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ABSTRACT
Previous research in security studies contends that information warfare (IW) is becoming a critical element in states' overall security strategies. Additionally, many researchers posit that artificial intelligence (AI) is quickly emerging as an important component of digital communications and states' military applications worldwide. However, less is known regarding how states are incorporating AI in their information warfare and influence operations (IWIO). Thus, given the growing importance of AI and IW in global security, this paper examines how the United States, China, and Russia are incorporating AI in their IWIO strategies and tactics. We find that the US, China, and Russia are utilizing AI in their IWIO approaches in significant ways depending on each state's overall IW strategy, with important implications for international security.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
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3 Ibid., 24.
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5 J. S. Hurley. ‘Enabling Successful AI Implementation in the Department of Defense’, Journal of IWIO 17, no. 2 (2018): 65–82, p. 65.
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7 L. Y. Hunter, C. D. Albert, C. Hennigan, and J. Rutland, ‘The Military Application of AI Technology in the United States, China, and Russia and the Implications for Global Security’, Defense and Security Analysis 39, no. 2 (2023): 207-232.
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9 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense – Issues for Congress (2022); A. Radin et al., ‘China-Russia Cooperation. Determining Factors, Future Trajectories, Implications for the United States’, RAND Corporation (2021).
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12 Ibid., 150.
13 A. Alimadadi and others, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to Fight COVID-19’, Physiological Genomics 52, no. 4 (2020): 200–2; Murphy, K. P. Murphy, Probabilistic Machine Learning: An Introduction (Cambridge: MA, MIT Press, 2022).
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19 B. Nakayama, ‘Democracies and the Future of Offensive (Cyber-Enabled) Information Operations’, Cyber Defense Review 7, no. 3 (2022): 49–65, p. 50.
20 C. A. Whyte, T. Thrall, and B. M. Mazanec, IWIO in the Age of Cyber Conflict (Oxfordshire: UK, Routledge, 2020, 344).
21 Ibid.
22 US Army, U.S. Army Techniques Publication No. 3-13.1: The Conduct of Information Operations. Headquarters, Department of the Army (2018), p. 1–1.
23 C. A. Theohary, ‘IWIO: Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service (2018): 7–5700.
24 H. Lin, ‘Russian Cyber Operations in the Invasion of Ukraine’, The Cyber Defense Review 7, no. 4 (2022): 31-46, p. 166.
25 CRS, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress (2022)
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27 S. Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Sammeul Griffith (London: Duncan Baird Publishers, 2005), 108. (Original work published 5th century BC).
28 M. Wojnowski, Russian Interference in the U.S. Presidential Elections in 2016 and 2020 as an Attempt to Implement a Revolution-like IWIO Scheme. Part II (Warsaw Institute, 2021).
29 C. Cunningham, ‘A Russian Federation IWIO Primer’, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington (2020). https://jsis.washington.edu/news/a-russian-federation-information-warfare-primer/ (accessed March 5, 2022).
30 Cunningham, ‘A Russian Federation IWIO Primer’; Wang, ‘Asymmetric War? Implications for China’s IWIO Strategies’.
31 US Army, U.S. Army Techniques Publication No. 3-13.1
32 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), ‘Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity’, (2020), https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-258a; G. Wilde and J. Sherman, ‘No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2023), https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/04/no-water-s-edge-russia-s-information-war-and-regime-security-pub-88644
33 B. Nakayama, ‘Democracies and the Future of Offensive (Cyber-Enabled) Information Operations’.
34 C. D. Albert and others, ‘Weaponizing Words: Using Technology to Proliferate Information Warfare’, Cyber Defense Review (2023); D. Morabito, ‘National Security and the Third-Road Threat: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Information Warfare’, Air & Space Power Journal 35, no. 3 (2021): 19–39.
35 M. Ajir and B. Vailliant, ‘Russian IWIO: Implications for Deterrence Theory’, Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 3 (2018): 70–89; C. Francois and H. Lin. ‘The Strategic Surprise of Russian Information Operations on Social Media in 2016 in the United States: Mapping a Blind Spot’, Journal of Cyber Policy 6, no. 1 (2021): 9–30.
36 E. B. Kania and J. K. Costello, ‘The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations’, The Cyber Defense Review 3 no. 1 (2018): 105–21; R. Diresta and others, Telling ‘China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign to Shape Global Narratives (Stanford International Observatory. Cyber Policy Center: Hoover Institution, 2020).
37 C. Botan, ‘Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics in Public Relations’, Public relations Theory II (Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2006).
38 J. Dawson, ‘Who Controls the Code, Controls the System: Algorithmically Amplified Bullshit, Social Inequality, and the Ubiquitous Surveillance of Everyday Life’, Sociological Forum (2023); J. Dawson and T. Wheeler, How to Tackle the Data Collection Behind China’s AI Ambitions (Brookings, 2022). https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-to-tackle-the-data-collection-behind-chinas-ai-ambitions/
39 See Note 34; S. Tiwari, ‘The Reality of Cyber Operations in The Grey Zone – The Emerging Geopolitics’, The Defense Horizon Journal (2022).
40 S. Zuboff, The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power (New York: NY, Public Affairs, 2020).
41 J. Dawson, ‘Microtargeting as Information Warfare’, Cyber Defense Review (2021), https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/CDR-Content/Articles/Article-View/Article/2537110/microtargeting-as-information-warfare/; Dawson, ‘Who Controls the Code’.
42 Dawson, ‘Microtargeting as Information Warfare’, 63.
43 See Note 34.
44 Ibid.
45 K. Strittmatter, We have been Harmonized: Life in China's surveillance state (New York: NY, HarperCollins, 2020).
46 See Note 37; Strittmatter, We have been Harmonized: Life in China's Surveillance State.
47 Dawson, ‘Microtargeting as Information Warfare’; J. Leonard, S. Mohsin, and D. McLaughlin, ‘Tencent’s Gaming Stakes Draw U.S. National Security Scrutiny’, (Bloomberg, 2020). https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-17/tencent-s-game-investments-draw-u-s-national-security-scrutiny#xj4y7vzkg
48 Dawson, ‘Microtargeting as Information Warfare’, 69.
49 Dawson, ‘Who Controls the Code’; K. Goldsmith, ‘An Investigation into Foreign Entities Who Are Targeting Service members and Veterans Online’, Vietnam Veterans of America (2019).
50 See Note 34.
51 116th Congress, Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election. Senate Report. 116–XX (Washington, DC: United States Senate Intelligence Committee, 2017); Dawson, ‘Microtargeting as Information Warfare’.
52 116th Congress, Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election; Dawson, ‘Who Controls the Code’.
53 See Note 30.
54 Tiwari, ‘The Reality of Cyber Operations in The Grey Zone – The Emerging Geopolitics’.
55 Ibid.
56 See Note 30; Tiwari, ‘The Reality of Cyber Operations in The Grey Zone – The Emerging Geopolitics’.
57 J. Costello and J. McReynolds, ‘China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era’, China Strategic Perspectives 13 (2018); Tiwari, ‘The Reality of Cyber Operations in The Grey Zone – The Emerging Geopolitics’.
58 M. Kaminska, ‘Restraint under Conditions of Uncertainty: Why the United States Tolerates Cyberattacks’, Journal of Cybersecurity 7, no. 1 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyab008; Tiwari, ‘The Reality of Cyber Operations in The Grey Zone – The Emerging Geopolitics’.
59 Thomas Cripps and David H. Culbert. Information Control and Propaganda: Records of the Office of War Information (University Publications of America, 1986).
60 Voice of America, ‘History of VAO’, (2023), https://www.insidevoa.com/p/5829.html
61 See Note 55.
62 B.R. Price, ‘Colonel John Boyd's Thoughts on Disruption’, Marine Corps University Press. MCU Journal, JAMS 14 no. 1 (2023). https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-14-no-1/Colonel-John-Boyds-Thoughts-on-Disruption/
63 J. Whitaker, ‘Psychological Warfare in Vietnam’, Political Psychology 18, no. 1 (1997): 165–79; Whyte Jeffrey, 2018. ‘Psychological War in Vietnam: Governmentality at The United States Information Agency’, Geopolitics 23, no. 3 (2018): 661–89.
64 R. Bouchard, ‘Information Operations in Iraq’, Defense Technical Information Center. Access Number: ADA363160 (1999).
65 See Note 30; Tiwari, ‘The Reality of Cyber Operations In The Grey Zone – The Emerging Geopolitics‘.
66 H. Lin, ‘Russian Cyber Operations in the Invasion of Ukraine’.
67 M. D. Phillips and T. A. Drohan, ‘Informatizing Operations: The Other Half of All-Domain Warfare’, Small Wars Journal March 03 (2020). https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/informatizing-operations-other-half-all-domain-warfare
68 R. Stenson, US Army Training and Doctrine Command updates Army capstone doctrine, codifying shift to multidomain operations. U.S. Army (2022). https://www.army.mil/article/260943/us_army_training_and_doctrine_command_updates_army_capstone_doctrine_codifying_shift_to_multidomain_operations
69 Department of the Army, FM 3-13: Information Operations, 1–2, 2016.
70 USMC. Information Doctrine, 4–2, 2022.
71 US Army, U.S. Army Techniques Publication No. 3-13.1: The Conduct of Information Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2018).
72 See Note 30; Tiwari, ‘The Reality of Cyber Operations in The Grey Zone – The Emerging Geopolitics’.
73 A. Wanless and J. Pamment, ‘How Do You Define a Problem Like Influence?’, Journal of Information Warfare 18, no. 3 (2019): 7.
74 R. J. Ross, ‘Information Advantage Activities: A Concept for the Application of Capabilities and Operational Art during Multi-Domain Operations’, The Cyber Defense Review 6, no. 4 (2021): 63–74.
75 Ibid.
76 T. Blagovest, M. Purcell, and B. McLaughlin, ‘Russia’s Information Warfare: Exploring the Cognitive Dimension’, MCU Journal 10, no. 2 (2019): 133.
77 See Note 30; S. Tiwari, ‘The Reality of Cyber Operations in The Grey Zone – The Emerging Geopolitics’; T. Blagovest, M. Purcell, and B. McLaughlin, ‘Russia’s Information Warfare: Exploring the Cognitive Dimension’.
78 J. R. McGrath, ‘Twenty-First Century IWIO and the Third Offset Strategy’, Joint Force Quarterly 82, no. 3 (2016): 16–23.
79 D. Cheng, Cyber Dragon: Inside China's IWIO and Cyber Operations: Inside China's IWIO and Cyber Operations (ABC-CLIO, 2016).
80 McGrath, ‘Twenty-First Century IWIO and the Third Offset Strategy’; M. Pomerleau, ‘Pentagon AI Team Sets Sights on IWIO’, CYISRNET (2020).
81 Ibid.
82 McGrath, ‘Twenty-First Century’.
83 R. Work, ‘The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies’, As Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, January 28, 2015. https://dod.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies/
84 E. P. Hilner ‘The Third Offset Strategy and the Army Modernization Priorities. Director’s Action Group’, Center for Army Lessons Learned (2019).
85 A. Obis and K. Macri, ‘The 2023 NDAA Emphasizes AI Investment for Cybersecurity, JADC2’, Government CIO Media. December 2022. https://governmentciomedia.com/2023-ndaa-emphasizes-ai-investment-cybersecurity-jadc2
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 US Department of State, ‘Data Informed Diplomacy’ (2022), https://www.state.gov/data-strategy/
89 US Department of State, ‘AI Inventory’ (2022), https://www.state.gov/data-strategy/ai_inventory/
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 CDAO, ‘About the JAIC: The JAIC Story’, (2022) https://www.ai.mil/about.html
93 Ibid.
94 C4ISRNET, ‘Pentagon AI team sets sights on IWIO’, July 22, 2020 https://www.c4isrnet.com/smr/information-warfare/2020/07/22/pentagon-ai-team-sets-sights-on-information-warfare/
95 Ibid.
96 CDAO, ‘Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office’, (2023) https://www.ai.mil/
97 US Department of Defense, ‘DoD Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office Hosts Global Information Dominance Experiments’ (2023). https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3282376/dod-chief-digital-and-artificial-intelligence-office-hosts-global-information-d/
98 Ibid.
99 DARPA, ‘About DARPA’, (2022) https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/about-darpa
100 Ibid.
101 S. Tompkins, Accelerating Innovation for the Warfighter: Statement Submitted to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee – Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 117th Cong. (2022) (statement by Dr. Stefanie Tompkins, Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)). https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PASSBACK%20DARPA_%20Tompkins%20SASC-ETC%20testimony%206%20Apr%202022_DARPA_FIINAL%200031.pdf
102 S. Sybert, ‘DARPA Launches New Programs to Detect Falsified Media’, GovCIO Media & Research September 16, 2021. https://governmentciomedia.com/darpa-launches-new-programs-detect-falsified-media
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 J. Yin and P.M. Taylor, ‘Information Operations from an Asian Perspective: A Comparative Analysis’, Journal of Information Warfare 7, no. 1 (2008): 3.
108 L. Wortzel, ‘The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Information Warfare’, US Army War College, Monographs, Books, and Publications 30 (2014): https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/506
109 See Note 30.
110 Yin and Taylor, ‘Information Operations from an Asian Perspective: A Comparative Analysis’, 1–23.
111 T. Thomas, ‘The Chinese Way of War: How Has it Changed?’ The MITRE Corporation. US Army Futures and Concepts Center 47 (2020).
112 Kania and Costello, ‘The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations’.
113 L. Turner and N. Hinkis, ‘Chinese State Media’s Global Influencer Operation’, Miburo (2022) (currently part of the Digital Threat Analysis Center), https://miburo.substack.com/p/csm-influencer-ops-1
114 (Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Hornung 2021) Harold, Scott W., Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Jeffrey W. Hornung. Chinese Disinformation Efforts (RAND, 2021).
115 Diresta et al., Telling ‘China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign to Shape Global Narratives’.
116 See Note 30.
117 L. Saalman, ‘China and Its Hybrid Warfare Spectrum’, in Hybrid Warfare: Security and Asymmetric Conflict in International Relations, eds. M. Weissmann, N. Nilsson, B. Palmertz, and P. Thunholm (London: I.B. Tauris, 2021), 95–112. Bloomsbury Collections. p. 95.
118 E. B. Kania and J. K. Costello. ‘The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations’, The Cyber Defense Review 3, no. 1 (2018): 105–21.
119 Ibid, p. 105.
120 D. Buck, ‘China in the Asia-Pacific Cyber Domain’, Marine Corps Gazette 105, no. 4 (2021): 1–5, p. 1.
121 M. Daniels and B. Chang, ‘National Power After AI’, Center for Security and Emerging Technology (2021): 1–30, p. 12
122 Ibid, p. 13.
123 Ibid, p. 14.
124 D. Buck, ‘China in the Asia-Pacific Cyber Domain’, Marine Corps Gazette 105, no. 4 (2021), p. 4.
125 J. Huang, ‘China Using ‘Cognitive Warfare’ Against Taiwan, Observers Say’, Voanews.com (2021), para. 1.
126 Ibid, para. 3.
127 Ibid.
128 C. A. Theohary, ‘IWIO: Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service (2018): 7–5700.
129 J. Dettmer, ‘China Adopts Kremlin’s ‘IWIO’ Tactics’, Voanews.com (April 5, 2021), https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_china-adopts-kremlins-information-war-tactics/6204171.html, para. 1.
130 Ibid, para. 2.
131 Ibid, para. 11.
132 E.B. Kania, ‘Chinese Military Innovation in AI’, Testimony before the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on Trade, Technology, and Military-Civil Fusion (2019), 3.
133 K. Takagi, ‘The Future of China’s Cognitive Warfare: Lessons from the War in Ukraine’, Hudson Institute (July 2022), https://www.hudson.org/research/17991-the-future-of-china-s-cognitive-warfare-lessons-from-the-war-in-ukraine
134 Ibid.
135 K. Pollpeter and A. Kerrigan, ‘The China AI and Autonomy Report’, CNA 22 (2022): 1–9, p. 3.
136 Ibid., 5.
137 Ibid., 5.
138 H. Towey, ‘Researchers in China Claim they have Developed ‘Mind-Reading’ AI that can Measure Loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party, Reports Say’, Business Insider, (July 10, 2022): https://www.businessinsider.com/china-says-mind-reading-ai-can-gauge-political-loyalty-reports-2022-7
139 Ibid.
140 Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce, ‘Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List and Revision of an Entry on the Entity List’, Federal Register (December 07, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/17/2021-27406/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-revision-of-an-entry-on-the-entity-list
141 Bureau of Industry and Security, ‘Entity List’ (2022), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policyguidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/entity-list
142 BBC, ‘Who are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide?’ BBC News (May 24, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22278037
143 US Department of State, ‘PRC Efforts to Manipulate Global Public Opinion on Xinjiang’, August 24 (2022) https://www.state.gov/prc-efforts-to-manipulate-global-public-opinion-on-xinjiang/
144 Ibid.
145 J. Brandt and V. Wirtschafter, ‘How China Uses Search Engines to Spread Propaganda’, Brookings (July 6 2022): https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-china-uses-search-engines-to-spread-propaganda/
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 M. Kaput, ‘AI in Search Engines: Everything You Need to Know’, Marketing AI Institute (March 7, 2022): https://www.marketingaiinstitute.com/blog/how-search-engines-use-artificial-intelligence
150 US Department of State, ‘PRC Efforts to Manipulate Global Public Opinion on Xinjiang’.
151 J. Kao and others, ‘How China is Using Social Media Propaganda to Whitewash the Repression of the Uyghurs’, Scroll.in (June 25, 2021) https://scroll.in/article/998385/how-china-is-using-social-media-propaganda-to-whitewash-the-repression-of-the-uyghurs
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 F. Ryan, D. Impiombato, and H. Pai, ‘China is Using Ethnic-Minority Influencers to Spread Its Xinjiang Narrative on Social Media’, Australian Strategic Policy (2022).
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.; P. Mozur and others, ‘How Beijing Influences the Influencers’, The New York Times (2021) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/13/technology/china-propaganda-youtube-influencers.html; Ryan et al., ‘China is Using Ethnic-Minority Influencers to Spread Its Xinjiang Narrative on Social Media’.
159 Mozur et al., ‘How Beijing Influences the Influencers’; Ryan et al., ‘China is Using Ethnic-Minority Influencers to Spread Its Xinjiang Narrative on Social Media’.
160 Diresta et al., Telling ‘China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign to Shape Global Narratives’.
161 Ibid., 20.
162 Ajir, Media, and Bethany Vailliant, ‘Russian Information Warfare: Implications for Deterrence Theory’, Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 3 (2018): 70–89.
163 A. Manoilo, ‘Modern-Day IWIO and Hybrid War Operations’, Analytical Dossier 1 (2021): 1–69, p. 3.
164 G. Wilde and J. Sherman, ‘No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2023), https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/04/no-water-s-edge-russia-s-information-war-and-regime-security-pub-88644
165 C. Cunningham, ‘A Russian Federation IWIO Primer’, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington (2020), https://jsis.washington.edu/news/a-russian-federation-information-warfare-primer/; B. Lilly, ‘Russian Information Warfare: Assault on Democracies in the Cyber Wild West’, Naval Institute Press (2022).
166 Topor, Lev, and Alexander Tabachnik, ‘Russian Cyber IWIO: International Distribution and Domestic Control’, Journal of Advanced Military Studies 12, no. 1 (2021): 112–27, p. 115.
167 D. Bolton, ‘Targeting Ontological Security: IWIO in the Modern Age’, Political Psychology 42, no. 1 (2021): 127–42, p. 130.
168 See note 158, 72.
169 Z. Rogers, ‘The Geopolitics of Surveillance Capitalism’, Chesterfield Strategy (2019), https://chesterfieldstrategy.com/2019/09/16/the-geopolitics-of-surveillance-capitalism/
170 Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart, ‘Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash’, Harvard JFK School of Government Faculty Working Papers Series (2016): 1–52.
171 Ibid.
172 A. Agrawal, J. Gans, and A. Goldfarb, ‘Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence’, Innovation Policy and the Economy 19, no. 1 (2016): 139–159.
173 See Note 7.
174 See Note 7; S. Petrella, C. Miller, and B. Cooper, Russia’s AI Strategy: The Role of State-Owned Firms (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2020).
175 R. J. Marks and S. Bendett, ‘Russia is Systematically Copying U.S. Military AI Robotics’, Mind Matters (2020), https://mindmatters.ai/2020/10/russia-is-systematically-copying-u-s-military-ai-robotics/.
176 F. E. Morgan and others, Military Applications of AI: Ethical Concerns in An Uncertain world (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Project Air Force, 2020), 89.
177 D. Bolton, ‘Targeting Ontological Security’, 130.
178 Ibid., 136.
179 Ibid., 136.
180 O. S. Sheremet, ‘Political and Legal Aspects of the IWIO’, Revista Amazonia Investiga 10, no. 45 (2021): 31–41, p. 34.
181 N. O’Donnell, ‘Have We No Decency? Section 230 and the Liability of Social Media Companies for Deepfake Videos’, University of Illinois Law Review 3 (2021): 701–40, p. 710.
182 Bolton, ‘Targeting Ontological Security’, 137.
183 O’Donnell, ‘Have We No Decency? Section 230 and the Liability of Social Media Companies for Deepfake Videos’, 710.
184 See note 158, 74.
185 Ibid., 75.
186 Ibid., 76.
187 Bolton, ‘Targeting Ontological Security’, 135.
188 Morgan et al., Military Applications of AI: Ethical Concerns in an Uncertain World, 83.
189 Ibid., 83.
190 Ibid., 88.
191 A. Polyakova, ‘Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-Driven Asymmetric Warfare’, Brookings Institute, (November 15, 2018): https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/. https://www.rand.org/topics/asymmetric-warfare.html
192 The RAND Corporation, ‘Asymmetric Warfare’.
193 Polyakova, ‘Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-Driven Asymmetric Warfare’.
194 Ibid.
195 D. Salaru, ‘Russia: Facial Recognition Software used to Target Journalists’, International Press Institute (June 23, 2022): https://ipi.media/russia-facial-recognition-software-used-to-target-journalists/
196 Ibid.
197 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations, (2012), II-1
198 James Andrew Lewis, ‘Cyber War and Ukraine’, CSIS (2022); NOTE: The 2/15-2/16 DDOS attacks were attributed to Russia by Australian, US, and UK. The 2/15 disinformation attack remains unattributed.
199 H. Lin, ‘Russian Cyber Operations in the Invasion of Ukraine’, The Cyber Defense Review 7, no. 4 (2022): 31-46.
200 S. Bond, ‘Facebook takes down Russian network impersonating European news outlets’, NPR (September 27, 2022): https://www.npr.org/2022/09/27/1125217316/facebook-takes-down-russian-network-impersonating-european-news-outlets
201 Ibid.
202 N. Ibrahim, ‘"We Are Not Prepared": Russia Uses AI, Deep Fakes in Propaganda Warfare’, Global News (March 30, 2022), https://globalnews.ca/news/8716443/russia-artificial-intelligence-deep-fakes-propaganda-war/
203 R. Booth, ‘Russia’s Trolling on Ukraine Gets ‘Incredible Traction’ on TikTok’, The Guardian (May 01, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/01/russia-trolling-ukraine-traction-tiktok
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Lin, ‘Russian Cyber Operations in the Invasion of Ukraine’.
208 V. Akimenko and K. Giles, ‘Russia’s Cyber and Information Warfare’, Asia Policy 15, no. 2 (2020): 67–75
209 S. Bendett, ‘The Development of Artificial Intelligence in Russia’, Air University Press 1, (2019): 168–77, 168.
210 Ibid.
211 Ross, Robert J., ‘Information Advantage Activities: A Concept for the Application of Capabilities and Operational Art during Multi-Domain Operations’, The Cyber Defense Review 6, no. 4 (2021): 63–74.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Lance Y. Hunter
Lance Y. Hunter, PhD, is a Professor of International Relations in the Department of Social Sciences and Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies programs at Augusta University located in Augusta, GA, USA. His expertise is in security studies and democratization. His research focuses on the causes and effects of terrorism and conflict, democratization, and the relationship between evolving technology and conflict.
Craig D. Albert
Dr. Craig D. Albert, PhD, is Professor and Director of the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies at Augusta University. He received his PhD from the University of Connecticut in 2009. His areas of concentration include international security studies, ethnic conflict, cyberterrorism, and cyberwar.
Josh Rutland
Josh Rutland is a graduate of Augusta University's Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies program. He is an Information Technology Specialist at the U.S. Army Cyber Command. His research focuses on information warfare, cybersecurity, terrorism, and biosecurity.
Kristen Topping
Kristen Topping is a recent graduate of Augusta University's Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies program. Her research focuses on information warfare, social influence, and how in-depth cross-cultural understanding and language acquisition affect intelligence analysis.
Christopher Hennigan
Christopher Hennigan is an AI and Data Operations consultant in Deloitte's Government & Public Services group. He is a graduate of Augusta University's Master in Intelligence and Security Studies program. His expertise is in Six Sigma, business risks and mitigation, data and process analysis, and ML process automation. His research focuses on machine learning, cybersecurity, terrorism, and AI game modeling theory.