗族誅夷，其禍若是之烈也！使彼知前日群臣之諫為忠，而觀止親征，則英廟何至有北狩之事？而彼身家之禍，亦豈至有如前所云者哉! WZSL, j. 164, pp. 3179-3180.

86 For more on righteous warfare, see Graff 2010, pp. 198–199. Jiang’s at least nominal recognition that Yingzong’s campaign was not for pleasure can be found echoed elsewhere, as in: Hongyou lu, j. 10, p. 232; Zhaodai dianze, vol. 2, j. 16, pp. 663–664.

87 Yingzong did make remarks similar to what Jiang quotes here. In a conversation with Ming envoy Li Shi 李實 (jinshi 1442, 1413–1472) on 19 August 1450, while still a hostage in the Mongols’ camp, Yingzong confided in Li: “When I initially came out here, it was not for such selfish matters as travelling or hunting. It was for the people of the realm that I personally led the imperial army on a punitive expedition to the north. Unexpectedly, I have been confined in this place; indeed, I fell into this trap because of Wang Zhen, Chen You, Ma Qing, and Ma Yun” 比先我出來，非為遊獵私己之事，乃為天下生靈，躬率六軍征討迤北。不意被留在此，實因王振、陳友、馬清、馬雲所陷. Yingzong also said, in response to Li’s pressing him on why he favored Wang Zhen: “When the times were without conflict, no one spoke out against Wang Zhen. Today such conflict came about, and the guilt may all be traced back to Me. I do recognize that this person ruined important affairs. I cannot change what happened; what good will regretting now do?” 王振無事之時，人皆不說。今日有事，罪却歸於朕。我亦知此人壞大事，不能去之，今悔莫及. See Beishi lu, j. 17, pp. 6a–7a. For an account of the embassy, see Dardess 2020, pp. 174–177.

88 方無事之時，雖有忠言，常不見聽，及至勢危事迫，雖知忠言而欲聽之，又已無及於事。自古及今，往往皆然。所以英廟既留居虜庭，嘗與臣下追論其事亦曰：「朕為姦臣所誤，悔之無及。」陛下天性英邁，洞察古今，於英廟北狩之事，非不能知。但恐左右之臣不肯詳為陛下言耳。陛下舊歲久廵關外，往來於土木者已非一次，使聞英廟北狩之事，其始末如此，必將惕然悔悟，久矣。何至今日又形之，勑旨必欲征虜除寇，足跡半天下哉！ WZSL, j. 164, p. 3180.

89 Jiang must have had in mind this passage of Hongwu’s: “I fear that my descendants in later generations, in relying upon China’s wealth and strength and in coveting nothing more than fleeting military glory, will raise an army without justification, causing great harm to the people’s lives. I emphatically write that this cannot be permitted” 吾恐後世子孫，倚中國富強，貪一時戰功，無故興兵，致傷人命，切記不可. Huang Ming zuxun, pp. 5b–6a.

90 天與祖宗之意，照然可見。陛下猶不覺悟，乃降勑傳旨信意而行。《祖訓》不暇遵，人言不暇顧。天變于上而不遑畏，民怨於下而不遑恤，不知陛下何所樂而為此也. WZSL, j. 164, pp. 3183.

91 CHC, p. 422; WZSL, j. 171, p. 3291.

92 WZSL, j. 171, p. 3294.

93 WZSL, j. 171, p. 3299.

94 Dardess 2003, pp. 99–109. The quotation is drawn from p. 108. For Jiang’s accompanying Zhengde, see WZSL, j. 177, pp. 3453–3457. For Zhengde’s new title, see Hongyou lu, j. 14, p. 328. The title is reminiscent of Yongle’s campaign against Jianwen, referred to as “Pacifying Turmoil Bearing Heaven’s [Mandate]” (Fengtian jingnan 奉天靖難); one wonders if Zhengde was harkening back to his ancestor and seeking legitimacy by association.

95 Xu was later in 1519 appointed to a censorial post. For his posting as a Hanlin bachelor and then censor, see respectively WZSL, j. 147, p. 2880, j. 177, p. 3462. For a biography, see Guochao xianzheng lu, j. 62, pp. 57a–60b. Also useful is Qiuyu ji, j. 15, pp. 3b–8a.

96 後來武宗亦頻出，六師狼狽非前日。終能萬歲老祇宮 … 何必親御沙場耀神武. For a transcription, translation, and analysis of the poem, see Robinson 2013, pp. 228–230. I base my translation on Robinson’s but make some minor alterations.

97 Phrasing borrowed from Ebrey 2014, p. 147.

98 This last point has been stressed by Peter Ditmanson in relation to succession crises and issues of moral authority throughout the Ming; the same principles he outlines apply in the context of the present study. See Ditmanson 2017.

99 Phrasing drawn from Ditmanson 2017, p. 445.

100 I draw this phrasing from Chang Su-ching 2013, esp. p. 68. The officials identified in this article, and especially Jiang Mian, align closely with the confrontational mode of remonstrance that Chang classifies.

101 Baker 1990, p. 4.

102 Chang 2007, pp. 45–65. See p. 50 for the quotation.

103 This sort of political culture survived well into the Qing: the official Xiong Cili 熊賜履 (jinshi 1658, 1637–1709), for instance, invoked both Yingzong and Zhengde in a 1688 memorial in order to admonish the Kangxi 康熙 emperor (r. 1661–1722) against campaigning. See Chang 2007, pp. 75–76; Huangchao jingshi wenbian, j. 9, p. 390.

104 Observers in Korea explicitly described Zhengde as behaving like a Mongol, see Robinson 2004, pp. 97, 109. With regard to this point, I benefited from discussion with Aaron Molnar.

105 Chang 2007, pp. 68–69n102.

106 Chang 2007, p. 70.

107 With Zhang’s support, Longqing presided over a spectacular military review in 1569; its reception was mixed and the event was eventually condemned. For discussion, see Robinson 2013, pp. 261–273, 374. Wanli also presided over his own in Grand Review in 1581, for which Zhang Juzheng offered effusive praise, see Robinson 2013, p. 268 and p. 268n188. Moreover, for further discussion of Zhang Juzheng’s inculcating in Wanli an appreciation for the military, see the following works: Swope 2001, pp. 16–18; Swope 2008, p. 72–73. Opposition of course emerged in court against Wanli’s interest in military affairs, see Huang 1981, p. 121.

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Aaron Throness

Aaron Throness (Song Zhanming 宋瞻明) is a Ph.D. candidate in East Asian Languages and Civilizations at Harvard University. His research centers on the political history of Ming China, with a particular interest in the court controversies, political personalities, and princely estates of the 15th and 16th century Ming. Recent refereed publications include “An Age of Exalted Harmony?” in Ming Studies 83 (2021), a number of book reviews in the International Journal of Asian Studies (2022, 2023), and “A Critical Biography of Zhu Zhanshan, Prince Xian of Xiang (1406–1478),” in T’oung Pao 109 (2023) 1–2. His first monograph – Yang Tinghe: A Political Life in the Mid-Ming Court – was published by Brill in October 2023.