![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
There is an often-neglected aspect of defence and military planning: the presence of excess and excessive capabilities in certain areas, despite existing capability gaps elsewhere. Focusing on Estonia's recent experiences, the analysis reveals how unchecked excesses can lead to unwanted resource drain. The study highlights the critical need to address the risks associated with surplus capabilities, which can cause cost inefficiencies and hinder force development. Findings from the Estonian case study indicate that excess capabilities within the existing force structure accounted for an average of 10–25% of total resource requirements, and in the context of certain capabilities, this excess was even more. These findings are relevant to both military and non-military contexts and underscore the importance of continuous reassessment and optimization of resource use.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 C. Sorin, ‘NATO and EU Approaches to Defense Planning’, Defence Resources Management in the 21st Century no. 16 (2021): 46–59.
2 T. Lawrence, ‘Estonia: Size Matters’, Prism 10, no. 2 (2023): 19–37.
3 P. Jones and P. Lagasse, ‘Rhetoric Versus Reality: Canadian Defence Planning in a Time of Austerity’, Defense & Security Analysis 28, no. 2 (2012): 140–51.
4 In defence planning, clear definitions of fundamental terms are essential for a comprehensive understanding. This paper focuses on several key concepts, interpreted in the following context:
Capability: In military force planning encompasses the combined effectiveness of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI).
Capacity: In military force planning “capacity” is the quantitative aspect of a military’s capabilities, encompassing units, personnel, and equipment, and it reflects the operational scale of the force.
Excessive Capability: A qualitative state where a force’s level of capability surpasses the requirements for its intended roles, often resulting in imbalance due to overinvestment.
Excess Capability: The ability to perform operations or tasks that are currently unnecessary, or may not be required in the future, allowing the reallocation of resources contributing to this capability.
Excess Capacity: A state in which a military force possesses more resources than required for operational necessity, or economic efficiency, leading to potential inefficiencies and misallocation.
Capability Gap: The condition where units or platforms lack sufficient effectiveness against anticipated threats, or where there are no units/platforms available to deliver a required capability.
Capacity Gap: The shortfall where a military force lacks enough units or platforms to fulfill the operational plans and policies.
5 R. Bellais, ‘The Economic Imperative of Europeanizing Defense Innovation’, in The Emergence of EU Defense Research Policy, ed. N. Karampekios, I. Oikonomou, and E. Carayannis (New York: Springer, 2017), 93–109.
6 The objective of the Estonian National Defence Development Plan is to determine a development course that is in line with the available resources and ensures deterrence and the capability to counter enemy aggression. This development plan covers 10 year period.
7 Specific documents included relevant defence white papers, strategic reviews, and internal memos.
8 This data set was complemented by interviews with other individuals in Estonian Defence Forces and Ministry of Defence, officers and policymakers. These interviews were semi-structured.
9 S. De Spiegeleire, P. van Hooft, C. Culpepper, and R. Willems, Closing the Loop: Towards Strategic Defense Management (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2009), 107.
10 C. Legacy, A. March, and C. Mouat, ‘Limits and Potentials to Deliberative Engagement in Highly Regulated Planning Systems: Norm Development within Fixed Rules’, Planning Theory & Practice 15, no. 1 (2014): 37–56.
11 A. Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 1–17.
12 E. Bajarūnas, ‘Addressing Hybrid Threats: Priorities for the EU in 2020 and Beyond’, European View 19, no. 1 (2020): 62–70.
13 Ariel E. Levite, ‘Integrating Cyber into Warfighting: Some Early Takeaways From the Ukraine Conflict’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48854 (accessed November 18, 2023).
14 A.H. Boyd, Satellite and Ground Communication Systems: Space and Electronic Warfare Threats to the United States Army. Land Warfare Paper No. 115 (Arlington, VA: The Association of the United States Army, 2017).
15 J.D. Watson, J.D. Allen, C.A. Mattson, and S.M. Ferguson. ‘Optimisation of Excess System Capability for Increased Evolvability’, Structural and Multidisciplinary Optimisation (2016): 1277–94.
16 M.S. Anderson, S.M. Martin, C. Dagli, and A. Miller, ‘Implementing an Architectural Framework to Define and Deliver Net-Centric Capability to Legacy Military Air Assets Operating within a System of Systems’ (paper presented at the Second Annual IEEE Systems Conference, April 2008, Montreal, 2008).
17 C. Hallie, ‘Bad Idea: Divest to Invest’, Defense360, December 10, 2008, https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-divest-to-invest/.
18 R. Miranda and A. Lerner, ‘Bureaucracy, Organisational Redundancy, and the Privatisation of Public Services’, Public Administration Review 55, no. 2 (1995): 193–200.
19 P.K. Davis, R.D. Shaver, and J. Beck, Portfolio-Analysis Methods for Assessing Capability Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 30–32.
20 T. Kõivastik, ‘Kaitseväe ja Kaitseliidu kaitsevalmiduse kujundamine taasiseseisvumisest alates’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2012 (Tallinn, 2013), 37–46.
21 Government of Estonia, The National Security Concept 2023 (Tallinn: Government of Estonia, 2023).
22 A. Kask, J. Murumets, and T.-D. Young, ‘Approaching the Need for Defence Reform: Background and Outlines of Suggested Estonian Defence Planning System’, in Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutuste Toimetised (1) (Tartu: Estonian National Defence College, 2003).
23 Estonia inherited only a minimal quantity of weapons and equipment from the former Soviet army. Most of that was either in bad condition or with limitations to future maintainability. Thus, it was a conscious decision to start building interoperability with Western equipment.
24 A. Laaneots, ‘Eesti riigikaitse sünd 1991–2017’, Riigikogu Toimetised 36 (2017): 39–62. Tallinn; T. Kõivastik, ‘Kaitseväe ja Kaitseliidu kaitsevalmiduse kujundamine taasiseseisvumisest alates’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2012 (Tallinn, 2013), 37–46.
25 A. Laaneots, ‘Eesti riigikaitse sünd 1991–2017’, Riigikogu Toimetised 36 (2017): 39–62. Tallinn.
26 The defence budget of Estonia in 1991 was under $15 million. By 2024, it had grown to $1.4 billion, representing an approximate increase of over 100 times over a three-decade period.
27 Kõivastik, ‘Kaitseväe ja Kaitseliidu kaitsevalmiduse kujundamine taasiseseisvumisest alates’.
28 A. Laaneots, ‘Eesti NATOs — Mitte tarbija, vaid partner’, in Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutuste Toimetised (2) (Tartu: Estonian National Defence College, 2003), 7–25.
29 A. Laaneots, ‘Eesti riigikaitse sünd 1991–2017’, Riigikogu Toimetised 36 (2017): 39–62. Tallinn.
30 A. Kask, J. Murumets, and T.-D. Young, ‘Approaching the Need for Defence Reform: Background and Outlines of Suggested Estonian Defence Planning System’, in Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutuste Toimetised (1) (Tartu: Estonian National Defence College, 2003).
31 Kask et al., ‘Approaching the Need for Defence Reform’.
32 NATO’s capability targets for countries highlighted the importance of specialised capabilities, particularly for its smaller member nations. Estonia faced criticism because it retained a land force-heavy military primarily designed for self-defence, contrary to these recommendations.
33 H. Toomsalu, ‘Kaitseplaneerimisest kaitseväes’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2008 (Tallinn, 2009), 55–56.
34 B. Püssa, ‘Riigikaitsest märksõnadega ja laiapõhiselt’, in Kaitseväe Aastaraamat 2008 (Tallinn, 2009), 57–59.
35 V. Toomet, ‘Vägi 22’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2013 (Tallinn, 2014), 15–17.
36 E. Mihhotin, ‘Kaitseväe 2008. aasta eelarve ja eelarvekärped’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2008 (Tallinn, 2009), 33–36.
37 A. Laaneots, ‘Eesti riigikaitse sünd 1991–2017’, Riigikogu Toimetised 36 (2017): 39–62. Tallinn.
38 I. Schvede, ‘Kaitseväe reform. Muudame koos Kaitseväge tõhusamaks’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2014 (Tallinn, 2015), 15–19; and S. Toomik, ‘Riigikaitse arengukava 2017-2026’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2016 (Tallinn, 2017), 27–29.
39 Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 underscored the importance of defence forces maintaining immediate operational readiness. These events highlighted that the risks associated with developing an ambitious force structure, keeping it at a reduced state of readiness and accepting obvious gaps in existing capabilities are too significant to ignore.
40 M. Vendla, ‘Riigikaitse arengukava koostamise õppetunnid’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2012 (Tallinn, 2013), 9–11.
41 V. Toomet, ‘Vägi 22’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2013 (Tallinn, 2014), 15–17.
42 R. Toomse, ‘Kaitseväe uus juhtimisstruktuur ja selle jätkusuutlikkus’, in Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutuste Toimetised (19) (Tartu: Estonian National Defence College, 2014), 183–220.
43 I. Schvede, ‘Kaitseväe reform. Muudame koos Kaitseväge tõhusamaks’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2014 (Tallinn, 2015), 15–19.
44 M. Vendla, ‘Riigikaitse arengukava koostamise õppetunnid’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2012 (Tallinn, 2013), 9–11.
45 S. Toomik, ‘Riigikaitse arengukava 2017-2026’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2016 (Tallinn, 2017), 27–29.
46 T. Kõivastik, ‘Kaitseväe ja Kaitseliidu kaitsevalmiduse kujundamine taasiseseisvumisest alates’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2012 (Tallinn, 2013), 37–46.
47 A. Kalmus, ‘Tagasivaade Siilile’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2015 (Tallinn, 2016), 31–37.
48 M. Klaos, ‘Tsiviilühiskonna vajadused ja ootused sõjaolukorras’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2016 (2016), 133–35.
49 V. Toomet, ‘Vägi 22’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2013 (Tallinn, 2014), 15–17.
50 I. Schvede, ‘Kaitseväe reform. Muudame koos Kaitseväge tõhusamaks’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2014 (Tallinn, 2015), 15–19.
51 Schvede, ‘Kaitseväe reform’.
52 S. Allik, ‘Sõjateaduse roll Eesti sõjalises võimekuses’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2015 (2016), 119–22.
53 The author of this paper was assigned to lead this project in December 2020.
54 When a new type of anti-tank system is integrated into a force, it impacts all existing systems associated with the anti-tank capability. This integration provides additional flexibility, allowing for adjustments in the ratios of existing systems and the required ammunition. This presents a range of options, each with its own cost-benefit.
55 T. Uudeberg, ‘Eesti riigikaitse aastal 2031’, in Kaitseväe aastaraamat 2021 (Tallinn, 2022), 22–25.
56 This scenario illustrates the phenomenon of a positive feedback loop. The success of the platoon, attributed to its heavier weaponry, bolstered the argument for acquiring more heavy equipment and adopting a dual role as ‘elite infantry’. This sentiment was further reinforced by the operators, who took pride and found it advantageous to be equipped with superior resources, especially compared to other units with limited equipment at their disposal during that period.
57 When a defence force depends on aid, seeks equipment at discounted prices, or procures based on affordability rather than necessity, it introduces significant unpredictability. Forecasting when and how new capabilities can be integrated into the force is challenging, potentially compromising strategic planning and operational readiness.
58 An ‘Over tasked Force Element’ refers to a situation in a military organization where a specific unit or element is burdened with more diverse capabilities than it can realistically master within a practical timeframe. This imbalance often arises when the various dimensions of DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability) are not properly aligned or balanced. Such a scenario can lead to organizational complexities, where the expectations for equipment proficiency and operational capability exceed the personnel’s ability to achieve proficiency. This misalignment often results in excessively long or complex training requirements, ultimately diminishing the unit’s overall effectiveness and operational readiness.
59 During the NDDP 2021–2031 drafting, a requirement was established to provide documentation that clearly outlined the purpose, operational use, and capability requirements for all force structure elements. While various documents on the force structure and its components previously existed, they were insufficient for the objectives. The introduction of standardised force planning and development documentation facilitated a more precise alignment and comprehension of the planned and existing conditions.
60 The platoon needed to improve in essential night- and thermal vision systems, sensors, and specialised equipment, which are critical for enhancing the effectiveness of primary missions.
61 Based on the Estonian Defence Forces’ (EDF) costing methodology, half of the projected annual expenses for maintaining and renewing a unit were directed towards capabilities that did not align, or only partially aligned, with the unit’s primary tasks.
62 M.I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (Frank Cass, 1992); J.M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1984).
63 O. Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
64 L.J. Blanken and J.J. Lepore, ‘Unpacking the Various Meanings of Redundancy: From Refining the Concept to Military Planning’, Defense & Security Analysis 28, no. 4 (2012): 326–342.
65 Blanken and Lepore, ‘Unpacking the Various Meanings of Redundancy’.
66 Ibid.
67 R. Miranda and A. Lerner, ‘Bureaucracy, Organisational Redundancy, and the Privatisation of Public Services’, Public Administration Review 55, no. 2 (1995): 193–200.
68 B. Nowell, C.P. Bodkin and D. Bayoumi, ‘Redundancy as a Strategy in Disaster Response Systems: A Pathway to Resilience or a Recipe for Disaster?’ Contingencies and Crisis Management 25 (2017): 123–35.
69 T.M. Cheung, ‘A Conceptual Framework of Defence Innovation’, Journal of Strategic Studies 44, no. 6 (2021): 775–801.
70 Government of Estonia, National Defence Development Plan 2023 (Tallinn, 2023).
71 Innovation and technology are intentionally not assigned as a separate area or category because it is intended that an approach to integrate relevant technology is always something to pursue. Innovation is not a goal but a by-product of synergy between areas.
72 A. Rossiter, ‘Hyping Emerging Military Technology: Probing the Causes and Consequences of Excessive Expectations’, International Relations (2023).
73 The Eurasian Times, ‘Estonia’s Global Arms Buying Spree Seeks Drastic Combat Gains’, June 14, 2023 https://www.eurasiantimes.com/terrified-by-ukraine-war-russias-next-door-neighbour-announces/ (accessed November 23, 2023).
74 Ibid.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Ivo Peets
Ivo Peets a senior officer in the Estonian Defence Forces, has experience from international combat and training missions. Specializing in defence planning, capability development, and military technology, he is currently advancing his expertise at the Naval Postgraduate School and Tallinn University through doctoral research on comprehensive defence planning methodologies for small states.