Evaluating policy coherence and integration for adaptation: the case of EU policies and Arctic cross-border climate change impacts

ABSTRACT

The impacts of climate change materialize in different ways and are of varying magnitudes at different locations around the world. Adaptation is a global policy challenge because some of those impacts propagate across borders. The presence of borders influences the policy responses that may aim at preventing, alleviating, or exploiting the impacts. Yet the dynamics of responses to cross-border impacts have not been explored in research on policy coherence. We extend the analysis of climate policy coherence and integration to cover adaptation policies that are enacted at different but interacting geographical locations, proposing a conceptual approach how to do this. We illustrate our approach with examples of European Union (EU) policies related to the cross-border ramifications of climate change impacts originating in the Arctic. Our example highlights interconnections between climate change adaptation policy with foreign, security and trade policies. Since climate change impacts are transmitted through systems that cross borders, policymakers in the EU and elsewhere should recognize the links between policy domains with potential significance in responding to these propagating impacts. The policy responses of a recipient region at risk of such impacts are limited by jurisdictional borders. By explicitly recognizing elements of integration and coherence, more effective policy actions can be developed. Seeking coherence between climate and other policies between different regions, intertwined together via global networks of trade and other relations, should be a fundamental policy goal for the EU.

Key policy insights

• New policies are needed to address the climate change impacts that are transmitted across jurisdictional borders.

• Coherence across policy domains that deal with cross-border issues helps in planning effective policy actions to address the challenges posed by cross-border climate change impacts.

• Integration of climate policy into other policy domains facilitates policy coherence by building a common base across policies and borders.

• Coherence of adaptation with other policies may be lacking, for example, when responding to opportunities and risks that climate change creates for resource exploitation.

KEYWORDS:

• Climate risk
• policy coherence
• policy integration
• climate impact
• adaptation

1. Introduction

Climate change knows no borders. A region can experience climate change impacts that may originate well beyond its jurisdiction, having propagated from place to place through pathways such as international trade, financial flows, infrastructural linkages or movement of people (Benzie et al., 2019). Such cross-border impacts have been defined as ‘consequences of climate change that occur remotely from the location of their initial impact, where both impacts, and potentially also responses to those impacts such as adaptation, are transmitted across one or more borders’ (Carter et al., 2021, p. 2). While some responses to cross-border impacts may be autonomous, most imply a need for targeted policies, many of which extend across jurisdictions. The impulses motivating policy development and how relevant policies emerge and interact are still under-researched. A rare example is a report by the OECD (2020) that emphasized integration and coherence in local adaptation projects taking place between national borders. This article seeks to progress novel research on the topic of climate change adaptation and policy coherence by focusing on the cross-border and international dimensions of adaptation and the challenges they create for policymakers and practitioners. Using the example of the European Union (EU) as a region known to be affected by cross-border impacts (Lung et al., 2017), it emphasizes that adaptation is not only a local issue, although often portrayed as such.

Hence, we introduce a new cross-border dimension to research on policy coherence and integration. Attention to cross-border impacts of climate change (hereinafter cross-border impacts) is relatively new in the context of policy making, though it is familiar in some contexts. For example, NATO has noted that ‘climate-related threats are global issues that transcend traditional sovereignty roles’ (NATO, 2021, p. 16). For Europe, it can be contended that ‘European policy-makers have given lower priority to risks that … are geographically remote’ (Knaepen, 2021, p. 24), which may also reflect a lack of approaches that can deal with the inevitable complexity of several policy domains interacting across borders. Here we address this challenge by using two related concepts – coherence and integration – for developing policy evaluation to deal with cross-border impacts.

Coherence and integration are related to interactions between different policy domains (Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Tosun & Lang, 2017). Efforts to pursue policy coherence refer to the systematic promotion across government departments and agencies of policy actions that mutually reinforce each other and create synergies (Jones, 2002) thereby increasing effectiveness and efficiency (Kivimaa & Sivonen, 2021). We adopt the definition of policy coherence by Nilsson et al. (2012, p. 396) as ‘an attribute of policy that systematically reduces conflicts and promotes synergies between and within different policy areas to achieve the outcomes associated with jointly agreed policy objectives’. In this article, we examine how policymakers can pursue policy coherence in a cross-border context.

Policy integration has been explored since the 1980s (Lafferty & Hovden, 2003; Nilsson & Persson, 2003; Underdal, 1980). It means the integration of specific policy goals (here: climate change adaptation) into the objectives and instrument designs of other policy domains. Approaches reported for advancing integration range from encouragement through appraisal to full mutual engagement of actors across policy domains (Tosun & Lang, 2017). Cejudo and Michel (2017) see policy integration as a process of solving complex problems via strategic and administrative decisions, and policy coherence as a policy design issue. We argue that both coherence and integration build on decision processes and policy design.

This article expands the general framework for cross-border impacts proposed by Carter et al. (2021) by concentrating on how policy responses can be examined. We show that this requires an extension of climate policy coherence and integration analysis to policy domains with cross-border importance, such as foreign, security and trade policies, and to other policies affecting adaptation at different but interacting geographical locations. Foreign policies address cross-border issues directly, security policies cover internal and external security, and trade policies encompass global economic activities connecting different regions (Benzie & Persson, 2019; EC, 2021; West et al., 2021). These domains have only recently recognized the significance of climate change, leading to potentially uncoordinated responses. We illustrate our approach with examples of EU policies in relation to the cross-border impacts of climate change in the Arctic, including adaptation, foreign, security and trade domains. It is an interesting case because global warming in the Arctic is progressing nearly four times faster than the global average (Rantanen et al., 2022), resulting in many impacts that may propagate across the Arctic itself and to lower latitudes.

Section 2 introduces the cross-border impact framework and literature on policy coherence and integration. Section 3 presents our proposition for how to conceptualize the analysis of policy coherence and integration in the context of cross-border impacts. Section 4 illustrates the analytical approach by applying it to EU policies with Arctic relevance. Section 5 discusses some implications and limitations of the approach. Section 6 concludes.

2. Setting the scene: Cross-border impacts of climate change, policy coherence and policy integration

2.1. Cross-border impacts of climate change and relevance for policy

Location-specific impacts of climate change, such as disruptions from forest fires, flooding and extreme heat waves, are well-known. Cross-border impacts, experienced remotely from the location of the initial impact, may also cause significant disruption to societies and livelihoods but are more difficult to recognize (Carter et al., 2021). Different types of cross-border impacts include those on trade, financial flows, migration of people, geopolitics, infrastructure, and biophysical effects (Benzie et al., 2019). Carter et al. (2021) define an ‘initial impact’ induced by a ‘climate trigger’ (a short-period weather shock or a slow-onset event) within a specific region, which propagates through an ‘impact transmission system’ that describes the links from the initial impact to the consequences across borders. Potentially relevant borders are those between states or between sub-national jurisdictions.

When cross-border impacts occur or are anticipated as risks (or opportunities), they may invoke responses by actors (e.g. policymakers, businesses) where they are felt, i.e. in the recipient region. These interventions constitute a ‘response transmission system’, which is a set of policies or governance structures for targeting adaptation responses, whether reactive or anticipatory, aimed at different points along the chain of propagated impacts (Carter et al., 2021). For example, Arctic permafrost thaw triggered by climate change can have cross-border impacts by damaging infrastructure that is used for transporting raw materials to serve industries outside the Arctic. Interventions aiming to reduce these impacts or risks may be targeted directly at the region and sources of initial impact (e.g. repair and improvement of infrastructure), along the impact transmission system (e.g. alternative methods of transporting materials), or in the region of recipient risk (e.g. businesses stockpiling materials instead of relying on just-in-time delivery). Indirect responses may aim to reduce impacts via external third parties, for example, by sourcing raw materials from alternative locations. The actors that respond to impacts can be in the region of the initial impact or in the regions facing the subsequent cross-border impacts. Unintended consequences from responses to the risks are also likely. For instance, substituting rail with road transport of materials in permafrost thaw zones may lead to pollution and congestion along routes and at port facilities.

The responses are taken or supported by different actors who, to a varying degree, are aware of the actions taken by others. Just as the impacts interact and propagate in the impact transmission system, responses also interact temporally, spatially and at different levels of governance. This highlights the relevance of policy coherence and integration, as actors are unlikely to fully share an understanding of what can or should be done to address the risks.

2.2. Policy coherence

Policy coherence has diverse interpretations in different literatures and policy domains. A shared understanding exists that policy coherence seeks consistency, synergies, and a reduction of conflicts between policy objectives and their implementation (Del Río, 2014; Kern et al., 2017). Efforts to seek coherence can be described as processes aiming to improve consistency and alignment between policies (Mackie, 2020; Nilsson & Nilsson, 2005; Thomas, 2012). There are different forms of policy coherence: (1) horizontal (between policy domains), (2) vertical (e.g. between the EU and member states), (3) internal (consistency within a policy domain) and (4) multilateral (between international organizations) (Carbone, 2008; Nilsson & Nilsson, 2005).

Preconditions for policy coherence include cooperation, shared responsibility, and political leadership (Tosun & Lang, 2017). Pursuit of coherence may be seen, for example, in political statements of intent, via champions advancing coherence (Mackie et al., 2017) and through aligning government budgets to avoid contradictory objectives (Mickwitz et al., 2009). Shared visions across domains can also advance policy coherence (May et al., 2011). For example, the European Green Deal (EC, 2019) attempts to take a coherent perspective on climate governance. The European Commission (EC) states explicitly that all ‘EU actions and policies should pull together to help the EU achieve a successful and just transition towards a sustainable future’ (p. 19), including actions at the international level.

While coherence can be seen as a policy attribute, it is also a goal for policy processes (Cejudo & Michel, 2017). Besides policy preparation, implementation is important for coherence. Implementation leads to various interpretations (mutations) of policy by the implementing officials, who may avoid potential conflicts but can also create conflicts unseen at a higher level (Nilsson et al., 2012; Urwin & Jordan, 2008). Therefore, striving for policy coherence should be seen as a dynamic process that explores synergies, trade-offs, and the reduction of inconsistencies, rather than a process directed towards a particular end-state.

Coherence can be evaluated at the levels of objectives, outputs, or outcomes. Objectives express desired directions, outputs refer to specific ‘products’ that policies deliver (e.g. decisions, statements, actions), and outcomes focus on consequences of policies (Mickwitz, 2003; Vedung, 1997). Several frameworks for evaluating coherence, with a focus on policy synergies and conflicts, have been developed (e.g. Del Río, 2014; Nilsson et al., 2012; Shawoo et al., 2023).

Policy coherence becomes complex in a cross-border context because the pursuit to reduce conflicts and improve synergies encounters different jurisdictions that become linked through the impact transmission systems. Increased synergies across borders in one policy domain may lead to conflicts with other domains on either side of the border. For example, optimal use of resources may suggest that raw materials should move freely across borders for processing. However, to be coherent with policies for the protection of biodiversity the recipient country’s trade policy may need to include strict checking of any imported raw materials to minimize the spread of harmful alien species benefitting from climate change.

2.3. Policy integration

Whilst policy coherence refers to how well policies work in consort, policy integration examines how elements of one policy domain are internalized into another. The term ‘policy mainstreaming’ is often used with a similar connotation (D’Alfonso, 2019; Mackie et al., 2017; Remling, 2018). Policy integration is a way to approach policy coherence by processes that make policy objectives, instruments and processes better aligned. This should reduce the risk of policy conflicts and increase coherence. For example, the integration of climate change adaptation objectives into foreign policy is likely to reduce the risk that foreign policy actions encourage development which may increase exposure or vulnerability to climate change.

Policy integration is not a stable state but continually affected by external factors, such as lobbying or policy crises (Biesbroek & Candel, 2020). Cultural and cognitive frames also affect integration (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010). Even when policy outputs show evidence of integration, only some of this is manifested in actual policy outcomes (Runhaar et al., 2018).

There are several approaches for examining policy integration. Russel et al. (2018) identify normative approaches, emphasizing the principled priority of environmental (or climate) issues and political commitment (e.g. Lafferty & Hovden, 2003); organizational and procedural approaches, seeking mechanisms that can deliver policy integration such as departmental responsibilities and mandates (e.g. Russel & Jordan, 2009); output-based assessments, exploring whether policy outputs deliver requirements for environmental/climate improvements (e.g. Kivimaa & Mickwitz, 2006); and reframing approaches, focusing on learning (e.g. Nilsson & Persson, 2003).

In a cross-border context, a normative approach to adaptation might examine, for instance, the degree to which it takes priority over trade interests in resource exploitation. An organizational and procedural approach would emphasize, for example, the existence of a mandate for trade policy to consider adaptation in (all) policy processes. An output-based assessment could look at whether integrating climate change adaptation into foreign policy opens new channels for strengthening regional partnerships, for instance, by using diplomatic means to ensure that funding for adaptation in the Global South is targeted more effectively. A reframing-based approach would highlight the role of learning, for example, drawing on precedents demonstrating how integration has promoted successful climate change adaptation.

2.4. Evaluating coherence and integration

Policy integration requires explicit recognition of the policy domain to be integrated, in this case climate change adaptation. Policy coherence, instead, would normally be judged by examining the lack of conflicts between policy objectives or actions in adaptation and other domains. In evaluating these, both processes and outputs are relevant.

Processes that can be evaluated include, for example, the establishment of parliamentary committees or executive agencies driven by political leadership (Tosun & Lang, 2017), inter-ministerial working groups and strategies (Kivimaa & Mickwitz, 2009), policy-appraisals and impact assessments (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010) and the creation of shared visions across policy domains supported by statements and actions (May et al., 2011). In cross-border cases, a sign of intent towards coherence or integration is the recognition of cross-border aspects, for example, in the task description of committees or inter-state working groups.

Policy outputs reflect policy integration when other domains explicitly adopt climate change adaptation objectives, change institutional structures, such as by creating specific organizations or administrative bodies (Runhaar et al., 2018), introduce specific policy instruments that target the policy problem (Biesbroek & Candel, 2020) or deliver concrete measures such as heatwave plans or early warning systems (Runhaar et al., 2018). In evaluating outputs, one can examine the extent to which incentives from different policies provide target groups with non-conflicting signals (Mickwitz et al., 2009). Distinctions can also be made between the degree of conflict, complementarity, and synergy between policy instruments (Del Río, 2014). The output analysis can examine the priority accorded to integration (in the case of contradictions) and the resources allocated (Kivimaa & Mickwitz, 2006; Mickwitz et al., 2009). In a cross-border context, the outputs of interest are those that bring two or more parties together to address adaptation.

Evaluations of climate policy integration are complicated by the fluidity of what constitutes climate policy; it has become difficult to distinguish between climate policy as a domain and climate policy integration (Adelle & Russel, 2013). This observation is today more relevant than ever, as the strengthening of overall climate objectives has seen the emergence of specific areas of climate policies, for example ‘climate diplomacy’, ‘climate finance’ and ‘climate security’. Biesbroek and Candel (2020) argue for a deeper understanding of dynamic processes that determine changes in policy integration over time. Such analyses should be based on a relevant measure of integration. Our approach focuses on how to evaluate processes and outputs relating to cross-border climate change adaptation policy responses, explained next.

3. Applying coherence and integration in evaluating policies for cross-border impacts

Our approach merges and elaborates on previous approaches to evaluate policy coherence and integration in a context of cross-border impacts. The starting point is that an initial impact from a climate trigger (anticipated or realized) propagates into cross-border impacts that activate responses (policy actions) in the response transmission system (see Section 2.1). Responses by policy actors may occur in the initial region, along the pathways of impacts that are transmitted across borders, in a potential recipient region, and indirectly via external agencies not directly affected by impacts but able to influence outcomes. Impacts are not only relevant for climate change adaptation policy but also for other policy domains. The presence of borders introduces additional complexity in addressing coherence and integration, because they create interactions between policies originating from different jurisdictions and levels of governance. To date, policy connections in this context have often been overlooked.

Whilst detailed evaluations require case-by-case deliberations, our ideas can be illustrated in the context of specific policy domains and actors. Figure 1 presents a suggestion for characterizing policy coherence and integration in the context of cross-border climate change impacts.

Figure 1. Framework for policy coherence analysis in the context of cross-border impacts of climate change, highlighting the role of foreign and security policy in relation to climate policy.

The Figure conveys the links between a climate trigger, its immediate impacts, transmission and crossing borders to reach a recipient region, and how that region may react through adaptation policies or other policy domains to address the initial impacts or the transmission to reduce the risk it experiences.

The following questions, condensed from Sections 2.2–2.4 above, can guide evaluations in a cross-border context:

1. How coherently do climate change adaptation and other policies operate in the response transmission system? Are there tools and processes that identify and support synergies and complementarities between policies affecting climate change adaptation?

2. To what degree and at what level can conflicts and synergies be detected between climate change adaptation policies and other relevant policies?

3. In what ways have objectives and measures of climate change adaptation policy been integrated into other policy domains?

We argue that complementarity, i.e. that two or more policies do not undermine each other’s effects (see Del Rio, 2014), should be set as the minimum level for policy coherence (questions 1 and 2). Higher levels of coherence include efforts to achieve synergies. This will often require policy integration (question 3). Each evaluation of cross-border coherence needs to be designed for its specific context. In our example on Arctic climate change (Section 4), we focus on the integration and coherence of climate adaptation policies with policies for foreign affairs, security and trade from an EU perspective. In practice, an evaluation involves identifying relevant ministries, implementing officials, policy target groups and other actors, exploring the collaboration across policy domains and states, and documenting mechanisms and processes (see Section 2.4; Kivimaa, 2022; Russel & Jordan, 2009).

We use a heuristic input-output description of policies that distinguishes between the policy process (initiation, preparation, and administration), the outputs in the form of decisions or resource allocations, and the outcomes forming the impact on the policy targets (Mickwitz, 2003; Vedung, 1997). However, when covering multiple policies and several policy domains in a cross-border context, a detailed analysis of inputs and outputs may be impractical or even impossible. Thus, the analytical level of detail should be determined separately for each policy evaluation.

There are different policy outputs in the response transmission system. Not all responses are generated by the recipient region (such as the EU) because policy action is also taken by jurisdictions that transmit the impacts, those in the region of initial impact, and by other international actors (see Figure 1). This creates challenges for coherence that the analysis should highlight. For example, implementation arrangements in one policy domain may be limited to domestic actions only, whereas international actions are recognized in another.

3.1. Addressing dimensions of cross-border coherence

The complexity of impact transmissions implies that cross-border coherence has several spatial and political levels and dimensions (Figure 1). First, in any specific region, different policies and actions affecting climate change adaptation can be synergetic or conflictual. For example, agricultural policies may favour crops that increase vulnerability to droughts while policies for water management prioritize allocation of water to industry or households. Such tensions can be identified by applying the questions above to horizontal coherence, i.e. conflicts or synergies between policies at the same level of governance under the same jurisdiction. Second, cross-border coherence can be checked by examining synergies and conflicts between policies in regions separated by borders. For example, the region of initial impact may strive to shift to drought resistant crops whereas trade policies of the recipient region focus on obtaining cash crops with high water demand. A third dimension is the vertical coherence between national and transnational policies pertaining to climate change adaptation and other relevant domains. For example, water management policies of an upstream country may be incoherent with the transnational aims for the whole watershed. Conflicts between objectives and instruments are frequent when many jurisdictions are involved at different levels of governance (Howlett et al., 2017).

The different dimensions underline Carbone’s (2008) observation that coherence depends on the choice of perspective. Hence, whilst some policy responses taken by a recipient region may seem coherent in the region itself, they may create tensions with policies in the region of initial impact, and vice versa.

It is particularly relevant to pay attention to vertical coherence with respect to policy domains that are by their nature linked to cross-border issues, such as foreign affairs and security, trade and finance policies of the recipient region and their relation to wider international policies (e.g. governed by the United Nations, the World Trade Organization or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

The fact that impacts are transmitted through a system that includes several borders puts additional demands on coherence between policies affecting adaptation. If a recipient region addresses actual risks within its own borders, it can merely focus on ‘domestic’ coherence and integration. However, whenever it seeks to influence parts of the impact transmission system outside its own borders, issues of coherence with policies in other jurisdictions arise. An evaluation of vertical coherence may help in identifying how transboundary policies can play a mediating role in ensuring coherence throughout the transmission system.

3.2. Addressing dimensions of cross-border integration

Policy integration aims at reducing conflicts and enhancing synergies, thereby increasing the likelihood of coherence across policies. Integration can be evaluated at three interlinked levels: (i) objectives, (ii) instruments and implementation, and (iii) outputs and outcomes. Figure 2 shows how integration of climate change adaptation policy can be reflected in other policy domains, highlighting key elements and the nature of interconnections.

Figure 2. Policy integration of adaptation to cross-border climate change impacts linking to non-climate policy domains.

The Figure conveys how the transmission of impacts into a recipient region generates demands to address cross-border impacts through adaptation policies or other policy domains. The figure displays the different ways of achieving integration of adaptation policies into other policy domain and where policy coherence can be detected.

Evidence for integration can be found in specific mechanisms and processes such as institutional arrangements and procedural instruments that support integration. For example, mandatory hearings across policy domains support the transmission of policy objectives. In cross-border-related policy integration, the processes need to give actors from different parts of the response system a say in formulating policies. Additional evidence for adaptation policy integration can be found in the degree that actors across policy domains and borders participate in mutual learning and reframing processes. These may be formal or informal. Whereas institutional arrangements for integration tend to be unidirectional, learning and reframing processes are almost always bidirectional. The detailed evaluation of policy integration can be used to gain deeper insights into how climate adaptation challenges are perceived in different policy domains and across borders.

Institutional integration of policies across borders from one jurisdiction into those of another is politically challenging. Transnational policies in the form of conventions or other institutionalized interactions are likely to mediate such integration significantly. For example, the UNECE Convention on Transboundary Waters has facilitated the development of institutional policy integration of adaptation to climate change between countries managing upstream and downstream parts of a river basin (Vingradov & Wouters, 2020).

4. Illustrating coherence and integration in policy responses to cross-border Arctic climate change impacts

In the following, we illustrate how policy coherence and integration can be analysed in a cross-border context by exploring policy responses to Arctic climate change from an EU perspective. This case highlights challenges that a recipient region encounters in policy responses to cross-border impacts when the policies are formulated by different entities and governance mechanisms. Additional challenges arise, because the EU does not have a seat in the Arctic Council, a key transnational forum for cooperation among Arctic states. However, three EU member states, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, are members of the Arctic Council, and six EU member states are observers (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain). An EU application for observer status was received positively in 2013 but a decision was deferred, although the EU may observe Council proceedings until a decision is made. This kind of setting is not atypical: policy connections between the region of origin and the recipient region exist but they are not fully institutionalized. Below, we focus on: (1) horizontal coherence between adaptation policies and security and trade policies, and (2) cross-border coherence. Vertical coherence and policy integration are also covered briefly. We also touch on linkages to mitigation, as highly intertwined with climate change adaptation policies for the Arctic.

4.1. Compiling material for the analysis

Key policies of the EU on the Arctic and of the Arctic Council, and literature pertaining to climate, security and trade policies concerning the Arctic form the basic material. The Joint Communication ‘A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic’ (EC, 2021) is the guiding policy from the European Commission’s side. We compared this to ‘Arctic Climate Change Update 2021: Key Trends and Impacts. Summary for Policy-makers’ (AMAP, 2021) which is a research driven report produced by the Arctic Council. Subsequently, the EU has engaged in dialogue with indigenous peoples in the Arctic Forum in February 2023 and strengthened cross-border cooperation in the Interreg Aurora programme and the Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme.

Additional material was obtained from reports on recent policy actions of the EU. For example, in 2022 the EU created the post of Special Envoy for Arctic Matters within the European External Action Service and plans to establish an EU Commission office in Nuuk to strengthen cross-border cooperation with the Government of Greenland. Complementary interviews were conducted in 2022 with 22 stakeholders representing the EU and national governments of Norway, Finland and Denmark, researchers specialized in Arctic policies, and indigenous communities in Finland and Norway. These are referred to by numeric codes below.

4.2. Cross-border climate change impacts originating in the Arctic and the institutional base of the response transmission system

The Arctic climate has warmed significantly (Rantanen et al., 2022). This slow-onset climate trigger causes thawing of permafrost, ecosystem changes and sea ice retreat, with consequences for indigenous livelihoods and other activities (AMAP, 2021; Constable et al., 2022; Meinander et al., 2022). Several impacts propagate beyond the Arctic region.

The region of initial impact includes the eight Arctic states, i.e. Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Russian Federation, and the United States, while the governance of the region is a mosaic of institutions and forums (Rahbek-Clemmensen & Thomasen, 2020). The Arctic Council, established by Arctic states in 1996, is a key forum for sustainable development. The Council comprises the Arctic states and six permanent representatives of indigenous groups: Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North and Saami Council. The indigenous groups bring unique pan-Arctic cross-border perspectives because traditional livelihoods have not recognized national borders.

The Arctic Council can act as an ‘intermediary’ between the Arctic states and the indigenous groups. It also produces new scientific knowledge and contributes to learning, supporting policy integration (Figure 2). As it does not have a strong legal base in the form of a regional convention, all joint policies require a spirit of consensus. The Council does not have an overall operational strategy, with commensurately modest opportunities to directly influence the climate policies of its members (Barry et al., 2020). Its possibilities to ensure wide policy coherence are also limited by its lack of a mandate to deal with security issues, and by its focus on research (interviews 1-6). In 2022, the Council’s seven member states declared a pause in their participation as a response to Russia invading Ukraine (Zellen, 2023).

The EU is a major user of resources from the Arctic. The European Commission has developed policies to address Arctic issues even in the absence of a formal position in the Arctic Council. It has also actively supported policy development in the Arctic through research funding. The EU policies of interest here are prepared in different departments. For instance, European External Action Service (EEAS) coordinates Arctic policy, whereas climate change adaptation and trade policies are led by DG CLIMA and DG TRADE, respectively.

The EU Arctic Communication (EC, 2021) provides a general frame aiming for mitigation and adaptation, echoing the Arctic Council’s strategic plan. It stresses the involvement of indigenous communities and use of indigenous knowledge. This suggests that synergies at the level of objectives have been achieved through cross-border integration of policy objectives (Figure 2).

4.3. Horizontal coherence and adaptation policy integration in EU security and trade policies pertaining to the Arctic

The prospects and risks for the Arctic under continued warming and extreme weather conditions underline the need for coherence between EU climate change adaptation and foreign and security policies, requiring close collaboration between DG CLIMA and EEAS. The EU Arctic Communication (EC, 2021) recognizes the consequences that changes in climate and economic activity can have for the Arctic and it strives to strengthen horizontal policy coherence between climate, trade and security policies. Horizontal coherence requires that the different departments manage to align their operational mechanisms and worldviews. Security is underlined, as the EU seeks to maintain peace by relying on allies, such as Canada, the US and NATO. EU Arctic policy supports the integration of adaptation policy at the level of objectives (Figure 2). It stresses the importance of improved resilience in the Arctic through sustainable extraction and processing of raw materials, but there are controversial issues such as indigenous rights and land encroachment. One interviewee remarked that the EU policy is focused on increasing renewable energy, and the Arctic is seen as a space to source or locate this energy (interview 7). Support for adaptation to climate change is secondary.

Whereas the EU has since 2008 begun to integrate climate change concerns generally into its foreign and security policy, for instance, via climate diplomacy and security (Youngs & Lazard, 2023), adaptation in the Arctic has been little addressed by EEAS (European Union External Action, 2020). Yet, some synergies have been identified. For example, surveillance of emergencies, accidents and disasters, mentioned in EU Arctic policy (EC, 2021), also supports responses to extreme weather events. Indeed, some measures indicate further movement towards integration of adaptation policy and improved coherence between adaptation and security policies at the level of policy outputs. These include enhancing strategic foresight capabilities to better understand the climatological changes in the Arctic and their impact on global security and boosting the capacity of monitoring and warning systems to anticipate effects of extreme weather. The EU taxonomy for sustainable activities was also mentioned as a financial policy instrument potentially supporting climate change adaptation in the Arctic region (interview 7).

Adaptation to the retreat of glaciers and sea ice, and the thawing of permafrost, can facilitate increasing exploitation of resources and expansion of shipping. Such development may be encouraged by EU trade policies, potentially causing horizontal incoherence between environmentally sustainable adaptation and trade policies within the EU. The EU’s use of Arctic resources and associated shipping contribute significantly to greenhouse gas emissions in the Arctic. This adaptation that exploits opportunities neglects the trade-off between environmental protection needs and economic prospects (Schunz et al., 2020). The lack of coherence and integration at the level of policy outcomes is seen in the absence of tangible examples of responsible sourcing of raw materials (Koivurova et al., 2021). The war in Ukraine has drastically reduced the EU’s possibilities to rely on Russian Arctic resources (Tollefson, 2022) and accelerated the shift to renewable energy (EC, 2022). Thus, external events have, as a side-effect, pushed climate and trade policies towards coherence from a mitigation point of view.

4.4. Vertical coherence in responses to Arctic cross-border climate change impacts

Vertical coherence between the EU and international policies is easiest to achieve for relatively uncontroversial issues that require joint actions to be effective, as in responses to climate-related natural disasters such as floods or wildfires. The EU Arctic policy and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UN, 2015) support international action, and are both consistent with the objectives of the Arctic Council. This demonstrates vertical coherence in policies addressing cross-border impacts (Figure 1).

Vertical coherence is more difficult to attain when strong economic interests intervene. For example, the importance of ‘Zero Emission and Zero Pollution shipping in the Arctic Ocean’ (EC, 2021) becomes increasingly important when shipping adapts to easier access into Arctic waters with the retreat of sea ice. The EU has supported heavy fuel oil use restrictions developed by the International Maritime Organization, but the rules will allow 75% of the vessels in the Arctic to continue using heavy fuel oil until 2030 (Koivurova et al., 2021). A major challenge is to address the environmental harm that spontaneous (mal)adaptation can cause when it leads to increasing pollution from shipping in Arctic waters. EU adaptation policy is silent on this and the vertical policy conflict with climate mitigation policies is not recognized. The conflicts arise in part due to international principles such as freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage (Ringbom, 2017).

There are also differences in the vertical coherence between the Arctic Council and the EU. The Arctic Council stresses environmental protection, resilience and responsible approaches to resource development. The EU policy reflects in addition a strong interest in access to resources (Koivurova et al., 2021). In practice the policies aim for partly conflicting outcomes. By not considering opportunities arising from climate change and how to ensure that they do not conflict with other environmental objectives, current adaptation policies fail to address issues of vertical coherence.

4.5. Challenges and opportunities for cross-border coherence

EU policy stresses clean and ethical sourcing of raw materials, but potential cross-border conflicts are apparent. Multiple socio-environmental conflicts have emerged in resource and land exploitation by Arctic states and have negatively affected indigenous people’s lives and their capacities to adapt to climate change (Hanaček et al., 2022). EU trade policies have so far not integrated these concerns, although they are recognized by EU Arctic policy (EC, 2021) and the Arctic Council. Recently, however, the Commission’s proposal for a Critical Raw Materials Act (COM(2023) 160 final) explicitly acknowledged the issue by claiming consistency with the EU’s updated Arctic policy, including its efforts to ‘tackle the effects of climate change, and support the sustainable development of Arctic regions to the benefit of Arctic communities, not least Indigenous Peoples, and future generations’ (p. 6.). A similar quest for policy coherence appeared in the new Green Deal Industrial Plan (COM(2023) 62 final), stressing global cooperation and underlining the role of the World Trade Organization and Free Trade Agreements in sustainability transitions, but without mentioning the Arctic or adaptation to climate change (p.18).

An important issue in cross-border coherence concerns who has control over the actions. Some indigenous communities feel that governments of non-Arctic states, including the EU, try to influence what indigenous communities should do (interview 4). This demonstrates that cross-border policy incoherence can arise when the recipient region attempts to instigate policies that explicitly aim at regulating activities in the region of initial impact. Such tensions also appear across sub-national borders between the central administration and indigenous communities (interviews 4,8). Some interviewees argued that the EU as a recipient region has a better understanding of certain Arctic issues involving indigenous communities than the Arctic states themselves (interview 6). Cross-border conflicts also relate to non-indigenous people in the Arctic, highlighted, for example, by resource nationalistic discourses regarding wind power export from Norway to the EU (Hansen & Moe, 2022).

Regarding policy outputs, cross-border synergies have been observed in producing new knowledge and information pertaining to climate change and the Arctic. Interviewees remarked that the EU funds projects and commits other resources such as remote sensing data that provide important information for which the Arctic Council itself lacks funding (interviews 7, 9–10). Other cross-border synergies, for example harmonized regulation between EU and non-EU countries, require demanding diplomatic negotiations and coordination between organizations influencing policies for climate change, security, and trade.

4.6. Geopolitics can affect coherence and integration

Until recently, the EU bought a quarter of Arctic hydrocarbon exports (Koivurova et al., 2021). EU-based companies have heavily invested in Arctic gas, (mal)adapting to climate change by utilizing improved access caused by retreating sea ice. The Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 rendered this activity politically unacceptable.

The EU already stated earlier that it is ‘committed to ensuring that oil, coal and gas stay in the ground, including in Arctic regions’ (EC, 2021, p. 10), creating a conflict between mitigation policies, the actual opportunities of adaptation and the economic policies of the oil and gas producing Arctic countries (Norway, Canada, Russia, US). This incoherence also generated tensions between the Arctic Council’s governing bodies and some of its members (Forbis & Hayhoe, 2018).

After February 2022, geopolitical considerations became a dominant policy objective that all other policies must integrate, reversing the arrows of policy integration (see Figure 2). As a side effect, the coherence between the EU’s own climate mitigation and energy policies has increased, but adaptation policies have not reacted. This is unfortunate because we may see an increasing demand for non-Russian Arctic oil and gas, evidenced already by Norway’s heightening role for European energy security (see, von der Leyen, 2023). Adaptation policies should pay attention to the opportunities that progressing climate change creates in the Arctic and ensure that those taking advantage of them do not reduce overall resilience. The working document of the EEAS ‘Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security’ is a start. It explicitly identified the Arctic as an illustration of possible geopolitical tensions stemming from climate change impacts when the retreat of sea ice creates economic opportunities and new challenges in relation to the fragile environment and natural resources (European Union External Action, 2020).

Increasing demand for Arctic resources also generates military interests (Hanaček et al., 2022). In the 2021 Arctic Communication, the EU expressed concerns over the increased military presence in the Arctic brought about by climate change. The 2022 situation demonstrated that cross-border policy conflicts can arise rapidly for non-climatic reasons, turning the Arctic into a region of geopolitical risks, contrary to the Arctic Council’s original aims.

4.7. Summary of cross-border synergies and conflicts in the Arctic

Our examination of cross-border policy issues in the Arctic demonstrates that policies can simultaneously create synergies and conflicts. Cross-border incoherence is evident between strong economic interests and long-term sustainability, and between development interests and interests of indigenous people’s traditional livelihoods (Table 1). There are some examples of climate change adaptation policy integration into EU security and trade policies concerning the Arctic (Table 2). However, these need to become more systematic to fully achieve the objectives of policy integration.

Table 1. Examples of potential policy synergies and conflicts affecting cross-border action in the Arctic.

	Examples of potential synergies between policies: support for coherence	Examples of potential conflicts between policies: challenges to coherence
Horizontal coherence for cross-border action within the EU as a region of recipient risk	Environment, security, and trade are connected in EU Arctic strategy. Security policy for surveillance of emergencies, accidents, and disasters also supporting adaptation, e.g. to weather extremes in the Arctic. Aims for EU to collaborate with non-EU Arctic states on environmental/climate issues to increase stability in the area (synergistic with foreign and security policy).	Lack of in-depth coordination of adaptation to climate change with foreign and security policy. Weak integration of climate change into trade and finance policy outputs and outcomes The Arctic paradox: EU aims to curtail carbon emissions, while continuing to benefit from the policies of the Arctic states to export raw materials and maintain shipping routes in the Arctic.
Cross-border coherence between the Arctic region and the EU as a region of recipient risk	Coherent responses in actions to reduce impacts from climate-related natural disasters, such as floods or wildfires, from the EU to the Arctic Coherent principles on adaptation and indigenous communities in the Arctic Council and the EU. Environmental protection objectives in the EU and the Arctic Council. Climate change identified as a comprehensive threat & goals to make the Arctic more resilient (integration of policy objectives)	Resource and land exploitation by EU and other Arctic states vs. indigenous peoples’ adaptive capacity. EU’s objective to ban further fossil fuel exploration in the Arctic vs. the energy/security policy plans of Arctic fossil fuel producing countries

Table 2. Examples of adaptation policy integration in EU trade and security policies affecting the Arctic.

Element of integration	Examples
Policy objectives	Adaptation objective included in the EU's sustainable finance taxonomy; Arctic strategy referred to in the proposed European Critical Raw Materials Regulation
Policy instruments	Adaptation diplomacy is specified as part of EU foreign policy towards non-EU Arctic states
Policy outputs and outcomes	Recognition of climate change impacts requiring improved capacity in security policy to address wildfires and other climate-related events
Learning and reframing	Support for the Arctic Council’s activities in creating knowledge and policy learning regarding how to integrate climate change adaptation into other policies.
Institutional arrangements and procedural instruments	Enhancing the EU’s strategic foresight capabilities to better understand climatic and related geophysical and ecological changes in the Arctic and their impact on global security.

5. Discussion and conclusions

This article has demonstrated how the concepts of policy coherence and integration can be used in evaluating policy responses to cross-border impacts of climate change, a topic hitherto underexplored. We have shown, using the example of EU Arctic policy, that evaluating cross-border policy coherence can reveal both synergies and conflicts between climate change adaptation and other policy objectives. This knowledge can be used to develop more effective policy responses for preventing, alleviating, or exploiting the cross-border impacts of climate change. Our findings from the illustrative EU–Arctic case highlighted the following points to consider in evaluating cross-border policy coherence and integration:

1. Coherence of policies pertinent for adapting to cross-border climate change impacts is a complex challenge because it involves actors operating under different jurisdictions, multiple policy domains (e.g. environment, trade, security, tourism, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, cultural heritage), and different linkages between policy objectives and instruments. The Arctic case revealed this complexity, for instance, in conflicting responses to climate change impacts (the exploitation of new economic opportunities versus protecting vulnerable nature and livelihoods).

2. A comprehensive analysis of coherence should address different actors’ mandates that may create overlaps or gaps in policy responses. Our case highlighted, for instance, the different interests of Arctic indigenous communities and Arctic states, and the limited mandates that indigenous communities and the Arctic Council have as policy actors. The interviews demonstrated that indigenous representatives feel their concerns being neglected in policy development. Evaluations of policy coherence should consider imbalances in power as a source of policy incoherence or conflict.

3. Whilst policies may appear coherent at the level of objectives, conflicts can arise in policy implementation, again illustrated by our case. Potential causes include the weight given to different policy objectives (e.g. trade over adaptation), the opportunities that different policy actors have to steer implementation, and unexpected policy outcomes during policy processes (Harrinkari et al., 2016; Kröger & Raitio, 2017). Moreover, due to demands for policy coherence, actors may present their objectives as more compatible than they truly are.

The above considerations also reveal that detailed evaluation of cross-border policy coherence requires in-depth information of policy processes, implementation, and outcomes. For example, our case revealed the need to understand practices pertaining to rights and conditions for exploiting natural resources that affect indigenous groups. Traditional livelihoods have crossed administrative borders determined by states (Magga, 2024) and must increasingly adapt to climate change through changing practices that may challenge existing state policies.

Evaluations are only a starting point for improving cross-border policy coherence. Previous studies have noted the challenges in achieving coherence across administrative domains (e.g. Carbone, 2008; Furness & Gänzle, 2017). The cross-border context magnifies these challenges because responses to impacts require input from actors that operate in different political and jurisdictional settings. Our example highlighted the following challenges: (1) Consensus seeking in the mosaic of Arctic governance may be an obstacle to integration and coherence, because some of the demands and expectations of different actors heavily contradict each other. (2) Cross-border responses to climate change can have adverse effects on sub-national actors, such as indigenous communities, even when the overall impact is considered positive. (3) Adaptation policies may fail to address potential issues of coherence by neglecting opportunities that climate change creates for resource exploitation. In addition to pre-existing challenges, the Russian attack on Ukraine demonstrated that geopolitical events outside the conventional channels of impact transmission may radically change the normative premises of policy integration and coherence. This stresses a dynamic view of coherence, recognizing that coherent policies today may become incoherent later due to new knowledge or changes in other influencing factors (Biesbroek & Candel, 2020; Biesbroek, 2021).

We end with a recommendation for policymakers: To better address cross-border impacts and go beyond the predominant local focus of climate change adaptation policy, it is vital to integrate adaptation as an objective to policy domains that by nature address cross-border issues. Such domains include, importantly, foreign, security, trade and finance policies. The EU, as a recipient region of many cross-border impacts (Benzie et al., 2019; Lung et al., 2017), should take a proactive approach by expanding its adaptation policy to cross-border questions. A first step is to create formal policy objectives and measures that can be integrated in other policy domains to improve coherence. The pursuit of coherence between climate and other policies and between different regions, intertwined together via global networks of trade and other relations, should be a fundamental policy goal for actors involved in different policy domains, such as DG Trade, DG Clima and EEAS in the EU. This goal should be met at the level of policy instruments, including changes in trade agreements and collaboration with regions susceptible to the direct impacts of climate change.

The cross-border context highlights the relationship between policy integration and coherence. Integrating climate change adaptation objectives and tools into other domains, such as trade, finance, and security and foreign policies, can be a beneficial starting point for addressing cross-border impacts of climate change. Policy integration strengthens the base for addressing cross-border impacts, but needs to be supported by active efforts to involve a wider variety of actors who can build sufficient horizontal, vertical and cross-border policy coherence in responding to the impacts.

In sum, we have shown that the concepts of policy integration and coherence can be used systematically to evaluate the nature of tensions and conflicts between policy domains in cross-border cases. The approach we provide is applicable in regular policy evaluations guiding policy revisions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Horizon 2020 Framework Programme [grant number: 821010]; Academy of Finland [grant number: 322667].