Francis and the Bomb: On the Immorality of Nuclear Deterrence

ABSTRACT

This essay investigates the change in the Catholic attitude toward nuclear weapons as articulated by Pope Francis. Francis has generally followed the position of his immediate predecessors with regard to the Catholic teaching on just war. While the resort to armed force remains a morally justifiable option if the principles of just war have been met, the pope forcefully emphasises the tools of nonviolent peacebuilding. Recently, however, Francis made an original just war argument when he broke with the Church’s established position on nuclear weapons. The pope declared both the use and possession of nuclear weapons “immoral” and, thus, abandoned the Church’s reluctant acceptance of nuclear deterrence that had survived the end of the Cold War. In this essay, I analyse the rationale behind Francis’s decision to break with nuclear deterrence, which is mainly grounded in the disillusionment about the failed promise of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, I assess the impact of the new position with regard to Catholic soldiers serving in nuclear armed militaries.

KEYWORDS:

• Conscientious objection
• just war
• nuclear deterrence
• nuclear weapons
• Pope Francis

1. Introduction¹

Pope Francis’s thinking on war and peace has generally followed the position of his immediate predecessors (see Braun 2018). The use of armed force can be morally justifiable, but must be limited to exceptional circumstances only. At the same time, Francis has foregrounded the tools of nonviolent peacebuilding. With regard to nonviolence, the pope has been speaking in a prophetic voice, seeking to encourage humankind to approximate the eternal peace in the world to come. Moreover, giving greater emphasis to nonviolent peacebuilding can help to create the conditions to avoid the outbreak of war or, in war’s aftermath, a relapse to armed conflict. At the same time, however, Francis’s focus on nonviolent peacebuilding does not deny the justifiability of armed force per se if a strict interpretation of just war principles has been satisfied. Consequently, Francis’s thinking on the justifiability of armed force is generally situated within the just war framework, which historically has been built around the themes of permission and restraint. While Francis strongly emphasises the tradition’s latter theme, he has disappointed Catholic pacifists who have called upon the pope to break with the Church’s just war teaching.² Other scholars working on the Catholic tradition of thought about war and peace have affirmed this continuity thesis. Gregory Reichberg (2017, chap. 11), observing that contemporary popes have rarely used the term just war, argues that the Church’s core teaching on war and peace has not changed radically since the times of Thomas Aquinas, minor alterations notwithstanding. Lisa Cahill (2019, 318, fn. 140), an advocate of the emergent “just peace” school that seeks to transcend the just war framework, agrees that Francis has not completely rejected the use of armed force. While for Cahill the emphasis on nonviolence dominates in Francis’s thinking, she accepts the term of “restrictive just war theory” as accurately capturing the pope’s position.

In this article, I reflect on Francis’s recent remarks on the ethics of nuclear weapons. While the above argument that the pope’s just war reasoning is generally conventional continues to apply, I hold that Francis has made an original argument vis-à-vis the atom bomb. Breaking with the position held by his predecessors, Francis not only condemns the use of nuclear weapons as immoral, but also denies the morality of possessing the atom bomb for deterrence purposes. I point out that Francis’s alteration of Church teaching is grounded in a heartfelt conviction and has more than one source. In the political sphere, condemnation of possessing of nuclear weapons is grounded in a disillusionment about the failed promise of nuclear disarmament and the increased threat nuclear weapons pose in a post-Cold War international security environment. At the theological level, the pope speaks in a prophetic voice, calling upon the international community to be bold and finally rid the world of a weapon whose use is inherently immoral.

Importantly, when Francis refers to the immorality of the use and possession of nuclear weapons, the question arises whether he condemns both aspects as intrinsically wrong acts. I argue that there is reason to doubt that he sees the possession of the Bomb as rising to the level of a mala in se. Interpreting a Holy See document that paved the way toward Francis’s original argument, I suggest that while the pope firmly believes that the possession of nuclear weapons is wrong, it does not constitute an evil of the same magnitude as detonating them. This complex argument, I assert, goes hand in hand with Francis’s characteristic moral witness, which requires significant discernment on the side of faithful Catholics. Naturally, the pope’s condemnation of the possessing of nuclear weapons is highly relevant with regard to Catholic soldiers. That is why at the end of this article I engage with the question of whether Catholic soldiers serving in the militaries of nuclear armed states will now have to claim conscientious objector status.

2. Francis’s original argument on the Bomb

While every pope since John XXIII has condemned the use of nuclear weapons and called for their abolition, the popes never clearly rejected their possession until Francis put forward his argument. In Pacem in Terris, John XXIII cried out that “Nuclear weapons must be banned” (1963, no. 112), but, at the same time, reluctantly acknowledged the rationale of deterrence’s preventative capabilities:

While it is difficult to believe that anyone would dare to assume responsibility for initiating the appalling slaughter and destruction that war would bring in its wake, there is no denying that the conflagration could be started by some chance and unforeseen circumstance. Moreover, even though the monstrous power of modern weapons does indeed act as a deterrent, there is reason to fear that the very testing of nuclear devices for war purposes can, if continued, lead to serious danger for various forms of life on earth. (Pope John XXIII 1963, no. 111)

In 1982, the year before the US Catholic Bishops issued their much-debated peace pastoral “The Challenge of Peace” (National Conference of Catholic Bishops 1983), which condemned the Bomb’s use but accepted its possession for deterrence purposes, Pope John Paul II made a similar argument in a message to the United Nations General Assembly: “In current conditions ‘deterrence’ based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion” (Pope John Paul II 1982). The distinction between use and possession survived the end of the Cold War and was the moral stance Francis inherited. As noted by John Paul II, the reluctant papal acceptance of deterrence was always linked to a credible effort to disarm.

When Francis ascended the throne of Peter in 2013, however, more than two decades had passed since the Berlin Wall fell and the world was still facing a nuclear threat. Instead of having moved toward Global Zero, the international community was dealing with the spread of nuclear technology. In addition, the international security environment had changed radically, having left behind the ostensible certainties of a bipolar world and turned into a more unstable multipolar one. Moreover, in Francis’s eyes, the continuing arms race was deviating resources away from “the real priorities facing our human family, such as the fight against poverty, the promotion of peace, the undertaking of educational, ecological and healthcare projects, and the development of human rights” (Pope Francis 2017). It was this context that made Francis adopt his original just war argument regarding the Bomb, claiming that “the threat of their use, as well as their very possession, is to be firmly condemned” (Pope Francis 2017). In a clear break with the conditional acceptance of deterrence advocated by his predecessors Francis declared: “International relations cannot be held captive to military force, mutual intimidation, and the parading of stockpiles of arms. Weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, create nothing but a false sense of security. They cannot constitute the basis for peaceful coexistence between members of the human family, which must rather be inspired by an ethics of solidarity” (Pope Francis 2017). Two years later, speaking at the Peace Memorial in Hiroshima, Francis gave even more emphasis to his heartfelt belief by employing the term “immoral:” “With deep conviction I wish once more to declare that the use of atomic energy for purposes of war is today, more than ever, a crime not only against the dignity of human beings but against any possible future for our common home. The use of atomic energy for purposes of war is immoral, just as the possessing of nuclear weapons is immoral, as I already said two years ago” (Pope Francis 2019). With survivors of the Hiroshima bombing in attendance, the pope, in powerful words, broke with the rationale behind nuclear deterrence strategies: “How can we propose peace if we constantly invoke the threat of nuclear war as a legitimate recourse for the resolution of conflicts? May the abyss of pain endured here remind us of boundaries that must never be crossed” (Pope Francis 2019).

2.1. Two sorts of peace

Francis’s condemnation of the possessing of nuclear weapons did not come out of nowhere. Rather, the pope’s new attitude was especially influenced by a document entitled Nuclear Disarmament: Time for Abolition, published as the Holy See’s contribution for the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. Written by an expert commission, this document, for the first time, broke with the Holy See’s reluctant acceptance of deterrence, which had permitted the possession of nuclear weapons as part of an interim ethic until nuclear abolition was achieved: “(…) it must be admitted that the very possession of nuclear weapons, even for purposes of deterrence, is morally problematic. (…) It is now time to question the distinction between possession and use which has long been a governing assumption of much ethical discourse on nuclear deterrence” (The Holy See 2015, 89). Underlying the changed attitude toward the Bomb was a distinction between two types of peace. The document distinguishes between the “‘peace of a sort’” (The Holy See 2015, 92) that underpins nuclear deterrence and “genuine peace” (The Holy See 2015, 90) that should be the ultimate goal of humankind.³ Regarding the former type of peace, the document argues that while such a peace may have helped to avoid a nuclear confrontation during the Cold War, it no longer constitutes a viable option in today’s multipolar world. More importantly, the “peace of a sort” shows no promise of human progress toward a world without nuclear weapons as the second element of the Church’s interim ethic on deterrence, namely, the call for disarmament, has not been met. “(…) the argument that nuclear deterrence preserves the peace is specious. The ‘peace of a sort’ provided by nuclear deterrence is a misnomer and tends to cloud our collective vision. (…) While recognizing how these concepts can provide a prudent curb on unwarranted exuberance, we must ultimately reject them as the defining outlook for our common political future (The Holy See 2015, 93–97).” In contrast, “genuine peace” seeks to transcend the logic that underpins the “peace of a sort.” It requires a focus on “positive peace” and seeks to go beyond the “negative peace” advocated by political realists who advocate nuclear deterrence in order to achieve a peace defined in terms of the absence of nuclear war.⁴ “A genuine peace cannot grow out of an instrumental prudence that establishes a precarious ethics focused narrowly on the technical instruments of war. What is needed is a constructive ethics rooted in a deeper vision of peace, an ethic in which means and ends coincide more closely, where the positive components of peace inform and limit the use of force” (The Holy See 2015, 90).

Reading these words, one immediately feels reminded of Francis’s prophetic voice that calls for an approximation of the eternal heavenly peace in this world. It can be read as an encouragement to be bold and abandon a strategy that may have helped avoid a nuclear confrontation during the Cold War, but that has not taken the human family closer to the goal of having a world without nuclear weapons. Importantly, Francis firmly believes that his prophetic voice is speaking of an objective that can realistically be achieved: “In this way, progress that is both effective and inclusive can achieve the utopia of a world free of deadly instruments of aggression, contrary to the criticism of those who consider idealistic any process of dismantling arsenals” (Pope Francis 2017). Put differently, for Francis, now is the time to make moral progress and break with the interim ethic. If humankind does not act, it will not only fail to answer God’s call to approximate heavenly peace, but it will also make the world a more dangerous place as nuclear deterrence seems no longer operable in a post-Cold War world.⁵

In summation, while the popes have always denied the moral justifiability of the use of nuclear weapons, Francis’s move to declare possessing the Bomb immoral, constitutes a break with the interim ethic on nuclear deterrence. Speaking in a prophetic (but realistic) voice, Francis seeks to challenge humankind not to feel comfortable with a “peace of sorts,” and to embrace a peace that is genuine. The pope’s forceful rejection of the possessing of nuclear weapons marks his most original just war argument. While this break with the position held by his predecessors did not receive significant scholarly attention initially, more recently there has been an emerging body of work to which this article seeks to contribute (see Christiansen and Sargent 2023). A diverse cast of scholars, including theologians and philosophers, has grappled with the ethical underpinnings of Francis’s argument as well as with its practical consequences. It is particularly to the letter aspect that I dedicate myself to in this article when I reflect on the impact of his decision on faithful Catholics serving in nuclear armed militaries. It is to that moral question that I turn to in the following section.

3. The implications of Francis’s original just war argument

Among the group of scholars that has grappled with the practical implications of Francis’s argument has been Joseph Fahey. Fahey (2020, 45) argues that from a Catholic point of view, nuclear weapons are “intrinsically evil.”⁶ Thus, “nuclear weapons may not be developed; nuclear weapons may not be used as a deterrent; and nuclear weapons may not be used in warfare” (Fahey 2020, 45). Furthermore, Fahey points out what he sees as the practical consequences for policy planners, military service, civil society, educators, and global governance. In the following, I concentrate on Fahey’s argument regarding policy planners and military servicewomen and servicemen.

Policy Planners: A faithful Catholic who is tasked with planning, developing, and providing funds for weapons of war can no longer assist in any way with the preparation of nuclear weapons (or conventional weapons of mass destruction). This will undoubtedly cause a crisis in conscience for those who had heretofore formed policy on the earlier teaching on the acceptance of “deterrence.” These policy planners, from corporate executive to elected and appointed political officials must be instructed that nuclear planning is now a condemned activity by the Catholic Church and they should seek employment in fields other than that of nuclear planning. (…)

Military Service: A faithful Catholic on active military duty who is involved with planning or supervising the deployment of nuclear weapons and those who serve in aircraft, surface naval ships and submarines can no longer in good conscience serve in any capacity that involves the very possession and possible use of nuclear weapons. Provision must be made in civil law and military law for those who conscientiously object to any military service that even remotely deals with nuclear weapons. (Fahey 2020, 46–47)

Obviously, the implications Fahey draws out would be far-reaching. Faithful Catholics would essentially have to withdraw from any service that is related to a nation’s nuclear weapons. Even if Catholics continued to serve in such positions, their superiors’ trust in their loyalty would be severely compromised. As Fahey (2020, 44) himself quotes the Chief of US Chaplains in 1976, Admiral Msgr. John O’Connor: “‘If nuclear deterrence is condemned no superior officer involved in nuclear weapons warfare would be able to trust a Catholic under his command.’” Consequently, if Fahey’s analysis is correct, Francis’s decision would have the potential to revive the infamous question of whether Catholics are primarily loyal to their nations or to the pope.⁷

So, is Fahey’s analysis correct? In what follows, I argue that Francis’s immorality argument regarding both use and possession allows for a diverging take, and assert that Catholics may continue to serve in nuclear armed militaries. As long as no authoritative statement by the Church authorities has been issued that affirms the implications articulated by Fahey there is no reason to believe that Catholic soldiers are no longer morally permitted to serve. The rationale behind my argument is two-fold. Firstly, the moral condemnation of possessing nuclear weapons is not of the same moral gravity as the condemnation of the Bomb’s use. Secondly, I will note Francis’s characteristic moral witness, which leaves significant leeway to the faithful and, thus, can lead to disagreements about how to interpret the pope.⁸

3.1. Degrees of moral wrongfulness

The pope’s move to deny the morality of possessing nuclear weapons seems to flow logically from his specific attitude toward just war thinking. For Francis, both the use and possessing of the Bomb are “immoral.” Thus, at face value, it seems indeed hard to imagine how Catholic soldiers can continue to serve in nuclear armed militaries. However, analysing Francis’s remarks before the horizon of Catholic Social Thought/theology provides a slightly more nuanced picture compared to Fahey’s succinct argument. To begin with, it needs to be noted that Francis’s remarks on the immorality of the use and possession of nuclear weapons are very brief. On the first occasion, the pope used the phrase “to be firmly condemned” (Francis 2017), whereas in subsequent remarks he employed the term “immoral” (Francis 2019). While Francis has talked at length about the dangers of nuclear weapons, at times in a surprisingly detailed manner, he has not spoken on the implications for Catholic servicewomen and servicemen. In order to fill this gap the distinction between acts that are intrinsically wrongful, i.e. acts that are always and everywhere unjust, and acts that are morally wrong but do not rise to the level of intrinsic wrongfulness.⁹ With regard to nuclear weapons, it seems fair to argue that because of their inherently indiscriminate destructiveness their use is intrinsically wrongful; employing them would be a mala in se. Their possession, in contrast, does not seem to rise to the same level of wrongfulness. While Francis has decided to condemn their possession as “immoral,” possession, although wrongful for deterrence, does not constitute a mala in se.¹⁰ What makes deterrence morally wrongful are the likely consequences of this policy, namely, the use of an intrinsically wrongful weapon in response to a prior attack.¹¹ Such a nuclear reprisal, clearly, would be an intrinsically wrongful act. However, it needs to be noted that the threat of a nuclear reprisal may remain at the threat level. In other words, a state may adopt a deterrence policy but decide not to employ a nuclear weapon in response to an attack. That is why deterrence, while morally wrongful, does not rise to the level of being intrinsically wrongful.¹² Francis has not engaged with this fine but important distinction, perhaps for a deliberate reason as I will suggest shortly. However, the Holy See document that paved the way for the pope’s condemnation of the possession of nuclear weapons does make that distinction: “Though it may be said, by way of a narrow casuistry, that possession of nuclear weapons is not per se evil, it does come very close to being so, because the only way such weapons work, even as a deterrent, is to threaten death to masses of human beings” (The Holy See 2015, 92).

As a result, due to the absence of an authoritative statement by either the pope or the national Bishops’ Conferences of nuclear armed states on the matter, it seems fair to assume that Fahey’s ostensible certainty about a duty for faithful Catholics to withdraw from nuclear-related military service is exaggerated. While a faithful Catholic soldier would have to disregard an order to launch a nuclear attack based on the grounds that the use of the Bomb is a mala in se, those who advocate nuclear deterrence, or because of their obligation of obedience, may continue to serve. Given the space for interpretation left by Francis’s “immorality” comment and the distinction between different types of wrongfulness made in the Holy See’s statement, no Catholic needs to claim conscientious objector status for the time being. Having said that, my argument only holds as long as no authoritative statement is issued. However, as I will suggest next, it might well be that Francis’s seemingly hesitancy to take that final step against nuclear weapons may be deliberate.

3.2. Pope Francis’s demanding moral witness

So why has the pope not forcefully declared that no faithful Catholic soldiers can any longer serve in positions related to the Bomb? The late Drew Christiansen offered two possible explanations. Firstly, he noted that Francis may have spoken in the prophetic voice “without binding authority” (Christiansen 2020), merely seeking to appeal to humankind to renew the disarmament effort. Christiansen rejected this take because for Francis the immorality claim is a “solemn judgment” (Christiansen 2020) that applies in the here and now. Secondly, Christiansen listed the pope’s characteristic moral witness, which gives significant leeway to the faithful.¹³

(…) Francis sets a high standard for moral maturity. He believes, in Nicholas Lash’s words, that teaching is not the same as commanding. He rejects moralism and legalism. At times, he has noted the limits of his papal authority and even identified a particular teaching as only his own, admitting that others might hold different positions. (…) Genuine teaching, Pope Francis believes, invites learning, and especially attention to the movements of conscience and the Spirit within us to work toward the greater good. (Christiansen 2020)

Thus, while Francis’s condemnation of both the use and possession of nuclear weapons is heartfelt, he seems to prioritise discernment and accompaniment over the categorisation of some acts as intrinsically wrong. It goes without saying that such a moral witness asks much from the faithful and can leave a moral vacuum behind; a sense of uncertainty about the practical implications of the pope’s remarks. And, in fact, that seems to have happened with regard to the question of how to interpret Francis’s immorality statement with regard to the status of faithful Catholics serving in nuclear armed militaries. Indeed, having to translate the pope’s position into policy positions, Church leaders such as national Bishops’ Conferences or the Holy See Diplomatic Service are facing a challenge.

4. Conclusion

With historical hindsight, Francis’s decision to declare the possession of nuclear weapons immoral seems consequential. After all, all his predecessors since John XXIII have forcefully condemned the use of the Bomb and only accepted its possession as part of an interim ethic that would lead to the weapon’s abolishment. Three decades after the end of the Cold War, the disarmament effort has clearly failed and in today’s multipolar world the threat of a nuclear confrontation seems to have grown. For Francis, now is the time to challenge an international community that seems to have given up on the hope of achieving a nuclear Global Zero. While the pope’s effort is arguably a laudable one, his most original just war argument has raised profound practical questions regarding the status of faithful Catholics serving in nuclear-related posts. Against Fahey, who argues that the possession of nuclear weapons is now deemed an intrinsically wrongful act, I have suggested that Francis’s remarks are, arguably for a deliberate reason, not as clear as Fahey suggests. That is why I disagree with him on the question of whether Catholics can continue to serve in positions having to do with the Bomb. As long as no authoritative statement has been issued, it remains a question of the individual conscience whether or not a practicing Catholic can serve in such positions. Francis’s teaching, through its emphasis on discernment and accompaniment, provides a rich but demanding source on the way toward arriving at that judgment.

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Christian Nikolaus Braun

Christian Nikolaus Braun is a lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at King's College London. His primary area of research is the ethics of war and peace. It is his ambition to bring to bear the wisdom of the just war tradition on ethical issues that confront us today. For example, in his monograph Limited Force and the Fight for the Just War Tradition (Georgetown University Press, 2023), Christian employs a neoclassical reading of just war that is grounded in the thought of Thomas Aquinas to argue about so-called uses of force-short-of-war. His research has also been published in numerous peer-reviewed journals, including Ethics & International Affairs, Global Studies Quarterly, International Relations, International Theory, and the Journal of International Political Theory.

Notes

1 The author wishes to thank Luke Cahill, Greg Reichberg and the participants of the 2020 UK Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance (DAAA) conference for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The conference paper that led to this article was awarded the Royal United Services Institute’s (RUSI) Trench Gascoigne Prize 2020.

2 For example, a 2016 conference held at the Vatican encouraged the pope to abandon the Church’s just war teaching.

3 That distinction goes back to Gaudium et Spes, which contrasted “peace of a sort” with a “sure and authentic peace.” See Pope Paul VI 1965, no. 81.

4 The distinction between “peace of a sort” and “genuine peace” echoes Johan Galtung’s well-known distinction between negative and positive peace. See Galtung 1969.

5 Interestingly, this train of thought is reminiscent of the general direction major voices within the Church have taken with regard to questions of war and peace. Elsewhere I have argued that in addition to the increased destructiveness of modern war, the idea of moral progress flowing from the highest virtue of charity has led to the adoption of what has been called a “presumption against war.” See Braun 2020.

6 See also Fahey 2023.

7 That, of course, was an issue that was hotly debated when John F. Kennedy ran for president. At the time, Kennedy found it necessary to address the loyalty question in a major speech to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association. See Kennedy 1960.

8 In the time since my original paper was finished in 2020, my argument has been affirmed by scholars who have also grappled with Francis’s argument. See especially Reichberg 2023; Christiansen 2023a; 2023b.

9 Examples of inherently wrongful acts would be abortion and euthanasia.

10 In a recent article, Gregory Reichberg and Henrik Syse point out how threats of armed force (such as the threat to use nuclear weapons that is implied in deterrence) represent a distinctive category for ethical analysis vis-à-vis the actual use of armed force. See Reichberg and Syse 2018.

11 While Francis’s rejection of possessing nuclear weapons is based primarily on their possible use, the wrongfulness it is also bound up with the risk of accidents on a massive scale, and the potential to redirect defence expenditures toward the global common good, such as the alleviation of poverty.

12 I am thankful to Greg Reichberg for sharing an unpublished document where he explains how the possession of nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence does not constitute the same kind of wrong as their actual use.

13 See also Christiansen 2023a.