Measuring Garrison States in International Politics: Towards a New ‘Garrison Index’

Abstract

What is the role played by Garrison States – actors in which domestic and external decision-making is subjected mainly to security considerations – in global politics? A wide array of literature has attributed the notion of Garrison states to a myriad of state actors. However, a robust empirical account remains vague and ill-defined. This paper lays the foundations for measuring Garrison states, introducing an index mapping their development over time, focusing on the period between 1990–2020. Based on an empirically informed discussion, the paper explores the case of the most highly Garrison state in this index – Israel.

In both the humanities and social sciences, certain concepts become widely recognized among scholars and practitioners, even though their definitions and applications may remain somewhat ambiguous. One such concept is the “Garrison State,” a term broadly used to describe highly militarized states deeply engaged in ongoing conflicts and focused intensely on security issues. Introduced by Harold Lasswell in 1941, the concept of a Garrison State originally referred to societies dominated by their defense establishments, where military priorities override other socio-political concerns, positioning the military as the primary domestic influence. Over time, this term has been applied to various countries that exhibit such characteristics in the international arena, with at least a dozen states frequently labeled as Garrison States. Notable examples include the U.S., Israel, South Korea, North Korea, Iran, the Russian Federation, China, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, among others. This paper addresses this theme by offering a refined conceptualization of Garrison states and – for the first time – laying the foundations for a unified measurement, introducing an original dataset that maps the development of this phenomenon between 1990–2020. This effort allows for a more nuanced discussion of this multilayered construct. The results reveal that the top Garrison States in this analysis include (in descending order) Israel, Pakistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Algeria, Syria, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Jordan, and Thailand. The paper discusses the logic underpinning the construction of this index, followed by a discussion of the distinctiveness of the Israeli case. In this country, security considerations have always played the most dominant role in domestic politics and foreign policy, a phenomenon that has become even more pertinent since the October 2023 attack and its aftermath – the eruption of a broad regional confrontation between Israel and various non-state actors, as well as an unprecedented direct clash with Iran (April 2024).

Garrison States – a History of a Concept

Harold Lasswell’s seminal conceptualization of Garrison States¹ depicts an extreme domestic environment in which ‘specialists in violence’ (i.e. the various realms of the security establishment) attain the vast majority of access to power and decision-making within state apparatuses and institutions. Under these circumstances, states experience a process of militarization², resulting in national policies that inevitably become subject to the security establishment’s real or perceived security considerations. In a reality of the superiority of security, the authority and special status of the security establishment constitute a domestic veto power. Under these circumstances, military apparatuses gain effective control and dominance over core facets of society and pivot domestic decision-making across issue areas.

Empowered and prioritized, security establishments navigate domestic and external policies and essentially gain control over resource allocation and prioritization³, further militarizing the political system (Kim 2019) and thriving under national states of emergency⁴. The prospects for military involvement in politics can further increase when substantial territorial threats are in place, undermining democracy and hindering democratization efforts in transitional states⁵, also increasing the conflict propensity when power is shared between military and civilian establishments⁶. Consistent with this construct, increased military involvement in politics was also shown to be associated with internal threats⁷, including threats related to domestic terrorism⁸. On a more general note, military regimes have been shown to exist in circumstances of increasingly external territorial threats. Within this setting, military regimes are more likely to resort to the use of force⁹. Military supremacy over domestic decision-making also tilts the balance concerning the core principle of civilian control over political navigation¹⁰ – widely understood as the ability of civilian elites to exert control over military preferences when at odds over national policy-making¹¹. Insufficient control over the military establishment contributes to destabilization in numerous primary issue areas, including the ability to formulate and execute foreign policy¹² or to cope with significant domestic unrest¹³ while effectively harnessing the military echelon by civilian leaders is essential for wartime grand strategy¹⁴. Classic interpretations have also warned of the malign implications of excessive militarization on the modern state system’s societal fabric and national identity, emphasizing that in extreme cases, the transformation into a militarized society may encourage the development of totalitarian regime features, mainly when fueled by expansionist ambitions. These extreme conditions tend to become more likely when militaries overtly control the significant policies of the society¹⁵. Ultimately, a balanced view of militarized societies must consider not merely the size and capabilities of the military but also who controls these apparatuses and to what end.

Lasswell’s seminal conceptualization of Garrison states has drawn several competing, closely related interpretations. A Similar type of securitized state was advanced by Dibble, referring to Garrison Societies¹⁶ – constructs characterized by heavy military influence on civilian life, with boundaries between military and civilian slowly breaking down. Another linked typology, known as the Contract State – a system where most domestic resources are extracted for military purposes¹⁷ – was introduced by Friedberg to characterize the U.S. conduct at the height of the Cold War in the 1950s¹⁸. This notion of allocating infinite funds toward defense was also used to describe the dynamic between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Indeed, the school of thought highlighting securitization – the social construction of security, a shift of the classic, robust definition of security to new facets (including economic, environmental, and social) – also builds partly on the classic premises of Garrison states. As these approaches commonly highlight, norms and ideas are increasingly shaping the security behavior of states¹⁹, leading specialized audiences and state actors to reinterpret a once non-security issue as a security issue²⁰. In securitization, state interests are constructed rather than merely existing, and security policies are shaped by contested identities within a society, subject to constant moral evaluation. As such, any State may perceive itself as a Garrison actor.

While initially mainly attributed to authoritarian regimes, a later adaptation of the original concept of Garrison States had acknowledged the possibility of a democratic garrison state, with eroding civilian control of the military establishment and an increasingly narrowing power distribution. Indeed, a handful of modern democratic states were suggested to possess characteristics similar to the garrison construct. Most prominently, a vast body of literature found security concerns to be the most influential theme in foreign and domestic policy-making in Israel²¹, with an emphasis on the role of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as the cornerstone of this reality²². This notion sparked a debate in the literature on the underpinnings of the garrison construct in the Israeli context, emphasizing the uniqueness of its civil-military societal structure²³. Yet, the Israeli context is not the sole illustration of this phenomenon among well-established democracies. South Korea, which, like Israel, has been facing a severe security challenge from an adjacent neighbor (North Korea) since its establishment, was also dubbed as the Garrison type²⁴. In both countries, evidence suggests civilian administrators were influenced by the military establishment in multilateral treaty-making through securitization processes, subjecting ratification deliberations to perceived security threats²⁵. As noted by Bernazzoli and Flint, the notion of securitization –particularly the increased military involvement in various aspects of society – is consistent with Lasswell’s interpretation of constrained democratic behavior among garrison states²⁶. The U.S. was too dubbed a Garrison state on account of its long-standing involvement in Cold War-era global conflicts and its vast military-industrial complex²⁷. While these accounts circle the notion of Garrison states, they lack a grounded and unified definition of the term, shying away from operationalization. More specifically, as the next section argues, the swift labeling of state actors as Garrison states lacks proper analytical and empirical rigor, interchangeably applying this term as a common phrase, used and understood in various subjective meanings.

Identifying the Garrison Prototype

What are the empirical tenets of the Garrison State? A modern-day Sparta should primarily centralize an unproportionate amount of its resources towards preparing for a real or perceived national security threat. Bernazzoli and Flint (2010) pose that the concept could be characterized by “an increasing proportion of the political and economic elite consisting of military professionals and militarized civilians”, while Esman sees national security requirements as surpassing any other national priority (i.e. economic, scientific and cultural), hence compromising individual rights²⁸. This view aligns with Friedberg’s influential account (1992), emphasizing that this concept could be measured via domestic defense spending (per capita or as a percentage of national income) and the number of personnel in the armed forces. Wallerstein’s concept of the Global System also assumes a high level of militarization, under which powerful nations harness their power to maintain and assert their dominance using their military and security forces. This state of affairs is rooted in deep inequality between the global north and the global south, manifested through various means, including militarization and the use of force²⁹.

A wide array of literature has attributed the notion of Garrison states to many state actors in the global arena. This non-exhaustive list of ‘usual suspects’ includes the U.S., which has been involved in numerous direct and secondary military interventions throughout the last century and where the defense establishment occupies a particularly dominant role in national policy-making on all levels³⁰. Another prominent actor in this dimension is Israel – where security concerns were repeatedly described to constitute the most influential and dominant aspect of decision-making, provided its unique conflicted regional status since the country’s establishment³¹, as well as South Korea and North Korea, for rather obvious reasons pertaining to the decades-long historic conflict on the Korean Peninsula³², and the vast military investment and societal militarization. These key actors are often joined by Iran, which has engaged in regional wars, as well as domestic repression of opposition forces since the 1979 Islamic revolution,³³ and Russia – a conventional and nuclear superpower whose military and security forces occupy the utmost positions in Moscow, steering Russian foreign policy for decades³⁴. Another prominent, allegedly Garrison actor, is China, considering its massive state-sponsored surveillance system and its powerful military and security establishment’s prominent role in all aspects of politics³⁵. Others that were said to be characterized with Garrison features include Saudi Arabia, on account of role that the military and other security forces play in shaping domestic and foreign policy³⁶; Syria, as a country which has been experienced a ravaging civil war for over a decade, as well as several regional wars and hostilities, coupled with a tight securitized governmental control over the lives of its citizens³⁷; Vietnam, a victim of Cold-War global power struggles and since then a rising regional military actor³⁸; Turkey, due to the strong influence of the military in its political and social affairs, including several attempted coups throughout the last decades³⁹; Jordan, on account of the unique role that the military holds in its tribal-monarchy relations⁴⁰; Singapore, provided its historic investment and focus on security, and its close security relationship with (among others) the U.S and Israel⁴¹, and Lebanon, on account of its reliance on foreign military assistance and complex history of inter-state and civil wars⁴². Established and transitioning military dictatorships, e.g. present-day military juntas in Mali and Myanmar⁴³, or other military-dominant regimes in Pakistan⁴⁴ and Brazil⁴⁵, were also said to possess a great deal of the garrison-type qualities, emphasizing the notion of ‘controlling the gun’, or in other words – exerting effective control over state violence, sidelining civilian leaders. Indeed, all these states (and others) are characterized as more heavily concentrated on security compared with those actors within the global sphere, which rarely participate in any form of military conflict. Nonetheless, whether they should automatically be dubbed Garrison remains vague and disputed, especially as militarism (including high military spending and significant arms imports) was also said to represent insurance policies for international protection rather than a mere indication of extreme securitization⁴⁶. The following section offers an empirical measurement to cope with this uncertainty, grounded in a combination of traditional military power metrics and an assessment of the role of militarism in society and politics.

Towards a Garrison States Index

As outlined above, in addressing the notion of Garrison states, a wide range of conceptualizations is used to highlight the underpinnings of the term. As many of these dimensions are highly correlated, including them individually in a single regression is impossible. Therefore, the paper develops an index of Garrison states, covering its most important aspects – both in ‘hard power’ features and in the realm of political-societal aspects of militarism. The latter is inseparable from the size of military apparatuses, as literature on the topic has been deeply concerned about military supremacy over civilian control and the reach of this dominance across society. While many attributes are found in the literature, few possess sufficient empirical qualities and cover an expansive set of years and states. Several core components stand out in their relevance for operationalization and prevalence in the literature:

1. The amount of armed forces personnel⁴⁷ – this indicator, with data availability between 1985–2021, is based on two sources of data: The first is collected by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) data from national governments⁴⁸, comprised of active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces, conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves, as a share of the total labor force; The second is based on the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) – which captures, among other indicators, the amount of military personnel among all states between 1816–2016⁴⁹, adjusted to population size. This indicator is particularly costly, as according to the World Bank, high military expenditures heavily burden the economy and affect growth.

2. Military expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product⁵⁰ – This indicator (with data availability between 1949–2022) varies significantly between risk-affected governments. According to the World Bank, it encompasses all expenditures on the armed forces (including peacekeeping forces, paramilitary forces, defense ministries, and other government agencies engaged in defense projects). This broad definition includes expenditures on retirement pensions, social services for personnel, operation and maintenance, procurement, military research and development, and military aid⁵¹. Even among NATO member states, this indicator enormously fluctuates: while (to date) Greece, the U.S, Poland, the UK, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania spend over 2% on defense, Germany, the Netherlands, Albania, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Canada, Slovenia, Belgium and Spain spend less than 1.5%. Indeed, this has caused significant friction within the Alliance, including heavy pressure by then-U.S President Trump for domestic policy shifts⁵².

3. Arms exports and arms imports⁵³ – With data availability between 1950–2023, this comprehensive dataset (Arms Transfers Database) encompasses all transfers of major conventional weapons since 1950, covering weapons suppliers and recipients worldwide. A prominent defense industrial complex and enhanced arms purchased constitute an immense signal for militarization and increased nationalism within societies, further fueling the narrative of insecurity.

4. Terrorist attacks⁵⁴ – A comprehensive dataset containing information on domestic and global terrorist attacks between 1970–2020, an overall of more than 200,000 cases (e.g., bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings), based on millions of open-source reports. In societies heavily affected by terrorism, the danger of militarization and societal radicalization becomes more apparent⁵⁵, and the emphasis on securitization weighs heavily on identity and domestic decision-making⁵⁶. Moreover, a prevalence of terrorist attacks is associated with increasing defense spending and domestic resource allocation⁵⁷.

5. Conflict recurrence⁵⁸ - This indicator covers 1989–2018, building on previous data on organized violence⁵⁹. The dataset identifies 347 recurring conflict episodes (close to 35% of all conflict dyads), tracing their recurrence and development. Recurring conflicts stem from various reasons, including tensions over natural resources⁶⁰, poverty, scarcity, and societal marginalization⁶¹. Nonetheless, the myriad of conflictual origins highlights that recurrent conflicts constitute a marker of highly militarized societies.

6. Military Participation in Government (MPG) and Military Dimension Index (MDI) – measuring the amount of cabinet-level government positions held by military officers between 1964–2008⁶², MPG maps the full breadth of military-political participation in decision-making, corresponding to the attributes of Garrison States. The prominence of civilian leaders in state-level decision-making is a hallmark of the effort to balance civil-military relations, especially among democracies. As this indicator is only available through 2008, the years 2009–2020 are then covered by the Military Dimension Index (MDI), part of the widely used V-Dem democracy index⁶³, which maps the extent to which the power base of the chief executive is determined by the military⁶⁴.

7. Civilian Control Scores (CCS) – a dataset that provides measurements for the extent of civilian control in political decision-making and the military’s involvement in the political process⁶⁵, widely cited in contemporary literature on civil-military relations⁶⁶. This dataset is available for all countries between 1946–2010, further substantiating the socio-political roots of the Garrison construct.

The variables were consolidated into a unified index through a methodologically rigorous statistical approach to capture multiple dimensions. For the analysis, each variable was transformed into an index ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate a greater alignment with Garrison characteristics (with 1 representing the maximal Garrison state). The weights for these variables were derived using principal components analysis (PCA), selecting 1990 as the base year. In this context, PCA decomposes the variance of the included variables, optimizing the weights to maximize the variance explained by the first principal component. Consequently, this index efficiently encapsulates the variation within the data. This technique proves particularly valuable when dealing with complex constructs like Garrison states, where multiple sub-components reflect diverse facets of the overarching concept. The same procedure is applied to the index. Finally, less than 2% of missing observations are included thanks to the reliance on expansive datasets with spread-out coverage on a global scale.

Firstly, the index accounts for the amount of armed forces personnel as a share of the total labor force in a given state. As this population occupies a larger share of the active workforce, the perception of militarization is greatly enhanced, resulting in a constant sense of emergency – a core component for Garrison states. The second component is the extent of military expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), assuming that prioritizing the security sphere over all other dimensions contributes to the Garrison character. Thirdly, the state’s arms exports and imports were taken into account – portraying the strength of the local defense industry (highly specialized arms and military equipment manufacturers, including advanced cyber and intelligence capabilities) and the country’s efforts to invest funds in importing arms, capabilities, and knowledge. States that prioritize this segment are necessarily absorbed in constant management of the national security dimension. Fourth, the notion of Garrison states involves a clear-eyed assessment of the share of violent events in a given country, most prominently terrorist attacks, because of their relative prevalence within highly conflicted areas and the vast effect they entail on the perception of national security⁶⁷. The index also accounts for the persistence and reappearance of armed conflicts globally, using the Conflict Recurrence Database (CRD). To address the notion of civilian control of the military or lack thereof – a crucial feature of garrison regimes⁶⁸ – the index integrates the amount of cabinet-level positions held by military officers, the extent of civilian control in political decision-making, the extent to which the power base of the chief executive is determined by the military, and the involvement of the military in the political process. These structures are critical to prevent disproportionate military influence, leading to the prioritization of military interests over civil liberties, eroding democratic principles, and overshadowing considerations of trust in government, accountability, and responsiveness to the general public.

All the measurements mentioned above cover the timeframe between 1990–2020, which offers a broad account of Garrison states in the post-Cold War era. Earlier years were limited in data availability, capturing an utterly transformed global architecture, during which many of today’s sovereign states were non-existent (e.g. former Soviet republics alone account for fifteen states today). Examining the results, the top ten Garrison states in the analysis include (in descending order) Israel, Pakistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Algeria, Syria, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Jordan, and Thailand (see Table 1).

Table 1. Top-10 Garrison states, 1990–2020.

	Country	Adjusted Garrison Score (1 is highest)	Prominent Garrison Criteria
1	Israel	1	Military expenditure; Arms exports, Conflict recurrence
2	Pakistan	0.793	Civilian control; Conflict recurrence; Arms imports
3	Iraq	0.747	Terrorist attacks; Armed forces personnel
4	Myanmar	0.746	Military in cabinet; Civilian control; Conflict recurrence
5	Algeria	0.739	Civilian control; Arms imports; Terrorist attacks
6	Syria	0.721	Armed forces personnel; Civilian control
7	Turkey	0.716	Armed forces personnel; Arms exports; Terrorist attacks
8	Russia	0.699	Arms exports; Military in cabinet
9	Jordan	0.685	Armed forces personnel; Military exp.; Terrorist attacks
10	Thailand	0.661	Military in cabinet; Civilian control; Terrorist attacks

Figure one demonstrates the development of this trend, as Israel consistently occupies the most prominent position among the top three Garrison states, barring the end of the first decade of the 2000s, when Pakistan’s military influence on the regime peaks (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Top-3 Garrison states, 1990–2020.

Table 2 depicts the country-year list of most Garrison states according to the index.

Table 2. Top-3 Garrison states, 1990–2020.

	Most Garrison	Runner up	3^rd most Garrison
1990	Israel	Pakistan	Myanmar
1991	Israel	Syria	Korea
1992	Israel	Iraq	Syria
1993	Israel	Syria	Iraq
1994	Israel	Myanmar	Russia
1995	Israel	Iraq	Turkey
1996	Israel	Iraq	Turkey
1997	Israel	Eritrea	Thailand
1998	Israel	Singapore	Syria
1999	Israel	Turkey	Singapore
2000	Israel	Singapore	Pakistan
2001	Israel	Pakistan	Algeria
2002	Israel	Pakistan	Yemen
2003	Israel	Pakistan	Myanmar
2004	Israel	Pakistan	Syria
2005	Israel	Pakistan	Oman
2006	Israel	Pakistan	Syria
2007	Israel	Russia	U.S
2008	Israel	Pakistan	Iraq
2009	Israel	Pakistan	Algeria
2010	Pakistan	Israel	Yemen
2011	Israel	Pakistan	Algeria
2012	Israel	Pakistan	Turkey
2013	Israel	Pakistan	Algeria
2014	Israel	Pakistan	Algeria
2015	Israel	Pakistan	Iraq
2016	Pakistan	Israel	Russia
2017	Israel	Pakistan	Iraq
2018	Israel	Pakistan	Algeria
2019	Pakistan	Israel	Iraq

Nonetheless, Israel’s ongoing involvement in a widescale regional military confrontation since October 2023, which began with a war in Gaza following the attack of 7 October 2023 but has since expanded to multi-front clashes with Iran and its regional militias and proxies (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and Shiite rebels based in Iraq) – will undoubtfully deepen Israel’s Garrison score. More specifically, in December 2023, Prime Minister Netanyahu announced an increase in annual military spending by $8.3 billion⁶⁹, driving up spending on defense as a share of GDP. This step was necessary given the scale of the ongoing war and the outlook for the country’s reorientation into a defense-oriented posture. In a January 2024 Government session, Netanyahu acknowledged that the war “requires [Israel] to incur far greater security expenditures than we planned”, and promised to create a multi-year budgetary plan designed to “free the State of Israel from dependence on external acquisitions for many [military-grade] items”⁷⁰. Simultaneously, the IDF announced plans to increase the time conscripts and reservists serve in the military⁷¹, expanding the pool of active-duty soldiers available. According to recent estimates, these changes will significantly increase the number of active-duty reservists, with a view of a stagnating conflict and growing regional threats. Israel’s investment in arms imports is expected to increase as more capabilities in the defensive (e.g. air defenses) and offensive spheres are required. Even before October 2023, Israel was set to purchase 25 additional F-35 stealth jets⁷², and in January 2024, announced several key defense deals with U.S companies, including more

F-35 jets, a squadron of 25 F-15 fighter jets, and a squadron of 12 Apache helicopters⁷³. Another Garrison indicator that has surged as a result of the war is the number of terrorist attacks against Israel, which – according to monthly reports published by the Israeli Defense Agency (ISA) – has risen since October 2023 both in numerical terms and considering the number of casualties⁷⁴. Finally, in October 2023, a dedicated ‘war cabinet’ was created to navigate the confrontation, with substantial representation of former IDF Chiefs of the General Staff and one former Major General (Minister of Defense), adhering to the Garrison principle of military involvement in politics.

These findings also prompt a broader reconsideration of how the Garrison characterization is applied in different contexts. Specifically, they raise questions about the thresholds used to define a Garrison State: Is a 70% score on a garrison scale enough to warrant this label, or should the threshold be higher, perhaps 80%? Engaging in debates over these hypothetical benchmarks may seem unnecessary, as drawing a definitive line can be impractical and arbitrary. Instead, the research highlights the distinctive nature of the Israeli case. It warrants an examination of what sets Israel apart, even among the top ten heavily militarized, mobilized, and conflict-experienced nations classified as Garrison States.

What Separates Israel from the Rest?

Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, security considerations played the most dominant role in the country’s domestic politics and foreign policy⁷⁵. Israel’s powerful defense establishment acquired over the years a reputation for being a deciding factor, the pointer on the set of scales in Israel’s strategic thinking, and its support is vital to advance policies and foreign policy reforms⁷⁶. Freilich notes that the military holds the most developed mechanisms for policy development, assessment, and implementation within the Israeli system. He describes Israel’s external environment as unusually volatile, complex, and danger-fraught, justifying such prominent national preoccupation with security policy, systematically setting aside other civilian considerations. This notion was also dubbed a self-sense of national security exceptionalism⁷⁷, decreasing internal tensions and preserving society’s cohesion while distorting an actual domestic reality. The perception of security exceptionalism is so integral to Israeli society that it became a central theme of public discourse in issues not directly connected to security, such as decision-making on multilateral treaties related to the environment, human rights, and even gender equality⁷⁸.

This false sense of exceptionalism hampers national decision-making, subordinating foreign policy to security considerations as a form of ‘diplomacy in uniform’. Freilich states this dominance was especially evident in Israel’s first decades after independence, but it remains the underlying contemporary logic. Indeed, it can be suggested that Israel’s long-lasting state of emergency, which the Provisional Council of State enacted on the day of its establishment in 1948, plays a significant role in the shaping of this reality. The Knesset extended the state of emergency every six months for over 75 years. It allows for preserving British Mandate era legislation (e.g. the Prevention of Infiltration Law, which enabled the military to seize private property, and emergency laws for arrests and searches). In an interview with the author, Prof. Robbie Seibel, a former Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) legal adviser, explained that the permanent state of emergency played a vital role in the decision-making on fundamental human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR):

The MFA supported ratification ever since 1966. The main obstacle that stood in the way of ratification was Israel’s permanent state of emergency and the laws sustaining it. This created a conflict with the Ministry of Justice [MoJ]… until one-day Meridor [the minister of justice in 1990] took… [ratification] upon himself and became our knight in shining armor.

Other scholars shared this view and suggested that Israel refrained from ratifying the treaties due to potential claims of human rights violations in the occupied territories, highlighting the main concerns that were raised within the defense establishment⁷⁹. A similar sentiment was set forth by Col. Ret. Pnina Sharvit Baruch, former head of the Department for International Law of the Military Advocate General Unit in the IDF, who reiterated in an interview with the author that obstacles set forth by the IDF, as an integral part of Israel’s powerful security establishment, played crucial roles in the decision-making process on multilateral treaties decision-making, even in non-traditionally securitized issue areas:

When the defense establishment declares a certain issue as problematic…it’s nearly impossible to revolt…unless the Prime Minister himself interferes.

As the IDF and the security establishment became the leading pressure group in national decision-making, they formed robust security networks consisting of veterans holding senior positions in the state’s civilian spheres, including politics, economy, society, culture, and foreign relations⁸⁰. Those informal networks also maintained security considerations as their most prominent concern in their civilian positions. Members of such security networks include former IDF officers, retired Mossad (Israel’s External Intelligence Agency) and Shin-Bet (Israel’s Internal Security Agency), as well as professionals from among the ranks of the Ministry of Defense, police, military, and aerospace industry professionals, atomic agency personnel, etc.

A prominent recent example that speaks volumes of the crucial role played by the military and security establishment in the national realm lies in its involvement in the 2023 domestic debate over the attempts by the ruling Likud government to impose a judicial overhaul. In this context, the most potent opposition to the government’s plan to date has been sounded by a vast ex-military movement calling upon reserve Air Force pilots, among other key stakeholders, to withdraw from their voluntary positions among the IDF ranks. This effort was led by a group called ‘Brothers in Arms,’ representing thousands of ex-military and security personnel, some very senior, protesting the proposed legislative reforms, harnessing the reputation and widespread public legitimacy enjoyed by this institution. Public opinion polls consistently demonstrate that the general trust in the IDF and other security organizations remains high, and the Military enjoys the highest level of public trust, measuring at almost 80% in 2022⁸¹. Preliminary polls after the recent war in Gaza (October 2023 and February 2024) demonstrate a slight further increase in this trend, cementing the IDF’s status in the public eye. Nevertheless, as Figure 2 shows, while Israel persistently maintained its Garrison status throughout 1990–2020, several small-scale fluctuations remain apparent. As the country faced large-scale wars and military confrontations (such as the 1991 Gulf War, the second Intifada, and the 2014 war in Gaza), the garrison index became more dire. This trend is expected to follow suit following the October 2023 war in Gaza and its aftermath. Following this path, periods of widescale peace negotiations (the Oslo Accords, the peace agreement with Jordan in 1994–1995, the Obama-era peace process with the Palestinians and the Trump presidency) had a noticeable smoothening effect on the Garrison index.

Figure 2. Israel’s Garrison state, 1990–2020.

These findings align with the literature exploring the relationship between peace negotiations and militarization in Israel⁸² and a strand of peacebuilding literature suggesting that during an active peace process, societies experience a decrease in nationalism⁸³. This also bears implications for future investigation on the role that peace negotiations can play in protracted conflicts – e.g. Israel’s protracted conflict with the Palestinians – by decreasing their degree of Garrison characteristics and curbing the potentially malign role of the military-industrial complex in national decision-making.

Conclusions

This article aimed to provide empirical clarity on the practical meaning of “Garrison states” within contemporary global policy, especially given the term’s rising prominence with relations to various state actors in recent years. A detailed analysis of the most common characteristics of Garrison states across different national contexts yielded several intriguing findings with potential policy implications. Notably, of the top ten Garrison states identified, six are in the Middle East (Israel, Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan), three are in Asia (Pakistan, Myanmar, and Thailand), and one is a major global power – Russia. This geographical distribution underscores that, although conflict is prevalent in other regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, traditionally militarized and security-focused states remain predominant in their security orientations globally. This challenges the conventional notion that conflict zones are synonymous with Garrison states, highlighting instead that being in a conflictual environment is just one aspect of the broader Garrison state concept. The presence of military juntas, dictatorships, and military-supported regimes among the top Garrison states is particularly notable. For example, Pakistan (2^nd most Garrison) experienced a military coup in 1999 under General Pervez Musharraf, leading to political and financial instability that lasted until 2008. This period included the suspension of the constitution and a state of emergency declared in 2007. Post-2008, the military continued to wield significant influence in domestic politics, aligning with typical Garrison state characteristics. In Myanmar (4^th most Garrison), tensions between the military and civilian groups have been profound. The military junta ignored the 1990 electoral victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and detained its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite attempts at democratization and a brief civilian rule from 2015 to 2021, the military reclaimed control via a coup in 2021, reinstating their dominance. Thailand, ranking sixth on the Garrison index, has seen several military coups, most notably in the early 1990s and again in 2006 when Prime Minister Shinawatra was ousted. Despite new constitutions aimed at reducing military influence, the military has maintained a significant role in politics, solidified by the 2016 constitution that formalized this influence. Further, Thailand (10^th most Garrison) has also seen substantial military influence destabilizing its political landscape through repeated coups, as well as Eritrea and Mali (ranked 20 and 24, respectively). These instances underscore the central role of military regimes in the politics of Garrison states. Additionally, due to substantial military expenditures, Garrison states face heightened vulnerability during global financial crises. This is exemplified by NATO’s guideline that suggests members spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense, indicating an expectation for continued or increased military investment.

Finally, while the Garrison index introduces a new empirical mechanism that allows for a better understanding of the logic underpinning Garrison states, it warrants further conceptual and empirical inquiry to enhance the manifold meanings of contemporary security. The interpretation and underlying logic of this term are constantly shifting. While national security was once closely correlated with military aspects, new issue areas quickly became integral to national security, including the environment, human security, and societal cohesion. As these norms enter the public discourse, they hold varying degrees of potential for shaping state practices and modifying the interpretation of modern Garrison states. The Garrison index enables a more informed discussion of these pressing themes.

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to the participants of the annual convention of the International Studies Association (April 2024) and the annual meeting of the Israeli Association for International Studies (June 2023) for their helpful comments. Previous versions of this paper greatly benefited from comments by Dr. Charles Roger (Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals – IBEI) and colleagues at the NATO Defense College in Rome.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (1941): 455–68, https://doi.org/10.1086/218693.

2 Richelle M. Bernazzoli and Colin Flint, “Embodying the Garrison State? Everyday Geographies of Militarization in American Society,” Political Geography 29, no. 3 (2010): 157–66, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2010.02.014.

3 Milan W. Svolik, “Contracting on Violence: The Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military Intervention in Politics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 5 (2013): 765–94, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712449327.

4 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Nine American Antistatism and the Founding of the Cold War State,” in Nine American Antistatism and the Founding of the Cold War State (Princeton University Press, 1992), 239–66, https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691188270-011; Tine Hanrieder and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, “WHO Decides on the Exception? Securitization and Emergency Governance in Global Health,” Security Dialogue 45, no. 4 (2014): 331–48, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614535833; Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

5 Nam Kyu Kim, “External Territorial Threats and Military Regimes,” Political Research Quarterly 72, no. 4 (2019): 863–77; Jose Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813344.

6 Peter White, “Generals in the Cabinet: Military Participation in Government and International Conflict Initiation,” International Studies Quarterly 65, no. 2 (2021): 551–61, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab012.

7 Desch, Michael C., “Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment,” (Washington, DC: JHU Press, 2001).

8 Vincenzo Bove, Mauricio Rivera, Chiara Ruffa, “Beyond Coups: Terrorism and Military Involvement in Politics, 2020,” 2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066119866499.

9 Nam Kyu Kim, “Are Military Regimes Really Belligerent?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 6 (2018): 1151–78, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716684626.

10 Desch, Michael C., “Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment.”

11 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Harvard University Press, 2009).

12 Jessica L. Weeks, “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (2012): 326–47, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000111; Daehee Bak, Michael R. Kenwick, and Glenn Palmer, “Who’s Careful: Regime Type and Target Selection,” European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 4 (2016): 872–96, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115611479.

13 Christian Davenport, “State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 4 (2007): 485–504, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307078940.

14 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (Simon and Schuster, 2002); Jim Mattis and Kori N. Schake, Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military (Hoover Press, 2016).

15 S. E. Finer, “The Man on Horseback-1974,” Armed Forces & Society 1, no. 1 (1974): 5–27, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7400100102.

16 Frank Lindenfeld, Radical Perspectives on Social Problems; Readings in Critical Sociology (Macmillan, 1968).

17 H. L. Nieburg, In the Name of Science, Revised Edition/Third Printing (Quadrangle, 1970).

18 Friedberg, “Nine American Antistatism and the Founding of the Cold War State.”

19 Joseph Farrell, “Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry,” RAND Journal of Economics 18, no. 1 (1987): 34–39; Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (2008): 563–87, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066108097553

20 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Bill McSweeney, “The Politics of Neutrality: Focus on Security for Smaller Nations,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals 18, no. 1 (1987): 33–46.

21 Uriel Abulof, “Deep Securitization and Israel’s ‘Demographic Demon,’” International Political Sociology 8, no. 4 (2014): 396–415, https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12070; Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security and Foreign Policy (University of Michigan Press, 2009); Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak, Israel’s Security Networks: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 1st edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

22 Tamir Libel, “Explaining the Security Paradigm Shift: Strategic Culture, Epistemic Communities, and Israel’s Changing National Security Policy,” Defence Studies 16, no. 2 (2016): 144, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1165595.

23 Gabriel Sheffer, “Has Israel Really Been a Garrison Democracy? Sources of Change in Israel’s Democracy,” Israel Affairs 3, no. 1 (1996): 13–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/13537129608719406; Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Israeli Institutions at the Crossroads,” Israel Affairs 11, no. 2 (2005): 462–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/1353712042000326560.

24 Jai-Hyup Kim, The Garrison State in Pre-War Japan and Post-War Korea: A Comparative Analysis of Military Politics (University Press of America, 1978).

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31 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land; Sheffer, “Has Israel Really Been a Garrison Democracy?”; Abulof, “Deep Securitization and Israel’s ‘Demographic Demon.’”

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