Russia’s Declining Satellite Reconnaissance Capabilities and Its Implications for Security and International Stability

Abstract

Satellite-based intelligence has played a crucial role in national security and international stability. This article explores the persistent decline in Russia’s satellite reconnaissance capabilities since the Cold War’s end, challenging hopes for recovery and highlighting systemic issues. It delves into the impact on Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, where the absence of satellites contributes to indiscriminate shelling and higher military casualties. Furthermore, it examines the repercussions on nuclear arms control and the peaceful use of space, critical for global stability. As Russia struggles with reconnaissance gaps, its pursuit of antisatellite weapons poses a threat to the principle of space for peace. This analysis aims to deepen insights into the intelligence decline during the Russia–Ukraine conflict and its potential ramifications for international stability.

The contributions of intelligence to national security, international stability, and trust-building have been well established. There now exists a strong case for viewing intelligence as a stabilizer of an insecure international system. Intelligence reduces uncertainty, presents a realistic view of threats, and can clarify the peaceful intentions of adversaries or reveal bogus pretexts for war.¹ Among various methods employed during the Cold War to avoid a nuclear conflict, satellite-based intelligence gathering has been recognized as a significant factor. As the main adversaries were preparing for and planning a potential nuclear confrontation, this method, along with others, contributed to creating conditions for a “long peace.”² Achieving space reconnaissance has been noted to reduce the likelihood of military conflict.³ Eliminating potential political embarrassments and providing accurate and timely information on security threats are some of the positive impacts of satellite reconnaissance.⁴ Once both Cold War adversaries achieved similar satellite-based intelligence collection capabilities, the “reconnaissance revolution” became one of the leading verification instruments in arms-control treaties and conflict prevention.⁵ Yet, what happens when intelligence-gathering abilities of a state previously at the forefront of technological capabilities fall behind those of its former and current adversaries? How does such a decline affect the state’s ability to conduct military operations, and what are the implications for global and national security, and international stability?

After the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies continued developing and improving their satellite reconnaissance capabilities while budget constraints led to private sector involvement.⁶ Since then, private companies and government agencies in the United States and Europe have been able to launch multiple imaging and sensing satellites, producing extensive high-resolution coverage used in military and civilian applications and reducing the opportunities for clandestine activities. At the same time, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation’s sharp decline in reconnaissance satellite capabilities was expected to be mitigated by emerging entrepreneurial initiatives and foreign investments.⁷ By 1999, the Russian space program was operating “almost solely from inertia left over from the Soviet period, and from funding provided by foreign partners anxious to exploit the cheap, sturdy elements of that Soviet legacy.”⁸ However, expectations for the improvement of space reconnaissance capabilities during the Russian years of plenty, characterized by high energy prices, invested in modernization of its military forces, and multiple rounds of state investment in space programs, did not bear fruit. Despite its formerly leading position as the first nation to launch an Earth-orbiting satellite in 1957 and the first crewed space flight in 1961, the Russian satellite fleet remains limited, its space program plagued by delays, accidents, and failures. At the same time, the Western governments, militaries, and private companies continue their progress in satellite capabilities and numbers. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, studies overlooked the growing disparity, ranking Russia as the second most capable space power and anticipating a recovery of setbacks with economic prosperity.⁹

This article presents three arguments. First, it asserts that, contrary to anticipated recovery, the regression in Russian space reconnaissance capabilities is caused by systemic issues that are a direct outcome of its political system and, as such, is unlikely to see significant improvements in the absence of political change. While President Putin claimed that Russia “maintains its leading position in space,”¹⁰ and despite repeatedly announced budget increases, Russia’s reconnaissance satellite program is plagued by continuous failures, delays, and satellite-poor life cycles. This persistent decline and the increasing gap between the Russian Federation’s satellite-based intelligence capabilities and those of the United States and its allies stem from pervasive corruption, an aging workforce and brain drain, and low government investment in research and development—issues emblematic of the Russian political regime, exacerbated by economic sanctions since the war in Ukraine.

Second, this article contends that Russia’s declining space reconnaissance capabilities are affecting its military activities in its war in Ukraine. Among the multiple intelligence failures demonstrated by Russia, including a shortage of satellites, insufficient reconnaissance data, a deficit of high-resolution imaging, and delays in disseminating crucial information to Russian forces play a significant role. The lack of precise and timely satellite reconnaissance is a key factor in the indiscriminate shelling of civilians and targets of no military value, resulting in a rise in casualties.

Third, this article argues that the decline in Russian satellite reconnaissance capabilities is having implications for international stability, Russia’s role in future nuclear arms–control treaties, and the peaceful use of space. Russia’s hostile stance, coupled with declining space capabilities and insufficient satellites, impairs future treaty verification, raising uncertainties in nuclear arms control. Satellites historically played a crucial role in compliance verification, adding complexity to arms-control adherence. Recognizing its limited space reconnaissance capabilities, the lack of integration into its military operations, and the reliance of American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces on space-based intelligence, Russia’s efforts have been directed at offensive space capabilities.¹¹ Despite the enduring principle of “space for peace,” the United States and its allies’ reliance on space-based intelligence, coupled with Russia’s economic and technological limitations, compels Russia to prioritize the development of antisatellite weapons.

This article seeks to contribute to the scholarly debate on Soviet reconnaissance capabilities, the role of the Russian regime in space-based intelligence, and the impact of the widening intelligence capabilities gap on the Russian war in Ukraine and future implications for the stability of the international system. It does so by examining a variety of sources, among them academic literature, memoirs, declassified documents from the Cold War period, and open-source data on Russian satellites, Russian space technology, and Russia’s military and intelligence issues in its war in Ukraine.

This article begins by examining the motivations for space reconnaissance during the Cold War and its effects on global stability and arms control. Parity in satellite technology helped to create a realistic perception of threat and enabled the successful negotiation of arms-control treaties, which led to a decrease in nuclear weapons and, ultimately, constituted a stabilizing effect. Second, it traces the causes for the decline in Russian space reconnaissance capabilities to the divergent paths the former adversaries took after the end of the Cold War. While the United States continued to develop its satellite reconnaissance capabilities, enabling private companies to launch, operate, and analyze the data, post–Cold War Russia was facing severe crises after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, affecting its political system, economy, demographics, and its space technologies and industries. Third, the article identifies the repercussions of Russia’s insufficient reconnaissance satellites in its war in Ukraine, leading to civilian casualties and damages to civilian infrastructure. It also caused the Russian military to waste ammunition, already in short supply, and led to increased Russian military casualties. The conclusion explores the potential repercussions of Russia’s declining space-based intelligence capabilities on nuclear arms control and the peaceful use of space, with implications for international stability.

EYE IN THE SKY

The almost instant transformation of former allies into adversaries after World War II (WWII), combined with the development of nuclear weapons and new delivery methods, increased the need for reliable intelligence on the capabilities and readiness of adversaries. At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the West found themselves in an intelligence desert, lacking insights into Soviet capabilities and intentions.¹² While the Soviet Union maintained an extensive agent network within the United States and United Kingdom throughout and after WWII, U.S. and UK efforts to collect intelligence from within the Soviet Union after the war were far less successful. All the Central Intelligence Agency agents dropped into the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1954 were killed or captured. Although the U.S. Venona Project provided “insight into Soviet intentions and treasonous activities of government employees,”¹³ it did not alleviate the “dearth of technical intelligence collecting systems during the 1940s and 1950s,” leading the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) to miscalculate Soviet capabilities, underestimating its long-range missiles program, and overestimating its long-range air force.¹⁴

Acknowledging the impossibility of reliable human intelligence networks in the Soviet Union, regular U.S. military reconnaissance overflights over Soviet territory began as early as 1946, becoming more regular during the Korean War.¹⁵ The need for intelligence was so great that presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, together with British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, authorized the overflights despite potential risks to crews and the possibility of an international scandal. Initial overflights were conducted from bases in Alaska, Europe, Korea, and Japan, skirting Soviet territory with the excuse of navigational equipment failure at the ready, later advancing to “deep penetration” missions.¹⁶ Improvements in Soviet air defenses in 1954 drove the development of U-2 planes, capable of flying at altitudes of 70,000 feet, beyond the Soviet strategic air defense capabilities and fighter jets, with multiple successful missions flown.¹⁷ The lack of intelligence and the resultant underestimates and overestimates had serious implications for global security. Underestimating Soviet rocket development capabilities, the United States began its work on intercontinental ballistic missile development in 1954, trailing behind the Soviet efforts that started in 1947 under Stalin’s personal attention.¹⁸ At the same time, and for the same reason, the United States overestimated the strength of the Soviet Long-Range Air Force, expecting it to exceed that of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, prompting calls by its head, General Curtis LeMay, to launch preemptive nuclear strikes on the Soviet Union.¹⁹ Intelligence obtained from the U-2 missions beginning in 1956 dispelled the fears of the existing “bomber gap” and “missile gap,” removing the preemptive strikes option and thus avoiding a possible nuclear confrontation.²⁰ After the international embarrassment following the Soviet downing of the U-2 spy plane in 1960 by an S-75 surface-to-air missile, President Eisenhower promised (and kept his promise) to stop overflights of Soviet territory.²¹

The Soviet launch of an Earth-orbiting satellite and the first crewed space mission confirmed the existence of significant gaps in U.S. intelligence on Soviet rocket and missile development and, at the same time, catalyzed the U.S. reconnaissance satellite program. So little was known about the launch that “the satellite passed over the US twice before the Moscow bureau of [the] New York Times broke the news in the US.”²² This gap spurred intense activity, and three years and $1.3 billion later, the U.S. satellite program was operational, revolutionizing intelligence collection. In 1960, several months after the cessation of U-2 reconnaissance flights, the first U.S. satellites in orbit were able to deliver, via film drops, images of better quality than the U-2 without any threats from the Soviet side.²³ As the initial U.S. satellite program was declared to be a civilian space exploration program,²⁴ the concept of “space for peace”²⁵ was promoted by the United States and adopted worldwide, resulting in the U.S.–Soviet stable relationship “in their military exploitation of space” and enabling the acceptance of photographic and electronic reconnaissance satellites as “benign and stabilizing.”²⁶ After the U.S. declaration of the primacy of the use of space for informational purposes, the Soviet side declared optical reconnaissance satellites as an urgent defense task in 1959.²⁷ Once the Soviet Union achieved the same satellite reconnaissance capabilities in 1963, the reconnaissance revolution was complete.²⁸

The new reconnaissance ability lessened the fears of a surprise attack as nuclear launch systems were now under surveillance, reducing the incentives for a first strike and thus decreasing the instability.²⁹ Newly available information significantly improved intelligence assessments on both sides, among them the U.S. intelligence estimates of the Soviet capabilities and levels of preparedness.³⁰ On the Soviet side, despite complaints about the film quality, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) officers could obtain previously unavailable information on American forces.³¹ As the Soviets never attempted to conduct overflights, Soviet reconnaissance satellites were the first able to obtain photographs of the entire American territory.³² Although both states’ satellite intelligence capabilities roughly matched, the Soviet program consistently trailed the United States in reliability and data access, among other things.

Technical improvements continued in the next generations of reconnaissance satellites on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The United States began using recoverable capsules in the 1960s in the KH-9 series, followed by electronic image transmissions of the KH-11 series. In contrast, the Soviet satellites had to be returned from orbit to recover the films, with an average orbit time of three weeks.³³ The Soviets added recoverable capsules during the late 1970s, and work on electronic transmissions, intercepted by Soviet military bases in Cuba and elsewhere,³⁴ began in the 1980s.³⁵ From its former position of primacy, the Soviet space program, despite (or due to) the Soviet centrally planned economy and the importance afforded by the leaders to maintaining parity with the chief adversary, was struggling to keep abreast of the rapid evolution of American scientific and industrial prowess. Luckily, Soviet intelligence’s clandestine program of technology transfers was able to assist.

American efforts to prevent the Soviet Union from accessing its advanced technologies by imposing multilateral export controls through the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls³⁶ were not able to stop the Soviet industrial espionage program, run on an industrial scale, and coordinated at the highest level of administration by the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK).³⁷ Soviet intelligence was able to “obtain technical and scientific knowledge from the West,”³⁸ leading to savings of billions of dollars in research and development, reduction of procurement times, productivity enhancements, and risk reduction.³⁹ In addition to industrial espionage, the Soviets were able to create a large pool of engineering and science graduates, producing military hardware that “emphasizes proven technology and favors rugged, relatively simple equipment,” partially due to “deficiencies in manufacturing techniques.”⁴⁰ Thus, in parallel with the Soviet aircraft development, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet space program was similarly a combination of German technologies developed during WWII, ingenious development, and industrial espionage.⁴¹ Although relying on technically inferior capabilities, the resulting intelligence product could achieve the same outcomes as U.S. intelligence, opening new opportunities for U.S.–Soviet cooperation on arms control and serving as a deconflicting and stabilizing factor during the Cold War.

As reconnaissance satellites provided the adversaries with previously unavailable information, space intelligence became one of the essential means of decisionmaking, accounting for “over 90% of US intelligence on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.”⁴² Even before the arms-control treaties of the 1970s and 1980s, the information provided by the U.S. space reconnaissance prevented the unnecessary increase in Minuteman systems. In addition to the information it provided, space intelligence removed the messiness involved in human intelligence and the potential for political embarrassment as the U-2 program did.⁴³ Indeed, the extensive use of spy satellites was criticized as the “antiseptic approach” and replicated on the other side of the Iron Curtain.⁴⁴ Despite those criticisms, leaders on both sides recognized space reconnaissance as critical for national (and thus global) security, providing “timely (in some cases, close to near-real-time) raw intelligence”⁴⁵ unavailable from other sources, reducing the fears of sudden unanticipated attacks, and paving the way for arms-control negotiations. The chances of armed confrontation dropped significantly after both sides possessed comparable reconnaissance satellites and data.⁴⁶

Successful arms-control negotiations demanded strategic parity of participants. Soviet perceptions of vulnerability to American technological and military superiority were alleviated in the 1950s, once the Soviet Union achieved a “minimum deterrent capable of dissuading any rational opponent from attack.”⁴⁷ Although both the Soviet Union and the United States acknowledged the “futility of nuclear war as an instrument of policy” in 1955, effective arms-control negotiations and reliable verification required parity in U.S.–Soviet weapons capabilities, intelligence, and the means of acquiring that were achieved in the mid-1960s.⁴⁸ This parity paved the way for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and SALT II treaties, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the new START, set to expire in 2026.⁴⁹ The reconnaissance revolution on both sides of the Iron Curtain was instrumental in deconfliction and realistic assessments, enabling both parties to reduce the threat of a potential nuclear conflict by reliably providing intelligence at a risk level, detail, and speed previously unavailable. Despite these advancements, tensions between adversaries persisted, as illustrated by the KGB’s Operation RYaN, which aimed to predict a surprise nuclear strike by monitoring NATO and the U.S. activities.⁵⁰ However, the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the long-established parity of former foes, putting their satellite reconnaissance capabilities on different trajectories.

AFTER THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 presented each of the former adversaries with a set of new challenges, although of incomparable magnitudes. While the United States found itself as a de-facto winner, the predictions for the new world order ran from facing a clash of civilizations,⁵¹ to enduring a long and painful socioeconomic transformation,⁵² to confronting a diffusion of threats.⁵³ The vast array of resources, once dedicated to potential conflict with the USSR, could now be redirected to other objectives. Yet, while the United States was contemplating new directions, prospects, and potential dangers in a new era, its political system intact and its economy going strong, Russia found itself a shadow of its former Soviet self, its republics gone, its borders redrawn, its economy in upheaval, in an unfamiliar political system and a demographic catastrophe.⁵⁴ This section shows that, although Russia was the sole heir of Soviet nuclear and space technologies and assets, the gaps in space reconnaissance capabilities, originating in the Soviet past and the disruptions of the years of upheaval, persist today and stem from the political and economic system that is a part of President Putin’s regime. Absent regime change, any expectations of recovery of Russian capabilities are misguided.

U.S. SATELLITE PROGRAMS: PRIVATE SECTOR WELCOME

The end of the Cold War and the substantial decrease in the nuclear threat for the United States called for a reevaluation of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program alongside the new priorities for its foreign policy and its IC.⁵⁵ The reliance on satellite imagery for the U.S. military and civilian needs led to the entry of private enterprises into the satellite launch and operations market. A “diffuse array of fresh dangers” replaced the Soviet threat and the IC argued that, rather than budget cuts, the new developments warranted an increase in budgets required to track rogue nations attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction, alleviate humanitarian crises, and support American troops in their remote missions.⁵⁶

The transition of national security policy from one of “containment” to “the enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies” required advanced intelligence.⁵⁷ The four new dangers of “regional conflicts; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; economic threats to democratic capitalist nations; and the possible failure of democratic reform in the former Soviet bloc” required ongoing funding for the space reconnaissance program.⁵⁸ The increased openness allowed the IC to collaborate with law enforcement to combat international crime and authorized international sales of satellite imagery.⁵⁹ Thus, despite the high costs of space-based intelligence, the newly found demands and collaborations kept the satellites in orbit.⁶⁰

American military campaigns in the years that followed have justified this view. The 1991 Gulf War presented an example of how a “formidable army of half a million troops” was decimated by a limited force using space satellites for reconnaissance, targeting, and navigation, a pattern that was repeated in 1999 in the former Yugoslavia.⁶¹ At the same time, the use of space and satellite technology as a force multiplier for future conflicts exposed their limitations and advocated for continued development of capabilities and the necessary cooperation with commercial satellite providers.⁶²

The transfer of former military-intelligence technologies into the public and private sectors has been encouraged by the end of the Cold War, national budget limitations, and anticipation of economic advantages.⁶³ Allowing the entry of private enterprise, the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 enabled private companies to operate remote-sensing satellites, opening up the market to satellite and sensing equipment design and geographic information system software and generating demand for data.⁶⁴ After the first commercial license approval in 1993, additional companies, including those formerly producing satellites for the U.S. government, joined the market.

By 2013, the space-based remote sensing data market had grown to an estimated $1.5 billion, shifting satellite imagery from intelligence and military secrets to commercial and open access.⁶⁵ Remote-sensing data spurred a cycle of innovation, driving advancements in satellites and sensing capabilities, cost reductions, and the development of supporting products like analytical software.⁶⁶ The commercialization of satellite sensing data, driven by the need to cut costs, birthed new satellite types, including constellations, microsatellites, and nanosatellites. Orbiting Earth, they cater to diverse purposes, such as civilian and military communications, remote sensing, and imaging.⁶⁷ With the growth in commercial satellite imagery, the U.S. government employs a variety of measures: from urging operators to restrict data collection and distribution⁶⁸ to purchasing exclusive rights to commercial satellite imagery to prevent adversaries adversary awareness of U.S. military focus⁶⁹ to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency purchasing satellite imagery to augment the needs of the U.S. government.⁷⁰ Yet the changes the United States had to undergo after the end of the Cold War pale compared to what happened in Russia at the same time.

RUSSIA: THE YEARS OF TURBULENCE

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the ensuing crises, the Russian Federation, a successor to the Soviet assets, was forced to curtail its spending on multiple projects, including its space and satellite programs.⁷¹ As a result of political and economic reforms, the industrial capacity of the Russian military-industrial complex fell by 90%, alongside a sharp decline in funding for science, education, and healthcare, leading to a reduction in economic activities, pervasive corruption, and widespread crime.

By 1999, Russia, inheriting 70% of Soviet military assets, downsized its forces by over 50%, halting exercises in all branches. After the 1998 default and inflation, military personnel often faced delayed salaries, falling below the poverty line.⁷² In addition to sharp cuts in military spending, according to some estimates, the state financing for science and technology dropped fourfold. In space technologies, the research and development investment in 1999 dropped 60-fold compared to 1991, while purchasing mass-produced components during the same period dropped 30-fold.⁷³ The 1990s economic transformation in Russia saw a surge in crime, corruption, and decreased state funding for key sectors. Siloviki, desperate for resources, turned to private enterprises, while scientists and engineers migrated or left research and manufacturing for business.

As each branch of the military was left to fend for itself, some fared better than others. In 1992, the GRU’s Space Intelligence Center, responsible for Soviet and Russian reconnaissance satellite data, received authorization to sell satellite imagery internationally to support declining space infrastructure. Despite lagging behind the United States, Russia’s satellite reconnaissance appealed to nations without their capabilities. Corruption persisted, as evidenced by the later indictment of three GRU officers for selling imagery to Mossad agents.⁷⁴ Strategic Rocket Forces, in charge of the space program, desperately sought additional financing sources to maintain the Ministry of Defense’s space facilities and infrastructure.⁷⁵

In the 1990s, as other nations were joining the space intelligence club, the Russians were forced to rent their launch vehicles to former adversaries, launching American satellites alongside their own.⁷⁶ Other funding sources were international collaboration projects with the European Space Agency and American companies.⁷⁷ In 1996, when the last surviving Russian reconnaissance satellite, Kosmos-2320, burned over the Pacific Ocean, the Russian means of arms-control verification were halted, causing significant concern within military and intelligence communities.⁷⁸ Despite launching a new satellite series in 1997, Russia faced challenges, relying on occasional launches of film-return satellites with short lifespans until 2008. The Persona, a new generation of Russian reconnaissance satellites,⁷⁹ encountered technical issues, signaling a decline in Russia’s technical capabilities and the loss of its hard-earned parity.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Russia–West relations were at their most friendly since WWII. The Russian Federation received assistance from the United States, the European Union (EU), and international institutions in various tasks, including securing its nuclear weapons and establishing an international science center to support Russian scientists.⁸⁰ For a brief period, former adversaries no longer considered each other a threat, leading to Russian collaboration with NATO and participation in the peacekeeping forces in former Yugoslavia.⁸¹ The prospects for Russia seemed bright, with improved living standards and significant Gross Domestic Product growth.⁸²

RUSSIA: THE YEARS OF PLENTY

Although in the early 2000s Russia experienced a political and economic recovery, those did not translate into durable reforms that could create a lasting prosperity climate for its citizens and institutions. Instead, the country continued to be plagued by corruption, insecurity of private property, and lawlessness.⁸³ Alongside Russia’s economic growth and expectations for the significant impact on the global economy, structural problems persisted.⁸⁴

Despite foreign investments in Russia, continued collaboration in multiple areas, including the International Space Station (ISS), and Russia’s access to imports of necessary components for high technologies, its satellites continued to suffer from failures, shorter-than-expected lifespans, and delays.⁸⁵ Extensive military spending, amounting to trillions of rubles, failed to modernize its defense industry or lessen Russia’s dependence on imports.⁸⁶ The Russian space agency was reorganized in 2004 and received government funding totaling more than 12.5 billion euros for its ten-year space program, aiming to expand its fleet to 70 satellites by 2015.⁸⁷ However, the structural problems within the Russian space industry reflected those afflicting its science, industry, and society.

The mass exodus of Russian scientists and engineers of the 1990s did not reverse in the 2000s, and the resulting void never filled.⁸⁸ The accompanying drop in scientific publications (less than half its previous levels) and quote factors (currently Russia holds 120th place out of 145) led to a fifteen-fold drop in Russia’s contribution to world science, while its contribution to the global high-tech market was limited to 0.5%. The Russian military-industrial complex (VPK), once the best-financed branch of Soviet industry, continued relying on outdated infrastructure and machinery, primarily focusing on foreign orders, producing mostly Soviet-designed armaments while paying 40% lower salaries than comparable industries to its aging workforce.⁸⁹ Ranked 136 out of 175 in Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index and engaging in a “military-industrial-political-criminal” complex laundering money and transferring weapons, the Russian economy operates in a “robber capitalism” fashion, where criminal activity, pervasive corruption, raiding, and lawlessness are plaguing state and private enterprises, and discouraging long-term investments required by the space sector.⁹⁰

The increased funding of space technologies by the Russian government increased opportunities for corruption, as is demonstrated by numerous investigations of ROSKOSMOS and its subcontractors, providers, and partners.⁹¹ In 2018, corruption in the Russian space and defense industry, according to the Russian investigative committee, surpassed 1 billion dollars, with over 172 million dollars stolen from just one spaceport in the Russian Far East, resulting in over 160 indictments.⁹² While the Russian reconnaissance satellite fleet was struggling amid delays, accidents, lawsuits, and launch issues, Russia’s outlook toward the West was turning increasingly confrontational.

The Crimea annexation in 2014 and the military conflict initiated by Russia in Eastern Ukraine caused a further deterioration of relations with the West, with economic sanctions imposed on individuals, energy companies, and several banks, complicating imports of electronic components, including hardened electronics suitable for operating in space for the new reconnaissance satellite models in development.⁹³ Since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine things have gotten progressively worse, with multiple rounds of sanctions imposed by the United States, the EU, and other states,⁹⁴ affecting multiple sectors,⁹⁵ and expected to deny “Russian economy and military end users critical technologies.”⁹⁶ Import substitution, one of the economic goals of the Russian government since the 2014 Crimea annexation and the first tranche of sanctions, proved impossible, despite the goals of “technological sovereignty facilitated by diversifying imports and increasing the share” of imports from friendly states, coupled with parallel imports.⁹⁷ As just 12% of Russia’s radio electronics components are produced domestically, and imports constrained, Russian military industries are turning to unorthodox sources, such as components from consumer electronics, to plug the critical gap.⁹⁸

In a revival of its Cold War predecessors' goals, the Russia’s Foreign Intelligence (SVR) got its new marching orders from President Putin to supply the necessary goods and products for Russia.⁹⁹ However, although the Soviet Union had plenty of experience in export control evasion during the Cold War, developing the needed networks of suppliers is not instantaneous and carries additional costs. Russian manufacturers reported that the rate of faulty electronics components has risen from 2% to 40% since the imposition of sanctions and the transition to multistep purchases using intermediaries and alternate suppliers.¹⁰⁰ Despite President Putin’s claims to the contrary, Western sanctions did impact the Russian economy,¹⁰¹ worsening the business climate for the remaining Russian companies,¹⁰² and causing mass migration from Russia.

The brain drain that started after the February 2022 invasion has accelerated after partial mobilization was announced.¹⁰³ Following the exodus of independent journalists, activists, and political figures that began during the prewar crackdown on democracy, another approximately million, mostly young and educated people, left Russia to various destinations in the period between the beginning of the war and the start of mobilization.¹⁰⁴ The conflicting instructions on mobilization protections for essential workers, coupled with the chaotic and corrupt recruiting offices, resulted in additional losses for the qualified workforce.¹⁰⁵ The Ministry of Defense rejected attempts to prevent the mobilization of highly educated and qualified personnel.¹⁰⁶ The tight labor market expected in 2023¹⁰⁷ will affect defense and space industries.

The war in Ukraine and the shortages it created forced the government to put the design and development of new weapons on hold,¹⁰⁸ and to cut over 20% of applied science financing.¹⁰⁹ Struggling to produce and launch sufficient quantities of its own satellites, the Russian space agency was reported to use the Iranian reconnaissance satellite it had contracted to launch to observe Ukraine before transferring the remote controls to Iran.¹¹⁰ The prospects of recovery of the Russian space industry are dim. Among the latest in the series of misfortunes befalling the Russian space program are the coolant leak on the Russian Soyuz spacecraft docked at the ISS, followed several days later by the descent from orbit and burning of Russian military satellite Kosmos-2560, less than two months after its launch.¹¹¹ The impacts of Russia’s space reconnaissance gaps are already visible in its military operations and will become more pronounced in their potential consequences on global stability.

FLYING BLIND

Diminished Russian space reconnaissance capabilities in Ukraine have made it more difficult for the Russian military to accomplish its objectives. Lack of satellite intelligence justified and enabled civilian collateral damage and was one reason for the high casualty rates among Russian forces. Although the reports of the Russian military campaign in Syria boasted of improved space reconnaissance capabilities, claiming integration of satellite imagery into the air, missile, and artillery strike capabilities, while admitting to the need to increase its satellite fleet, the reality on the ground in Ukraine was quite different.¹¹² As Russian forces in Syria did not encounter adversaries with antiaircraft capabilities, and did not critically depend on the successful production, analysis, and dissemination of satellite reconnaissance products to customers, reliance on air reconnaissance and indifference to civilian casualties simplified matters.¹¹³ Hence, the effects of the ongoing lack of space-based intelligence were likely unanticipated.

As Russia failed to secure the airspace in Ukraine and faced a regular army aided by the United States and NATO, the challenges Russian forces faced in Ukraine proved to be of a different magnitude. The lack of satellite assets and their resultant intelligence was visible on multiple levels—from the troops using a Soviet road atlas for navigation to the successful use of deception by Ukrainian forces, “drawing strikes on dummy air defense” to the Russian attacks on Ukrainian airfields avoiding targeting reconstructed hangars.¹¹⁴ The deficiency of adequate satellite intelligence prevented Russian forces from detecting “on time a significant volume of strategic railway movements by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), which, in March 2022, amounted to three-four echelons per day.”¹¹⁵ Other weapons and troops’ movements using road transportation remain similarly hidden from Russian satellites with an optical resolution from the 1980s.¹¹⁶ Russian space reconnaissance was similarly inadequate for existing stationary targets, resulting in indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets.

As Russia is struggling to integrate its space assets in its military operations, demonstrating poor accuracy of its precision-guided munitions relying on its Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema navigation satellites, and suffering delays, Ukraine receives and incorporates “high resolution imagery from Western commercial firms, including synthetic-aperture radar that can ‘see’ at night and through clouds,” and is able to effectively incorporate satellite data in its networked artillery system.¹¹⁷ Ukrainian access to imagery of commercial satellite constellations capable of revisiting targets within hours is contrasted by the revisit rate of three to fifteen days of Russian satellites.¹¹⁸ Additionally, Ukraine is purchasing and crowdfunding satellite imagery from private companies that have been instrumental in finding Russian military assets.¹¹⁹

Despite Russian Ministry of Defense claims of “high-precision strikes on valuable military assets”¹²⁰ when hitting Ukrainian civilian targets, high civilian casualties of the attacks can be explained by the use of old Soviet-era maps of the Ukrainian strategic and military targets and the lack of current space-based intelligence for target selection.¹²¹ Even when satellite reconnaissance images were available, their poor quality makes confirming target coordinates impossible.¹²² The indiscriminate shelling of Ukrainian civilian targets, causing significant collateral damage, draws complaints from some of the Russian officers while exhausting the limited supply of Russian missiles, leading to periodic lulls in missile strikes.¹²³ The shortage of modern cruise missiles is demonstrated by the Russian military’s use of aging nuclear cruise missiles without the nuclear warhead, and attempting to purchase missiles and munitions in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.¹²⁴ Additionally, targeting of stationary civilian buildings, infrastructure, and the population does nothing to suppress the capabilities of the Ukrainian military and its Western-supplied weapons, which continue to cause severe damage to Russian military logistics and infrastructure and tens of thousands of military casualties.¹²⁵

Despite efforts to implement network-centric approaches over the years, the Russian military organization and its strategic culture maintain a strictly hierarchical structure, hampering the progress of modernization. Factors such as lack of working equipment, lack of training, and a military culture that discourages authority delegation and individual initiative, demonstrated in abundance in Ukraine, preclude any potential benefits from timely integration of satellite reconnaissance imagery within its military units on the ground.¹²⁶ While the short-term impacts of space intelligence gaps are clearly observable, the long-term impacts, although less certain, are no less concerning.

ROCKING THE BOAT

For the international community, international stability is characterized by the majority of its members surviving, and the absence of large-scale wars, while for individual nations, it involves the ability to maintain their existence as independent political entities within their territorial boundaries.¹²⁷ Since the beginning of the nuclear age, strategic stability—defined as the “probability of strategic nuclear exchange” between two nuclear superpowers—has been a crucial aspect of international stability, with nuclear arms–control treaties limiting the numbers and types of nuclear weapons and serving as mechanisms designed to avoid such a “low-probability, high-impact event.”¹²⁸ The peaceful use of space is another critical factor in maintaining international stability, as noted by multiple experts.¹²⁹ As both the United States and Russia depend on “vulnerable space assets for warning” of nuclear attacks, an attack on such an asset can be considered an escalatory step in a conflict.¹³⁰ Consequently, Russian decline in satellite reconnaissance capabilities and its continued development of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons is affecting both the strategic stability and the peaceful use of space, serving to undermine international stability.

Nuclear arms–control treaties have been present since the 1970s and have effectively reduced the types and numbers of nuclear missiles threatening the world. However, the only nuclear arms–control treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation currently in force, the New START treaty, has exhausted all extension options and is set to expire in 2026.¹³¹ Despite earlier agreements to negotiate the renewal of the inspections stipulated in the treaty that were paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic, barely two weeks later, Russia unilaterally postponed the meeting, citing the deterioration in U.S.–Russia relations due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.¹³² As Russia has “brandished his country’s nuclear sword in an attempt to compel Ukraine to capitulate,” the threat of nuclear confrontation is at its highest level since the Cold War.¹³³ However, if and when negotiations occur, the question of acceptable verification mechanisms will have to be resolved. Given its paucity of existing reconnaissance satellites and its difficulties in producing and launching additional ones, Russia’s options for verification control resemble those available at the beginning of the Cold War.¹³⁴ Even the agreement Russia proposed before it invaded Ukraine, with its unacceptable demands for NATO to abstain from deploying forces or weapons in certain countries, would similarly require a satellite reconnaissance-based verification mechanism.¹³⁵ In the current atmosphere of distrust and belligerence expressed by President Putin and Russian officials, a lack of a reliable verification mechanism can impede future arms-control negotiations.¹³⁶

Although the principle of “space for peace” has been accepted since the Cold War, as the disparity between Russian and Western satellite reconnaissance capabilities widens, Russia’s interest in adherence decreases due to the asymmetry between the Western and Russian militaries in their use of space for intelligence and as a force multiplier. Since the 1991 operation “Desert Storm,” Russian military analysts have noted an increased U.S. reliance on satellite reconnaissance as a necessary part of its military campaigns.¹³⁷ According to Russian estimates, the contribution of the “US space forces to increasing the effectiveness of military operations (in armed conflicts and local wars in Iraq, Bosnia and Yugoslavia) is: in intelligence—60%; communications—65%; navigation—40%, and in the future it is estimated to range from 70% to 90%.”¹³⁸ While there was optimism that modernizing the military and investing in space programs would bring Russia closer to achieving similar results,¹³⁹ the lack of success in Ukraine despite significant investments suggests that no amount of resources may be sufficient to bridge the gap. Therefore, the critical dependency on space as a necessary component of the U.S. military strategy and use of force, coupled with a lack of similar reliance on the Russian side, presents an opportunity that the Russian military can exploit by neutralizing the advantages of U.S. and NATO space assets.¹⁴⁰

Russian ASAT efforts follow the Cold War–era Soviet tests of quick-reaction antisatellite intercepts.¹⁴¹ The Soviet Union used its ASAT program to produce concessions during SALT II negotiations with the United States.¹⁴² Since the Cold War, various means of ASAT have been tested by Russia, including electromagnetic pulse (EMP)–based weapons and air-launched vehicles.¹⁴³ Recent developments of Russian kinetic ASAT capabilities include ground-launched missiles, ground ballistic missile defense systems, S-400 and S-500 surface-to-air and missile defense systems for low-earth orbit, and potentially, inspection satellites that Russia has been launching since 2013.¹⁴⁴ Among the nonkinetic ASAT systems that could covertly disrupt satellites during peacetime and are potentially available to Russia are laser technology to blind satellites and radio-electronic warfare systems to jam communication and navigation satellite signals. The latter has been demonstrated multiple times by Russia in various regions, such as Norway and the Black Sea.¹⁴⁵ Russia’s considerable cyber capabilities enable successful cyberattacks on satellites.¹⁴⁶ A Russian cyberattack on commercial satellite provider Viasat at the beginning of its invasion of Ukraine, damaging ground-based satellite providers’ interfaces, proves the capability.¹⁴⁷ Multiple Russian ASAT tests have been conducted, striking Russian satellites in orbit, some generating over 1,500 pieces of orbital debris that presented immediate threats to other space assets and required astronauts at the ISS to seek shelter.¹⁴⁸ The United States views those tests as attempts to deny space access and undermine strategic stability, while Russia claims the tests are designed to restore the stability that has been upset by the capabilities of non-nuclear high-precision weapons of the United States and its allies and to counter their technological superiority.¹⁴⁹

Given the high dependency of U.S. and NATO forces on space assets, and the lack of such dependency of the Russian military, Russian ASAT development efforts present a sinister prospect and are likely to continue despite the ongoing structural problems of the Russian space sector. Although the Russian deputy foreign minister stated that “Moscow remains committed to not being the first to place weapons in space,” trust in Russian official statements has been at its lowest point since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.¹⁵⁰

The absence of nuclear arms–control treaties and the ongoing development of space weapons represent a throwback to the unstable periods of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union, a more formidable adversary than contemporary Russia, and the United States and its allies were teetering on the brink of armed confrontation. As Russia’s space capabilities remain limited, impeding its ability to observe its adversaries and produce reliable intelligence, its attitude will likely remain hostile.

CONCLUSION

The Cold War reconnaissance revolution, prompted by the nuclear scare and the shared challenge of obtaining reliable intelligence, which both the United States and the Soviet Union struggled with through alternative means, became pivotal once both Cold War adversaries achieved rough parity in their satellite intelligence capabilities. This revolution was widely acknowledged as critical to maintaining global stability, averting nuclear confrontation, and delivering realistic and timely intelligence. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the political, economic, and demographic crises experienced by the Russian Federation severely affected its space program. While the United States has created opportunities for commercial satellite imagery providers and continued to integrate its space reconnaissance in its military operations, Russia, hindered by a military and strategic culture less amenable to similar integration, was forced to rely on Soviet-era technologies, commercializing its launch vehicles and spaceports for its former adversaries’ use.

The continuing progress of space reconnaissance in the West of government, military, and commercial entities was not replicated in Russia. The structural issues of the Russian Federation, with its endemic corruption, the lawlessness that discourages private companies from long-term, capital-intensive investments, the brain drain, and the decrease in funding of scientific research, are an integral part of Putin’s autocratic regime, further exacerbated by the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation since the start of its invasion of Ukraine. Persistent delays, failures, and redesigns in the Russian space reconnaissance program render its ability to provide reliable intelligence uncertain. The Russian military, not heavily dependent on such intelligence, is unlikely to close the ongoing reconnaissance gap, disappointing those expecting improvement since the Soviet Union’s disintegration.

Russia’s lack of reconnaissance satellites has been impacting its invasion of Ukraine, reducing its shelling of Ukrainian civilian and military positions to a style reminiscent of WWII, with trench warfare from WWI. The reliance on Soviet-era road atlases for navigation highlights the deficiencies in Russia’s space program, contradicting claims of successful satellite reconnaissance integration in past campaigns. The absence of actionable and timely space-based intelligence has led to civilian casualties, increased Russian military losses, and an inability to impede the influx of Western weapons into Ukraine.

In addition to impacting its military operations, Russia’s reduced capability in space-based intelligence is adversely influencing international stability in two ways. The first is strategic stability and the reduction of nuclear weapons. The need to negotiate arms-control treaties to replace the one about to expire looms larger than ever since the Cold War due to Russia’s belligerent stance and nuclear arms rattling. However, in the absence of a reliable verification mechanism and lack of trust, the prospects of successful negotiations are dimming. The second potential impact is the risk to the continued peaceful use of space. In contrast to the Russian military, the United States and NATO have integrated space reconnaissance into their combat operations and have created a dependency on its availability. This critical dependency, recognized by Russian military analysts and strategists, provides an additional incentive for Russian investment and the continued development of ASAT weapons, further jeopardizing the “space for peace” principle.

The decline in Russia’s technological capabilities and space-based intelligence results from systemic issues, with enduring implications for its ability to address security threats, nuclear arms control, and international stability.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Elena Grossfeld

Elena Grossfeld is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London (KCL), and a member of King’s Centre for the Study of Intelligence. Her research interests are the strategic culture of Russian/Soviet intelligence, Cold War, and information warfare. Prior to her academic career, she worked as a software engineer and architect, specializing in reliability and performance of systems powering the Internet and e-commerce, before transitioning into cybersecurity, focusing on insider threat, cyber threat intelligence, and cryptocurrencies-related fraud investigations. Elena holds an M.A. in Intelligence and International Security from KCL, an M.A. in Linguistics from San Jose State University, and a B.S. in Mathematics with a minor in Russian Studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The author can be contacted at [email protected].

Notes

1 Joshua Rovner, “Spies as Agents of Peace,” Engelsberg Ideas (blog), 19 August 2022, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/spies-as-agents-of-peace/

2 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1986), p. 123.

3 Bryan R. Early and Erik Gartzke, “Spying from Space: Reconnaissance Satellites and Interstate Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 65, No. 9 (2021), pp. 1551–1575.

4 Aaron Bateman, “Technological Wonder and Strategic Vulnerability: Satellite Reconnaissance and American National Security during the Cold War,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2020), pp. 331–333.

5 Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1998), p. 328; Paul Stares, “U.S. and Soviet Military Space Programs: A Comparative Assessment,” Daedalus, Vol. 114, No. 2 (1985), p. 128.

6 Nina Witjes and Philipp Olbrich, “A Fragile Transparency: Satellite Imagery Analysis, Non-State Actors, and Visual Representations of Security,” Science and Public Policy, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2017), p. 532.

7 Judyth L. Twigg, “The Russian Space Programme: What Lies Ahead?,” Space Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1994), pp. 19–31.

8 Judyth L. Twigg, “Russia’s Space Program: Continued Turmoil,” Space Policy, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1999), p. 69.

9 James Clay Moltz, “Russia and China: Strategic Choices in Space,” in Space and Defense Policy, edited by Damon Coletta and Frances T. Pilch (London: Routledge, 2009); Pavel Podvig, “04 Russian Space Systems and the Risk of Weaponizing Space,” Chatham House, 23 September 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/advanced-military-technology-russia/04-russian-space-systems-and-risk-weaponizing-space

10 “Putin Zaiavil o Sohranenii Rossiei liderstva v Kosmicheskoi Sfere” [Putin Announced the Preservation of Russian Leadership in Space], RT, 12 April 2022, https://russian.rt.com/science/news/989396-putin-kosmos-liderstvo

11 Matthew Mowthorpe, “The Russian Space Threat and a Defense against It with Guardian Satellites,” The Space Review, 13 June 2022, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4401/1

12 Gordon Corera, M16: Life and Death in the British Secret Service (London: Orion Publishing Group Limited, 2012), pp. 10, 22.

13 National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Venona Documents,” National Security Agency, https://www.nsa.gov/Helpful-Links/NSA-FOIA/Declassification-Transparency-Initiatives/Historical-Releases/Venona/

14 Jon Schmid, “Intelligence Innovation: Sputnik, the Soviet Threat, and Innovation in the US Intelligence Community,” in Technology and the Intelligence Community, edited by Margaret E. Kosal (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2018), p. 44.

15 Andrew S. Bowen, “Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 24 November 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46616/5

16 Schmid, “Intelligence Innovation,” p. 43.

17 R. Cargill Hall, “Denied Territory: Eisenhower’s Policy of Peacetime Aerial Overflight,” Air Power History, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2009), p. 9.

18 Schmid, “Intelligence Innovation.”

19 Trevor D. Albertson, “Ready for the Worst: Preemption, Prevention and American Nuclear Policy,” Air Power History, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2015), p. 32.

20 Andrew, “Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War,” p. 327.

21 Ibid.

22 Schmid, “Intelligence Innovation,” p. 46.

23 Ibid., p. 49.

24 Supraja Sudharsan, “Organizational Process, Leadership, and Technology for Intelligence Gathering: Development of Photo-Reconnaissance Satellites in the United States,” in Technology and the Intelligence Community: Challenges and Advances for the 21st Century, edited by Margaret E. Kosal (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2018), p. 59.

25 Dale Armstrong, “American National Security and the Death of Space Sanctuary,” Astropolitics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2014), p. 70.

26 Paul Stares, “U.S. and Soviet Military Space Programs,” p. 128.

27 Boris Chertok, Raketi i Liudi: Goriachii Dni Kholodnoi Voini [Rockets and People: Hot Days of the Cold War] (Moscow: RTSoft, 2007), pp. 60–61.

28 Raimo Väyrynen, “Military Uses of Satellite Communication,” Instant Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1973), p. 45; Gaddis, “The Long Peace,” p. 123.

29 Bryan R. Early and Erik Gartzke, “Spying from Space,” p. 1558.

30 Schmid, “Intelligence Innovation,” p. 48.

31 Chertok, Raketi i Liudi, p. 33.

32 Ibid., p. 76.

33 As compared to 35 weeks for KH-9 and 100 weeks for KH-11, see Paul Stares, “U.S. and Soviet Military Space Programs,” p. 136.

34 Alexander Karasev, “Vidy voyennogo prisutstviya SSSR v period kholodnoy voyny” [Types of Military Presence of the USSR during the Cold War], Politika I Obschestvo [Politics and Society], No. 1, 2020, pp. 1–9.

35 Stares, “U.S. and Soviet Military Space Programs,” p. 136.

36 Cecil (I) Hunt, “Multilateral Cooperation in Export Controls—The Role of Cocom,” University of Toledo Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1983), pp. 1285–1298.

37 Philip Hanson, “Soviet Industrial Espionage,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1987), p. 27.

38 Gus W. Weiss, “The Farewell Dossier,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 39, No. 5 (1996), p. 121.

39 Robert Cheesman, “Methodologies Used by Warsaw Pact Countries (Except U.S.S.R.) in Obtaining U.S. Technologies,” Air Command and Staff College, April 1987, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA180570, p. 8.

40 Tony Ingesson, “Innovators, Copycats, or Pragmatists? Soviet Industrial Espionage and Innovation in the Military Aerospace Sector during the Cold War,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2022), p. 4.

41 Hanson, “Soviet Industrial Espionage,” p. 26; Lance Kokonos and Ian Ona Johnson, “The Forgotten Rocketeers: German Scientists in the Soviet Union, 1945–1959,” War on the Rocks, 28 October 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/the-forgotten-rocketeers-german-scientists-in-the-soviet-union-1945-1959/

42 Bateman, “Technological Wonder and Strategic Vulnerability,” p. 331.

43 Ibid., p. 333.

44 Ibid., p. 337.

45 Ibid., p. 337.

46 Early and Gartzke, “Spying from Space.”

47 Walter C. Clemens, “Nicholas II to Salt II: Continuity and Change in East-West Diplomacy,” International Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1973), p. 397.

48 Ibid., p. 396.

49 Andrea Chiampan, “SALT Treaty,” in The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy, edited by Gordon Martel (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), pp. 1–6; “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—INF (1987) | Nuclear Arms Control Treaties,” Atomic Archive, https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/treaties/inf.html

50 Madeline Michels, “Crying Wolf?: Project RYaN, US Intelligence, and the 1983 ‘War Scare,’” Wilson Center, 20 September 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/crying-wolf-project-ryan-us-intelligence-and-1983-war-scare

51 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (1 June 1993), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations

52 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Cold War and Its Aftermath,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71 (1 September 1992), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/1992-09-01/cold-war-and-its-aftermath

53 John Lewis Gaddis, “Toward the Post–Cold War World,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2 (1 March 1991), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-03-01/toward-post-cold-war-world

54 Elizabeth Brainerd, “Mortality in Russia since the Fall of the Soviet Union,” Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 63, No. 4 (2021), pp. 557–576.

55 Sheila Kerr, “The Debate on US Post‐Cold War Intelligence: One More New Botched Beginning?,” Defense Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1994), p. 338.

56 Loch K. Johnson and Kevin J. Scheid, “Spending for Spies: Intelligence Budgeting in the Aftermath of the Cold War,” Public Budgeting & Finance, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1997), p. 12.

57 Kerr, “The Debate on US Post‐Cold War Intelligence,” p. 338.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Harvey Nelsen, “The U.S. Intelligence Budget in the 1990s,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1993), p. 196.

61 Jaganath Sankaran, “Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapons: An Asymmetric Response to U.S. Aerospace Superiority,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2022), p. 16.

62 William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (1991), pp. 66–82, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/1991-09-01/desert-storm-and-deterrence

63 Witjes and Olbrich, “A Fragile Transparency.”

64 Ray A, Williamson, “The Landsat Legacy: Remote Sensing Policy and the Development of Commercial Remote Sensing,” Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, Vol. 63, No. 7 (1997), p. 882.

65 Alexis A. Blanc et al., “Chinese and Russian Perceptions of and Responses to U.S. Military Activities in the Space Domain” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 11 October 2022), p. 5.

66 The development of new analytic approaches continues to this day, with machine learning and artificial intelligence algorithms used to interpret data, such as Edward Lempinen, “A Machine Learning Breakthrough Uses Satellite Images to Improve Lives,” Berkeley News, 20 July 2021, https://news.berkeley.edu/2021/07/20/a-machine-learning-breakthrough-using-satellite-images-to-improve-human-lives/; Tomaz Logar et al., “PulseSatellite: A Tool Using Human-AI Feedback Loops for Satellite Image Analysis in Humanitarian Contexts,” in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 34 (2020), pp. 13628–13629.

67 Elizabeth Buchen, “SpaceWorks’ 2014 Nano/Microsatellite Market Assessment,” in Proceeding of the AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites, Utah State University, SSC14-I-3, Logan, UT, Technical Session I: Private Endeavors, 2014; Matt Bille, Robyn Kane, and Mel Nowlin, “Military Microsatellites—Matching Requirements and Technology,” in Space 2000 Conference and Exposition (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics).

68 Blanc et al., “Chinese and Russian Perceptions of and Responses to U.S. Military Activities in the Space Domain,” p. 7.

69 “The Satellite Wars—Iraq, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia,” Space Today Online (2006), http://www.spacetoday.org/Satellites/YugoWarSats.html#afghanistan

70 Brian Crothers et al., “US Space-Based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” in Space Primer (Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2009), p. 169.

71 Karasev, “Vidy voyennogo prisutstviya SSSR v period kholodnoy voyny.”

72 V. I. Korotkevich, Istoria Sovremennoi Rossii 1991–2003 [Contemporary History of Russia 1991–2003] (St. Petersburg, Russia: St. Petersburg University Publishing, 2004), https://edu.tltsu.ru/er/er_files/book346/book.pdf

73 Anatoliĭ Tereshchenko and A. I. Vdovin, Iz SMERSha v GRU: Imperator Spetssluzhb, Boitsy Nevidimogo Fronta, Spet︠s︡sluzhby Stalina [From SMERSH to GRU: The Emperor of Special Services, Combatants of Invisible Front, Stalin’s Special Services] (Moskva: ĖKSMO, 2013).

74 Maxim Stepenin, “Ofitzeri GRU [GRU Officers],” Kommersant, 21 March 1998, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/194946

75 Tereshchenko and Vdovin, Iz SMERSha v GRU.

76 M. Tarasenko, “Na Orbite—Sputnik Sviazi PanAmSat” [Communication Satellite PanAmSat on Orbit], Novosti Kosmonavtiki, Vol. 23/24, December 1998, https://web.archive.org/web/20220824073115/https://www.roscosmos.ru/media/pdf/russianspace/nk1998-23d.pdf, p. 30.

77 “Roskosmos Ne Udovletvorili Rossijskie Shattly” [Roskosmos Was Not Satisfied with Russian Shuttles], Lenta.RU, 3 February 2006, https://lenta.ru/news/2006/02/03/roscosmos/; “Fact Sheet: Russian Rocket Engines used by the United States,” Space Foundation, August 2019, https://www.spacefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/RussianRocketEnginesUsedByTheUnitedStates.pdf

78 Tereshchenko and Vdovin, Iz SMERSha v GRU.

79 Bart Hendrickx, “Upgrading Russia’s Fleet of Optical Reconnaissance Satellites,” The Space Review, 10 August 2020, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4006/1

80 Curt Tarnoff, “US Assistance to the Former Soviet Union,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Information Service, Library of Congress, 14 April 2005).

81 Erik Yesson, “NATO and Russia in Kosovo,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 144, No. 4 (1999), pp. 20–26.

82 Ben Aris and Ivan Tkachev, “Long Read: 20 Years of Russia’s Economy Under Putin, in Numbers,” The Moscow Times, 19 August 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/19/long-read-russias-economy-under-putin-in-numbers-a66924

83 V. F. Nitsevich et al., “Why Russia Cannot Become the Country of Prosperity,” IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, Vol. 272, No. 3 (2019); Ben Aris and Ivan Tkachev, “Long Read.”

84 Gulnar Nagashybayeva, “BRICS: Sources of Information: Introduction,” Library of Congress Research Guides, https://guides.loc.gov/brics/introduction

85 “Intel Capital Launches Russia Venture Investment Operations,” Intel Corporation, 15 May 2003, https://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/2003/20030515corp.htm; Sarah Loff, “Oct. 31, 2000, Launch of First Crew to International Space Station,” NASA, 31 October 2015, https://www.nasa.gov/image-feature/oct-31-2000-launch-of-first-crew-to-international-space-station; Hendrickx, “Upgrading Russia’s Fleet of Optical Reconnaissance Satellites.”

86 Korotkevich, Istoria Sovremennoi Rossii 1991–2003.

87 “Russia Allocates $3.8 Bln for Space Programs in 2011,” Sputnik International, 1 November 2011, https://sputniknews.com/20110111/162102586.html; “No Cut in Russian 2009 Space Spending, $2.4 Bln on 3 Programs,” Sputnik International, 18 March 2009, https://sputniknews.com/20090318/120627935.html; “Russian Govt Agrees 12.5 Bln Eur 10-Yr Space Programme,” Forbes, 15 July 2005, https://web.archive.org/web/20070501124334/http://www.forbes.com/finance/feeds/afx/2005/07/15/afx2141304.html

88 According to an estimate, over 8 million people left Russia from 1992 to 2021; see Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Will Russia Close the Borders?,” Riddle Russia, 31 October 2022, https://ridl.io/will-russia-close-the-borders/

89 V. I. Boyarinzev and L. K. Fionova, Voyna Protiv Razuma [War against Reason] (Moscow, 2010), https://litresp.ru/chitat/ru/%D0%91/boyarincev-vladimir-ivanovich/vojna-protiv-razuma/1

90 Alec Luhn, “15 Years of Vladimir Putin: 15 Ways He Has Changed Russia and the World,” The Guardian, 6 May 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/06/vladimir-putin-15-ways-he-changed-russia-world; Victor Barantez, “Kak Ubivajut Oboronku?” [How Defense Industry is Killed], Komsomolskaja Pravda, 17 June 2009, https://www.kp.ru/daily/24311/504421/

91 The reports of corruption are too numerous to cite, but here are some: Yuri Senatorov, “Aferu Prigotovili Na Pechi” [The Scam Was Cooked On a Stove], Kommersant, 24 February 2022, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5229609; Grigorij Dubov and Inna Sidorkova, “Chajka Zayavil o Khischenii Bolle 1,6 mlrd Rub. V ‘Roskosmose’ I ‘Rostekhe’” [Chaika Announced the Theft of More Than 1.6 Billion Rubles in Roscosmos and Rostec], RBK, 9 April 2019, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/09/04/2019/5cac0c4d9a794718838721e4; Maria Lisytzina, “Rogozin vystupil za «rasstrely, a ne posadki» za korruptsiyu v oboronke” [Rogozin advocated “executions, not imprisonments” for corruption in the defense industry], RBK, 8 August 2021, https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/08/08/2021/610f07c09a7947abc280d855. Transparensy.org’s report with an appropriate title provides a subset of corruption cases “Beskonechnost Ne Predel” [Infinity Has No Limit], Transparency International Russia, 20 November 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20220514080123/https://transparency.org.ru/special/roskosmos/

92 Natalia Anisimova, “Chaika Soobschil o Bolee 160 Ugolovnykh Delakh Po Kosmodromu Vostochnij” [Chaika Reported More Than 160 Criminal Cases at the Vostochny Cosmodrome], RBK, 9 December 2019, https://www.rbc.ru/society/09/12/2019/5dedfab09a79471e1762eb28

93 Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” Survival, Vol, 56, No. 6 (2014), pp. 7–38; Hendrickx, “Upgrading Russia’s Fleet of Optical Reconnaissance Satellites.”

94 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs,” 24 February 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608

95 Cory Welt, “Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Sanctions and Other Responses,” Congressional Research Service, 21 October 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11869

96 Gerard DiPippo and Matthew Reynolds, “Sanctions in Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 March 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/sanctions-response-russias-invasion-ukraine

97 Heli Simola, “Russia Is Struggling to Find New Sources of Imports,” Bank of Finland Bulletin, 26 August 2022, https://www.bofbulletin.fi/en/blogs/2022/russia-is-struggling-to-find-new-sources-of-imports/

98 “Import Substitution Delusion,” The Bell—Eng (blog), 18 July 2022, https://thebell.io/en/import-substitution-delusion/; Jeanne Whalen, “Sanctions Forcing Russia to Use Appliance Parts in Military Gear, U.S. Says,” Washington Post, 12 May 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/05/11/russia-sanctions-effect-military/

99 “Putin poruchil razvedke dobyt’ tekhnologii dlya promyshlennosti” [Putin Instructed Intelligence to Obtain Technologies for Industry], The Moscow Times, 1 July 2022, https://www.moscowtimes.eu/2022/07/01/putin-poruchil-razvedke-aktivizirovat-promishlennii-shpionazh-a21863

100 Timofei Kornev, “V Rossii rastet populyarnost’ braka” [The Popularity of Defects Increases in Russia], Kommersant, 17 October 2022, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5619160

101 Robyn Dixon, “Western Sanctions Catch up with Russia’s Wartime Economy,” Washington Post, 26 November 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/26/russia-war-economy-military-supply/

102 Alena Popova, “Russian Search Giant Yandex Struggles to Survive,” CEPA, 14 November 2022, https://cepa.org/article/russian-search-giant-yandex-struggles-to-survive/; Nicholas Gordon, “Yandex, Russia’s ‘Google’, Wants to Flee the Country,” Fortune, 24 November 2022, https://fortune.com/2022/11/25/yandex-leaves-russia-ukraine-invasion-sanctions-search-aleksei-kudrin/; “Putin Ally Alexei Kudrin Set to Run Tech Giant Yandex—Reports,” The Moscow Times, 25 November 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/11/25/putin-ally-alexei-kudrin-set-to-run-tech-giant-yandex-reports-a79500

103 For example, more than 10% of Yandex’s staff has left Russia. More than 20,000 people are estimated to have left Russia at the beginning of its invasion of Ukraine, with an additional estimated 1 million leaving in September and October 2022 when a military mobilization began, according to Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Will Russia Close the Borders?”

104 “Chislo rossiyan, begushchikh v SSHA cherez granitsu s Meksikoy, vzletelo na 4600%” [The Number of Russians Fleeing to the US Across the Border with Mexico has Soared by 4,600%], The Moscow Times, 29 November 2022, https://www.moscowtimes.eu/2022/11/29/chislo-rossiyan-beguschih-ssha-cherez-granitsu-s-meksikoi-vzletelo-na-4600-a26907; Elena Tofianiuk and Yulia Safronova, “Rossiyu posle 21 sentyabrya pokinuli okolo 700 000 grazhdan” [About 700,000 Citizens Left Russia after September 21], Forbes, 4 October 2022, https://www.forbes.ru/society/478827-rossiu-posle-21-sentabra-pokinuli-okolo-700-000-grazdan

105 Vera Borisova, “Chastichnaya Mobilizatsiya v Rossii: V Armiyu Zabrali s Bron’yu Ot Zavoda—Kuda Obrashchat’sya s Zhalobami Na Voyenkomat” [Partial Mobilization in Russia: Protected Soldiers Sent to the Army Straight from the Factory—Where to Lodge Complaints against the Military Enlistment Office], Novosti Yaroslavlia, 10 November 2022, https://76.ru/text/incidents/2022/11/10/71799149/; Information Service, “Voyenkomaty Peterburga otmenili «broni». Mobilizatsii meshayet korruptsiya v Smol’nom?” [The Military Registration and Enlistment Offices of St. Petersburg Canceled the “Reservations.” Is Corruption in Smolny Hampering Mobilization?], Nakanune, 18 October 2022, https://www.nakanune.ru/news/2022/10/18/22682223/

106 Conflict Intelligence Team, “Volontorskaya Svodka Po Mobilizatsii v RF Za 29–30 Noyabrya” [Volunteer Summary on Mobilization in the Russian Federation for November 29–30], Teletype, 30 November 2022, https://notes.citeam.org//mobilization-nov-29-30?cda=

107 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Russia 2023: The Year of No Return,” Riddle Russia, 22 December 2022, https://ridl.io/russia-2023-the-year-of-no-return/

108 “20 trillionov na veter: Krupneyshaya v rossiyskoy istorii gosprogramma proizvodstva oruzhiya ostanovlena iz-za provalov v Ukraine” [20 Trillion Down the Drain: The Largest State Weapons Production Program in Russian History Has Been Stopped Due to Failures in Ukraine], The Moscow Times, 11 November 2022, https://www.moscowtimes.eu/2022/11/11/20-trillionov-na-veter-krupneishaya-v-rossiiskoi-istorii-gosprogramma-proizvodstva-oruzhiya-ostanovlena-posle-provalov-v-ukraine-a26303

109 “Funding Cuts for Science in Russia,” The Moscow Times Telegram, 1 December 2022, https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/9495

110 Joby Warrick and Ellen Nakashima, “Russia to Launch Spy Satellite for Iran but Use It First over Ukraine,” Washington Post, 4 August 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/08/04/russia-iran-spy-satellite/

111 “Russian Military Satellite ‘Kosmos-2560’ Descended from Orbit,” The Universe Space Tech, 13 December 2022, https://universemagazine.com/en/russian-military-satellite-descended-from-orbit-less-than-two-months-after-launch/; Steve Gorman, “Unexplained Leak from Docked Soyuz Spacecraft Cancels Russian ISS Spacewalk,” Reuters, 15 December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/science/unexplained-leak-docked-soyuz-spacecraft-cancels-russian-iss-spacewalk-2022-12-15/

112 David Axe, “Russia Is Using Space Power in Its Attack on Syria,” The Daily Beast, 16 December 2015, https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/16/russia-is-using-space-power-in-its-attack-on-syria; Aleksei Leonkov, “Kosmicheskiy eshelon razvedki blestyashche srabotal v Sirii” [The Space Reconnaissance Echelon Worked Brilliantly in Syria], Zvezda Weekly, 13 February 2018, https://zvezdaweekly.ru/news/20182121447-9DVF5.html

113 “Polovina Popadaniy Raketami Po Grazhdanskim Iz-Za Sboyev v Rabote Tekhniki i Plokhoy Podgotovki. Vtoraya Polovina—Osoznannyye Udary” [Half of the Missiles Hit Civilians Due to Equipment Malfunctions and Poor Training. Second Half—Purpuseful Strikes], Volya Telegraph, 5 May 2022, https://telegra.ph/Polovina-popadanij-raketami-po-grazhdanskim-iz-za-sboev-v-rabote-tehniki-i-plohoj-podgotovki-Vtoraya-polovina–osoznannye-udary-05-05

114 Ia Meurmishvili, “You Can’t Make This Up—Some of the Russian Units in Ukraine Used (Probability Are Still Using) ‘Atlas of the Automobile Roads of the USSR’ for Directions. This Is the Second Largest Army of the World. https://T.Co/P9FfuxnOt8,” Twitter, 15 September 2022, https://twitter.com/iameurmishvili/status/1570503553789362179; Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022,” RUSI, 30 November 2022, https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf, p. 25.

115 Zabrodskyi et al., “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” p. 24.

116 “Kak Ukraina Dostavliaet Tysiachi Tonn Snariajenia I Orujia do Zon Boevyx Dejstvij” [How Ukraine Delivers Thousands Tons of Ammunition to the Battlefields], 12 April 2022, Atomic Cherry Telegram, https://t.me/atomiccherry/425

117 David Burbach, “Early Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War as a Space Conflict,” Atlantic Council (blog), 30 August 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/airpower-after-ukraine/early-lessons-from-the-russia-ukraine-war-as-a-space-conflict/

118 Pavel Luzin, “Russia’s Space Satellite Problems and the War in Ukraine,” Jamestown, 24 May 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/russias-space-satellite-problems-and-the-war-in-ukraine/

119 “ICEYE Signs Contract to Provide Government of Ukraine with Access to Its SAR Satellite Constellation,” Iceye, 18 August 2022, https://www.iceye.com/press/press-releases/iceye-signs-contract-to-provide-government-of-ukraine-with-access-to-its-sar-satellite-constellation; “People’s Satellite,” Deutsche Welle Telegram, 25 November 2022, https://t.me/dwglavnoe/21585

120 “V Minoborony zayavili o nanesenii udarov po voyennym ob”yektam na Ukraine” [The Ministry of Defense Announced Attacks on Military Targets in Ukraine], Moskva 24, 16 October 2022, https://www.m24.ru/news/politika/16102022/511904

121 “Polovina Popadaniy Raketami Po Grazhdanskim Iz-Za Sboyev v Rabote Tekhniki i Plokhoy Podgotovki. Vtoraya Polovina—Osoznannyye Udary,” Volya Telegraph.

122 “Pochemu Uchastilis’ Obstrely Grazhdanskikh Ob”yektov v Ukraine” [Why Shelling of Civilian Targets in Ukraine Has Become More Frequent], Volya Telegram Channel, 1 July 2022, https://t.me/volyamedia/278

123 Matt Lee and Nomaan Merchant, “EXPLAINER: What’s the State of Russia’s Missile Arsenal?,” AP News, 13 October 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-moscow-fb4f603cd7e8694e788eb764da9e23ac; Liubov Skichko, “Missile Shortage Hampers Further Russian Strikes,” Kyiv Post, 15 November 2022, https://www.kyivpost.com/russias-war/missile-shortage-hampers-further-russian-strikes.html

124 Ministry of Defence, “‘Russia Is Likely Removing the Nuclear Warheads from Aging Nuclear Cruise Missiles and Firing the Unarmed Munitions at Ukraine,’” Twitter, 26 November 2022, https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1596389927733927937; Julian E. Barnes, “Russia Is Buying North Korean Artillery, According to U.S. Intelligence,” New York Times, 6 September 2022 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html

125 Illia Ponomarenko, “Why Is Russia so Vulnerable to HIMARS in Ukraine?,” The Kyiv Independent, 22 July 2022, https://kyivindependent.com/national/why-is-russia-so-vulnerable-to-himars-in-ukraine

126 Roger McDermott, “Tracing Russia’s Path to Network-Centric Military Capability,” Jamestown, 4 December 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/tracing-russias-path-to-network-centric-military-capability/

127 Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964), p. 390.

128 Christopher Chivvis et al., Strengthening Strategic Stability with Russia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017).

129 Alexander G. Savelyev and Olga M. Alexandria, “What Factors Affect Strategic Stability?,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2022), pp. 93–111.

130 Chivvis et al., Strengthening Strategic Stability with Russia.

131 Abigail Williams, “U.S. Extends New START Nuclear Treaty with Russia for 5 Years,” NBC News, 3 February 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-extends-new-start-nuclear-treaty-russia-5-years-n1256625; U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty,” https://www.state.gov/new-start/

132 Kylie Atwood and Michael Conte, “US and Russia Agree to Hold Talks on Nuclear Treaty for First Time since Ukraine War Began,” CNN, 8 November 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/08/politics/us-russia-nuclear-treaty-talks/index.html; Elena Chernenko, “Komissiya ushla v pesok” [The Commission Has Gone into the Sand], Kommersant, 28 November 2022, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5693436; Mike Eckel, “How Bad Are Things Between Russia and the U.S.? They Can’t Even Agree To Discuss Nuclear Weapons Inspections.,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2 December 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/united-states-russia-new-start-treaty-inspections-canceled-tensions/32159325.html

133 Pierre de Dreuzy and Andrea Gilli, “NATO Review—Russia’s Nuclear Coercion in Ukraine,” NATO Review, 29 November 2022, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/11/29/russias-nuclear-coercion-in-ukraine/index.html

134 Mark Krutov and Sergei Dobrynin, “In Russia’s War on Ukraine, Effective Satellites Are Few and Far Between,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 April 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-satellites-ukraine-war-gps/31797618.html

135 Steven Pifer, “Russia’s Draft Agreements with NATO and the United States: Intended for Rejection?,” Brookings (blog), 21 December 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/12/21/russias-draft-agreements-with-nato-and-the-united-states-intended-for-rejection/; Zachary Basu, “U.S. to Consider Russia’s NATO Proposal, but Calls Some Demands ‘Unacceptable,’” Axios, 17 December 2021, https://www.axios.com/2021/12/17/russia-nato-ukraine-invasion

136 Daniil Sotnikov, “Lavrov isklyuchil vosstanovleniye otnosheniy mezhdu RF i Zapadom” [Lavrov Ruled Out Restoring Relations between Russia and the West], Deutsche Welle, 12 January 2022, https://www.dw.com/ru/lavrov-isklucil-vosstanovlenie-preznih-otnosenij-mezdu-rf-i-zapadom/a-63951360

137 Sankaran, “Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapons,” p. 16.

138 Victor Savinykh, “Kosmicheskaya Sfera Voyennykh Deystviy” [Space Warfare], Obrazovatel’nyye Resursy i Tekhnologii, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2015), p.102.

139 Sergei Grigoriev, “Kosmicheskiy Krizis Zavershayetsya” [Space Crisis Ends], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 October 1999, http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/1999-10-29/6_spcrisis.html

140 Mikhail Khodarenok, “Zvezdnyye voyny: sozdast li Rossiya kosmicheskiye voyska” [Star Wars: Will Russia Create a Space Force?], Gazeta.Ru, 3 April 2020, https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2020/04/03/13035031.shtml

141 Matthew Mowthorpe, “The Soviet/Russian Antisatellite (ASAT) Programme during the Cold War and Beyond,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2002), p. 18.

142 Ibid., p. 21.

143 Ibid., p. 26.

144 Tyler Rogoway, “Russia Tests Another Anti-Satellite Weapon as Battleground Space Looms,” The Drive, 22 December 2016, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/6631/russia-tests-another-anti-satellite-weapon-as-battleground-space-looms

145 Thomas Nilsen, “More Russian GPS Jamming than Ever across Border to Norway,” The Independent Barents Observer, 9 July 2022, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/07/more-russian-gps-jamming-ever-across-border-norway; Tyler Rogoway, “Russia May Be Testing Its GPS Spoofing Capabilities Around the Black Sea,” The Drive, 16 August 2017, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/13549/russia-may-be-testing-its-gps-spoofing-capabilities-around-the-black-sea

146 Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski, “Russia’s Approach to Anti-Satellite Weapons and Systems,” Polish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 159, No. 1405 (2019), p. 2.

147 Patrick Howell O’Neill, “Russia Hacked an American Satellite Company One Hour before the Ukraine Invasion,” MIT Technology Review, 10 May 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/05/10/1051973/russia-hack-viasat-satellite-ukraine-invasion/

148 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Russian ASAT Test Highlights Urgent Need for Space Governance Negotiations,” Policy Commons, 20 November 2021, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/1897497/russian-asat-test-highlights-urgent-need-for-space-governance-negotiations/2648324/; Shannon Bugos, “Russian ASAT Test Creates Massive Debris,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 51, No. 10 (2021), pp. 30–33.

149 Jaganath Sankaran, “Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapons.”

150 Daryl Kimball, “Russian ASAT Test Sparks War of Words,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2020), p. 33.