Introduction

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Notes

  1. Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement states that “As soon as the operation of this agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.” Ankara Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community and Turkey, signed at Ankara, Sept. 12, 1963. For a legal analysis of the Ankara Agreement, see Dominik Lasok, “The Ankara Agreement: Principles and Interpretation,” Marmara Journal of European Studies, Vol. 1, Nos. 1–2 (1991), pp. 27–47.

  2. See the original version of the Rome Treaty, Articles 2 and 3. For the method employed by the founding fathers of the European integration, that is, neo-functionalism and its basic attributes, strengths and shortcomings, see, for instance, Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (London: Palgrave, 2000), especially pp. 50–97.

  3. The academic literature in the field of the development of Turkey–EU relations is extensive. Amongst those, see, for instance, Mehmet Uğur, The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Meltem Müftüler Baç, Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Haluk Kabaalioğlu, “Turkey and the European Union: Converging or Drifting Apart?,” Marmara Journal of European Studies, Vol. 7, Nos. 1–2 (1999), pp. 109–65; Şaban Çalış, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri, Kimlik Arayışı Politik Aktörler ve Değişim (Ankara: Nobel, 2001), Atila Eralp (ed.), Türkiye ve Avrupa (Ankara: İmge, 1997); Pia Christina Wood, “Europe and Turkey: A Relationship Under Fire,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 12 (Winter 1999), pp. 95–115; Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 21–35, Meltem Müftüler Baç, “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1998), pp. 240–58; Sevilay Elgün Kahraman, “Rethinking Turkey–European Union Relation in the Light of Enlargement,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 1–20; Gamze Avcı, “Putting the Turkish EU Candidacy into Context,” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 7 (2002), pp. 91–110; Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US Attitudes, and Challenges for Turkey,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 25–54; Ziya Öniş, “Turkey, Europe and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1999), pp. 107–36; William Park, “Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki – to Ankara?,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 31–53; Ziya Öniş, “An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative-Historical Perspective,” Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2001), pp. 105–19; Ziya Öniş, “Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey–EU Relations,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Fall 2000), pp. 463–83; Ziya Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State Turkey–EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 9–35; Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, “Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State,” paper presented at the ISA Conference, Budapest, Hungary, June 24–28, 2003, pp. 1–32; Christopher Brewin, Turkey and Europe After Nice Summit (İstanbul: TESEV, 2002) at: www.tesev.org.tr; David Barchard, Building a Partnership: Turkey and the European Union (İstanbul: TESEV, 2000), at: www.tesev.org.tr; Meltem Müftüler Baç, Enlarging the European Union: Where Does Turkey Stand? (İstanbul: TESEV, 2002), at: www.tesev.org.tr; Chris Rumford, “From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the Politics of EU Enlargement and Prospects of Accession,” Contemporary Politics, Vol. 6, No 4 (2000), pp. 331–43; Tarık Oğuzlu, “How to Interpret Turkey's Accession Process with the European Union – A Clash of Discourses,” Perceptions, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec.–Feb. 2003), pp. 51–83; Çınar Özen, “Neo-Functionalism and the Change in the Dynamics of Turkey–EU Relations,” Perceptions, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Sept.–Nov. 1998), pp. 34–57.

  4. Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring 1999), p. 41.

  5. For the implications of the current enlargement process for the EU, see Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of European Union (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), pp. 140–57; Michael Baun, A Wider Europe, The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement (Lanham-Boulder-New York-Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000); Helen Wallace, Brigid Fowler, Lykke Friis, Anna Murphy and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Enlargement of the European Union: Impacts on the EU, the Candidates and the ‘Next Neighbors’,” ECSA Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 2–7; Helene Sjursen and Karen E. Smith, “Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement,” ARENA Working Papers, WP 01/1, 2001, at: www.arena.uio.no

  6. Stephen White, Ian McAllister and Margot Light, “Enlargement and the New Outsiders,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 135–53.

  7. Christopher Hill, “The Geo-political Implications of Enlargement,” EUI Working Paper, RSC No. 2000/30, 2000, reprinted in Jan Zielonka, Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 95–117.

  8. The term “finality of the integration process” has been popularly referred to and discussed since the famous speech of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at Humboldt University in May 2000. For the speech and academic responses to it, see Christian Joerges, Yves Meny and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer (San Domenico: European University Institute, 2000).

  9. Taking into account the evolving and dynamic character of the European integration process, the desirability and feasibility of such ultimate determination will be discussed below.

 10. For a similar view see Baun, A Wider Europe, The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement, pp. 8–11; Sjursen and Smith, “Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement;” Helene Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy,” ARENA Working Papers, WP 01/6, at: www.arena.uio.no, reprinted as “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sept. 2002), pp. 491–513.

 11. For the estimated economic benefits of the enlargement process, see Agenda 2000, Strengthening the Union and Preparing for Enlargement, at: www.europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm. Sjursen points out that “most studies of enlargement have come to the conclusion that the economic cost of the enlargement will outweigh the gains in the short and medium term.” See Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy,” p. 6.

 12. Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, “The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 1999), p. 218. Also, see Romano Prodi, “Catching the Tide of History: Enlargement and the Future of the Union,” Speech to the Paul Henri Spaak Foundation, Brussels, Oct. 11, 2000. See www.europa.eu.int/comm/igc2000/dialogue/index_en.htm

 13. For similar views, see, Baun, A Wider Europe, The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement, pp. 8–11; Sjursen and Smith, “Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement;” Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy.”

 14. See in general Helene Sjursen, “Security and Defence,” ARENA Working Papers, WP 10/03, 2003 at: www.arena.uio.no, reprinted in Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen and Brian White (eds), European Foreign Policy Today: Theory and Practice (London: Sage, forthcoming); Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy;” Helene Sjursen, “Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU's External Policy?,” ARENA Working Papers, WP 98/18, 1998, at: www.arena.uio.no; Helene Sjursen, “Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building Blocs,” ARENA Working Papers, WP 9/03, 2003, at: www.arena.uio.no, reprinted in Sebastian Princen and Michele Knodt (eds), Understanding the EU's External Relations (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

 15. Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy,” pp. 16–20.

 16. Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy,” pp. 16–17.

 17. It will be argued below that the same explanation is not conceivable for Turkey's inclusion into the enlargement process, which constitutes the main reason for the problematic nature of the relations between the EU and Turkey.

 18. For in-depth analysis on the “conditionality” of the EU enlargement process, see Heather Grabbe, “European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 (July 2002), pp. 249–68; Sjursen and Smith, “Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement;” Karen Smith, “The Conditional Offer of Membership as an Instrument of EU Foreign Policy: Reshaping Europe in the EU's Image;” Marmara Journal of European Studies, Vol. 8, Nos. 1–2 (2000), pp. 33–46.

 19. See how the enlargement conditionality is designed in Agenda 2000 and the Luxembourg Summit: Agenda 2000, see supra no. 11 and the Luxembourg Presidency Conclusions, Dec. 12–13, 1997, Luxembourg European Council, Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 12/97, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998.

 20. For the Copenhagen Criteria, see the Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, Bulletin of the European Communities, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1994. For the elements of the strengthened pre-accession strategy which provides the conditionality to work, see Agenda 2000, supra no. 11, and Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions, Dec. 12–13, 1997, supra no. 19. See also Avery and Cameron, The Enlargement of European Union, pp. 113–20 and Baun, A Wider Europe, The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement, pp. 99–114.

 21. For a similar view, see Grabbe, “European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire,” pp. 249–68; Sjursen and Smith, “Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement.”

 22. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) Article 2 stipulates, as one of the main objectives of the Union, to maintain and develop the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice.

 23. See, for instance, Öniş, “Turkey, Europe and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization,” p. 120; Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State Turkey–EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” pp. 10–12; Mehmet Uğur, The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma, in general as regards EU's external anchor role vis-à-vis Turkey.

 24. See in general, Sjursen, “Security and Defence;” Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy;” Sjursen, “Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU's External Policy?;” Sjursen, “Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building Blocs.”

 25. Sjursen, “Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU's External Policy?,” p.25.

 26. For the view of the Commission, see Agenda 2000, supra no. 11.

 27. David Phinnemore, Association: Stepping-Stone or Alternative to EU Membership? (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), p. 133. Also, see Haluk Kabaalioğlu, “The Customs Union: A Final Step Before Turkey's Accession to the European Union? ,” Marmara Journal of European Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1998), pp. 113–40.

 28. This eligibility has in fact been stated several times since the Commission Avis of 1989, without further progress in the accession process. See EC Commission, 1989, Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community, SEC(89) 2290 final, Dec. 18, 1989.

 29. For the European Strategy, see Rumford, “From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the Politics of EU Enlargement and Prospects of Accession,” pp. 334–35.

 30. See for instance Park, “Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki – to Ankara?,” pp. 36–38; Öniş, “Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey–EU Relations,” pp. 471–76; Chris Rumford, “From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the Politics of EU Enlargement and Prospects of Accession,” pp. 339–41; Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2000), pp. 489–502; Sanem Baykal and Tuğrul Arat, “AB'yle İlişkiler, in Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası-Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne, Vol II, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), pp. 326–65, 351–53.

 31. See Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions, supra no. 19.

 32. Öniş, “An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative-Historical Perspective,” p. 105.

 33. See İhsan Dağı, “Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980–83: The Impact of European Diplomacy,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1996), pp. 124–41; İhsan Dağı, “Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983–1987,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2001), pp. 16–40; Bertil Duner and Edward Deverell, “Country Cousin: Turkey, the European Union and Human Rights,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 1–24; Harun Arıkan, “A Lost Opportunity? Critique of the EU's Human Rights Policy Towards Turkey,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 19–50; Richard Youngs, “Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy,” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working Document No. 167, Oct., 2001, at: www.ceps.be; Jolanda Van Westering, “Conditionality and EU Membership: The Cases of Turkey and Cyprus,” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 5 (2000), pp. 95–q118; Meltem Müftüler Baç, “The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics,” East European Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 159–79.

 34. For the role of the European Parliament in Turkey–EU relations, see Stefan Krauss, “The European Parliament in EU External Relations: The Customs Union with Turkey,” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 5 (2000), pp. 215–37. For the role of the European Parliament in democracy promotion in general, see Youngs, “Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy.”

 35. For the Greek–Turkish relations in general and Cyprus problem in particular, see, for instance, Heinz Kramer, “The Cyprus Problem and European Security,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Autumn 1997), pp. 16–32; Christopher Brewin, “European Union Perspectives on Cyprus Accession,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan. 2000) pp. 21–34; Neill Nugent, “EU Enlargement and ‘the Cyprus Problem’,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 131–50; Stelios Stavridis and Justin Hutchence, “Mediterranean Challenges in the EU's Foreign Policy,” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 5 (2000), pp. 35–62; Ziya Öniş, “Greek–Turkish Relations and the European Union: A Critical Perspective,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 31–45; Panayotis J. Tsakonas, “Turkey's Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Autumn 2001), pp. 1–40; Nathalie Tocci, “The ‘Cyprus Question’: Reshaping Community Identities and Elite Interests within a Wider European Framework,” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working Document, No. 154, Sept. 2000, at: www.ceps.be; Nanette Neuwahl, “The European Union and Cyprus,” Perceptions, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Sept.–Nov. 2001); Ziya Öniş, “Greek–Turkish Relations and the Role of the European Union: Perpetuator of Conflict or Contributor to Peace?,” Revised Draft – Dec. 2002, prepared for Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük-Şenesen (eds.), Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation?, forthcoming.

 36. Council Decision No 2001/235/EC of March 8, 2001 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, (20017235/EC) OJ 24.03.2001 L 85/13.

 37. Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, March 19, 2001, Official Gazette, March 24, 2001, No: 24352.

 38. For instance the sensitive foreign policy areas like the Cyprus and Aegean disputes were only dealt with in the introductory part of the National Programme in order to emphasize the fact that Turkey did not regard these as conditions or criteria for EU membership.

 39. For an analysis of the efforts in respect to legal harmonization, see Sanem Baykal, “Turkey–EU Relations in the Aftermath of the Helsinki Summit: An Analysis of Copenhagen Political Criteria in Light of the Accession Partnership, National Programme and the Regular Reports,” Ankara Review of European Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 15–63.

 40. In this respect, the European Commission's Regular Reports assessing Turkey's progress towards fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria provide in-depth analysis. See, for instance, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 9.10.2002, SEC (2002) 1412.

 41. For an in-depth analysis on the implications of the enlargement conditionality on pro-EU and anti-EU discourses in Turkish domestic politics and their repercussions on foreign policy approaches, see, for instance Oğuzlu, “How to Interpret Turkey's Accession Process with the European Union? Clash of Discourses,” pp. 51–83; Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State Turkey–EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” pp. 9–35. For a view on Turkey's domestic political turbulence due to accession requirements stimulating nationalistic tendencies in foreign policy, see Tsakonas, “Turkey's Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue,” pp. 1–40, and for a response, see Tarık Oğuzlu, “The Impact of ‘Democratisation along the EU Accession Process’ on the Turkish Foreign Policy,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 9, No. 1 (forthcoming). Oğuzlu argues that “it would be flawed to attribute Turkey's external behaviours to her transitionary democracy identity, for such accounts do not generally take into consideration the environment in which Turkey has found herself in a degraded interaction process with the European Union. It is because of this oblivion that somehow analysts confuse Turkey's Europeanization process with the ongoing democratization along the EU accession process. Unless this situation were reversed, it would not be possible for the analysts to solve the puzzle why Turkey's foreign policy behaviours have turned out to become more non-European in the 1990s despite the increasing level of democratization along the EU accession process.” In this respect, the European Commission's Regular Reports assessing Turkey's progress towards fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria provide in-depth analysis. See, for instance, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 9.10.2002, SEC (2002) 1412, p. 11.

 42. For various analyses in respect of the degree of reform required in the domestic and foreign policies of Turkey along the EU accession process see for instance, Paul Kubicek, “The Earthquake, the European Union and Political Reform in Turkey,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 1–18; Natalie Tocci, “21st Century Kemalism – Redefining Turkey–EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Working Document, No. 170 (Sept. 2001), pp. 1–41, at: www.ceps.be; Keyman and Öniş, “Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State,” pp. 1–32; Chris Rumford, “Failing the EU Test? Turkey's National Programme, EU Candidature and the Complexities of Democratic Reform,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 51–68; Müftüler Baç, “The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics,” pp. 164–77.

 43. For an interesting analysis of Turkish elite opinion on the issue of EU membership, see Lauren M. McLaren, “Turkey's Eventual Membership of the EU: Turkish Elite Perspectives on the Issue,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 117–29.

 44. Öniş, “Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey–EU Relations,” pp. 376–77.

 45. See supra no. 20.

 46. For a similar view, see Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy;” Oğuzlu, “The Impact of ‘Democratisation along the EU Accession Process’ on the Turkish Foreign Policy;” Keyman and Öniş, “Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State;” Chris Rumford, “Failing the EU Test? Turkey's National Programme, EU Candidature and the Complexities of Democratic Reform,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 51–68.

 47. Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy,” p. 16.

 48. As William Park points out, therefore, “In the final analysis, Turkey has simply been regarded as too important to ‘lose’.” See Park, “Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki – to Ankara?,” p. 44.

 49. Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy,” p. 22.

 50. Öniş, “Greek–Turkish Relations and the European Union: A Critical Perspective,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), p. 37.

 51. Günther Verheugen, The Second Decade: Towards a New and Integrated Europe, Den Haag, Nov. 4, 1999.

 52. Commissioner Günther Verheugen, “The enlargement process and Turkey's place in this process,” speech at Boğaziçi University, March 9, 2000, quoted in Sjursen, “Why Expand? The Question of Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy,” p. 15.

 53. For instance Chris Rumford asserts that Turkey's exclusion from pan-European networks is an example of this differentiated attitude. See Rumford, “From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the Politics of EU Enlargement and Prospects of Accession,” pp. 337–39.

 54. Keyman and Öniş, “Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State,” p. 26.

 55. The pivotal role Turkey played in the popularization of those discussions will be analyzed in the section concerning Turkey's contested European identity.

 56. For a view which argues that a commitment to EU membership is one of the ways in which a European identity can make itself apparent, see White, McAllister, Light, “Enlargement and the New Outsiders,” pp. 140–42.

 57. Anthony Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity,” International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1 (1992), p. 75, as quoted in Rainer Hülsse, “The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference – Turkey as Europe's Other?,” Discussion Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mannheim, March 26–31, 1999, p. 2.

 58. Jan Zielonka and Peter Mair, “Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged European Union,” West European Politics, Vol. 25, No. 2 (April 2002), p. 3.

 59. See Penelope Sofioleas, “Identity Shift and Europe's Changing Perceptions of Others: Europe, Turkey and the Issue of Self-Identification,” Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2.1, at: www.trinstitute.org/qjpcr/2_1identity.htm.

 60. See Penelope Sofioleas, “Identity Shift and Europe's Changing Perceptions of Others: Europe, Turkey and the Issue of Self-Identification,” Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2.1, at: www.trinstitute.org/qjpcr/2_1identity.htm.

 61. Müftüler Baç, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,” p. 25.

 62. For a similar view on the significance of religion in shaping the identity of the “New Europe,” see Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,” pp. 21–35.

 63. Wallace, Fowler, Friis, Murphy and Sedelmeier, “Enlargement of the European Union: Impacts on the EU, the Candidates and the ‘Next Neighbors’,” p. 2.

 64. See Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions, 19–20 June, 2000, at: http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=62050&from=&LANG=1.

 65. For in-depth analysis on this issue, see Michael Smith, “The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 5–28; Friis and Murphy, “The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries,” pp. 211–32; Hill, “The Geo-Political Implications of Enlargement,” pp. 95–117; Jan Zielonka, “Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration,” in Joerges, Meny and Weiler, What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, pp. 151–62, Zielonka and Mair, “Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged European Union,” pp. 1–19.

 66. See Smith, “The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order,” pp. 5–28; Friis and Murphy, “The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries,” pp. 211–32.

 67. For a similar view, see Zielonka and Mair, “Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged European Union,” pp. 1–19; Zielonka, “Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration,” pp. 151–62.

 68. There are indeed other probable variations for the future prospects of European integration, but for the sake of argument we will limit our focus to these two models.

 69. See White, McAllister and Light, “Enlargement and the New Outsiders,” p. 135.

 70. Hill, “The Geo-political Implications of Enlargement,” p. 101.

 71. As Hill points out, one of the determinants of the future borders of the EU and the criteria employed to draw them will be geopolitics, see Hill, “The Geo-political Implications of Enlargement,” pp. 95–117.

 72. Smith, “The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order,” pp. 5–28. Also see Friis and Murphy for the elaboration of this categorization, Friis and Murphy “The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries,” pp. 211–32.

 73. Independent of the value-judgment on the country's European credentials, Turkey might be cited as a case here as it has a Customs Union with the Community, and therefore subject to its Common Commercial Policy on the one hand and a wide range of its single market rules and practices on the other.

 74. For instance, Britain, Sweden and Denmark, despite being full members of the EU, are out of the Euro-zone, therefore not bound by a crucial policy of the Union.

 75. See, for instance, Michael Emerson, “Some Paradigms for the Evolving Map of Europe,” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working Document, No. 164 (April 2001), pp. 1–19, at: www.ceps.be.

 76. Smith, “The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order,” p. 12.

 77. Hill, “The Geo-political Implications of Enlargement,” pp. 96–97.

 78. Hill, “The Geo-political Implications of Enlargement,” pp. 96–97.

 79. For a similar view as regards the profound effects of Turkey's accession to the EU both in negative and positive terms, see, for instance, Buzan and Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” pp. 41–57; Vittorio Sanguineti, “Turkey and the European Union: Dreaming West but Moving East” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 8 (Winter 1997), pp. 11–26; Hill, “The Geo-political Implications of Enlargement,” pp. 96–97. Recently Valery Giscard d'Estaign expressed his unfavorable opinion over the subject and triggered a debate on the final destination of the Turkey–EU relations. See “Pour ou contre l′adhésion de la Turquie à l′Union Européenn, Le Monde, Nov. 8, 2002.

 80. Buzan and Diez argue that “A central difficulty lies in the way that the EU Turkey relationship penetrates deeply into the domestic politics of both sides. The internal political constitution and the basic construction of collective identity in both entities is deeply intertwined with the nature of relationship between them. In the case of Europe, the identity issue revolves around who can and who cannot be considered ‘European’.” Buzan and Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” p. 41. Also, see Sanguineti, “Turkey and the European Union: Dreaming West but Moving East,” pp. 11–26. Sanguineti states that Turkey is “by definition not European,” see p. 12.

 81. “Pour ou contre l′adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union Européenn.”

 82. Quoted in The Economist, “The Limits of Europe,” Vol. 359, No. 8222 (May 19–25, 2001), pp. 14–17. For similar comments from European politicians, see Avcı, “Putting the Turkish EU Candidacy into Context,” pp. 96–99; Duner and Deverell, “Country Cousin: Turkey, the European Union and Human Rights,” pp. 8–9.

 83. On this issue, see the much publicized article of Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22–49.

 84. Nuri Yurdusev, “Avrupa'yı Kurmak, Türkiye'yi İdare Etmek,” in Şaban Çalış and İhsan Dağı, Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi (Ankara: Liberte, 2001), p. 163.

 85. International Herald Tribune, Dec. 11–12, 1999.

 86. Öniş, “Turkey, Europe and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization,” pp. 113–17. On the nature of the European Union as a project of civilization and its perception of Turkey as the “other” of Europe, see Öniş, “Turkey, Europe and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization,” pp. 107–36; Müftüler Baç, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,” pp. 21–35; Müftüler Baç, “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,” pp. 240–58.

 87. The European Commission's public opinion surveys, entitled “Eurobarometer” contain valuable insight into the EU's public opinion in many aspects as well as in respect to enlargement. Eurobarometer is available at: www.europe.eu.int/comm/public_opinion.

 88. See Yurdusev, “Avrupa'yı Kurmak, Türkiye'yi İdare Etmek,” pp. 161–83; Nuri Yurdusev, “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği,” in Atila Eralp, Türkiye ve Avrupa (Ankara: İmge, 1997), pp. 17–85; Gündüz Aktan, “Avrupa Birliğinin Bizde ve Onlarda Yarattığı Kimlik Sorunu,” Foreign Policy (Summer 1999), pp. 56–72; Sofioleas, “Identity Shift and Europe's Changing Perceptions of Others: Europe, Turkey and the Issue of Self-Identification;” Hülsse, “The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference – Turkey as Europe's Other?;” Günther Endruweit, “Turkey and the European Union: A Question of Cultural Difference?,” Perceptions, Vol. 3 (June–Aug. 1998), pp. 54–72; Müftüler Baç, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,” pp. 21–35.

 89. Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 36 as quoted in Erik Jones and Niels Van Der Bijl, “Public Opinion and Enlargement: A Gravity Approach,” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working Document, No. 192 (March 2003), p. 1, at: www.ceps.be.

 90. For the EU, discourse on Turkey's suitability for EU membership functioning as a means to (re-)construct its own identity See Hülsse, “The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference – Turkey as Europe's Other?,” pp. 1–23.

 91. For instance Müftüler Baç points out that “Europe became a mirror through which the Ottoman elite perceived its own weaknesses, differences, and traits. The Ottoman process of Europeanization became critical in defining what the Turkish people rejected, namely non-European elements of their national character. Because the Turkish elite transformed Ottoman society from above, a gap formed between the ruling elite and the masses in their perceptions of Europe and modernity.” See Müftüler Baç, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,” p. 28.

 92. Buzan and Diez argue that Turkey is or ought to be a “Westernistic” country instead of aspiring to become a “European/Western” country. According to their definition, “A Westernistic state aspires to synthesise its own culture with Western ideas about organising the political economy … but it does not seek to replace its own culture with that of the West.” Buzan and Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” pp. 49–50.

 93. For the Asian characteristics of Turkish identity and its effects on EU membership see Çağrı Erhan, “Asian Dimension of Turkey's Character: An Obstacle or a Catalyst for European Union Membership,” Ankara Review of European Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 123–49. See also Bozkurt Güvenç, “Quest for Cultural Identity in Turkey – National Unity of Historical Diversities and Continuities,” at: www.ignca.nic.in/ls_03012.htm.

 94. Sanguineti, “Turkey and the European Union: Dreaming West but Moving East,” pp. 112–14.

 95. Turkey's distinctiveness has been expressed in different terms by Huntington. According to his analysis, Turkey was a “torn country,” a country that has its origins in one civilization, but chooses to move to another. See Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” p. 44.

 96. Stephen Larrabee and Ian Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003), pp. 45–47.

 97. Buzan and Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” p. 44. Similarly, Kramer argues that “EU membership is synonymous with the acknowledgement of the standards of contemporary Western civilization for Turkey. Simultaneously, the ultimate success of the Kemalist revolution would be confirmed. These elites normally point out that Turkey has been apart of European politics for centuries and has established an unequivocal European identity.” See Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States, (Washington, DC: Brookings Press, 2000), p. 184.

 98. Buzan and Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” p. 44.

 99. For an evaluation of Kemalism and its implications for Turkish identity and politics, see Andrew Mango, “Atatürk and the Future of Turkey,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn 2000), pp. 113–24. For a somewhat critical approach to Kemalism and need for reform, see Nathalie Tocci, “21st Century Kemalism – Redefining Turkey–EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” pp. 1–41,

100. Paul Howe, “A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 1995), p. 28.

101. See in general, Hill, “The Geo-political Implications of Enlargement,” pp. 95–117.

102. For similar views, see Gilles Andreani, “Europe's Uncertain Identity,” Centre for European Reform (CER) Essay, 1999, pp. 1–28, at: www.cer.org.uk; Hill, “The Geo-political Implications of Enlargement,” pp. 95–117. Similarly Peter van Ham asserts that the European identity, or an “identity beyond the state” can only be based on a solid base of multiculturalism, acknowledging that cultural diversity is a permanent and valuable part of democratic political society. Therefore, Europe's emerging postmodern identity calls for a politics of cultural affinity, rather than a narrow-minded conception of “Europeanness.” See Peter van Ham, “Europe's Postmodern Identity: A Critical Appraisal,” International Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 229–51.

103. See for instance Müftüler Baç, “Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies,” pp. 489–502.

104. See Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty.

105. On this issue, see Christopher Hill, “The Capabilities Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe's Global Role,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sept. 1994), pp. 305–28; Christopher Hill, “Closing the Capabilities–Expectations Gap?,” in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen, A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 18–38; Michael Smith, “The EU as an International Actor,” in Jeremy Richardson, European Union: Power and Policy-making (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 24–262; Stanley Hoffmann, “Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 189–98; Anand Menon, “Enhancing the Effectiveness of the EU's Foreign Defence Policies,” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Policy Brief, No. 29 (Dec. 2002), pp. 1–9, at: www.ceps.be; Stephen Everts, “EU Foreign Policy: From Bystander to Actor,” Centre for European Reform (CER), 2001, at: www.cer.org.uk; Steven Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe? – Managing Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy,” Centre for European Reform (CER), (Feb. 2001), at: www.cer.org.uk.

106. For the enlargement policy to be described as EU's most effective foreign policy tools, see, for instance, Sjursen and Smith, “Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement.”

107. Sjursen, “Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU's External Policy?,” p. 2.

108. See for instance, Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe, “Has the Period of ‘Civilian Power Europe’ Come to an End?,” Ankara Review of European Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 1–14.

109. See, for instance, Anthony Forster and William Wallace, “Common Foreign and Security Policy – From Shadow to Substance,” in Helen Wallace and William Wallace, Policy Making in the European Union, 4th Ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 461–91.

110. See Hill “Closing the Capabilities–Expectations Gap,” p. 25.

111. Forster and Wallace, “Common Foreign and Security Policy – From Shadow to Substance,” in Wallace and Wallace, Policy Making in the European Union, p. 489.

112. According to Article 17/2 of the Treaty on European Union, Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making.

113. Açıkmeşe, “Has the Period of ‘Civilian Power Europe’ Come to an End?,” p. 12. Despite those predictions, the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force is involved in an operation in Congo under the name “Artemis.” It is still early, however, to assert with any certainty that the EU is ready and willing to play a global military role.

114. Steven Everts, “Shaping a credible EU Foreign Policy,” Centre for European Reform (CER), (Feb. 2002), at www.cer.org.uk.

115. Francois Heisbourg, “Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity,” Survival, Vol 42, No. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 5–15; Esra Çayhan, “Towards a European Security and Defense Policy: With or Without Turkey?,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2003), p. 50.

116. For a similar view, see, for instance, Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 235–58; Michael Emerson, “The Wider Europe as the European Union's Friendly Monroe Doctrine,” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Policy Brief, No. 27 (Oct. 2002), pp. 1–25.

117. See, for instance, Youngs, “Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy,” pp. 1–58.

118. See Şebnem Udum, “Turkey and the Emerging European Security Framework,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Autumn 2002), pp. 75–77.

119. See Helene Sjursen, New Forms of Security in Europe, ARENA Working Papers, WP 01/14, 2001.

120. For a discussion on the European Union in respect to different forms of state, see James Caporaso “The European Union and Forms of State. Westphalian, Regulatory and Post-Modern?,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 29–52.

121. For an analysis of “Europe” itself being a security referent, see Ole Wæver, “European Security Identities,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 103–32.

122. Tarık Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the European Union: The Security Dimension,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Dec. 2002), pp. 65–66.

123. See Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, Vol. 113 (June/July 2002), at: www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html; and for contrasting views, see, for instance, Ronald Asmus and Kenneth Pollack, “The New Transatlantic Project – A Response to Robert Kagan,” Policy Review, Vol. 115 (Oct.–Nov. 2002), at: www.policyreview.org/OCT02/asmus.html; Steven Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe? – Managing Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy;” Francois Heisbourg, Nicole Gnesotto, Victor Kremenyuk and Robert Kagan, European Security and Defence Policy: Taking Stock, European Security Forum (ESF) Working Paper, No. 8 (Sept. 2002), pp. 1–38.

124. Tarık Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the European Union: The Security Dimension,” p. 63.

125. See, on this issue, the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union annexed to the Laeken Summit Presidency Conclusions, Dec. 14–15, 2001, at: http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/makeFrame.asp?MAX=&BID=76&DID=68827&LANG=2 &File=/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf&Picture=0 (hereafter the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union). Also, see John Palmer “The Mission and Values of the Europe We Need,” European Policy Centre (EPC), (Sept. 2001), at: www.epc.be.

126. Sjursen, “Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building Blocs,” p. 8.

127. Sjursen, “Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building Blocs,” pp. 6–8.

128. For a contrasting view, see Fraser Cameron and Antoinette Primatarova, “Enlargement, CFSP and the Convention – The Role of the Accession States,” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), EPIN Working Paper, No. 5 (June 2003), at: www.ceps.be. Cameron and Primatarova state that “As opposed to viewing the candidates as a burden, it is possible to argue that, the new member states might be part of the solution rather than part of the problems around a CFSP, and a benefit rather than a liability” and add that “the time will tell.” p. 11.

129. See Articles III-206–209 and III-226 of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe for various formats of flexibility. The text of the Draft Constitutional Treaty is available at: www.european-convention.eu.int. “Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,” The European Convention Secretariat, CONV850/03, Brussels, July 18, 2003.

130. See Article III-196 of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.

131. See Article 42 of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.

132. According to the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article III-210/1 the new Petersberg tasks are as follows: “The tasks referred to in Article I-40(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”

133. For an evaluation of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe as regards its external policy and institutional set up reform proposals, see Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane, “The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy: Learning from Failure,” Survival, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 167–86, especially, pp. 167–75.

134. See Alfred van Standen, Kees Homan, Bert Kreemers, Alfred Pijpers and Rob de Wijk, Towards a European Strategic Concept,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Nov. 2000 as quoted in Esra Çayhan, “Towards a European Security and Defense Policy : With or Without Turkey?,” p. 50.

135. See, for instance, Burkard Schmitt, “Disunity holds the EU back from a major global role,” International Herald Tribune, Feb. 13, 2003.

136. See, for instance, Fraser Cameron, “After Iraq – Can There Really be a Future for CFSP?,” European Policy Centre (EPC), (March 2003), at: www.epc.be; Everts and Keohane, “The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy: Learning from Failure,” pp. 183–84.

137. “A Secure Europe in a Better World, ”presented by Javier Solana, EUHR for CFSP–European Council, Thessaloniki, June 20, 2003 (hereafter the Solana Report).

138. For an in-depth analysis of the Solana Report, see Everts and Keohane, “The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy: Learning from Failure,” pp. 167–86, especially, pp. 175–84; Jean-Yves Haine, “European Strategy – First Steps,” EU–ISS Newsletter, No. 7 (July 2003).

139. Haine, “European Strategy – First Steps.”

140. Everts and Keohane, “The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy: Learning from Failure,” p. 168.

141. “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU,” Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Jean Monnet Project, by Romano Prodi President of the European Commission, Brussels, Dec. 5–6, 2002, pp. 1–6.

142. For instance the European Commission has adopted a Communication setting out a new framework for relations over the coming decade with Russia, the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS), that is Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus and the Southern Mediterranean. See the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours,” Brussels, March 11, 2003, COM (2003) 104 final. Moreover, see the “Institute's Note” for the conference entitled “The Enlarged EU and its New Neighbours: New Security Challenges” held by The Institute of Security Studies in Paris on June 30, 2003, at: www.iss-eu.org/activ/content/s2003e.html; Emerson, “The Wider Europe as the European Union's Friendly Monroe Doctrine.”

143. See the Communication, supra no. 142, pp. 5–6.

144. See the Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, Dec. 12–13, 2002, at: http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/makeFrame.asp?MAX=&BID=76&DID=73774&LANG=1&File=/pressData/en/ec/73774.pdf&Picture=0.

145. See the Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, Dec. 12–13, 2002, at: http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/makeFrame.asp?MAX=&BID=76&DID=73774&LANG=1&File=/pressData/en/ec/73774.pdf&Picture=0.

146. See the Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, Dec. 12–13, 2002, at: http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/makeFrame.asp?MAX=&BID=76&DID=73774&LANG=1&File=/pressData/en/ec/pdf&Picture=0.

147. In the Commission's Communication, the Southern Mediterranean countries are specified as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia.

148. See the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, supra no. 129.

149. See Prodi, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU,” pp. 1–6.

150. See the Commission Communication, supra no. 142, p. 9.

151. Prodi, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU,” pp. 1–6.

152. Prodi, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU,” pp. 1–6.

153. Prodi, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU,” The same view is shared by academics as well. See, for instance, Emerson, “The Wider Europe as the European Union's Friendly Monroe Doctrine,” pp. 1–25; Emerson, “Some Paradigms for the Evolving Map of Europe,” pp. 1–19.

154. Prodi, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU,” pp. 1–6.

155. See the Commission Communication, supra no. 142, p. 4, emphasis added.

156. The Communication appears to be following the latter approach and proposes a framework, which takes into account the differences of the partner countries, yet the commonality of interests.

157. The current association model is stipulated in the EC Treaty Article. It states that “The Community may conclude with one or more states or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure.” See Phinnemore, Association: Stepping – Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?

158. For proposed areas of cooperation, see the Commission Communication, supra no. 142.

159. Müftüler Baç, “Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies,” pp. 495–500.

160. Müftüler Baç, “Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies,” pp. 495–500.

161. For a similar approach, see Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the European Union: The Security Dimension,” pp. 61–82.

162. For a similar approach, see Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the European Union: The Security Dimension,” pp. 61–62.

163. William Park, “Turkey, Europe and ESDI: Inclusion or Exclusion,” Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2000), p. 325.

164. See Udum, “Turkey and the Emerging European Security Framework,” p. 63.

165. Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the European Union: The Security Dimension,” p. 64.

166. Özlem Terzi, New Capabilities, Old Relationships: Emergent ESDP and EU–Turkish Relations, Southeast European Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (June 2002), p. 55.

167. See for instance Nathalie Tocci and Marc Houben, “Accommodating Turkey in ESDP,” Centre for European Policy Studies, (CEPS) Policy Brief, No. 5 (May 2001), pp. 1–11.

168. See for instance, Onur Öymen, “Turkey and its Role in European Security and Defence,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan.–March 2001), pp. 53–57; Sinan Ülgen, “Turkey's Role in European Security and Defence Policy,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July–Sept. 200), pp. 41–46, Lord George Robertson, “Turkey and the European Security and Defence Identity,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan.–March 2001), pp. 41–51; Çayhan, “Towards a European Security and Defense Policy: With or Without Turkey?,” pp. 35–54; Udum, “Turkey and the Emerging European Security Framework,” pp. 67–103; Müftüler Baç, “Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies,” pp. 489–502; Mark Webber, Terry Terriff, Joylon Howorth and Stuart Croft, “The Common European Security and Defence Policy and the ‘Third Country’ Issue,” European Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 75–100; Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri,” Doğu-Batı, Vol. 4, No. 14 (2001), pp. 156–66.

169. See the Washington Summit Communique and the Strategic Concept issued and approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC on April 23–24, 1999.

170. The Turkish General Staff View on ESDI, Insight Turkey, Vol. 3, No. 2 (April–June 2001), p. 88.

171. The Turkish General Staff View on ESDI, Insight Turkey, Vol. 3, No. 2 (April–June 2001), p. 88.

172. The Turkish General Staff View on ESDI, Insight Turkey, Vol. 3, No. 2 (April–June 2001), p. 88.

173. Onur Öymen, “Turkey and the New Challenges to European Security,” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 6 (2001), pp. 401–402.

174. Onur Öymen, “Turkey and the New Challenges to European Security,” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 6 (2001), pp. 401–402.

175. Onur Öymen, “Turkey and the New Challenges to European Security,” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 6 (2001), pp. 401–402.

176. Müftüler Baç, “Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies,” p. 495.

177. Francois Heisbourg, “European Defence Takes a Leap Forward,” NATO Review, Vol. 48 (Spring/Summer 2000), p. 15 as quoted in Park, “Turkey, Europe and ESDI: Inclusion or Exclusion,” p. 323. Similarly William Park states that “Ankara's response is psychological as much as it is purely political. Turkey's apparent fear of imminent exclusion from European security arrangements, of “discrimination,” might be the expression of a psychological dimension to Turkey's relationship with Europe that recognition as a candidate for EU membership has far from dispelled.” Park, “Turkey, Europe and ESDI: Inclusion or Exclusion,” p. 323.

178. Terzi, “New Capabilities, Old Relationships: Emergent ESDP and EU–Turkish Relations,” p. 54.

179. Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the FYROM, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan are the members of the NATO Partnership for Peace.

180. See the Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, Dec. 12–13, 2002.

181. William Park rightly points out in that regard that “the form Turkey's involvement in Europe's security arrangements takes may be more dependant on the country's long-term EU accession prospects than on any verbal constructions EU and NATO diplomats can devise in the shorter term.” Park, “Turkey, Europe and ESDI: Inclusion or Exclusion,” p. 326.

182. See, for instance, Buzan and Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” pp. 51–52; Kuniholm, “Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US Attitudes, and Challenges for Turkey,” pp. 30–40. Moreover, after arguing similar points throughout his article, Sanguineti concludes by asserting that “the hazardous combination of excessive antagonistic dissimilarities is conducive to chaos, not to synergy. Turkey would bring multiple problems and add little to European cohesion. Its admission to the European union, therefore, can hardly be expected at this stage or in the foreseeable future.” See Sanguineti, “Turkey and the European Union: Dreaming West but Moving East,” p. 26.

183. Müftüler Baç, “Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies,” p. 489.

184. Kuniholm, “Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US Attitudes, and Challenges for Turkey,” pp. 30–40.

185. See, for instance, Buzan and Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” pp. 51–52; Sanguineti, “Turkey and the European Union: Dreaming West but Moving East,” pp. 11–26.

186. Buzan and Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” pp. 52–55.

187. For an argument on the basis of Turkey's incapability as regards transforming itself into a security community and the danger it presents to the post-Westphalian character of the EU, see Buzan and Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” p. 51. As far as they are concerned “The EU project would be imperilled by taking modernising states such as Turkey into its post-modern collective. The EU as a security community – that is to say, as a group of states that neither expects, not prepares for, the use of force in relations among themselves, would be threatened by accepting as member states that are still ready to go to war with their neighbors, or which shall seek the status of independent regional powers.”

188. For a similar view, see Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the European Union: The Security Dimension,” pp. 61–82; Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State Turkey–EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” pp. 9–35; Keyman and Öniş, “Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State,” pp. 1–32.

189. For a similar view, see Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the European Union: The Security Dimension,” pp. 61–82; Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State Turkey–EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” pp. 9–35; Keyman and Öniş, “Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State,” pp. 1–32.

190. Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the European Union: The Security Dimension,” p. 61.

191. See Solana Report, supra no. 37.

192. See Solana Report, supra no. 37.

193. Oğuzlu, “How to Interpret Turkey's Accession Process with the European Union: Clash of Discourses,” pp. 51–83.

194. Keyman and Öniş, “Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State,” p. 3.

195. For the reasons why Turkey should be accommodated in the ESDP, and how that can be achieved before the deal in the Copenhagen summit has been struck, see, for instance, Tocci and Houben, “Accommodating Turkey in ESDP,” pp. 1–11.

196. These are mainly the areas that are generally covered by the Wider Europe policy.

197. Despite the fact that Turkey is not considered within the framework of the Wider Europe policy in the official documents of the EU institutions, due to the fact that it is a candidate country, there is ample evidence that a debate on that issue is going on in unofficial circles. For an example, see the “Institute's Note” for the Conference entitled “The Enlarged EU and its New Neighbours: New Security Challenges” held by The Institute of Security Studies in Paris on June 30, 2003, available at: www.iss-eu.org/activ/content/s2003e.html. Here it is pointed out that “while many officials present stressed that the eventual accession of Turkey to the EU is a done deal (irrespective of the length of the process), non-officials suggested that options other than accession (such as strategic or associate partnership) need to be considered.”

198. For a similar view see, Müftüler Baç, “Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies,” pp. 498–500.

199. The Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union.

200. For the “Future of the Europe Debate” which has been going on since the Nice Summit of 2000 see, www.europa.eu.int/futurum/index_e.htm;european-convention.eu.int.

201. Joschka Fischer “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration,” in Joerges, Meny and Weiler, What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, pp. 19–30.

202. All these areas which required reform have been specified in the Laeken Declaration.

203. Discussions are available at: www.europa.eu.int/futurum/index_e.htm;european-convention.eu.int.

204. Joschka Fischer “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration,” in Joerges, Meny and Weiler, What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, pp. 19–30.

205. Joschka Fischer “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration,” in Joerges, Meny and Weiler, What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, pp. 19–30.

206. Helen Wallace, “Possible Futures for the European Union: A British Reaction,” in Joerges, Meny and Weiler, What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, pp. 146–49.

207. See the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Also, see “CER Guide to the Draft EU Constitution,” Centre for Policy Reform (CER), (June 2003), at: www.cer.org.uk; Heather Grabbe, “The EU will Soon Grow out of its New Clothes,” Centre for European Reform (CER), (June 2003), at: www.cer.org.uk; Ben Crum, “Towards Finality? A Preliminary Assessment of the Achievements of the European Convention,” ARENA, (2003), pp. 1–25, at: www.arena.uio.no.

208. See the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Also, see Eric Philippart, “Optimising the Mechanism for ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ within the EU: Recommendations for the Constitutional Treaty,” Centre for European Policy Studies, (CEPS) Policy Brief, No. 33, (May 2003), pp. 1–10, at: www.ceps.be.

209. See Ben Hall, “How Flexible Should Europe Be?,” Centre for European Reform (CER), (Oct., 2000), pp. 1–20; Zielonka and Mair, “Introduction: Diversity and Adaptation in the Enlarged European Union,” pp. 1–19; Zielonka, “Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration” pp. 151–62.

210. Zielonka, “Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration,” pp. 152–56.

211. Hall, “How Flexible Should Europe Be?.”

212. For a detailed analysis of the historical evolution of flexibility in the European integration and the meaning, definition and merits of different versions of flexibility, see Wolfgang Wessels, “Flexibility, Differentiation and Closer Cooperation,” in Martin Westlake, The European Union Beyond Amsterdam Treaty – New Concepts of European Integration (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), pp. 76–98; Philip Lynch, “Flexibility and Closer Cooperation: Evolution or Entropy?,” in Philip Lynch, Nanette Neuwahl and G. Wyn Rees, Reforming the European Union from Maastricht to Amsterdam (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000), pp. 200–216; John Usher, “Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation,” in Ton Heukels, Niels Blokker and Marcel Brus, The European Union after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis (The Hague. Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 253–71; Giovanni Grevi “Differentiated Integration in an Enlarged Union,” European Policy Centre (EPC), (March 2002) at: www.epc.be.

213. See the accession treaties for the acceding states.

214. Zielonka, “Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration,” p. 152.

215. Zielonka, “Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration,” p. 161.

216. See Brigid Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order of Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 81–101.

217. See, for example, Zielonka, “Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration” pp. 161–62.

218. For further information on the democratic deficit in the European integration, see, for instance, Kevin Featherstone, “Jean Monnet and the ‘Democratic Deficit’ in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 149–70; Juliet Lodge, “Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sept. 1994), pp. 343–68; Erik Oddvar Erikse and John Erik Fossum, Democracy in the European Union – Integration Through Deliberation? (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2000); David Beetham and Christopher Lord, Legitimacy and the European Union, (London and New York, NY: Longman, 1998); Daniel Wincott, “Does the European Union Pervert Democracy Questions of Democracy in New Constitutionalist Thought on the Future of Europe,” European Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Dec. 1998), pp. 411–28.

219. On democratic deficit and elitism in the European integration, see Featherstone, “Jean Monnet and the ‘Democratic Deficit’ in the European Union,” pp. 149–70 and Yves Meny, “The People, the Elites and the Populist Challenge,” EUI Jean Monnet Chair Paper, RSC No. 98/47, (1998), pp. 1–13.

220. For a brief analysis of the neo-functionalist theory and other integration theories in the context of their relevance to the European integration process, see Rosamond, Theories of European Integration.

221. On the methods and the need for creating a European “demos” for the new polity called the European Union and on the legitimacy issue, see, for instance, Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Political Order of Europe,” pp. 81–101, J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Antje Wiener and Vincent Della Sala, “Constitution-Making and Citizenship Practice: Bridging the Democracy Gap in the EU?,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec. 1997), pp. 595–627.

222. For an opposing view see J.H.H. Weiler, “The Commission as Euro-Skeptic: A Task Oriented Commission for a Project-Based Union, A Comment on the First Version of the White Paper,” NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper, 6/01, 2001, pp. 4–7. As far as Weiler is concerned, such neo-functionalist and utilitarian approaches are not sufficient for strengthening the European identity of the citizens. Europe is not about what should be done but about the distinctive process of doing things, about how things should be done.

223. Eurobarometer surveys are available at: www.europe.eu.int/comm/public_opinion.

224. Helen Wallace, “Enlarging the European Union: Reflections on the Challenge of Analysis,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Aug. 2002), pp. 658–65; Meltem Müftüler Baç, Enlarging the European Union: Where Does Turkey Stand?, TESEV, 2002, at: www.tesev.org.tr.

225. Müftüler Baç, Enlarging the European Union: Where Does Turkey Stand?

226. For differences amongst the member state according to their particular policy priorities and concerns over Turkey's future membership, see Müftüler Baç, Enlarging the European Union: Where Does Turkey Stand?.

227. Buzan and Diez, “The European Union and Turkey,” p. 50.

228. For similar views, see Oğuzlu, “How to Interpret Turkey's Accession Process with the European Union – A Clash of Discourses,” pp. 178–80; Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State Turkey–EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era,” pp.125–30; Nathalie Tocci, “Cyprus and the European Union Accession Process: Inspiration for Peace or Incentive for Crisis?,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Autumn 2002), pp. 121–28.