Jihad and Heroic Hypermasculinity – Recruitment Strategies, Battlefield Experiences, and Returning Home

Abstract

There is a gap in knowledge when it comes to jihadism and how it is associated with notions of masculinity. Especially empirical studies on masculinity that are based on interviews with active or former jihadists are lacking. This study seeks to analyze the role that notions of masculinity have played in different phases of jihadiship among Swedish jihadist foreign fighters, from recruitment to traveling to the conflict zone, and then eventually returning to Sweden. With a focus on heroic jihadist hypermasculinity, which is a form of hegemonic masculinity that exaggerates male stereotypical behavior such as violence and aggression, the study identifies five themes: Recruitment strategies and masculinity; from masculine failure to protecting sisters in faith; jihad and street culture; the warrior ideal; jihad, patriarchy, and brotherhood; and returning home and preventing re-emasculation. The empirical material is based on interviews with six Swedish jihadists and a former jihadist recruiter.

A plethora of literature emerged in the field of terrorism studies after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the subsequent war on terror. An increasing body of scholarly work has also used the concept of gender as a vantage point to investigate, for example, women’s agency and the various roles women have had in jihadist groups.¹ Indeed, much of the early research on gender and terrorism was focused on women, but in recent years also questions regarding masculinity have been analyzed. However, as Qvotrup Jensen and Fuglsang Larsen argue, many studies of violent radicals “often do not consider it analytically important that the vast majority are male”.²

Thus, there is still a gap in knowledge when it comes to jihadism and how it is associated with notions of masculinity. Especially empirical studies on masculinity that are based on interviews with active or former jihadists are lacking. This study asks what role notions of masculinity have played in different phases of jihadiship among Swedish jihadist foreign fighters, from recruitment to traveling to the conflict zone, and then eventually returning to Sweden. The empirical material is based on interviews with six Swedish jihadists and a former jihadist recruiter.

Some of the literature on masculinity and jihadism is theoretical.³ Although the theoretical contributions of these studies may be valuable, they do not seek to analyze the empirical basis for the arguments. However, there are studies that are based on interviews with former jihadists. For example, Duriesmith and Ismail conducted life history interviews with four Indonesian former foreign fighters, charting multiple masculinities and disengagement from militant Islamism.⁴ And Duriesmith explored encounters between notions of militarized manhood through the lives of four Indonesian former foreign fighters.⁵ Similarly, Chiovenda talked to one former Taliban in Afghanistan in a psychotherapeutic like setting.⁶

But since access to jihadists can be difficult, many scholars have gathered different kinds of empirical data. For example, Chiovenda also interviewed other Pashtun men in Afghanistan, and Aslam analyzed the performatory acts of common young Pakistani men who lack healthy activities and search for quick glory.⁷ Khoja-Moolji also studied print and online contents such as videos, magazine articles, and essays of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.⁸ Van Leuven et al. analyzed the romanticized notion of masculinity in IS propaganda material.⁹ Similarly, Fricano conducted a thematic analysis of Osama bin Laden’s public statements, arguing that “masculinity is associated with courage and activity in the Ummah’s defence, whereas femininity is associated with purity, passivity and vulnerability”.¹⁰ Also, transcripts from a court case against a radical group planning an attack in Australia, including surveillance material, have been used as the empirical material for an analysis of violence as protest masculinity, as subordinated men distinguish themselves by violence.¹¹

From the perspective of social constructivism, gender is a social organizing principle that upholds patters of expectations about behavior, and there is variation in how being a male is perceived between different societies and time periods.¹² Different masculinities can even share the same social space, but we can speak of a multiplicity of masculinities encapsulating a variety of subject positions, as Connell argued that there exists a hierarchy of masculinities that includes not only men’s dominance over women but also the dominance of some masculinities (hegemonic masculinities) over other masculinities (marginalized masculinities).¹³

Hegemonic masculinity as an ideal is impossible for anyone to live out fully, but it consists of practices that both legitimize men’s dominant position in society and justify the subordination of the common male population and marginalized ways of being a man.¹⁴ Being in a position of marginal masculinity can be experienced as emasculation and therefore jeopardize one’s social identity, which makes hegemonic masculinity appealing.¹⁵ When research on men and masculinities was been consolidated in the 1990s and the early 2000s, the concept of hegemonic masculinity was found to be analytically useful, for example, in the fields of criminology and the military to better understand men’s use of violence as they construct identities through ideal male behavior.¹⁶

To better structure our understanding of such processes of identity construction, Connell and Messerschmidt suggested that scholars should empirically analyze hegemonic masculinities at three levels: the local (constructed in arenas of face-to-face interaction such as schools and organizations); the regional (constructed at the society-level); and the global (constructed in transnational arenas such as world politics and media).¹⁷ For example, Messerschmidt and Rohde examined how bin Laden’s public statements discursively formulate a jihadist masculinity that is a specific version of global hegemonic masculinity.¹⁸

As Barrett argued, hegemonic masculinity “refers not only to the various groupings of men and the ideals they uphold. It refers also to the process by which these groups and ideals form”.¹⁹ With the help of interviews with Swedish jihadists and a former recruiter, the current study argues that the construction of heroic jihadist hypermasculinity (i.e. the exaggeration of male stereotypical behavior such as violence and aggression), as a form of hegemonic masculinity, plays an important role in the local context of jihad, from the recruitment strategies to participating in jihad in the conflict zone and then eventually returning to Sweden. Although the Swedish foreign fighters in Syria participated in global jihad, their experiences were very local, reflecting their lived experiences both in Sweden and Syria.

Methods

The empirical material is based on interviews with six Swedish jihadists and a former jihadist recruiter in the Gothenburg area in western Sweden. About 300 Swedes travelled to Syria to join jihadist groups during the civil war and up to 100 of them came from the Gothenburg area, which makes the city the jihadist hub of Scandinavia.²⁰ The author used the snowball method to locate informants for the study. When using such a sampling method, previous informants help recruit new ones, which makes it suitable for accessing hidden populations that are difficult to access.²¹

Few jihadists are willing to talk about their experiences and, because of the use of non-probability sampling and the small size of the sample, the informants are not necessarily representative of the entire population of interest. However, qualitative analysis can identify different ways of constructing masculinity in the various phases of jihadiship. Moreover, the sample includes different generations of jihadists to create a relatively broad picture of the construction of masculinity among Swedish foreign fighters.

Bilal was an active jihadist in Syria, and I met him when he was briefly visiting Sweden. He first fought for Al Muhajirun but then joined IS, before being killed in battle. Three of the informants, Mazen, Abdullah, and Jamal were former fighters who had been to Syria, also in IS controlled territories, but did not return there. Mazen came back to Sweden quite quickly after being disgruntled by the violence and IS ideology.

Ahmed, however, belonged to an older generation of Swedish jihadists and had fighting experience from Afghanistan, where the mujahideen first fought the Red Army in the 1980s and then continued to fight different militias vying for power in the early 1990s. As even jihadists started to fight other Muslims, Ahmed left for the Bosnian War (1992–1995), which he perceived to be a more religiously legitimate form of jihad. Amir also fought in Bosnia till the end of the conflict. Kareem, in turn, had been one of the most active Swedish jihadist recruiters during the heyday of the Syrian Civil War but had now left the jihadist environment. Perhaps more than two dozen Swedish foreign fighters had left for jihad in Syria after being in contact with him.

The interviews were conducted in an ethnographic setting in private homes, mosques, and at cafes. Although the interviews lasted only about one hour each, much more time was spent on getting to know the informants and on trust building. There was also variation in the longevity of my relationship with the informants.

The interview data were analyzed thematically, as the method is well suited for highlighting different types of patterns that exist in the empirical material in relation to the research question. The themes should capture and present the phenomenon in question as close to the interview data as possible.²² To do so, Braun and Clarke suggest that thematic analysis consists of six steps: First, acquainting oneself with the data; second, generating a set of initial codes; third, searching for themes; fourth, evaluating the themes; fifth, defining and labelling the themes; and finally, compiling a report.²³ In the fifth step, the patterns were defined in terms of their theoretical relevance. This included how a pattern could be explained in terms of, for example, heroic jihadist hypermasculinity.

The informants gave informed consent to be interviewed, and they have been assigned pseudonyms to protect their identities. The study was approved by the Swedish Ethical Review Authority.²⁴

Analysis

Five themes emerged from the analysis: Recruitment strategies and masculinity; from masculine failure to protecting sisters in faith; jihad and street culture; the warrior ideal; jihad, patriarchy, and brotherhood; and returning home and preventing re-emasculation.

Recruitment Strategies and Masculinity

Recruiters are well aware of how the local context of potential recruits can be used to facilitate the recruitment process. Thus, they seek to find something in potential recruits’ experiences and needs that can make the call for jihad more appealing. Hafez and Mullins argue that general disenchantment with society is “often posited as a root cause of violent radicalization in the West”.²⁵ However, potential recruits can also have specific cognitive openings that make them question their prior ideas about society and the use of violence.²⁶ For example, being exposed to racism can function as such a cognitive opening.²⁷ The death of a family member is also a very effective context for questioning one’s beliefs.²⁸ Indeed, according to the Norwegian police, 17.5% of the radical Islamists in Norway had lost one or both of their parents while growing up.²⁹ Capitalizing on such cognitive openings calls for sensitivity to the local social context and the experiences of a potential recruit.

It is widely suggested that one of the main problems facing young men in socio-economically disadvantaged communities is the absence of male role models, especially the absence of fathers.³⁰ This has been argued to lead to the adoption of “risky adult masculinities”,³¹ while positive role models have been associated with, for example, avoidance of violence.³² Kareem explained that when he was an active jihadist recruiter he specifically targeted young men who lacked positive male role models: “They come from horrible conditions; the absence of fathers is common”. He also said that he would not only strive to be their “imam” but also their “father” to associate jihadist violence with ideal masculinity. However, the recruitment strategies that he used varied depending on the target and what was expected to appeal to them. Research suggests that focusing on experiences of failure has been effective in marketing that targets men.³³ Similarly, Kareem explained that some targets had failed in achieving what was expected of a typical male, such as making money and getting married. Therefore, they were attracted by the promise of a wife and being able to support a family. Engaging in jihad was merely part of the package of images and promises of ideal masculinity that IS disseminated from Syria:

When they recruited some people, they told them that you can get married here. And they even showed pictures to some, sent pictures of women and simply offered them for marriage. There were some who thought then “now I can go, now I can also have a life there”. Because the entire Daesh [i.e. IS] way of propagating was that you can live a good life here—the romantic image. Here you get a house, here you get a wife, job, money, jihad, for the sake of Allah.

Previous research has also suggested that, for example, some Tunisians had heeded the call for jihad because poverty had prevented them from getting married, joining IS “at least in part for the promise of a wife”.³⁴ However, although Swedish jihadists were unlikely to experience similar difficulties, the promise of a wife was still appealing to some. A young Swedish man whose friends had joined IS once asked me: “Do you know why so many more men travel to join the jihad in Syria, whereas not so many travelled to Somalia?” When I replied that I did not know, he answered that “the Syrian women are among the most beautiful women in the Muslim world!”

Others had not even wanted to get married and had become gang members. However, recruiters could also frame the high risk of dying in battle as appealing to young men interested in extramarital sex and who often had a lifestyle that involved several women. Indeed, previous research suggests that some young men had even joined gangs to get access to women.³⁵ To lure in these potential recruits, the story about 72 Hoor al-’Ayn, who are often thought to be virgin maidens in Paradise with beautiful eyes, came in handy for Kareem:

For example, women in Paradise. Do you understand what I mean? Because they have a lot of girls, and they go out clubbing at bars and stuff—Hoor al-’Ayn. And then you talk a lot about it. So, this something that should be, in their heads, is linked to this desire, the desire for violence or the desire for sex. And then they become so interested and listen a lot. And I’ve tested it myself when I talk to them. When you sit and talk about why it is very important to pray five times a day and have a relationship with God and things like that. I can be a good speaker and they may listen and not yawn, but it is not the case that they come afterwards and ask about prayers and how I become so and so.

Previous research has also stressed the role that adventure seeking, which is conducive to the construction of masculinity for many young men, has played for those who become foreign fighters.³⁶ Similarly, Kareem said that the way of preaching was modelled after the mindset of young men who were expected to be guided by their desires and a search for excitement. However, this excitement was contextualized in the Islamic apocalyptic narratives:

This way of preaching and lecturing is very much about Hell, the grave, the punishment, and very little about God’s grace and spirituality and the more traditionally religious things, you know, that you should like get close to God, because usually people in this environment are not really interested in sacrificing their lusts or, you know, they follow their impulses. So, we often use the rhetoric about, for example, what happens in the grave, you will be punished like that, and many details. Or if you are going to talk about the opposites—it is called in Arabic targhib [i.e. desiring for Paradise] wa tarhib [i.e. and terror of Hellfire] […] If I’m talking about the grave, the Doomsday and stuff, Yajuj and Majuj [i.e. Gog and Magog], something like that, you know, then it’s going to be really exciting!

Thus, recruitment strategies can focus on notions of masculinity in several ways. They can range from jihad as an exciting adventure for young men, enchanted by apocalyptic narratives while seeking to construct a masculine identity, to promising access to women, which can for some recruits be related to failed masculinity. However, some of the motives the recruits express are associated with seeking to construct other seemingly more noble notions of masculinity, such as protecting sisters in faith.

From Masculine Failure to Protecting Sisters in Faith

Most European jihadists had not been successful in school and had been unemployed before leaving for Syria.³⁷ This is not surprising as, for example, in Sweden as many as 70% of them came from socio-economically vulnerable neighborhoods.³⁸ The promise of being able to support your family rather than relying on social welfare benefits was appealing to those who wanted to better fulfil the role of a patriarch and not experience a masculine failure. For example, one of the most famous Swedish IS members, Michael Skråmo, in addition to having lacked a male role model when growing up, was unemployed and first moved to Egypt to be able to live in a country where he and his family would not be exposed to islamophobia. However, he could not find work there, which contributed to making the call from IS increasingly appealing.³⁹ His father-in-law explained that “he was regarded as a positive Islamic man who could be the patriarch that had been missing in the family”.⁴⁰ Similar narratives have been observed also among Indonesian jihadists. As one veteran of Afghan jihad explained, “In Afghanistan, we were not just proven as men, we felt noble. In Indonesia we were confined”.⁴¹

However, one of the main mobilization narratives of Western jihadists has been to protect brothers and sisters in faith. For example, Eric Breininger, a German jihadist who died fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan, related in his memoirs that protecting Muslim women was one of the main motivations for his joining the jihad:⁴²

What really shocked us the most was the news about the prisons, and how the Crusaders treated our brothers, how they tortured and oppressed them. And also the fact that these infidels put innocent women in prison, rape them every day and then afterwards some of them have to carry the babies. That these honorable women were being treated like trash fanned the flames of my hatred for the infidels.

Similar narratives, with a focus on Muslim men’s duty to protect Muslim women were found especially among the first travelers to Syria. For example, Jamal felt obliged not only as a Muslim but also as a man to act:

It was my duty as a Muslim to help our brothers and sisters in Syria. Who else would have protected the women when the war started and the government started killing those who demonstrated? As a man, you are ashamed that the governments in the West did nothing to help.

Thus, not only failing to be a providing patriarch, but also not protecting women in general can be felt as a masculine failure, and rectifying the situation calls for radical action in the form of violence. These images and arguments have been widespread during the long history of violent conflicts, as women have mostly been seen as the victims of war and men as their protectors.⁴³ However, as Young argued about “this patriarchal logic, the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience”.⁴⁴ This suited especially well IS when it constructed its heroic version of hypermasculinity, a form of hegemonic masculinity, that many recruits found appealing, as it was in stark contrast to the values of the Western societies they had lived in and where they had often felt a masculine failure in terms of lack of achievement and opportunities.

Jihad and Street Culture

The crime-terrorism nexus, such as the convergence between criminal street culture and jihadism, has received some attention among scholars.⁴⁵ Jihadism and street culture possibly contain overlapping ideals of masculinity “with toughness and the readiness for violence being the common denominator”.⁴⁶ But jihadism potentially also offers the legitimization of pre-existing patterns of violence,⁴⁷ as well as the exchange of criminal masculinity for a more heroic jihadist hypermasculinity.

In the conflict zone, the use of violence and male socialization are two means for upholding such hypermasculinity, i.e. the exaggeration of male stereotypical behavior emphasizing, for example, physical strength, aggression, and even sexuality. Bin Laden famously argued that the Western governments and the media have sought “to strip us of our virility—we believe that we are men”.⁴⁸ In the same vein, he said that “perhaps the virility of the rulers in this region has been stolen, and they think people are women”.⁴⁹ Just like in right-wing extremism,⁵⁰ violence possibly contained for bin Laden the promise of reclaiming one’s manhood. Reflecting the view that taking such action was the appropriate solution to the predicament, he praised the 9/11 attackers as “these heroes, these true men, these great giants”.⁵¹

I met Bilal a couple of times before he went back to Syria and IS. During one conversation, he said that “there is nothing special about killing kufar [i.e. unbelievers] ”. It was as if killing had gradually become routinized, and it did not arouse the same emotions as when he experienced battle for the first time. It also seemed that this was for him the ultimate male characteristic, being untouched by the violence. I also talked to a friend of his about his character. The friend confirmed that Bilal had always been very straightforward, did not fear saying aloud what he thought, but at the same time he could create a feeling that he was also quite harsh, which was a possible expression of both his personality and Salafist ideology. This all seemed to affect his conception of ideal masculinity. As Barrett argued in a study of the U.S. military, there are several different strands of hegemonic masculinity that individuals engaged in warfare can draw upon to secure a masculine identity, including risk taking, stoic endurance of hardship, perseverance in the face of difficult physical trials, as well as absence of emotion.⁵²

However, Messerschmidt argued that violent actions in general are a form of accomplishing masculinity that varies by class differences.⁵³ The radical group Roose studied in Australia seemed to be influenced by not only Salafism but also Western youth culture, “infused with a youthful articulation of working class male masculinity”.⁵⁴ Similarly, how masculinity is expressed once one has left for the conflict zone can vary depending on, for example, the social context and background of the jihadists, sometimes finding an expression in the intersection of street culture and jihad. Mazen related how he had hung out with other Swedish jihadists who came from the same socio-economically vulnerable area in Gothenburg, and how masculinity was constructed in this social context of street culture and jihad. It was not only expressed by being untouched by violence but also by disobedience to authority, even to that of IS:

People from Hisingen [an area in western Gothenburg] spent time with people from Hisingen, so it became a subculture of Hisingen and Syria, emigrating muhajirun soldiers. We arrived once at an installation. It was a house that the muhajirun had. And there was an Arab who was guarding the door. So, we were a couple of guys from Hisingen, street guys from Biskopsgården [a socio-economically vulnerable area in Hisingen]. And they did not want to let us in. That kind of nonchalance, that kind of street attitude, we just rolled over him. Just went in, almost ignored the guard. We belonged to the same group but did not take orders from him. It was funny, quite mischievous.

Mazen had positive memories of male socialization—a group of young guys, who knew each other from before and came from the same part of the city, being on a male adventure. This is not surprising. Hafez and Mullins argued that there is consensus among scholars that radicalization involves “socialization” into a belief system that prepares the ground for the use of violence.⁵⁵ Previous research has also suggested that the social context of radicalization is important, as ideas easily spread in peer groups. For example, Kleinmann argued that social ties and networks were key to understanding radicalization in as many as 93% of the cases in the United States.⁵⁶ Although one of the methods of socialization is to socially isolate potential recruits under the guidance of a charismatic recruiter, socialization often starts already in peer groups of friends consisting of young men unhappy with their lives in the West. However, as Mazen’s recollections suggest, this male socialization in old peer groups can also result in a mix of street culture and jihad in the conflict zone, which becomes one of the building blocks of a specific kind of heroic jihadist hypermasculinity.

The Warrior Ideal

Images of ideal jihadists are often clearly visible in jihadist organizations’ communications with the outside world. For example, Khoja-Moolji argued that Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan sought to lay claim over Islamic warrior masculinity in their publications.⁵⁷ However, socialization to the warrior ideal takes mainly place in jihadist groups. For example, Hegghammer wrote that the jihadist training camps in Afghanistan were important for molding ideal warriors: “The training camps generated an ultra-masculine culture of violence which brutalized the volunteers and broke down their barriers to the use of violence. Recruits increased their paramilitary skills while the harsh camp life built strong personal relationships between them”.⁵⁸ Aslam further argued that the notion of honor is important in many Muslim men’s socialization. And if other paths of masculine performativity fail, different forms of collective “Muslim masculinities” may emerge.⁵⁹ She also suggested that men who have limited opportunities for “self-actualization” may choose to “live fast and die young, and die as a warrior, a hero”.⁶⁰ Somewhat similar topics emerged from the interviews, but they can be divided into three components.

First, freedom is an important aspect of the warrior ideal. When I asked Mazen about the ideal jihadist, he first argued that such a jihadist is the ultimate expression of a man’s freedom from the structural constraints of the society where he has been living: “The warrior, I think, he is a free soul”. Abdullah also agreed: “He is a man who fights for what is right. He breaks free from the constraints of the oppressing society”. Second, Mazen suggested that the warrior ideal not only consists of this capacity to break free for a higher purpose, but it is also an expression of “ultimate manhood” through the potential for violence:

It is clear that you must be militant, always to be ready as a man. That is expected of a man. It is expected of a man that he is capable of doing some things in case it is needed to protect his family, wife and children. He must be competent throughout his entire life till the day you die, if he has the capacity. Muslim men. You must have the capacity for that explosion, but you do not do it, you contain it. Then, if it is needed, you do it. You must master it as a man.

Indeed, this capacity for freedom and violence can be latent for those men who do not currently participate in fighting. However, it is one of the most fundamental ways of how men and women are expected to relate to each other: “It is an ideal that women respect. The women sift these types of men. That is of the greatest relevance”. Third, Mazen also argued that the ideal warrior has several talents, although taking care of his woman is essential to his being:

Of course, if he is educated it can also be important. If you think of the ideal warrior, he is a Muslim Samurai in way. He is a poet, he can brandish the blade, he can take care of his woman, he can join a military expedition, he can obey orders from a leader… You should not be brutal so that women don’t find you repugnant. You should be adequately tame and civilized so that you argue for things in a civilized way. So, it is required that you have studied. It is a must that you engage in physical activity.

In essence, with all these qualities—with a capacity to break free and to use violence, and with multiple talents, but always in control of his family—he is an adaptable man who possesses ultimate agency such that he can reach his goals and maintain control over his environment. As Mazen argued, “He is in constant motion, and in motion there is a blessing for him”.

Mazen stressed, however, that not every man can be such a warrior since he is the epitome of manhood. Still, one has to choose what one strives for, and an adventure with one’s friends is better than a meaningless life that can be experienced as a masculine failure:

It is either that [i.e. the warrior ideal] or the labor market and being violated by some boss. So, you understand. You end up moving from one job to another job, from one warehouse to another warehouse, without an education that would place you in a worthy place in the labor market. You are spit out from one company to another, occasionally maybe accused [of a crime], end up at the employment agency, and have to deal with some government administrator. It becomes, you know, a banal lifeless existence if you cannot create some kind of meaning in it. Better to die on an adventure!

Even if jihad may seem like an adventure of a lifetime with one’s (male) friends, also other motivations and religion are important. As Ahmed argued, “In the beginning it was also about seeking an adventure, but when the risk of dying becomes obvious, you start looking for the right niyyah [i.e. intention] and making du’a [i.e. supplications]”. Still, the warrior ideal, which is an idealized expression of heroic jihadist hypermasculinity, stands in stark contrast to the seemingly meaningless life that can be experienced as failed masculinity when growing up in socio-economically vulnerable areas.

Jihad, Patriarchy, and Brotherhood

Survey research conducted in Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Libya suggests that hostile attitudes toward women are strongly associated with support for jihadism.⁶¹ However, although jihadist organizations generally value women as subordinate mothers and wives in official statements,⁶² we have little empirical data about how jihadists reason about women. When I first met Bilal, I was mostly interested in his experiences from battle. During our meetings, however, he was often more interested in talking about how to relate to women than talking about his experiences from jihad. For him, jihad was something that comes naturally when a man finds his true nature in social interaction with other men. In jihad, the daily interactions are with other men, but running a family means interactions between a man and a woman, the latter having a subordinate position: “You must guide your women. You must tell her to wear a hijab. As a man it is your duty. In Islam, there is an order and roles for everyone”.

I still found it puzzling that he, who was merely taking a couple of weeks’ break from the fighting, would find such things more worth stressing or more meaningful than the war itself. The study of militarized masculinities in the West has argued that Western soldiers see “other women” (often Muslim women) as oppressed women who must be saved by the masculine soldiers.⁶³ However, in the world of jihad, women are to be saved not only by the masculine jihadists but also by enforcing traditional rules on gender separation, as opposed to what is considered the degenerate and immoral lifestyle in the West, i.e. the “other”. Indeed, according to many international comparisons, especially Sweden has very high levels of not only individual freedom but also gender equality,⁶⁴ which has not escaped jihadists’ attention. As Abdullah argued, “Thing have become extreme in Sweden. You can do almost anything in the name of equality. This is not good for a marriage”.

Bilal had gotten married in Syria and had children. He would often spend a lot of time away from home and it seemed to be important to him that, when he was away, he was still in control of his family. Abdullah also explained that jihadists would “spend much time away, either training or fighting. But that was not a problem. Men do what men do and women do their job at home”. There was always the possibility of dying in battle, which would mean that one’s wife would marry another jihadist instead. That did not seem to bother Bilal. He, as a man, and his wife had distinct roles and a hierarchy that was to be enforced while he was alive. He was the warrior; her job was to give birth to more jihadists and raise them correctly. Her role would not change even if he died. If some other man took over his position as the patriarch, the new husband would at least belong to the same brotherhood, which likely gave him some sense of control or at least stability in a world view where gender relations and marriage serve the greater cause of jihad.

As Mazen explained, giving birth to new jihadists is the ultimate task: “You raise the next generation of warriors. The woman mirrors you. That is what she offers. I love you so much, here is a copy of you!” Similarly, Enloe argued that women are often valued as only nurturing mothers while men are celebrated as soldiers.⁶⁵ Femininities—including traits such as nurturing and needing protection—are also a necessary counterpart to the militarized masculine identity of men as protectors of women.⁶⁶

Both Bilal, Abdullah and Mazen, who had been to Syria, were unhappy about the social order in Sweden. Although Mazen could respect some Swedish men, he was strongly critical of the identities and roles that women had taken:

There are men in Sweden who have built this country, who have been men of honor. But there are elements of men today, secondary men, not like before, and their masculine women. You know, those who are in some sort of mass psychosis among themselves. You cannot pursue ignorance and opposition to truth indefinitely. Either the people will make a change or Allah will drown them. They have put her on a pedestal, so it is politics based on emotions, not reason.

Thus, although Mazen stressed the need to be a considerate man and to avoid brutality, he believed that too strong emotions and feminism had tossed the society upside down. This did not mean that he was against expressing emotions. Quite the contrary. Some of the most entrenched truisms about masculinity are about men’s inability to express emotions.⁶⁷ However, for Mazen, these truisms belonged to the world of masculine failure, while the rightful place for expressing strong emotions was the world of jihad and masculine brotherhood:

Every environment has its people. During the short time I was there, we had time, under the starry sky, to recite Swedish poetry to each other, and remind each other of how to recite the Quran. Swedish poetry! Moments of culture, happiness when you sit there. You wake up for fajr [i.e. morning prayers] together, you pray all prayers together, you read the Quran together.

You are like a Pygmies in the jungle. You are so united, like a tribe of your own on the move. You don’t have so many distractions. The topics of discussion go to human emotions, crying and laughing, that you break down. The emotional experience, in contrast to just existing in Sweden, becomes more intense. Being together, brotherhood, the miracles you get to experience.

This male bonding—galvanized by strong emotions that are created by a mixture of spiritualty, violence, and even moments of jihadist culture—further strengthens heroic jihadist hypermasculinity. Duriesmith argued similarly in a study of Indonesian former jihadists that “performances of manhood were centred on practices of traditional cultural sophistication (mainly in poetry, storytelling and religious knowledge) as well as martial prowess (through traditional martial arts and military training)”.⁶⁸

Amir had left the battlefields in Bosnia a long time ago. Reflecting on his experiences, he explained that the feeling of a brotherhood kept him fighting till the war was over. He argued that these feelings for a male brotherhood are especially strong for young men. He once left the battlefield to be with his family, feeling that he could not contribute much more to the fight, but when he heard that one of his friends had died in battle, he felt obliged to return to the brotherhood: “I thought, how could I look at myself in the mirror, and went back to Bosnia”. Fighting for the brotherhood and male socialization had become a greater priority than being with the family.

Despite all the experiences of brotherhood and the strong feelings they created, Mazen was critical of how the state-building experiment of IS ended in Syria. In essence, echoing how Amir perceived the outcome of the Bosnian jihad, Mazen argued that many jihadists were not religiously and morally pure enough to win the war. As they did not live up to the high ideals also the brotherhood had weaknesses:

It calls for much purity for Allah to grant you victory. You must behave like an angel on Earth. Unless you behave like Gabriel himself, you will not gain victory. You have to be really pure for it to succeed. If the believer will be successful—whichever way it goes, right, left, up, down, askew—it is homeruns for the believer in each case. The jihadist groups consist of human beings, full of deficiencies. Between each tone, there is sin. For each white spot, they have a black spot. Time is on the righteous’ side… Jesus did not descend in Damascus [as expected by the jihadists’ apocalyptic beliefs]. Until you walk like Jesus, Jesus will not come. But walk like Jesus first. Would Jesus descend among jihadists? They would be arrogant, people who are not ready yet. They would reply to him arrogantly. It is not Jesus-ready yet. It must be extreme politeness… They are our ideals, Jesus, Muhammed, peace be upon him. We have no other ideals than the prophetic ideal. Until people walk like these men, you know, the rescue will not come. All these problems existed in Syria. Do not steal your brother’s shoes, and so on.

Returning Home and Preventing Re-emasculation

Returning home from jihad has been a mental challenge to many jihadists, especially those who had joined IS. The organization’s utopian state-building project was based on rejecting the past by moving to the caliphate as a land of no return. In an IS recruitment film, for example, jihadists were shown symbolically burning their passports in a campfire.⁶⁹ Some returnees have been able to find work and live rather normal lives, but others have found it difficult to deal with the fact that the utopian project failed as the caliphate collapsed.

This also involves the risk of experiencing re-emasculation, i.e. being again deprived of what one sees as a positive male identity. Indeed, among many militaries there has been an ethos that dying in battle is better than being taken captive or leaving the battlefield without having achieved victory. For example, the famous “Travis Letter” written by commander William Barret Travis during the Battle of the Alamo in 1836 was signed “Victory or Death”.⁷⁰

However, even if the jihadist project failed, returning home does not need to lead to a sense of re-emasculation, as the events can be framed as something else than a defeat. Mazen pointed out that the battle cry of Muslim armies has not been victory or death but Allahu akhbar, God is greater. Before he died in battle in Syria, Bilal explained that it means that “Allah is greater than anything, no matter what happens”, even greater than what may seem like a defeat. Thus, he did not see the outcome of the battle as affecting his manhood: “You just fight. The rest is up to Allah”. Abdullah also said that in the early history of Islam there were examples of the Prophet and his companions losing battles: “Fighting bravely is what a Muslim man can do. But you must be certain that the fight will continue, just like it did in the past”. Thus, losing a battle does not mean losing the war: “The victory belongs to the ones who have sabr [i.e. patience]. You must understand that Allah’s time is different”.

Ahmed, who fought in Afghanistan, also explained that if you do not die in battle, i.e. “if you do not become a shahid [i.e. a martyr], you will be a ghazi [i.e. someone who fights for Islam] ”. He further explained that “it was common for some people to come over for the summer to train and then go back home. Even training is a contribution to jihad”. Although the local mujahideen looked down upon such jihad tourists, just having been to the conflict zone could be seen as some sort of capital and source of respect in the radical circles upon returning home. However, when time passes and nothing new happens, there is a risk that some returnees fall back into experiencing the duller everyday life as meaningless and re-emasculating after having gone through the ultimate male adventure with one’s friends. Indeed, being in a position of marginal masculinity, which in this case is the opposite of the hegemonic position of heroic jihadist hypermasculinity, can be experienced as emasculation and therefore jeopardize one’s social identity.⁷¹

Therefore, lacking equally appealing jihadist conflict zones that are equally easy to access, some have instead (re)established contacts with gangs. Such contacts can be easy for especially those who had a criminal background before leaving for Syria. Indeed, as many as two thirds of the Swedish jihadists in Syria may have had a criminal record.⁷² However, while gangs may offer excitement and a context for using violence that can create a sense of hypermasculinity—and even drugs to sooth one’s anxieties—they do not offer the same kind of heroic hypermasculinity as did jihad. A brotherhood violently defending its territory in Sweden can become a partial substitute for a brotherhood violently defending its territory in Syria, but rather than entirely leaving the jihadist identity, some individuals create dual identities to get the best of what both worlds have to offer. As Kareem explained:

There is a mix between them. It’s like they have their loyalty both to Islam—what’s in their heads, Islam then—and also to the gang. So they are like between the gang and between the jihadists. And these environments are close to each other. Because these jihadists talk a lot about sacrifice, martyrdom and weapons and things like that, and in that environment there is a lot of talk about being brothers and shooting and defending your territory. So it’s like the same talk. Both attract.

Conclusion

Connell argued that there exists a hierarchy of masculinities that includes not only men’s dominance over women but also the dominance of some masculinities (hegemonic masculinities) over other masculinities (marginalized masculinities).⁷³ The results of this study suggest that the construction of heroic jihadist hypermasculinity (i.e. the exaggeration of male stereotypical behavior such as violence and aggression), as a form of hegemonic masculinity plays, an important role in the local context of jihad, from the recruitment strategies to participating in jihad in the conflict zone, and then eventually returning to Sweden. This heroic jihadist hypermasculinity appeals to especially young men who find life in socio-economically vulnerable areas meaningless. As Aslam argues, socio-economic conditions can be associated with powerlessness and failed masculinities, which makes heroism a desirable escape.⁷⁴

As recruiters are well aware of the problems of possible recruits, notions of masculinity are also an important component of the recruitment strategies. As Kareem explained, he specifically targeted young men who lacked positive male role models, and then strove to become not only their imam but also their father to associate jihadist violence with ideal masculinity. Some of the recruits had also failed to achieve what was expected of a typical male, such as making money and getting married, which IS could offer in return for joining the organization.

However, rather than merely focusing on masculine failure, one of the main mobilization narratives of jihadists, for example, traveling to Syria, was to protect brothers and especially sisters in faith. In the long history of warfare, women have mostly been seen as the victims of war and men as their protectors.⁷⁵ As Young argued, this seemingly heroic but also patriarchal logic places women in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience.⁷⁶ This suited especially well IS as it created its gender-segregated proto-state and heroic version of hypermasculinity that many recruits found appealing because it stood in stark contrast to the Western societies where they had often felt a masculine failure in terms of lack of achievement and opportunities.

In the conflict zone, the use of violence and male socialization in the context of a brotherhood are two means for upholding heroic jihadist hypermasculinity. However, how it is expressed can vary depending on, for example, the social context and background of the jihadists, sometimes even finding an expression in the intersection of street culture and jihad. In the context of this study, for example, a peer group of “street guys from Biskopsgården” could find a meaningful but “mischievous” expression of heroic jihadist hypermasculinity that probably differed from some other jihadists’ experiences. Moreover, the warrior ideal of jihadists—the capacity for freedom and violence and possessing multiple talents—which is an expression of the heroic jihadist hypermasculinity, stands in stark contrast to the seemingly meaningless life that can be experienced as failed masculinity when growing up in socio-economically vulnerable areas.

The world of jihad is extremely patriarchal with clear gender roles. Those who are critical of the feminist ideas and gender equality of Western societies, and perhaps even associate them with their own experiences of masculine failure, can find jihadist groups and the heroic hypermasculinity they offer appealing. In the world of jihad, women are mothers who produce more jihadists, while the strongest emotions are found within the confines of a brotherhood of jihadists. This male bonding, galvanized by strong emotions, further strengthens heroic jihadist hypermasculinity by exaggerating male stereotypical behavior emphasizing physical strength, aggression, and control over women.

Returning home has been a mental challenge to many jihadists, especially those who had joined IS. However, this does not mean that one will automatically reexperience failed masculinity that may have been one of the factors contributing to the decision to join the jihad. Indeed, defeats on the battlefield can be framed as not being decisive for the war if one sees the conflict in a longer time perspective and argues that it continues under God’s providence. However, when time passes, there is still a risk that some returnees will fall back into experiencing the duller everyday life as meaningless and emasculating after having gone through the ultimate male adventure with one’s friends. To avoid re-entering a position of marginal masculinity, which can be experienced as emasculation and therefore jeopardize one’s social identity,⁷⁷ some returnees have established contacts with gangs. While gangs may offer excitement and a context for using violence that can create a sense of hypermasculinity, they do not offer the same kind of heroic hypermasculinity as did jihad, which has in some cases led to dual identities to get the best of both worlds.

Just like IS’s apocalyptic worldview,⁷⁸ its hypermasculine worldview serves as a liberating mechanism and a way to regain control over a situation perceived as hopeless. The jihadists’ embrace of this worldview is an example of the discursive journey of jihadiship that includes problems, such as a perception of society as an obstacle, and solutions that change when new circumstances emerge.⁷⁹ For some, the first solution was to leave the world of masculine failure behind and move to Syria to protect Muslim women, but also other expressions of jihadist heroic hypermasculinity emerged on the battlefield. And when returning home, new strategies are needed so as not to slip back into a sense of masculine failure. Although heroic jihadist hypermasculinity, as a form of hegemonic masculinity that contrasts with previous experiences of masculine failure, is an essential component of many jihadists’ experiences, future studies should analyze how jihadists’ different backgrounds and social contexts can lead to different expression of masculinities.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Laura Sjoberg and Caron. E. Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics. (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2007); Nelly Lahoud, “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women from Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 5 (2014): 780–802; Amanda N. Spencer, “The Hidden Face of Terrorism: An Analysis of the Women in Islamic State,” Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 3 (2016): 74–98; Elizabeth Pearson, “Online as the New Frontline: Affect, Gender, and ISIS-Take-Down on Social Media,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41, no. 11 (2018): 850–874; Mia Bloom and Ayse Lokmanoglu, “From Pawn to Knights: The Changing Role of Women’s Agency in Terrorism?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 46, no. 4 (2023): 399–414.

2 Sune Qvotrup Jensen and Jeppe Fuglsang Larsen, “Sociological Perspectives on Islamist Radicalization: Bridging the Micro/macro Gap,” European Journal of Criminology 18, no. 3 (2021): 430.

3 Ibid.

4 David Duriesmith and Noor Huda Ismail, “Militarized Masculinities Beyond Methodological Nationalism: Charting the Multiple Masculinities of an Indonesian Jihadi,” International Theory: A Journal of International Politics, Law and Philosophy 11, no. 2 (2019): 139–159; David Duriesmith and Noor Huda Ismail, “Masculinities and Disengagement from Jihadi Networks: The Case of Indonesian Militant Islamists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (advance online publication) doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2034220.

5 David Duriesmith, “Hybrid Warriors and the Formation of New War Masculinities: A Case Study of Indonesian Foreign Fighters,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 7, no. 1 (2018): 1–16.

6 Andrea Chiovenda, Crafting Masculine Selves: Culture, War, and Psychodynamics in Afghanistan (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020).

7 Ibid.; Maleeha Aslam, Gender Based Explosions: The Nexus Between Muslim Masculinities, Jihadist Islamism and Terrorism (New York, NY: United Nations Press, 2012).

8 Shenila Khoja-Moolji, Sovereign Attachments: Masculinity, Muslimness, and Affective Politics in Pakistan (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2021).

9 Dallin Van Leuven, Dyan Mazuran, and Rachel Gordon, “Analysing the Recruitment and Use of Foreign Men and Women in ISIL through a Gender Perspective,” in Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond, eds. Andrea de Guttry, Francesca Capone, and Christophe Paulussen (The Hague, The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016), 97–120.

10 Guy Fricano, “Horizontal and Vertical Honour in the Statements of Osama Bin Laden,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 5, no. 2 (2012): 204.

11 Joshua M. Roose, Political Islam and Masculinity: Muslim Men in Australia (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); see also Joshua M. Roose, Michael Flood, Alan Greig, Mark Alfano, and Simon Copland, Masculinity and Violent Extremism (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

12 Michael Kimmel, Misfraiming Men, The Politics of Contemporary Masculinities (London, UK: Rutdgers University Press, 2010).

13 R. W. Connell, Masculinities (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995).

14 Ibid.

15 Michael Kimmel, Healing from Hate: How Young Men Get Into—and Out of—Violent Extremism (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2018).

16 James, W. Messerschmidt, Nine Lives: Adolescent Masculinities, the Body, and Violence (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000); James, W. Messerschmidt, Flesh & Blood: Adolescent Gender Diversity and Violence. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Frank J. Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity: The Case of the U.S. Navy,” Gender, Work and Organization 3, no. 3 (1996): 129–142.

17 R. W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” Gender & Society 19, no. 6 (2005): 829–859.

18 James W. Messerschmidt and Achim Rohde, “Osama Bin Laden and His Jihadist Global Hegemonic Masculinity.” Gender & Society 32, no. 5 (2018): 663–685.

19 Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity”, 130.

20 Marco Nilsson, Jihadism in Scandinavia: Motivations, Experiences, and Change (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 10.

21 Raymond M. Lee, Doing Research on Sensitive Topics (London, UK: Sage Publications, 1993): 63–69.

22 Liz Spencer, Jane Ritchie, and William O’Connor, “Analysis: Practices, Principles and Processes,” in Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, eds. Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis (London, UK: Sage, 2013), 199–218.

23 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology,” Qualitative Research in Psychology 3, no. 2 (2006); 77–101.

24 Approval number 2021-01245.

25 Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 961.

26 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).

27 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam (Memphis, TN: Rhodes College, 2004).

28 Robert S. Leiken, Europe’s Angry Muslims: The Revolt of the Second Generation (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 157.

29 Dafina Shala, Temarapport: Hvilken bakgrunn har personer som frekventerer ekstreme islamistiske miljøer i Norge før de blir radikalisert? (Oslo, Norway: Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2016).

30 Janet Batsleer, “Against Role Models. Tracing the Histories of Manliness in Youth Work. The Cultural Capital of Respectable Masculinity,” Youth & Policy 1. no. 113 (2014): 15–30.

31 Martin Robb, Brigid Featherstone, Sandy Ruxton and Michael Ward, Beyond Male Role Models: Gender Identities and Work with Young Men (Milton Keynes, UK: The Open University, 2015), 30. https://wels.open.ac.uk/sites/wels.open.ac.uk/files/files/BMRM_report.pdf.

32 Karisman Roberts-Douglass and Harriet Curtis-Boles, “Exploring Positive Masculinity Development in African American Men: A Retrospective Study,” Psychology of Men and Masculinity 14, no. 1 (2013): 7–15.

33 Niusha Jones, Blair Kidwell, and Anne Hamby, “Success Is Not Final; Failure Is Not Fatal: How Failure Versus Success Messaging Leads to Preference for Masculine Brands,” Journal of Marketing Research (advance online publication) doi.org/10.1177/00222437231181078.

34 Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla, ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate (McLean, VA: Advances Press, 2016), 79.

35 Craig T. Palmer and Christopher F. Tilley, “Sexual Access to Females as a Motivation for Joining Gangs: An Evolutionary Approach,” The Journal of Sex Research 32, no. 3 (1995): 213–217.

36 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, Be Afraid. Be a Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2014).

37 Thomas Hegghammer, “Revisiting the Poverty-terrorism Link in European Jihadism”. Society for Terrorism Research Annual Conference. Leiden, The Netherlands, November 8, 2016; Peter R. Neumann, Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

38 Linus Gustafsson and Magnus Ranstorp, Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: An Analysis of Open-source Intelligence and Statistical Data (Stockholm, Sweden: Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies, 2017).

39 Patricio Galvez and Joakim Medin, Amanda: Min Dotters Resa till IS (Stockholm, Sweden: Verbal Förlag, 2022), 52, 72–74.

40 Ibid., 57.

41 Duriesmith, “Hybrid Warriors and the Formation of New War Masculinities,” 7.

42 Abdul Ghaffar El-Almani, Mein Weg nach Jannah (n.p. 2010), 52–53.

43 Joshua S. Goldstein, War and Gender (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 251–252.

44 Iris Marion Young, “The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections of the Current Security State,” Signs 21, no. 1 (2003): 2.

45 Jonathan Ilan and Sveinung Sandberg, “How ‘Gangsters’ Become Jihadists: Bourdieu, Criminology and the Crime–terrorism Nexus,” European Journal of Criminology 16, no. 3 (2019): 278–294.

46 Qvotrup Jensen and Fuglsang Larsen, “Sociological Perspectives on Islamist Radicalization,” 432.

47 Manni Crone, “Radicalization Revisited: Violence, Politics and the Skills of the Body,” International Affairs 92, no. 3 (2016): 587–604.

48 Bruce Lawrence, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden (New York, NY: Verso, 2005), 89.

49 Ibid., 90.

50 Kimmel, Healing from Hate.

51 Lawrence, Messages to the World, 155.

52 Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity”.

53 James W. Messerschmidt, Masculinities and Crime (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993).

54 Roose, Political Islam and Masculinity, 86.

55 Hafez and Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle,” 960.

56 Scott Matthew Kleinmann, “Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni Militants in the United States: Comparing Converts and Non-converts,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 4 (2012): 278–297.

57 Khoja-Moolji, Sovereign Attachments.

58 Thomas Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism after the Iraq War,” The Middle East Journal 60, no. 1 (2006): 14.

59 Aslam, Gender Based Explosions, 272.

60 Ibid., 275.

61 Melissa Johnston and Jacqui True, Misogyny and Violent Extremism: Implications for Preventing Violent Extremism (Melbourne, Australia: Monash University, 2019).

62 Katharina Von Knop,” The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 5 (2007): 397–414; Farhat Haq, “Militarism and Motherhood: The Women of the Lashkar-i-Tayyabia in Pakistan,” Signs 32, no. 4 (2007): 1023–1046; Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford, and Ross Frenett, Becoming Mulan? Female Western Migrants to ISIS (London, UK: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015); Elizabeth Pearson, “Wilayat Shahidat: Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and the Question of the Female Suicide Bomber,” in Boko Haram Behind the Headlines: Analyses of Africa’s Enduring Insurgency, ed. Jacob Zenn (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2018), 33–52.

63 Maryam Khalid. “Gender, Orientalism and Representations of the ‘Other’ in the War on Terror,” Global Change, Peace & Security 23, no. 1 (2011): 20; Ryan S. Ogilvy, “Military Masculinity,” in The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia Gender and Sexuality Studies, ed. Nancy A. Naples (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 1.

64 Global Gender Gap Report 2023 (Gologny/Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2023). https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-gender-gap-report-2023/in-full/benchmarking-gender-gaps-2023/#global-results.

65 Cynthia Enloe, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 107.

66 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, “Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC),” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 2 (2009): 499.

67 Milette Shamir and Jennifer Travis, “Introduction,” in Boys Don’t Cry: Rethinking Narratives of Masculinity and Emotions in the U.S., eds. Milette Shamir and Jennifer Travis (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), 1.

68 Duriesmith, “Hybrid Warriors and the Formation of New War Masculinities,” 5.

69 “French Isis Fighters Filmed Burning Passports and Calling for Terror at Home,” The Guardian, November 20, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/20/french-isis-fighters-filmed-burning-passports-calling-for-terror.

70 “Travis’ 1836 Victory or Death Letter from the Alamo,” Texas State Library, 2017, https://www.tsl.texas.gov/travis-letter.

71 Kimmel, Healing from Hate.

72 Amir Rostami, Joakim Sturup, Hernan Mondani, Pia Thevselius, Jerzy Sarnecki, and Christofer Edling, “The Swedish Mujahideen: An Exploratory Study of 41 Swedish Foreign Fighters Deceased in Iraq and Syria,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43, no. 5 (2020): 382–395.

73 Connell, Masculinities.

74 Aslam, Gender Based Explosions.

75 Goldstein, War and Gender, 251–252.

76 Young, “The Logic of Masculinist Protection,” 2.

77 Kimmel, Healing from Hate.

78 Nilsson, Jihadism in Scandinavia, 241; Marco Nilsson, “Jihad after the Fall of IS: Reframing the Apocalyptic Narrative,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (advance online publication) doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2297318.

79 Nilsson, Jihadism in Scandinavia, 11.