Chapter II: The Balance of Capabilities in the Subsurface Domain

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Notes

1 Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–86, pp. 23–30.

2 Arnaud Sobrero, ‘Russian Submarines, Still a Relevant Threat?’, The Diplomat, 11 February 2021.

3 Julian Cooper, Russia’s State Armament Programme to 2020: A Quantitative Assessment of Implementation 2011–2015 (Stockholm: FOI, 2016), p. 20.

4 Globalsecurity, ‘Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research: (Military Unit 40056)’, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/gugi.htm>, accessed 7 November 2021.

5 Andrew Metrick, Kathleen Weinberger and Kathleen Hicks, Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2016), pp. 11–12.

6 Eric Werheim, ‘Russia’s Capable New SSGN’, US Naval Institute, May 2020.

7 Michael Kofman and Anya Fink, Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Key Concepts, Debates, and Players in Military Thought (Arlington, VA: CAN, 2020).

8 Kofman, speech given at RUSI Seapower Conference.

9 Ibid.

10 James P Stebbins, Broaching the Ship: Rethinking Submarines as a Signalling Tool in Naval Diplomacy (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015).

11 Owen R Cote Jr, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle With Soviet Submarines (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2003).

12 For a discussion of Russian objectives, see Metrick, Weinberger and Hicks, Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe; Kofman, speech at RUSI Seapower Conference. Analysts tend to agree that both bastion defence and SLOC interdiction will play a role in Russian maritime strategy, with differences of opinion over the relative weight given each function.

13 Xavier Vavasseur. ‘Russia's Pacific Fleet to Get 15 New Vessels in 2020’, Naval News, 29 May 2020.

14 Metrick, Weinberger and Hicks, Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe, p. 10; numbers validated by authors via imagery of key port and shipyards to identify vessels currently in refit.

15 Julianne Smith and Jerry Hendrix, ‘Forgotten Waters – Minding the GIUK Gap: A Tabletop Exercise’, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), May 2017.

16 See, for example, H I Sutton, ‘Russian Submarine May Test New Missile off Norway This Week’, Forbes, 26 October 2019; Xavier Vavasseur, ‘Russia’s Akula-Class Submarines to Fire Kalibr Cruise Missile Following Upgrade’, NavalNews, 30 March 2020.

17 Atle Staalesen, ‘A Large-Scale Russian Military Exercise Is Coming to the Arctic’, Barents Observer, 20 December 2018.

18 The justifications for noise estimates are provided in the footnotes to Table 2.

19 See Eugene Miasnikov, ‘The Future of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces: Discussions and Arguments’, Federation for American Scientists, January 1997, <https://fas.org/spp/eprint/snf0322.htm>, accessed 12 March 2021.

20 H I Sutton, ‘Pr885 Severodvinsk Class’, Covert Shores, 13 April 2019.

21 NTI, ‘Russia’s Submarine Capabilities’, fact sheet, 9 June 2014, <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/>, accessed 8 November 2021.

22 Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘Confirmed: The Russian Pacific Fleet to Receive 6 New Attack Submarines’, The Diplomat, 9 September 2016.

23 Peter Suciu, ‘Russian Submarine Fired Kalibr Missiles During Recent Exercise’, National Interest, 29 September 2020.

24 PortNews, ‘SSK Kaluga to be Launched on May 26 After Overhaul’, 4 May 2012.

25 Interfax, ‘Dve rossiyskiye atomnyye podlodki ispytayut oruzhiye v Norvezhskom more’ [‘Two Russian Submarines Set to Undergo Tests in the Northern Sea’], 26 August 2019; Thomas Nilsen, ‘Old Nuclear Sub Gets New Life at Nerpa Shipyard’, Barents Observer, 5 October 2020; Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘Russia’s Pacific Fleet to Get Four Upgraded Nuclear Subs With Supersonic Cruise Missiles by 2021’, The Diplomat, 7 February 2018; Tass, ‘Russian Shipyard Floats Out Nuclear-Powered Akula-Class Sub After Upgrade’, 26 December 2020. Office of Naval Intelligence, ‘The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics’, August 2009; Amit Ray, ‘Considerations and Challenges in Silencing Submarines’, Indian Navy, <https://indiannavy.nic.in/insshivaji/sites/default/files/paper_on_considerations_and_challenges_in_silencing_submarines.pdf>, accessed 20 March 2021; Eugene Miasinkov, ‘The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces: Discussions and Arguments’, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies’, <http://armscontrol.ru/subs/snf/snf0322.htm>, accessed 12 February 2021; on methodological considerations when estimating submarine noise levels in open source, see also Wu Riqiang, ‘Survivability of China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Forces’, Science & Global Security (Vol. 19, No. 2, 2011), pp. 91–121. Averaging results from multiple sources can allow for random errors to be disregarded in aggregate, though sources of inaccuracy – such as the systematic use of ONI reports by nearly all the literature surveyed – are likely to stay. The sources describing Chinese and Indian assets use Russian submarines as the baseline for comparisons.

26 Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al., ‘A New Heuristic Measure of Fragility and Tail Risks: Application to Stress Testing’, International Monetary Fund Working Paper, WP/12/216, August 2012, p. 2.

27 On Soviet ASW, see Milan Vego, ‘Submarines in Soviet ASW Doctrine and Tactics’, Naval War College Review (Vol. 36, No. 2, 1983), pp. 2–15.

28 Author imaging of Severomorsk-1.

29 Author interview with retired Royal Navy ASW operator, London, 5 May 2021.

30 Milan Vego, ‘A World of Difference: Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare in 1991’, Naval War College Review (Vol. 45, No. 3, 1992), pp. 58–77.

31 H I Sutton, ‘Analysis: Russia Seeks Submarine Advantage in the Arctic’, Covert Shores, 20 September 2016.

32 Global Security, ‘Garmoniya/Harmony: RUSOSUS’, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/harmony.htm>, accessed 10 May 2021.

33 On the systems, see Sutton, ‘Analysis: Russia Seeks Submarine Advantage in the Arctic’.

34 Thomas Nielsen, ‘Russia Exercises Long-Range Radio-Electronic Warfare on Kola’, Barents Observer, 4 November 2020.

35 Author OSINT analysis – details in Appendix 2.

36 Naval Technology, ‘The Slava Class Guided Missile Cruiser’, <https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/slavaclassguidedmiss/>, accessed 25 March 2021.

37 Yves-Heng Lim, China’s Naval Power: An Offensive Realist Approach (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), p. 134.

38 Eric Wertheim, ‘Modernizing Udaloy-Class ASW Destroyers’, USNI Proceedings (Vol. 146, No, 9, September 2020).

39 Navyrecognition, ‘Russia Laid Down Two Gorshkov-Class Frigates of Project 22350’, April 2019.

40 RussianShips, ‘Small Anti-Submarine Ships’, <http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_1124.htm>, accessed 9 November 2021.

41 Kommersant, ‘The Entire Russian Fleet’, 21 March 2021, <http://www.admiraltytrilogy.com/read/OOB_of_The_Russian_Fleet.pdf>, accessed 28 November 2021.

42 Navyrecognition, ‘Russian Navy to Receive About 30 Upgraded IL-38 Maritime Patrol Aircraft’, <http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2017/february-2017-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/4873-russian-navy-to-receive-about-30-upgraded-il-38-maritime-patrol-aircraft.html>, accessed 9 November 2021; Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Maritime “A2AD” Strengths and Weaknesses’, Russian Military Analysis, 29 January 2020, <https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2020/01/29/russian-maritime-a2-ad-strengths-and-weaknesses/>, accessed 28 November 2021.

43 BMPD Journal, ‘Na Severnom flote vosstanovleny dva aviatsionnykh polka’ [‘Two Naval Aviation Regiments Restored to the Northern Fleet’], 3 December 2019, <https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3860313.html>, accessed 10 May 2021; Westerlund and Oxenstierna (eds), Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective- 2019, p. 71.

44 Westerlund and Oxenstierna (eds), Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective- 2019, p. 71.

45 The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) comprises the first part of a NATO response force to be mobilised at short notice. It is comprised of land, sea and air assets which can be mobilised in 48–72 hours. This includes a land brigade and elements from the two NATO Standing Maritime Groups, each comprised of four to six destroyers and frigates. See ‘NATO, NATO Response Force’, 20 September 2021, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/49755.htm>, accessed 22 November 2021.

46 NATO, ‘Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’, 24 October 2019, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169936.htm>, accessed 22 November 2021.

47 The NATO Response Force is a multinational joint force including both the VJTF and follow-on elements. See NATO, ‘NATO Response Force’.

48 Dynamic Mongoose involved five ships and five SSNs drawn primarily from NATO’s Standing Maritime Group North, see Naval Technology, ‘NATO Begins Dynamic Mongoose 2020 Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise’, 30 June 2020.

49 See, for example, Douglas Barrie et al., ‘Defending Europe: Scenario-Based Capability Requirements for NATO’s European Members’, International Institute of Strategic Studies, April 2019, p. 20; Björn Ottosson, ‘United States’, in Eva Hagstöm Frisell and Krister Pallin (eds), Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020: Part II National Capabilities (Stockholm: FOI, 2021).

50 Ottosson, ‘United States’, in Eva Hagstöm Frisell and Krister Pallin (eds), Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020: Part II National Capabilities (Stockholm: FOI, 2021).

51 Federation of American Scientists, ‘DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class’, <https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/ddg-51.htm>, accessed 12 March 2021.

52 BBC, ‘U Resurrects Second Fleet to Counter Russia’, 5 May 2018.

53 Ben Werner, ‘Indo-Pacom Commander Says Only Half of Sub Requests Are Met’, USNI News, 27 March 2019.

54 Eva Hagström Frisell et al., Western Military Capability in Northern Europe (Stockholm: FOI, 2020), p. 87.

55 Hagström Frisell et al., Western Military Capability in Northern Europe, p. 87.

56 Ibid.

57 Sidharth Kaushal, ‘A Globally Postured Regional Navy’, RUSI Defence Systems, 24 March 2021; Kate Tringham, ‘Naval Group Delivers First FREMM Air-Defence Frigate to French Navy’, Janes, 19 April 2021.

58 Igor Delanoe, ‘Russia’s Black Sea Fleet: Toward a Multiregional Force’, CNA, 5 June 2019.

59 A lack of Arctic specialisation may also hamper French submarine operations in the northern theatre. Author interview with retired Royal Navy ASW Operator, 12 May 2021, London.

60 RAF News, ‘Fourth RAF Poseidon MRA1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft Named’, 2 November 2020; NavalNews, ‘French Navy Receives Third Upgraded ATL2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft’, 24 April 2020.; Naval Technology, ‘Halifax Class Frigates’, <https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/halifax/>, accessed 21 March 2021.

61 Viktor Lundquist, ‘Denmark’, in Hagstöm Frisell and Pallin (eds), Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020: Part II National Capabilities, p. 20; Jakob Gustafsson, ‘Norway’, in Hagstöm Frisell and Pallin (eds), Western Military Capability in Northern Europe 2020: Part II National Capabilities, p. 27–33.

62 NavalNews, ‘Canada’s CP-140 Aurora MPA Upgraded to Block IV Takes First Flight’, 22 February 2020.

63 For an example of the view that submarines are of limited use as a peacetime competitive tool, see Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay, ‘The Influence of Sea Power on Politics: Domain- and Platform-Specific Attributes of Material Capabilities’, Security Studies (Vol. 29, No. 4, October 2020), pp. 601–36.

64 Cote Jr, The Third Battle.

65 On the threat posed by SLCMs, see Daryl Press’s presentation at the 2020 RUSI Space and Missile Defence Conference, 27 February 2020.

66 On the Reagan administration's Maritime Strategy, see Peter Swartz and John Hattendorf (eds), US Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008).

67 For a useful overview of this debate, see Steven E Miller and Stephen Van Evera (eds), Naval Strategy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

68 Kofman, speech at RUSI Seapower Conference.

69 On Russian fears regarding such an attack, see Dave Johnson, ‘Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds’, Livermore Papers on Global Security, 2018, pp. 20–30.

70 While a stochastic model would have been preferable given the number of variables at play, this would have added to the complexity of the process to a degree that exceeded its value. Indeed, deterministic models have proved useful in operations analysis. See Alan Washburn and Moshe Kress, Combat Modeling (New York, NY: Springer, 2009).

71 DT, the detection threshold for a submarine, is calculated on the basis of a detection index, the bandwidth frequency of the receiver and the time taken for integration. It is (5Log dw)/T. For further details, see Eugene Miasnikov, ‘Can Russian Strategic Submarines Survive at Sea? The Fundamental Limits of Passive Acoustics’, Science & Global Security (Vol. 4, No. 2, 1994), pp. 213–51.

72 Miasnikov, ‘Can Russian Strategic Submarines Survive at Sea?’

73 William C Dixon and C Ray Rollins, ‘Very Low Frequency Acoustic Detection of Submarines’, Naval Research Laboratory, 1977; Øivind Grenness, ‘Acoustic Ambient Noise in the Barents Sea’, SACLANTCEN Conference Proceedings CP-32 (Vol. 2, Part 1, 1982), pp. 8–1 to 8–9.

74 All figures are at an assumed frequency of 50hz, with the speed of travel being 8 knots. The detection radius of a sonobuoy and a MAD were assumed at a standard of 6 km and 1600 m respectively. For fidelity, we also asked a retired Royal Navy ASW operator for range estimates.

75 The array gains for hull-mounted sonar were assumed to be 10 db less than towed array – based on Miasnikov, ‘Can Russian Strategic Submarines Survive at Sea?’. The authors also assumed that passive hull-mounted sonar will be used to avoid ASW vessels being targeted by SLCM-equipped submarines, which is a reasonable, but not perfectly realistic, assumption.

76 All estimates are in the lower bound, which is accepted as an assumption due to climactic difficulties.

77 The Astute’s presumed noise level is benchmarked to the Virginia, because the two submarines share a number of characteristics, including pump jet propulsion.

78 Benchmarked against the Kilo for modelling.

79 For more details about the combat models used, see Washburn and Kress, Combat Modeling, Chapter 7.

80 Michael Kevin McMahon, ‘Defending Norway and the Northern Flank: Analysis of NATO’s Defensive Options’, unpublished thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1985; Alain C Enthoven and K Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defence Program, 1961–69 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1971), pp. 140–60; Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 150–70.

81 The 18-hour loiter time of French Atlantique aircraft partially offsets this limitation.

82 Boeing, ‘P-8: An Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Solution’, <https://www.boeing.com/defense/maritime-surveillance/p-8-poseidon/index.page#/tech-spec>, accessed 12 November 2021.

83 UK Armed Forces Commentary, ‘The Merlin Family in UK Service’, 11 May 2011, <http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2011/05/merlin-family-in-uk-service.html>, accessed 12 November 2021; Lockheed Martin, ‘MH-60R’, <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/sikorsky-mh-60-seahawk-helicopters.html>, accessed 12 November 2021.

84 The IL-38N can stay on station for 12 hours, if operating from airfields such as Severomorsk-1 and 3, as can the TU-142. See Peter G Dancey, Soviet Aircraft Industry (Stroud: Fonthill Media, 2015).

85 Waldo Lyon, The Polar Submarine and Navigation of the Arctic Ocean (San Diego, CA: US Navy Electronics Laboratory, 1959).

86 Both NATO and Russia are assumed to maintain two barriers – for NATO, these are the Norway Bear Island and GIUK Gaps.

87 Assuming a two-barrier defence – the Greenland Norway and GIUK Gaps.

88 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, p. 235.

89 See, for example, Heginbotham et al., The US–China Military Scorecard, p. 350.

90 For a useful Late Cold War study, see Posen, Inadvertent Escalation.

91 Submarine Industrial Base Council, ‘Virginia Payload Module’, 2015, <http://submarinesuppliers.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Virginia-Payload.pdf>, accessed 28 November 2021.

92 Dave Johnson, Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Approach to Conflict (Paris: FRS, 2016).