Sailing close to the wind: Japan’s forward deterrence posture toward the Taiwan Strait

ABSTRACT

Some scholars claim that Japan’s 2022 documents mark a critical juncture in security policy. Is this the case? I argue for a positive answer but, based on deterrence concepts, not for the reasons advanced. Counterstrike capabilities and other aspects of the documents pinpointed by scholars are more adaptations of, than deviations from, past deterrence practices. An overlooked and more substantial evolution is taking place amid an intensifying deterrence-entrapment dilemma: the adoption of a forward deterrence posture aimed at preventing crises in the Taiwan Strait through the projection of general deterrent effects. This posture constitutes a critical juncture because it sets Japan on the path of becoming a potent regional security actor. It also raises questions about Tokyo’s ability to keep a balanced approach toward China.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Harry W.S. Lee and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Lionel P. Fatton

Lionel Fatton is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Webster University Geneva and Research Collaborator at the Research Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer, Meiji University. His research interest lies in security dynamics in East and Southeast Asia, China-Japan-US-Taiwan relations, Japan and China’s foreign/security policies, civil-military relations and Neoclassical realism. His latest book, Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing, was published in 2023 by Palgrave Macmillan. Fatton earned a PhD in Political Science from Sciences Po Paris and two MA in International Relations from Waseda University and the Geneva Graduate Institute.