Decolonising Philosophy

Abstract

In its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation movement carries on the work of Socrates, who sought to persuade those who thought that they were wise but were not, that they were not. Yet in its determination to recover and elevate indigenous systems of thought, decolonisation seems opposed to this very work, which is always corrosive of inherited belief. Decolonisation both expresses and contradicts the spirit of Socratic philosophy.

Notes

1 Matolino 2020, p. 215.

2 I sometimes use the term ‘decolonisation’ as shorthand for ‘the decolonisation movement’ and cognate phrases; context will make this clear. On the wrongs of colonialism, see, for example, Pillay 2015 and Matolino 2020, p. 213.

3 On epistemicide, see Grosfoguel 2013 and Tobi 2020. See also Táíwò 2019, pp. 141–142 and, more generally, Valentini 2015.

4 See wa Thiong’o 1986; Hountondji 1995; and Táíwò 2019. See also Wiredu 1998, pp. 17 and 22.

5 Mitova 2020, p. 191. See also Mbembe 2015 and Etieyibo 2016.

6 wa Thiong’o 1986, p. 87, as paraphrased by Mbembe 2015.

7 Plato, Apology of Socrates, 38a and passim.

8 Plato, Republic, book VII, 537e ff. For more on the relationship between inquiry and detachment, see section 6. On the conflict between philosophy and traditional belief, see also Oruka 1990, p. 44.

9 This account is compatible with the analysis of Tobi 2020, pp. 259 ff.

10 Cf. Táíwò 2019, p. 149.

11 Matolino 2020, p. 221. I use the term ‘intellectual’ to mean ‘relating to ideas’ in the sense defined in the text.

12 See Wiredu 2002, p. 58 and Ramose 2016. For Wiredu, decolonisation means ‘divesting African philosophical thinking of all undue influences emanating from our colonial past’ (1998, p. 17).

13 See Emmanuel 2019, pp. 1–3. I do not take a position on the merits of free trade or protectionism in economics.

14 Plutarch, Life of Cato the Elder, 22, and Nasr 1968.

15 Emmanuel 2019, pp. 3 and 14.

16 See Wiredu 2002, pp. 17 and 20. See also Etieyibo 2016, pp. 404–405.

17 I do not claim that African philosophy is to be identified with traditional belief, only that it must begin with this. As Wiredu puts the point, decolonisation seeks to recover an African ‘philosophic inheritance in its true lineaments’ (2002, p. 58); he speaks also of bringing ‘oneself to a vantage point for viewing African thought materials in their true light’ (ibid.). Cf. also Wiredu 1984, p. 34 and Eze 2001, p. 207. To be sure, the difficulty of reconciling a historical account of intellectual ownership with the demand for philosophical self-examination is a primary concern of this paper.

18 See Wiredu 2002, p. 17.

19 See Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2017, p. 51. Similarly, Eze remarks that ‘[t]heories … should be able to flow from one place to another precisely because no one culture or tradition of inquiry has a monopoly on the production of knowledge’ (2001, p. 209). Compare also Wiredu’s claim that it is ‘the responsibility of contemporary African philosophers to delve beneath the communal beliefs to find their underlying reasons wherever possible’ (Wiredu 2002, p. 26).

20 Emmanuel 2019, p. 4. See also Etieyibo 2016 and Matolino 2020, p. 213. Fanon’s work, which seeks to ‘liberate the black man from the arsenal of complexes that germinated in the colonial situation’ (2008, p. 14) is, of course, seminal.

21 Wiredu 2002, p. 22.

22 Wiredu 1998; 2002, p. 56. For a detailed discussion of Wiredu’s position on decolonisation, see Futter 2023.

23 See Wiredu 2002, pp. 54 and 58. See also Wiredu 2004, p. 4.

24 According to Emmanuel, there is in Wiredu’s account ‘no privileging of African ideas simply because they are of African origin’ (op. cit., 8). I don’t believe that this is true, for reasons given in the text. Certainly, Wiredu is committed to the critical evaluation of African ideas after they have been excavated, on which see section 6 below. See also Hountondji 1995.

25 Wiredu 1996, p. 136.

26 As noted above, decolonisation is on my view committed to an account of African philosophy as ethnophilosophy. There are, of course, different of what this means (see Agada 2020) On the rehabilitation and redefinition of ethnophilosophy in response to Paulin Hountondji’s well-known criticisms, see Hallen 2010.

27 But see Eze 2001.

28 According to Plutarch, Cato held that Socrates was ‘as a mighty prattler, who attempted, as best he could, to be his country’s tyrant, by abolishing its customs, and by enticing his fellow citizens into opinions contrary to the laws’ (Life of Cato the Elder, 23).

29 Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2017, p. 51.

30 See Lear 2003.

31 Cf. Táíwò 1998, p. 4.

32 See Plato, Phaedo 65d–66a and Republic 514a–517c and wa Thiong’o 1986, p. 87.

33 Wiredu 1998, p. 20.

34 I discuss the idea of laying claim to ancestral methods later on in this section.

35 These questions, slightly reframed, are borrowed from Wiredu 1998, p. 23. Similar questions can be asked at the level of doctrines and arguments.

36 Cf. Wiredu 2002, p. 61.

37 See Wiredu 1984, p. 33.

38 For further discussion of this point, see Futter 2016a.

39 See Metz 2007 and Ramose 2007. See also Futter 2016b.

40 See Hadot 1995; 2002.

41 Hadot 1995, p. 73.

42 Cf. Hountondji 1970, p. 122.

43 I here bypass the debate between philosophical universalists and particularists. See Eze 2001 and the responses by Jones 2001 and Matolino 2015. Compare also Hountondji’s claim that ‘philosophy everywhere must carry the stamp of criticality and analyticity if it must count as philosophy (quoted in Agada 2020, p. 7).

44 Lear 1998, p. 5. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for Philosophical Papers for comments that have helped me to improve this paper. My research is supported by the National Research Foundation of South Africa.