Proliferation before Hiroshima: tracing the wartime diffusion of nuclear knowledge

ABSTRACT

Relatively simplistic conceptions of early nuclear history can sometimes prevail even among nonproliferation scholars. The dominance of the nation-state in historic and contemporary conceptions of nuclear-weapons development carries with it a temptation to treat nuclear-weapons acquisition as essentially linear: first one state and then another, with the United States as the point of origin for all weapons-relevant nuclear knowledge and 1945 as the effective year of proliferation studies’ birth. This article argues against such a view. It draws on a wide range of archival material to illustrate the surprisingly wide diffusion of nuclear knowledge prior to the bombing of Hiroshima, highlighting, first, the reciprocal nature of the early Anglo-American nuclear relationship, including the extent to which the United States benefited from external information; second, how connections within the British Empire enabled the participation of personnel from Australia and New Zealand in various aspects of British and American nuclear work during the war; and, third, the privileged access of French personnel to British and Canadian nuclear knowledge. The overall argument is that the early history of nuclear proliferation is more complex than is generally thought and that greater acknowledgment of these complexities may have contemporary value.

KEYWORDS:

• nuclear proliferation
• nuclear weapons
• empire
• World War II
• United Kingdom
• Australia
• Canada
• New Zealand
• France
• United States

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Sabine Clarke for her constructive comments on an early draft of this article and Joanna Kidd for having generously encouraged the initial research upon which the article is based.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964).

2 Two points on usage are important here. First, the term “British Commonwealth” was in this period used almost interchangeably with the older term “British Empire,” particularly when the increasing independence of territories outside the United Kingdom was being emphasized. The significance of the Commonwealth idea is discussed later in this article. Second, because the complexities of “British” identity across the British Commonwealth in the middle of the 20th century play a key part in the argument here, and because usage has changed considerably over time, it is worth noting that, unless otherwise qualified, use of the word “British” here refers to the character or interests of the entire British Empire (as seen from London), whereas “United Kingdom” or its abbreviation always refer to that state alone, distinct from other parts of the British Empire. The key point here is that, while parts of the British Empire enjoyed a significant degree of self-government and others were ruled directly from London, all were liable to be described as “British”; the label could overlap with other strongly asserted national identities both within the United Kingdom (Welsh, Scottish, English, and Irish) and beyond. In other words, an individual or an institution could be simultaneously British and, say, Australian, both legally and culturally (cf. sense 2 of the adjective in the New Oxford American Dictionary).

3 See, for example, Alan Moorehead, The Traitors: The Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo, and Nunn May (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952); Frank Close, Trinity: The Treachery and Pursuit of the Most Dangerous Spy in History (London: Allen Lane, 2019).

4 On the German program, see Per F. Dahl, Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear Energy (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2019), especially Chapters 9 and 12. On Japan, see Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster: 1986), pp. 327, 346, 375, 457–59, 580–82.

5 Examples include Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Vintage, 1977); John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, “The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Ideas and Beliefs,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2012), pp. 331–46; Septimus Paul, Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1941–1952 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2000); Gerard DeGroot, The Bomb: A Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Ronald W. Clark, The Birth of the Bomb: The Untold Story of Britain’s Part in the Weapon that Changed the World (London: Phoenix House, 1961); Jonathan Hogg, British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the Long 20th Century (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); David Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War (London: Penguin, 2012); Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1955 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Sabine Lee, “‘In No Sense Vital and Actually Not Even Important’? Reality and Perception of Britain’s Contribution to the Development of Nuclear Weapons,” Contemporary British History, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2006), pp. 159–85; Sabine Lee, “‘Crucial? Helpful? Practically Nil?’ Reality and Perception of Britain’s Contribution to the Development of Nuclear Weapons during the Second World War,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2022), pp. 19–40.

6 Graham Farmelo, Churchill’s Bomb (London: Faber & Faber, 2013), pp. 15–27; Hogg, British Nuclear Culture, pp. 34–37.

7 See, inter alia, O. Hahn, F. Strassmann, “Uber den Nachweis und das Verhalten der bei der Bestrahlung des Urans mittels Neutronen entstehenden Erdalkalimetalle” [On the detection and behavior of alkaline earth metals formed when uranium is irradiated with neutrons], Naturwissenschaften, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1939), pp. 11–15; Lise Meitner and O.R. Frisch, “Disintegration of Uranium by Neutrons: a New Type of Nuclear Reaction,” Nature, Vol. 143 (1939), pp. 239–240; O.R. Frisch “Physical Evidence for the Division of Heavy Nuclei under Neutron Bombardment,” Nature, Vol. 143 (1939), p. 276; H. Halban, F. Joliot, and L. Kowarski, “Number of Neutrons Liberated in the Nuclear Fission of Uranium,” Nature, Vol. 143 (1939), p. 680. Research was correspondingly intense in the United States.

8 “The Possibility of Producing an Atomic Bomb: A Review of the Position,” May 3, 1939, AB [“Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and its predecessors”] 1/9; David Pye to William Elliot, July 6, 1939, AB 1/37 (The National Archives of the United Kingdom, or “TNA”).

9 Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard, Oliphant: The Life and Times of Sir Mark Oliphant, (Adelaide: Axiom Books, 1981), p. 98.

10 “Report by M.A.U.D. Committee on the Use of Uranium for a Bomb,” AB 1/347, TNA.

11 John Cockcroft to R.W. Boyle, April 20, 1940, AB 1/210, TNA.

12 Herbert Gough to C.J. Mackenzie, June 20, 1940, AB 1/346; Chadwick to Cockcroft, June 11, 1940, AB 1/210, TNA.

13 Extract, Cockcroft to Gough, October 11, 1941, AB 1/219; Cockcroft to Ralph Fowler, February 18, 1941, AB 1/346; Fowler to Cockcroft, February 24, 1941, AB 1/233, TNA.

14 Cockcroft to Fowler, January 8, 1941, AB 1/346, TNA.

15 The term “dominion” here refers to self-governing nations (other than the United Kingdom) within the British Empire. During World War II, the dominions included Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The legal, constitutional, and political complexities of dominion status are discussed at length later in this article.

16 Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume I: The New World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), p. 259.

17 Spencer R. Weart and Gertrud Weiss Szilard, eds., Leo Szilard: His Version of the Facts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), p. 146, quoted in Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 372.

18 Bush’s confidence rested in part on Arthur Compton’s reports on the bomb’s feasibility, which in turn were influenced by his secondhand awareness of the British work. See also Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, pp. 362–78.

19 Anderson to Churchill, July 30, 1942, PREM [“Records of the Prime Minister's Office”] 3/139/8A, TNA.

20 Barton J. Bernstein, “The Uneasy Alliance: Roosevelt, Churchill and the Atomic Bomb, 1940–1945,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1976), p. 202.

21 “Uranium Supplies: Meetings in Ottawa,” June 1942, AB 1/541, TNA.

22 “Uranium Supplies: Meeting in Washington,” June 1942, AB 1/541, TNA.

23 “Notes on Discussion of the 26th January, 1943, between Brigadier-General L. R. Groves, Dr. J. B. Conant and W. A. Akers,” January 1943, AB 1/374, TNA.

24 Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 2002), p. 39.

25 Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 237.

26 Ferenc Morton Szasz, British Scientists and the Manhattan Project: The Los Alamos Years (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1992); Dennis C. Fakley, “The British Mission,” Los Alamos Science, Vol. 4 (Winter/Spring 1983), pp. 186–89.

27 Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 316; Leslie M. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York, NY: Harper, 1962), p. 254.

28 “Memorandum: Imperial Conference. Committee on Inter-Imperial Relations,” November 15, 1926, CAB [“Records of the Cabinet Office”] 24/182/9, TNA.

29 Statute of Westminster, 1931, <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1931/4/pdfs/ukpga_19310004_en.pdf>.

30 Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, pp. 13, 22, 29–31.

31 Cockburn and Ellyard, p. 82.

32 Casey to Rivett, September 17, 1941, A3300 217 (National Archives of Australia); Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, p. 113.

33 Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, pp. 90–91.

34 A.K. Longair to Oliphant, November 11, 1943, AB 1/481, TNA; Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, p. 93.

35 Bruce to Curtin, August 16, 1943, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (DAFP), Vol. 6 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1983), Document 258.

36 Alice Cawte, Atomic Australia, 1944–1990 (Kensington, NSW: New South Wales University Press, 1992), p. 2.

37 W.L. Gorell Barnes to Michael W. Perrin, February 29, 1944, AB 1/113, TNA; Rivett to Scientific Liaison, December 24, 1943, AB 1/604, TNA; Rivett to Oliphant, March 24, 1945, AB 1/343, TNA; Wallace Akers to Perrin, January 7, 1944, AB 1/537, TNA.

38 Chadwick to Akers, April 17, 1944, AB 1/113; Lord Cherwell, “The Tube Alloys Position,” circa March 1944, PREM 3/139/2, TNA; cf. Cockburn and Ellyard, Oliphant, p. 118.

39 On the whole question of Oliphant’s position vis-à-vis Australia, see Richard J.E. Brown, “The Dominions and the Bomb: Commonwealth Involvement in the British Nuclear Weapons Programme, 1939–1947,” PhD diss., King’s College London, 2019, especially pp. 116–19.

40 Akers to Gorell Barnes, November 8, 1943, AB 1/246, TNA.

41 Rivett to White, January 5, 1944, DAFP, Vol. 7 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1988), Document 4.

42 Burhop to Rivett, June 10, 1944, DAFP, Vol. 7, Document 192.

43 Those seconded during the war were A.H. Allan, Gordon Fergusson, K.D. George, George Page, Robin Williams, William Young, and Charles Watson Munro, their de facto chief. AAOQ W3424 5/74, Archives New Zealand. Cf. Rebecca Priestley, Mad on Radium: New Zealand in the Atomic Age (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2012), pp. 42–46.

44 “Sources and Supplies of Uranium,” December 17, 1943, AB 1/504, TNA.

45 Anderson to Churchill, May 25, 1944; Cherwell to Churchill, May 17, 1944, and Cherwell to Churchill, May 10, 1944, PREM 3/139/11A; R.S. Sayers to Gorell Barnes, June 14, 1944, AB 1/667; Sayers to Gorell Barnes, May 17, 1944; Gorell Barnes to Anderson, May 18, 1944, AB 1/586 (all TNA). Between them, these documents detail the extent and timing of the information shared personally with dominion prime ministers by Churchill and his advisers.

46 Ross Galbreath, “The Rutherford Connection: New Zealand Scientists and the Manhattan and Montreal Projects,” War in History, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1995), p. 308.

47 Ernest Marsden to Sir Edward Appleton, September 29, 1944, AB 1/277, TNA, and the documents around it in this file contain discussions about the extent of the New Zealanders’ exposure to secret information and their ability to make use of it after the war. Comparable material relating to Australia can be found in Perrin to Akers, September 10, 1943, AB 1/83, TNA.

48 See Smuts to Churchill, June 15, 1944, PREM 3/139/11A, TNA, which makes reference to Smuts’s separate conversations with Churchill, Anderson, Cherwell, and Bohr on the topic of the Allies’ nuclear endeavors.

49 Dominique Mongin, La bombe atomique française, 1945–1958 [The French atomic bomb, 1945–1958] (Brussels: Bruylant, 1997), p. 27.

50 Minutes of 1st MAUD Committee, April 10, 1940, AB 1/347; see also Allier to Cockcroft, May 9, 1940, AB 1/210, TNA.

51 Details of Suffolk’s evacuation of the French scientists, including Halban and Kowarski, and their subsequent engagement in the United Kingdom, are in “Earl of Suffolk, Ministry of Supply Liaison Officer in France: Evacuation from France with French Scientists and Equipment,” AVIA 22/2288A, TNA.

52 “Meeting with Morin on 23rd October 1942,” AB 1/62, TNA.

53 Morin to Akers, November 5, 1942, AB 1/62, TNA.

54 Gorell-Barnes to Perrin, October 29, 1942, AB 1/62; Note to the Lord President, October 28, 1942, CAB 126/30, TNA; “Note on Existing Obligations Regarding Exchange of Information … ” March 8, 1944, CAB 126/30 TNA.

55 Bertrand Goldschmidt, L’aventure atomique [The atomic adventure] (Paris: Fayard, 1962), p. 54.

56 Peter Parides, “The Halban Affair and British Atomic Diplomacy at the End of the Second World War,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2012), pp. 619–35.

57 Bertrand Goldschmidt, Les rivalités atomiques, 1939–1966 [The atomic rivalries, 1939–1966] (Paris: Fayard, 1967), pp. 175–88; Mongin, La bombe atomique française, pp. 45–48.

58 Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 72; Dahl, Heavy Water, pp. 174–76; Richard J.E. Brown, “Halban’s ‘Diplomatic Flu’: A Case Study in Nuclear Diplomacy in World War II,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 35 (forthcoming).

59 See also Lee, “In No Sense Vital,” for an interesting discussion on the relative significance of British participation in the Manhattan Project.

60 Memorandum by First Secretary, Department of External Affairs, November 6, 1945, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 10 (Ottawa: Canadian Department of External Affairs, 1987), Document 628; see also RG77-D-1-b., Box 284 “Radiological Research. Policy Vol. 2” (Library and Archives Canada).

61 Note, however, that in December 2018 the British government removed the entire “AB” file series dealing with Britain’s early nuclear history from public access, having previously made it freely available.

62 See AB 1/356; other British open-source analyses are in AB 1/355, TNA.

63 Jim Walsh, “Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia's Nuclear Ambitions,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1–20.

64 Priestley, Mad on Radium, adopts this approach to good effect.

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Richard J.E. Brown

Richard J.E. Brown is a historian of science and diplomacy based in Yorkshire, United Kingdom. He has taught at King’s College London and the University of York and was a policy adviser in the UK Home Office. Between 2012 and 2017 he was a nonproliferation analyst at the International Centre for Security Analysis, King’s College London. He holds an MA and PhD in war studies from King’s College London and a BA in history from the University of Oxford.