Political corruption in the Arab Mediterranean countries: an innovative typology

ABSTRACT

Corruption is a major challenge in the Arab Mediterranean countries (AMCs). The fight against it was a key point in the Arab uprisings, yet since then and despite the international community’s attempts to support anti-corruption strategies, the governments of the AMCs have not been able to address effectively the demands of their population. The article compares the anti-corruption initiatives in four AMCs: two republican semi-presidential systems (Egypt, Tunisia) and two constitutional monarchies (Jordan, Morocco). It focuses on their fight against political corruption, which has different forms. To reduce corruption, policymakers advocate the decentralization of power, as it leads to more accountability and transparency. The article unpacks the idea of decentralization and asks to what extent it contributes to reducing political corruption in the region. In doing so, the article produces a new typology that adds two important factors that contribute to a better understanding of the links between anti-corruption initiatives and decentralization: the challenges to the political survival of the government and the type of external support to fight corruption. The findings show that decentralization measures frequently result in administrative deconcentration rather than the decentralization of decision-making. Thus, they reproduce political corruption in the region.

KEYWORDS:

• corruption
• anti-corruption initiatives
• decentralization
• Arab Mediterranean countries
• MENA
• EU

Introduction

Corruption is a paramount challenge in the Arab Mediterranean countries (AMCs), exerting profound influence on development while eroding trust in the public sector. Its detrimental impacts span from the stability of the banking system to the efficacy of public expenditure across various policy domains.¹ Scholars have extensively explored the correlation between corruption and development.² The literature ranges from the effects of corruption on trade,³ to its impact on environmental and energy issues in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).⁴

Corruption was among the triggers that led to the 2011 Arab uprisings, coupled with deficiencies in economic development and growth and a lack of social justice. After 2011, the political discourse across the MENA featured the imperative to combat corruption. International policymakers expressed support for anti-corruption initiatives. However, in 2022, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI, as assessed by Transparency International) indicated that reform progress in the AMCs was slow and anti-corruption efforts did not meet the expectations of protesters. According to Transparency International, the global average corruption score among 180 countries was 43/100. Egypt ranked 141st, scoring 30/100. Morocco was in a slightly better position in 107th place. Its score was still below the global average at 38/100. Tunisia was 100th among 180 countries, with a score of 40/100. Jordan performed better than the other AMCs and is the only country of the four cases above the global average. In 2022, the country held 71st place with a score of 47/100.⁵ A similar picture can be found in the Index of Public Integrity by the European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State Building.⁶ Despite these modest results, international organizations appear committed to assisting the administration of the AMCs with tackling corruption.

As there are numerous illegal behaviours that constitute corruption, it is important to note that anti-corruption programmes address a wide variety of concerns. As a result, there are various drivers and classifications for corruption. Corrupted public officers can be driven by need or manipulation or they can be considered roving or stationary bandits. Among the different types of corruption one can find distinctions between supply-versus demand-side corruption, active versus passive corruption, public versus private corruption, and grand versus petty corruption. While petty corruption involves the exchange of smaller sums of money and favours by people holding minor positions, grand corruption involves “the highest public offices”.⁷

While in the more advanced economies of the developed world public administrations have managed to address more successfully the petty form of corruption (although it is not eliminated),⁸ in the AMCs both petty and grand corruption are present and affect economic growth. In fact the links between the two forms in developing countries are discussed in the relevant literature and how these links reproduce economic backwardness and socioeconomic inequalities.⁹

The complexity of the phenomenon and the links between its different forms make it impossible to offer a comprehensive account of the impact of corruption on the AMCs. In this article the focus is on grand corruption and more specifically on its political form – which “is still hampering the fight against corruption and progress towards democracy”.¹⁰ Grand corruption involves higher ranking government officials and elected politicians, who exploit opportunities presented through government work. Political corruption is a sub-category of grand corruption. It is important due to the involvement of high-ranking public officials. It exists when corrupt politicians are entrusted to enforce laws. In its extreme forms, it can lead to state capture or systemic corruption (when corruption is considered pervasive in a society).

International organizations have emphasized the importance of fighting corruption as key to political, economic, and social development. The European Union (EU), the largest donor in the AMCs, has developed a toolbox to fight this type of corruption; its main strategy is related to two key concepts: accountability and decentralization. For policymakers, the two terms are linked. Centralization of power leads to diminished levels of accountability, resulting in reduced probabilities for fighting corruption. The solution is the construction of decentralized models of governance, ideally involving local authorities and civil society organizations (CSOs) that can act as counterweights to corruption. Although there are various calls for decentring the agenda of the EU, in this area the EU is not dogmatic regarding the specific forms of decentralization, as policymakers are aware of context-specific issues. The role of national governments is important in order to contextualize solutions and to have ownership of the reform process.

The AMCs have followed international mandates (usually through aid conditionality and democracy promotion programmes) for more localized forms of political institutions before the Arab uprisings, but the relevant reforms were slow. As the idea of decentralization has (once again) become an appealing political slogan, the main claim of this article is that the merits of such a crude model are questionable. More specifically, this article seeks to answer the following questions: Do the governments of these four AMCs (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) face a trade-off between political centralization and the effectiveness of the fight against corruption? Under what political conditions can the governments of the AMCs crack down on political corruption? By analysing the experience of four AMCs after 2011, the key argument of this article is that decentralization is not a panacea for the fight against corruption. Political elites can manipulate anti-corruption campaigns for their own benefit while advocating for decentralization. Often, such strategies are deployed when regimes are under threat, and it is not unusual in such circumstances to see international donors supporting corrupt politicians. The findings of this research suggest that the success of strategies against grand political corruption is related to the configuration of three parameters: decentralization reforms, the challenges to the political survival of governing elites, and the role of external actors.

The article combines lessons from the political economy of crony capitalism and public policy to construct a typology for the assessment of anti-corruption strategies.¹¹ It thus makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, related to the political economy (of corruption), this study challenges the application of liberal, technocratic models of anti-corruption by highlighting the contradictions that emerge when autocratic governments liberalize the region’s market. Second, regarding public policy, the article analyses the mechanisms of corruption and the relationship between decentralization reforms and the simultaneous reproduction of corrupt practices, which are often overlooked in academic debates.

Methodologically, the article offers a comparison between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The four AMCs are selected as they are old partners of the EU, which, as stated above, is the largest donor to the MENA region and has developed a toolbox for fighting corruption. The four countries receive significant aid since the MEDA programmes (in 1996) and have signed Association Agreements and Action Plans with the EU. As a result of these comprehensive agreements, the four cases have harmonized a larger part of their domestic regulations with the EU acquis and have integrated more into the EU market than other MENA countries (in fact Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are privileged partners of the EU). Syria and Libya do not have such relations with the EU and the ongoing conflicts hinder definitive conclusions about their fight against corruption. Lebanon is not part of this comparison as it has a different political system (consociational system since 1943) and thus has been excluded.

The article proceeds as follows. The first section explains the typology of this research and analyses the parameters that shape the efforts to fight political corruption in the AMCs. Then the article focuses on anti-corruption initiatives in the two republican semi-presidential systems: Egypt and Tunisia. The next section analyses anti-corruption initiatives in the two constitutional monarchies: Jordan and Morocco. The conclusion summarizes the findings of this research.

Conceptualizing decentralization and political corruption chains in the AMCs

In the literature about corruption in developing countries, the AMCs (usually discussed in the literature as part of the wider MENA region) appear as typical cases showing the detrimental effects of the phenomenon on the sustainable development of Arab societies. A typical conclusion of the relevant scholarship is that strong authoritarian regimes offer fertile ground for the reproduction of corruption. This work has tried to unpack the causes of corruption, focusing generally on two types of causes.

First, some studies highlight the socio-cultural character of corruption in the AMCs.¹² Early research on the topic, especially, is strongly Eurocentric. According to this line of thought, the AMCs have copied the institutions of Western countries, but cultural elements such as familism, tribalism, and primordialism have survived. These traditional patterns of behaviour undermine the work and independence of state institutions.

Second, without discounting entirely the importance of cultural patterns, several studies (especially research conducted after the 2000s) are informed by the dominance of a liberal technocratic discourse about corruption.¹³ The new analytical framework downplays the (cultural) macro level of analysis and focuses more on the level of the individual as the independent variable for explaining corruption. Through this prism, explanations of the high level of political corruption in the AMCs establish links between individual policymakers (or policy officers, in research that focuses generally on corruption), who make bounded rational decisions in order to maximize their utility. In other words, policymakers become corrupt because the benefits of such illegal actions exceed costs.

Eclectic accounts of corruption have tried to link the two discourses. The link between them is the concept of trust in societies that suffer from cronyism. The low performance and efficiency of the AMCs generates the feeling that the public sector cannot be trusted to manage/regulate the market and private transfers, so corruption becomes appealing.¹⁴ The mobilization of close personal relations increases the probability of corruption, while at the same time such networks reduce the chance of punishment. In Jordan, tribal identity (ashīrah or hamūlah) was manipulated in the (self)defence of high level politicians and civil servants, who were accuses of corruption.¹⁵ “Having wasta” is a term often used in Arab societies to indicate an implicit social contract between members of the same group, “when those from whom one can request assistance are in positions of power that make it possible for them to grant the requested assistance”.¹⁶

Such explanations that focus on the micro level have been further advanced by lessons taken from New Institutional Economics (NIE). These explanations stand in contrast to the ideas of Old Institutional Economics, which effectively emphasized the influence of economic and legal factors and the development of institutions through formal and informal methods, yet were considered as “behaviouristic” and “anti-formalist”.¹⁷ NIE helped researchers of corruption quantify the phenomenon and to analyse its impact on growth, allowing anti-corruption strategies to tackle more accurately the sources of corruption. Such anti-corruption strategies are usually developed either due to domestic or international pressure.

Especially after the Arab uprisings, the international community has been more responsive to calls that ask to link foreign assistance to anti-corruption reforms in the MENA, whereas before 2011, (EU) foreign aid was considered a tool that increased the stability of (corrupt) regimes.¹⁸ In recent years, the EU has sought to change this view of aid and to become an actor who leads such reforms. As one of the largest donors in the region, it has created a comprehensive toolbox for fighting corruption and collaborates with other international organizations (such as the Council of Europe) to fight corruption in the countries of its neighbourhood. These EU efforts have been only partially addressed by the relevant scholarship. The attention given to this policy area is sporadic, and often the role of the EU in anti-corruption initiatives is part of a broader discussion about norm transfer and norm promotion. In general, most analyses highlight (one of) three aspects of the EU’s efforts to fight corruption: EU incentives and conditionalities to address corruption as well as their limits;¹⁹ the discrepancies/contradictions between anti-corruption initiatives and other EU objectives;²⁰ and the issue of Eurocentrism and a one-size-fits-all approach.²¹

Despite the aforementioned critiques, the main driver of EU policymakers’ anti-corruption strategy is the presumption that corruption in the AMCs is an endogenous phenomenon. Country assessments help policymakers understand the ability of each AMC to fight particular forms of corruption and monitor the risks that are associated with such illegal practices. These country reports help tailor anti-corruption strategies to particular circumstances and channel aid in specific directions (e.g. improvements in existing agencies, organization of new anti-corruption mechanisms, training of public servants, etc.). However, the solutions that are suggested have a common thread: the idea of decentralization of power. This idea has several ramifications: first, institutional reforms that allow local authorities and independent agencies to participate in decision-making help legitimize anti-corruption measures for local communities. Second, if citizens have more access to (decentralized) public agencies, then rent-seeking activities (bribes) are reduced and accountability, transparency, and trust increase. In addition to these benefits, settings that encourage bottom-up initiatives can generate sustainable and contextualized solutions, as CSOs have a better understanding of local problems.²² Improvements of allocative efficiency allow policymakers to better match public goods with citizens’ preferences.

Decentralization should not be considered a panacea for the success of anti-corruption reforms. The main argument of this article is that the process of decentralization can be manipulated by the leadership of the AMCs and is often used as a vehicle that reproduces the gains from political corruption, while allowing policymakers to claim they follow international guidelines. This occurs when decentralization plans successfully transfer more responsibilities to subnational actors, but fail to offer them more decision-making powers. In this way, governments proceed to mere deconcentration, but not to genuine decentralization. They seek to increase their administrative performance and international image as good managers who deserve foreign investments, but the main foundations of political corruption stay.

To develop a comprehensive picture of the performance of the AMCs against corruption, the article deconstructs the idea of decentralization and creates a typology that takes into account the following parameters: (a) the degree of decentralization reforms; (b) challenges to the political survival of the central government; and (c) the role of external actors in anti-corruption initiatives. As will be shown, the last two parameters are important, as they ensure the sustainability of anti-corruption measures. Decentralization reforms are divided into three categories: (a) reforms that reproduce the power of central governments; (b) reforms that allow formal decentralization but permit central authorities to maintain informal control; and (c) reforms that lead to effective decentralization of power (see Table 1).

Table 1. Factors that shape the success of anti-corruption initiatives.

Level of success	Parameters that determine the outcome of anti-corruption initiatives	Failure of anti-corruption initiatives	Moderate success of anti-corruption initiatives	Success of anti-corruption initiatives
Degree of decentralization of power (distribution of rents)		Centralized system of power/deconcentration, but not decentralization	Formal decentralization, but informal central control	Effective decentralization of power
Challenges to political survival of government		Protection of regime by gatekeepers	Recalibration of elites	Collective new belief
Role of external actors		Support to gatekeepers	Support to gatekeepers and agents of change	Support to agents of change

 Source: Authors’ compilation.

Degree of decentralization reforms

It is important to elaborate on the types of decentralization to understand how a simple shift of responsibilities to intermediate tiers does not necessarily represent strengthened local decision-making. First, decentralization can reproduce the power of central governments, especially when monitoring mechanisms are weak, when a larger number of political actors are involved in deals with potential investors, or when powerful interest groups dominate the local political scene; deconcentration of this sort without a corresponding transfer of power to lower levels of government can actually serve to increase political corruption.²³

The second type occurs when formal authority is delegated to subnational actors or autonomous agencies, but this has little impact on informal power relations. This mismatch between structures and actual power does not lead to de facto decentralization, as decentralized actors do not fully adopt anti-corruption measures (e.g. new audit systems) in order to improve the delivery of public goods. Especially in (extended) transition periods (e.g. in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings) the state’s ability to monitor corruption can weaken offering an opportunity to strategically positioned elites to (further) undermine efforts for institutional reforms in order to exploit state resources. This misalignment between formal and informal practices can lead to the reproduction of corruption at both central and local levels.²⁴ The next sections show that in some cases corrupted networks manipulate the boundaries that are supposed to separate the state from the private sphere and benefit from lucrative contracts and the privatization of state assets.

The third type – effective decentralization – occurs when subnational actors and autonomous agencies are strengthened both financially and legally and their activities are outside the direct control of the central government. This type of decentralization, i.e. effective decentralization, differs from deconcentration, as “agencies at the subsociety level are primarily directed by, and responsible to, the political subsystem of that subsociety”.²⁵ Such decentralization reforms can be triggered by democratic changes in the political system but can also be hindered by domestic conflicts and fragmented societies due to sectarian, religious, or other types of clientelist conflicts. Regimes may engage in tactical maneuvers that create a show of change but have no tangible outcome. Even when action is taken to promote decentralization, it is often ineffective.

These dynamics highlight the significance of the other two factors in this typology (Table 1): the challenges to the political survival of the government; and the role of external actors in anti-corruption reforms.

Challenges to political survival of government

Challenges to the political survival of the leadership or regime occur when governments can no longer provide sufficient resources to maintain political support. Such periods of crisis have three sources: threats to leadership, either from within the ruling party or from other parties; revolutionary challenges to specific individuals and/or political systems (such as the Arab uprisings); or external threats (e.g. military attacks or foreign interventions). The main assumption is that leaders generally want to stay in power, so they can allocate goods and “when possible, retain resources for their discretionary use”.²⁶

In this typology, such challenges are categorized according to the results they produce. This typology has identified three types of results when the survival of leadership or regimes is threatened:

First, the leadership can successfully mobilize its supporters to preserve the position of powerholders. In this case, threats to leadership do not have the capacity to alter existing hegemonic structures that are already in place. Gatekeepers can adopt a rhetoric against corruption, but they resist the implementation of anti-corruption reforms. The term gatekeepers or veto players is preferred, as it covers not only the ruling elite but also powerful economic and civil society actors.²⁷ The logic that informs resistance to such reforms does not pose any theoretical challenge; gatekeepers are driven by a profit- and power-maximizing logic. Political corruption does not only increase the wealth of politicians. The allocation of government contracts is used to buy loyalties from cronies.

Second, when the political system experiences some change, usually in the form of recalibration, a different result can occur. In this case, political elites (even former competitors) coordinate in order to maintain/gain power. The main question is under what conditions the recalibrated elites prefer to change their stance at least partially. This occurs when their profit- and power-maximizing logics collide. When political corruption becomes a more important issue in the public sphere (usually during political crises), the recalibrated elites choose to proceed with some reforms in order to maintain their position. These circumstances force the recalibrated elites to put aside divergent concerns, usually for a short period of time, in order to create a political setting that allows them to compete over the distribution of public goods. In this situation, the survival of institutional arrangements correlates with authoritarianism. This does not help the creation of sustainable anti-corruption solutions, as the recalibrated elites know that their survival depends on the establishment of privileges for their powerful supporters. Reforms may have some impact on petty corruption at lower levels of the state apparatus – a development that improves the position of the country in the relevant indexes. Yet political corruption remains strong.

The third result is the emergence of a new civic-minded government that has different beliefs and is willing to produce lasting solutions to corruption. Often, such developments occur simultaneously with further efforts for democracy promotion. In this case, rules and procedures do not become obstacles in the fight against political corruption. However, very few examples can be found in the literature where autocratic governments show good credentials against corruption. Two cases stand out, both outside the MENA region. Hong Kong (before its return to China) produced high-quality public goods and had very low levels of corruption; Singapore also has low levels of corruption, despite its autocratic rule.²⁸

Role of external actors

In the past thirty years, the literature on corruption indicates that the intervention of donors affects the balance of power between actors in favour of change and those against it. In this typology, the role of external actors takes three forms: (1) of support for gatekeepers only; (2) support for both gatekeepers and for forces that seek change; and (3) support for agents that seek change.

The first scenario is external actors offering support to gatekeepers. This scenario usually leads to the failure of anti-corruption initiatives. The creation of anti-corruption agencies and platforms in states with centralized systems of power only polishes the idea of preventing political corruption.²⁹ In several cases, this type of support generates additional tools for the suppression of opposing voices, as external help to create tough anti-corruption laws bolsters the rulers’ prestige and endangers political opponents.

The second possible scenario is when external actors both support national gatekeepers and at the same time fund agents of change. In this case, external support partially advances anti-corruption strategies/reforms. Depending on the context, it is not surprising that this partial support produces disappointing results, as external conditionality becomes more selective. For example, the European Court of Auditors found that before the Arab uprisings, support for anti-corruption initiatives had very little success in Mubarak’s Egypt.³⁰ This example illustrates that bad policy is often good politics (for the survival of corrupt politicians), and it is not unusual to see the international community support corrupt politicians. At first glance, such actions seem paradoxical, as at least Western institutions in the international community are more sensitive to corruption. However, support for political systems that reproduce corruption can be either a calculated action in favour of stability and maintenance of economic ties with the (new) regime or an unintended consequence, as the international community values the avoidance of future economic calamities over the success of anti-corruption strategies.

The final possible scenario is that international actors identify plausible agents of change and fully support them in their fight to tackle corruption, such as providing funds for anti-corruption initiatives and/or transfer of technical knowledge, etc. The difference between this type of support and similar measures that can be found in centralized systems of governance is that help for these agents leads to powerful alliances that advance the idea of good governance and to measures that prevent political corruption. In this case, the international community improves the capacity of such domestic agents to act collectively and to hold the government to account.

In sum, the argument of this section is twofold. The first claim is that the idea of decentralization should not be treated as a monolithic process that transfers power to subnational actors or independent agencies. The different forms that decentralization takes inform the success of anti-corruption plans. Yet this parameter is not the only one that matters in assessing the performance of the AMCs. Challenges to the political survival of regimes and the role of external actors are important factors shaping the efforts of policymakers in the AMCs against political corruption as we will see next.

Anti-corruption initiatives in Arab Mediterranean semi-presidential republics: Egypt and Tunisia

Following the categories in Table 1, this section explains the impact of anti-corruption initiatives in the two semi-presidential republics of the four selected cases: Egypt and Tunisia. The findings suggest that although the two countries have similar political systems, the impact of decentralization reforms, the challenges to the political survival of their governments, and the role of external actors (especially the EU) have different inputs in the fight against corruption.

In Egypt before the Arab uprisings, decentralization reforms focused primarily on the transfer of administrative duties to local entities. Yet the transfer of these duties was not accompanied by meaningful participation of local actors in decision making.³¹ Despite the republican character of the political system, the heavily centralized structure generated significant spatial inequalities. Besides the geographical division between wealthier and poorer governorates, the centralization of power led to the reproduction of political corruption.³² Despite calls for more equality during the Arab uprisings, these phenomena were further exaggerated by the 2014 reforms.

More specifically, the constitutional amendment of January 2014 foresaw the gradual decentralization of Egypt’s governance system over a five-year period and the provision of better anti-corruption legislation. Articles 215–221 emphasize the autonomy and empowerment of anti-corruption agencies.³³ However, the Constitution empowers the President to nominate the leaders of these agencies, hence allowing him significant leverage over their work. As a result, important elements of the anti-corruption apparatus such as the Central Auditing Organization, the Administrative Control Authority, and the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority are nominally independent, but their links with important state figures hinder their activities.³⁴ This kind of interference further embeds the leader’s hold on the state and allows key political figures to wield disproportionate influence over crucial parts of governance. Consequently, the leadership of the country can reproduce its dominance in Egypt’s political economy space (with minimal domestic control) in order to secure personal benefits.

In fact the new Constitution allows the leadership of the country to construct an even less balanced playing field than Mubarak’s regime and to utilise more tools to capture the state and to reproduce the power of its cronies. Examples of these tools are the use of the “state of emergency”, which allows government ministries to bypass the bidding process and the expansion of the definition of military infrastructure, which gives the power to the army and the connected businesses to extend their power over larger parts of the Egyptian land.³⁵

Moreover, the aforementioned agencies do not have any presence in governorates outside Cairo, meaning that it is extremely difficult to trace grand corruption in the rest of the country. Even the reforms that were supposed to give more authority to local governments over development plans (Articles 181–183) are not yet implemented. Instead, the existing administrative authority postponed the publication of the new Local Administration Law while disregarding the constitutional deadlines. The dissolution of local councils in 2011 meant that local elections are still not held, thus leading to further centralization of power.³⁶

Statements by the Head of the Local Administration Committee in the Parliament, highlight an inherent contradiction in Egyptian administration’s decentralization policies: they pledge support for decentralization in theory but do not implement it.³⁷ The stagnation of the reform process in Egypt primarily benefits gatekeepers in the high ranks of the military regime. The result of this situation is that reforms involving local actors are most often advanced when they strengthen the symbolic or political legitimacy of the army locally or internationally. This scenario can be observed in the framework of the Egyptian–European partnership, which was signed by the Ministry of International Cooperation and the EU in May 2022. €138 m of EU funds are allocated for supporting Egypt’s development initiatives in a wide range of sectors including administrative reform and local development. The agreement includes the launch of the “Decentralization and Integrated Local Development with a Special Emphasis on Upper Egypt” project. The United Nations is also a participant in this project, and through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it will finance Egypt with €7 m. The idea of the EU–OECD project is to offer support to “Enhanced Administrative and Public Economic Governance” from 2022 to 2026.³⁸

Although the project has started recently, a closer look at its actions shows that the international funds will not drastically change the situation in the country. Its focus is on improvements of the administrative capacity of local authorities and of outdated or nonexistent infrastructure in order to “develop a regulatory framework supportive of the digital ecosystem”.³⁹ The initiative also focuses on the integration of national databases to facilitate Egyptian citizens’ electronic access to state agencies. Yet as the procurement policy remains the same, it is not a surprise to see the project becoming a platform for the reproduction of corruption and patronage.⁴⁰

While political corruption still exists in Tunisia, the findings of this research show that in comparison with Egypt, there have been some positive steps to address it. Both countries went through a regime change following the Arab urpsisings. Contrary to Egypt, Tunisia experienced changes at different levels of the political system including decentralization and anti-corruption measures.⁴¹

Following the Arab uprisings, the Tunisian government set up an anti-corruption agency, Instance Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption (INLUCC), in November 2011. In 2014, INLUCC was replaced by an anti-corruption authority, Instance de la Bonne Gouvernance et de la Lutte Contre la Corruption (IBGLCC). The new legislative proposals included laws that protect whistle-blowers. However, Tunisian policymakers followed informal network tactics. Furthermore, Members of Parliament (MPs) have been very slow to ratify the anti-corruption strategy.

The power of informal politics is even greater than in the other case studies (as explained below), as the state is in a transition period. New, strategically positioned elites have managed to weaken the state apparatus in order to exploit it. These elites seek to weaken the anti-corruption agencies and to manipulate the narrative of the fight against corruption. Despite foreign assistance by EU member states to support anti-corruption strategies,⁴² President Saied has closed down the anti-corruption agencies and has used corruption as a tool to silence his opposition.⁴³ Meanwhile, the funding of other decentralized authorities remains subject to informal control, despite recent constitutional amendments. Critical resources are to be provided by the central government in accordance to the needs of local governments, thus generating opportunities for informal control of the recently more powerful decentralized authorities.

The Arab uprisings forced the new Tunisian political elites to coordinate at least partially with local NGOs in order to show that the demands of demonstrators were taken into account. Yet strong gatekeepers, especially in the Tunisian Ministry of Interior, were influential in watering down the decentralization and transparency processes, leading many representatives of civil society to consider the government’s initiatives as another instance of the centralization of decentralization.⁴⁴ Although it is early to assess the impact of these actions, it is safe to argue that this type of regulatory abuse reverberates Ben Ali’s practices for state capture by special interests.⁴⁵ Besides closing anti-corruption agencies, the current President decommissioned the Ministry of Local Affairs, which had led the decentralization process, and its services were transferred to the Ministry of Interior. At the same time, President Saied named members of his electoral campaign as heads of the delegations who represent the central authority on the local level.⁴⁶ In this way, the regime manages to control local governments and to ensure their loyalty.

In Tunisia external actors play a bimodal role. On one hand, they support agents of change, while on the other, they cooperate with gatekeepers of the (new) status quo. Between 2012 and 2022, decentralization and anti-corruption initiatives in Tunisia have been supported by the EU and its member states. For example, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BZM) sponsored a decentralization project in Tunisia for the period 2018–2022.⁴⁷ The adoption of the 2018 Code des Collectivités Locales (Law on Local Governance) and the municipal elections in 2018 were steps in the right direction. Furthermore, Tunisian programmes such as the Programme d’Appui à la Réforme de Décentralisation support projects for the transfer of knowledge and the modernization of the administration, but in cooperation with ministries that the current leadership has reshuffled in order to maintain control over local authorities.⁴⁸ Under these conditions, the chance for this type of administrative support to become a successful foreign policy strategy to fight corruption is slim.

The analysis of the two cases suggests that the (similar) character of the political system in the two countries does not determine the effects of anti-corruption initiatives. The primary factors contributing to the disparities between the two countries are rooted in their respective post-2011 transitional experiences. In Egypt the quick restoration of the authority of the army allowed the leadership of the country to directly intervene in order to block anti-corruption initiatives. In the case of Tunisia, the longer transition period opened a window of opportunity for CSOs to pursue positive changes. These were mostly suspended by the use of informal control.

Anti-corruption initiatives in Arab Mediterranean constitutional monarchies: Jordan and Morocco

While political corruption persists in Jordan and Morocco, the results of this study reveal that the two countries are in a better position than Egypt, but not Tunisia. A common characteristic between the two monarchies and the Tunisian case is the impact of the Arab uprisings on anti-corruption measures. Despite social pressure, the two monarchies’ leaderships maintained their power over other emerging actors even as they proceeded with reforms for decentralization. As in the Tunisian case, the maintenance of power was through informal channels.

In Jordan, the Arab uprisings forced the monarchy to take some measures for addressing corruption. The country was already the first state in the MENA to enact the Access to Information (ATI) law in 2007, and in 2011 it joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP). So far, Jordan has implemented four OGP action plans. The fifth OGP action plan (for 2021–2025) is under development.⁴⁹

The government that was formed in 2019 has introduced a new National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIAS) for 2020–2025 and amended the anti-corruption law of 2016.⁵⁰ NIAS is a set of 1–5 year projects that aim to modernize the public sector and raise awareness in schools and religious institutions about corruption. The amendments of the anti-corruption law gave more financial and administrative independence to the Anti-Corruption Committee.⁵¹ In 2022, the law was amended again, giving accused persons the right to ask for conciliation.⁵²

The constraints that the new initiatives put on policymakers have been bypassed by informal networking, which is ensconced in formal institutions and especially in Parliament. Interestingly, the increased formalization of anti-corruption rules has generated broad alliances and demands for informality that transcend political divisions. Since the Arab uprisings, MPs have voted only twice in favour of waiving their immunity; in some instances, the power of informal control led to paradoxical results such as the lifting of immunity for some MPs but not for others in the same case.⁵³

Besides the OGP action plans, in 2015 the monarchy introduced a new Decentralization Law and a new Municipality Law, which changed the way that municipal councils and mayors are appointed. These initiatives followed King Abdullah II’s intention to reshape the political system, and his view that “political development should start at the grassroots level, and then move up to decision making centres and not vice versa”.⁵⁴

At first glance, the Decentralization Law appears to be an important step towards the provision of more power to local authorities. However, central authorities still maintain informal control. The Ministry of Municipal Affairs, controlled by the King, is instrumental in this type of control. It nominates the executive council, comprised of a governor, deputy governor, district officials, heads of each ministry’s local executive offices, and three municipal executive directors. So far, the people appointed have close political and/or economic relationships with the monarchy. Moreover, the central administration (the budget division of the Ministry of Finance [MoF]) makes the final decisions for budget proposals. As local authorities depend on the central state for approving the budget,⁵⁵ close ties with the Ministers have helped municipalities gain easier access to the MoF. In the same vein, the NIAS does not seem adequate to eliminate the sources of grand corruption. The fact that political parties act more as informal factories of “wasta” rather than as organizational bodies that generate political programmes makes grand corruption very difficult to uproot from the Jordanian system using merely legal tools.⁵⁶

In order to absorb the Arab uprisings, King Abdullah II dismissed the unpopular government of Samir Rifai (in 2011), replacing it with a new one led by Marouf al-Bakhit. Soon after the new appointment and despite many statements by the King that corruption would be addressed, Marouf al-Bakhit had to resign, as he was at the epicentre of a corruption scandal related to a secret deal to build a supercasino.⁵⁷ Unsurprisingly, the gatekeepers who delayed the anti-corruption measures and decentralization reforms were an “ossified layer of elites seeking to protect their own interests”.⁵⁸ These recalcitrant elites resisted not only pressures from below, but also from above, forcing the head of state to proceed to further cabinet reshuffles in order to maintain the status quo. Even after the Arab uprisings, most changes were below what was aspired by the people and did not delve into the core of the problem of corruption.⁵⁹

The changes to the government do not necessarily entail antithetical objectives of the monarchy and of key political figures who benefit from corruption. They highlight the contradictions between reform agendas and the entrenched effects of cronyism. Although international donors acknowledge these effects, they have limited room to manoeuvre, and as a result they appear to support both gatekeepers and forces of change. The “EU Support to Civil Society in Jordan” programme supported the policy dialogue and consultations between civil society and the government. The debate focused on two major themes to encourage civil society engagement: the external legal environment for civil society; and CSOs internal governance problems. The EU has increased its assistance to CSOs, with a focus on effective participation in public life. In recent years, the EU has contributed more than €20 m through various financing channels.⁶⁰ Furthermore, in April 2021, in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Administration, the Ministry of Interior, the EU Delegation in Jordan, and the UNDP, it allocated €5 m for a programme that aims to improve local governance by encouraging accountability and effective policymaking.⁶¹

In summary, Jordan’s local administration fundamentally relies on the branches of centralized power. Despite the presence of various forms of decentralization in Jordan’s structure, research findings indicate that a majority of policies and procedures continue to be determined by the central government.⁶²

Similar efforts to improve legislation to fight corruption can be found in Morocco. The leadership of the country has triggered a series of reforms to decentralize the decision-making process and to improve the anti-corruption legal apparatus, but with very modest results. Before the uprisings, the launch of the 2005 National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD) was supposed to transfer significant powers to the subnational level. The uprisings accelerated this process. The 2011 constitution (as well as the Decentralization Charter of 2019) was supposed to increase the participation of regional and local authorities in decision-making and transparency.

At the same time, more targeted measures to fight corruption were introduced. The National Commission for Integrity and Anti-Corruption (NCIAC) was established in 2011, but its Head was appointed only in 2017, two years after the launch of the National Strategy for Anti-Corruption.⁶³ The findings of this article suggest that Morocco is a typical case of an authoritarian regime operating through a combination of formal institutions and informal practices. This complex system reproduces cronyism, as the losses from corrupt practices are about 5%–7% of the country’s GDP.

The strength of organizational cronyism could be observed soon after the introduction of the new legislations as indicated in the 2011 constitution and those governing the work of the NCIAC. Investigations by the Court of Accounts into economic sectors such as the medical sector and into disbursements by political parties led the leadership of most political parties in Parliament, as in Jordan, to accuse the anti-corruption agencies of interfering in political affairs, while members of the Istiqlal Party referred to the prosecutors as “terrorists”.⁶⁴ This informal alignment of key political actors against the anti-corruption bodies and the fear of disinvestment forced then-Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane to acknowledge the complexities of fighting corruption. Indicative of this stance is his answer in an Al Jazeera interview to a question about existing cases of corruption, where he replied, “Afaa Laho Ama Salaf” (May God forgive the past) in order to reassure that the treatment of cases of grand corruption “will be done gently”.⁶⁵

The greater involvement of the monarchy in the country’s private sector and its informal connections with prominent businessmen have sustained a large web of patronage and corruption that exacerbates persistent transparency problems.⁶⁶ Key modernization projects, such as Plan Maroc Vert, which was supposed to make agriculture the country’s main engine for growth by 2020, have been subject to corrupt practices that resemble colonial agricultural policies.⁶⁷ Other decentralization efforts to tackle corruption-related issues and to improve citizen engagement in the decision-making process have had similar effects. Central authorities continue to maintain informal control of the elements they were supposed to decentralize.

For example, transparency and citizen participation have been established as fundamental characteristics of good governance in the new constitution (Article 1). Article 269 of the Organic Laws (OL) on municipalities specifies lofty norms of good governance such as equal access for residents to public services. Municipal councils are encouraged to establish participatory arrangements to improve dialogue and consultations with citizens and NGOs (Chapter V of Title III of the OL), particularly for strategic and investment planning. The OL specifically call for the establishment of an Institutional Body of Equity, Equal Opportunities, and Gender Approach (Instance de l'équité, égalité des chances, et approche genre) in each municipality. However, because the operational norms and composition of these instances intended to represent civil society have to be specified within the rules of procedure of each city council (Article 120), coherent and harmonized practices have not been possible.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the idea of “tutelle” (“guardianship”) provided by the administrative authorities of the Ministry of Interior has been abolished in accordance with the principle of “administrative freedom” of LGs. Despite the new wording of Article 136, the changes are limited.

Morocco's decentralization/regionalization programme was influenced by World Bank– and EU-funded research. Bergh notes that the World Bank “seems to have copied the EU’s twinning approach, and has used it to support the reform of the organic finance law in Morocco”.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, while the “advanced regionalization” system retains some of the centralized features of the state that were inherited from the French colonization era, it is also inspired by the Italian, German, and Spanish models, as well as global trends towards decentralization and participatory local democracy in general.

The intertwined interests of the political and economic classes were not threatened by the EU’s “more-for-more” principle. In fact, the country has been less reliant on the EU in recent years. Furthermore, the EU’s refocus on stability in the MENA (post-Arab uprisings) became dominant even at the expense of democracy. Other international players such as the UNDP and the World Bank have been more engaged in supporting Morocco’s reforms. EU member states and think tanks are engaged with the Moroccan reforms. So “apart from (co-)financing some analytical studies and organizing study visits, the EU has thus far not supported decentralisation/regionalization per se”.⁷⁰ But it keeps supporting the current elites to ensure stability in a volatile region and avoid influxes of migration crossing the Mediterranean.

Overall, the findings suggest that the governments of the two countries have made some positive changes in order to fight corruption. Yet, these positive changes should not be attributed to the type of their political system, as the analysis suggests that the leadership of the two countries is reluctant to embrace progressive measures to tackle political corruption. As in the case of Tunisia, which has a different political system, the strong presence of informal channels of control was used in order to prevent anti-corruption initiatives or to water down anti-corruption reforms.

Conclusions and policy implications

The wave of pro-democracy protests in 2010 and 2011 forced policymakers to pursue decentralization plans in order to fight corruption – considered one of the most pressing problems in the AMCs. To date, the ensuing reforms have not met the demands of the people who demonstrated so fiercely against authoritarianism thirteen years ago.

As Table 2 shows, the analysis of these four AMCs, which receive support from the EU and other international donors to fight corruption, indicates that the development of anti-corruption and decentralization measures is not homogeneous in the region.

Table 2. Categorization of Arab Mediterranean countries according to the success of anti-corruption initiatives.

Level of success	Factors influencing decentralisation	Failure of anti-corruption initiatives (Egypt)	Moderate success of anti-corruption initiatives (Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia)	Success of anti-corruption initiatives
Degree of decentralisation of power (distribution of rents)		- Centralised system of power/deconcentration, but not decentralisation. - Administrative reforms without real powers transferred to local authorities (who are political appointees)	Formal decentralisation, but informal central control by the ruling elites. Different informal techniques allow central authorities to undermine the independence of local actors
Challenges to political survival of government		Successful protection of regime by gatekeepers from domestic revolts.	Domestic revolts lead to recalibration of elites.
Role of external actors		Support to gatekeepers: Collaborating with authoritarian elites/indirect or unintended legitimation of current elites	Support to gatekeepers and agents of change Both to the Monarch’s reforms and CSOs and local authorities

Source: Authors’ compilation.

Egypt is at the bottom of this list of four countries. Consecutive Egyptian governments have utilized different tactics to mitigate the effects of the uprisings while maintaining tight control over anti-corruption agencies and other local actors. However, the relevant reforms do not stop political corruption. In the case of Egypt, among the gatekeepers who resist any meaningful reform are high-ranking military officers with close ties to the new regime. External actors, such as the EU, are persuaded that security and stability are the most important priorities in its bilateral relations, and the programmes that it funds bring only cosmetic changes to the fight against corruption.

Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco are in better positions in the fight against corruption. Even if the three countries have different political systems, their leadership seeks to maintain control over anti-corruption agencies and the decentralization process. Despite positive decentralization and anti-corruption measures, different informal techniques in each case allow central authorities to undermine the independence of local actors. A common strategy that can be found in all four cases we have discussed is policymakers seeking control through the power of the purse.

Informal politics take two forms. The first form takes place in high-level interactions between MPs and/or the cabinet. These horizontal interactions result in delays of anti-corruption measures. The second form takes place between key political figures and other private actors. The manipulation of the boundaries between public and private domains allows these groups to convert state resources into fungible assets. For example, the Plan Maroc Vert and the former Prime Minister of Jordan’s deal for the construction of a supercasino both weaken the power of the state and are more destructive than rent seeking – a typical feature of cronyism. The less hostile environment that the three countries offer CSOs allows the EU to support agents of change. However, even there, the access allowed for CSOs to engage in reforms and policymaking is rather limited.⁷¹ Yet the findings of this article suggest that international donors collaborate with central authorities that are not fully committed to the fight against corruption. International support may bring some administrative changes and improve the legal apparatus in the AMCs, but it fails to address the key sources of grand corruption.

Against this background, policy recommendations should consider three aspects of decentralization to improve the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures: planning, implementation and monitoring. As this article showed that gatekeepers in the four case studies try to exercise influence at these stages of the reform process.

The participation of CSOs (independent of government control) is important in every aspect of the reform process. More specifically in the planning phase clarity of both spending and the division of powers is necessary for effective decentralization. The findings show that gatekeepers invest on the lack of subnational capabilities and on the manipulation of intergovernmental mechanisms. Therefore, international donors should direct more funds not only for the improvement of subnational infrastructure, but also for technical support for the creation of legal acts and mechanisms that allow partnerships and cooperation beyond the government-controlled mechanisms.

Such mechanisms should be given the legal space and operational means to play an important role in both the implementation and monitoring phases. As discussed in the empirical sections, despite the type of political system, when different levels of government have (exclusive) jurisdiction in sub-areas of an anti-corruption measure, gatekeepers use their power either to freeze the implementation of anti-corruption measures or to “neutralise” the work of anti-corruption agencies. To their efforts to prevent progress, the separation of operating and capital expenditures functions also contributes to the ineffective implementation of decentralization and anti-corruption measures.

The last point that should be mentioned here is that effective decentralization does not necessarily entail the complete absence of shared responsibilities, something impossible in practice. However, the key principle for the division of responsibilities should not be the idea of “vertical hierarchy”, but this of “balanced and clear division of labour”. This balance should exist not only within the anti-corruption framework, but also between policy sectors that are decentralised. As the reform process is dynamic, it is advisable to initially generate such balance between sectors, which are a more likely subject of political corruption and involve (grant scale) infrastructure building. Periodic, joint reviews of the operation of both the central and decentralised governments (especially the performance of service delivery) would assist further reforms and the future improvements of the anti-corruption framework.

Acknowledgement

We are grateful to the Editors of Democratization and the anonymous reviewers for their highly valuable comments. Additionally, we express our appreciation to Yf Reykers for his insightful comments on a previous draft, which was shared during the Research group “Politics and Culture in Europe” at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Assem Dandashly

Assem Dandashly is an Associate Professor at the Political Science Department at Maastricht University. His research focuses on the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in terms of democracy promotion, minority rights and security in the MENA. His research has been published in edited volumes and international peer reviewed journals such as the Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Integration, Journal of European Public Policy, Democratization, International Spectator, and Mediterranean Politics.

Christos Kourtelis

Christos Kourtelis is Assistant Professor in European Public Policy at the Department of International, European and Area Studies at Panteion University. Before moving to Panteion University, Christos worked as a lecturer of International Relations in the UK, Turkey and in the Netherlands. His work focuses on the European Neighbourhood Policy and EU external relations. His research interests cover Euro-Mediterranean relations and EU development assistance. His research is published in international peer-reviewed journals of EU studies and international relations.

Notes

1 Ben Ali, Fhima, and Nouira, “How does Corruption Undermine Banking Stability? A Threshold Nonlinear Framework”; Swaleheen, Ben Ali and Temimi, “Corruption and Public Spending on Education and Health.”

2 Saha and Ben Ali. “Corruption and Economic Development: New Evidence from the Middle Eastern and North African Countries”; Saha, and Ben Ali. “Corruption and Economic Development: New Evidence from the Middle Eastern and North African Countries.”

3 Ben Ali and Mdhillat. “Does Corruption Impede International Trade? New Evidence from The EU and the MENA Countries.”

4 Sekrafi and Sghaier. “Examining the Relationship Between Corruption, Economic Growth, Environmental Degradation, and Energy Consumption: a Panel Analysis in MENA Region.”

5 Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2022.”

6 See European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State Building.

7 Mashali, “Perceived Grand Corruption and Petty Corruption,” 776.

8 Bardhan, “Corruption and Development: A Review ofthe Issues.”

9 See for example Rose-Ackerman, International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption.

10 Transparency International, “CPI 2021.”

11 For a discussion on Crony Capitalism and Corruption in the Middle East and North Africa, see Kırşanlı, “Crony Capitalism and Corruption in the Middle East and North Africa.”

12 Schoeberlein, “Corruption in the Middle East & North Africa”; Singh, “Anticorruption, Cultural Norms.”

13 For an overview of the evolution of anti-corruption strategie see Marqutte, Corruption, Politics and Development. For a critique to the liberal technocratic discouse see Bukovansky, The Hollowness of Anti-Corruption Discourse; Di Puppo, Anti-Corruption Interventions in Georgia.

14 F. Kırşanlı, “The Political Economy of Corruption: The Case of Lebanon.” In A. Rafay (Ed.), Concepts and Cases of Illicit Finance. IGI Global.; Sapsford et al., “Corruption, Trust, Inclusion and Cohesion.”

15 Badarneh, “Self-Defence Discourse in Collectivist Cultures: The Case of Jordanian Tribes Defending Their Members Against Public Accusations of Corruption.”

16 Barnett, Yandle, and Naufal, “Regulation, Trust, and Cronyism,” 41.

17 Rutherford, Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New Institutionalism; Langlois, “What was Wrong with the Old Institutional Economics (and What is Still Wrong with the New)?”.

18 European Court of Auditors, “EU Cooperation with Egypt.”

19 Börzel and Pamuk, “Pathologies of Europeanisation.”

20 Delcour, “Dealing with the Elephant in the Room.”

21 Stivachtis, “The ‘Civilizing’ Empire”; Björkdahl et al., Importing EU Norms; Králiková, “The Case of Anti-Corruption Reform in Ukraine.”

22 On the role of CSOs and anti-corruption, see Villanueva, “Why Civil Society Cannot Battle it All Alone: The Roles of Civil Society Environment, Transparent Laws and Quality of Public Administration in Political Corruption Mitigation.”

23 Blanchard and Shleifer, “Federalism with and without Political Centralization”; Shleifer and Vishny, “Corruption”; Gurgur and Shah, “Localization and Corruption.”

24 Dubois and Fattore, “Definitions and Typologies.”

25 Lundquist, “Means and Goals of Political Decentralization.”

26 De Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 24.

27 Tolstrup (2013) used the term (gatekeepers) to explain democracy promotion by external actors. This term can explain the role of the political, economic, civil society elites that have the power to facilitate or constrain anti-corruption reforms.

28 Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival.

29 Mungiu-Pippidi, “The Quest for Good Governance.”

30 European Court of Auditors, “EU Cooperation with Egypt.”

31 European Committee of the Regions, “Southern Neighbourhood Area Country - Egypt.”

32 Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt.

33 “Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt”; Fayed, “The Current Status of Corruption in Egypt.”

34 Fayed, “The Current Status of Corruption in Egypt.”

35 Adly, Cleft Capitalism: The Social Origins of Failed Market Making in Egypt; Adly, “Disempowerment without Expropriation: Egypt’s Old Oligarchy under Sisi”; El-Haddad, “Redefining the Social Contract in the Wake of the Arab Spring: The Experiences of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.”

36 Shantir, “Decentralization and Geographical Inequality in Egypt.”

37 USAID, “Comparative Analysis of MENA,” 35.

38 OECD, “EU-OECD Project”; Dailynews, “Egypt, EU Sign Development.”

39 Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, “Administrative and Public Economic Governance.”

40 Ministry of Communications and Information Technology.

41 Kherigi, “How to Make Local Government in Tunisia More Accountable.”

42 GIZ GmbH, “Perception de la Corruption en Tunisie.”

43 Middle East Monitor, “Tunisia: Authorities Close Anti-Corruption Authority.”

44 Yerkes and Muasher, “Challenges of Decentralization,” 14.

45 Rijkers, Freund, and Nucfora, “All in the family: State capture in Tunisia.”

46 Chaima Bouhlel, “Local Governance Amid Extreme Political Uncertainty in Tunisia.”

47 GIZ GmbH, “Supporting Decentralisation Reforms in Tunisia.”

48 VNG International, “Tunisia, Programme d’Appui à La Réforme de Décentralisation.”

49 The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “The Open Government Partnership (OGP).”

50 Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, “The National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020–2025 (Updated).”

51 Al Hamrani and Al Shobaki, “The Writing Is on the Wall.”

52 Merhej, “Promises and Pitfalls of Jordan’s Anti-Corruption.”

53 Al-Rawashdeh, “Jordan: Parliament Refers 2 Former Ministers to Court”.

54 OECD, Towards a New Partnership with Citizens.

55 Sowell, “Jordan’s Quest for Decentralization.”

56 Jackson, Tobin, and Eggert, “Capacity Building for Politicians.”

57 The Guardian, “Jordan’s King Names Hague Court Judge as Prime Minister.”

58 Muasher, “A Decade of Struggling Reform.”

59 See, Beck and Hüser, “Jordan and the ‘Arab Spring’: No Challenge, No Change?”.

60 Delegation of the European Union to Jordan, “The European Union and Jordan.”

61 MENA Affairs, “Jordan, EU and UNDP.”

62 Taamneh, Rawabdeh, and Abu-Hummour, “Evaluation of Decentralization Experience through Political, Administrative, and Fiscal Indicators: The Case of Jordan.”

63 Berraou, “The Limits of Anti-Corruption Policies in Morocco.”

64 Maghress, “Chbat Sends Harsh Criticisms.”

65 El Yahyaoui, “Benkirane and ‘God Forgive What’s from the Past’ Slogan.”

66 Denoeux, “Corruption in Morocco.”

67 Benamar, “In the Shadows of Colonial Agricultural Policies.”

68 Zaki, “Decentralization in Morocco.”

69 Bergh, “Public Sector Governance Reforms,” 9.

70 Ibid., 11.

71 For analysis on Morocco and Tunisia, see Khakee and Weilandt, “Supporting Democratic Participation beyond Democracy Promotion? EU Relations with Moroccan and Tunisian Civil Society in the Areas of Trade and Anti-Corruption”.