https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5218-4073
![Sample our Social Sciences journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110822/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Social-Sciences.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Poland is a case of a state in which the role of legislative bodies in the political system has been gradually reduced at the various levels – national, regional, and local. Recently, this process has been related to executive aggrandisement observed in Poland, but the roots of this phenomenon can be traced back to the political transformation of this country observed after 1989. At the national level, the deteriorating legislative role of parliament manifests itself in four general processes: (1) The executive power treats the Sejm (lower chamber) as a subordinate institution. This involves formally introducing laws forced by the government in the form of proposals written by members of parliament (MPs) (as a way to shorten the legislative process and limit public consultations required by law); (2) Speeding up of parliamentary works – the Sejm is treated as a voting machine and not as a forum where debates and discussion take place; (3) Public consultations are superficial and the regulatory assessment impact is minimal; (4) The influence of the opposition on legislative processes is reduced to almost zero. Similar processes can be observed at the regional and local levels. The subnational legislative bodies are often under the control of executives. Instances of voting with no or limited discussions (favouring the governing majority) can be sometimes observed during the sessions of local and regional councils. This paper analyses the weakening of the legislative function in Poland at different levels, using a qualitative approach and data from desk research, media analysis, in-depth individual interviews and focus group interviews.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 E.g. Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index <www.eiu.com> accessed 15 September 2023; V-dem Liberal, Participatory and Deliberative Democracy Indices <https://v-dem.net/> accessed 15 September 2023.
2 Some authors consider Poland a semi-presidential democracy. See: Connor McAfee, ‘Semi-Presidentialism: A Pathway to Democratic Backslide’ (2023) 11 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 210–17. However, this approach does not seem justified because, compared to other consolidated democracies considered semi-presidential democracies, the president has less power in Poland. More on this matter: Mirosław Wyrzykowski, ‘Presidential Elements in Government Poland – Semi-Presidentialism or “Rationalised Parliamentarianism”?’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 253–67.
3 This paper was prepared before the parliamentary elections held on 15 October 2023, which has ended the Law and Justice party rule in the country, started in 2015. It still takes then the time perspective till the date of elections (reflected also in the frequent use in the text of present perfect and simple present instead of past simple) and it does not cover the period after the establishment of the new government by the previous opposition on 13 December 2023.
4 The democratic indices reveal a rapid decline in democratic performance of Poland. As indicated by the Liberal Democracy Index according to the V-Dem assessment, Poland's score regressed significantly from 0.81 in 2014 to a 0.42 in 2022. Similarly, the EUI Democracy Index manifested a noteworthy decrement, shifting from 7.47 in 2014 to 7.04 in 2022. Furthermore, data provided by the IDEA corroborates this trend, demonstrating conspicuous reductions across pivotal categories that gauge democratic performance.
5 Agnieszka Bień-Kacała, ‘Legislation in Illiberal Poland’ (2021) 9 Theory and Practice of Legislation 276–94.
6 Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, Backsliding Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World (Cambridge Elements Political Economy 2018).
7 Adam Szymański, ‘De-Democratization: The Case of Hungary in a Comparative Perspective’ (2019) 52 PS: Political Science & Politics 272–73.
8 Nancy Bermeo, ‘On Democratic Backsliding’ (2016) 27 Journal of Democracy 5–19.
9 Bagus Hermanto and Nyoman Mas Aryani, ‘Omnibus Legislation as a Tool of Legislative Reform by Developing Countries: Indonesia, Turkey and Serbia Practice’ (2021) 9 Theory and Practice of Legislation 425–50.
10 These phenomena have been confirmed by numerous research results, e.g. V-Dem Institute Democracy Report, ‘Autocratization Changing Nature?’ (2022) V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg 10–13 <https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf> accessed 15 September 2023; Hubert Tworzecki and Holi Semetko, ‘Media Use and Political Engagement in Three New Democracies’ (2012) 17 The International Journal of Press/Politics 407–32; Matthijs Bogaards, ‘De-democratization in Hungary: Diffusely Defective Democracy’ (2018) 25 Democratization 1481–99. However, it should be noted that efforts to limit the legislative functions of parliaments are also visible in consolidated liberal democracies, and this phenomenon in countries such as Canada, Germany or the US was particularly evident in the form of so-called omnibus legislation during the COVID-19 pandemic. More on this subject in: Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.), Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation (Springer 2021) 4–17.
11 Szymański (n 7) 272-73; Radosław Zubek, ‘Core Executives and Coordination of EU Law Transposition: Evidence from New Member States’ (2011) 89 Public Administration 433–50.
12 Renata Mienkowska-Norkiene, Koordynacja polityk unijnych w Polsce [Coordination of EU Policies in Poland] (ASPRA-JR 2009) 7–28.
13 The mayor is the executive body of the municipality where the seat of government is located in a town within the territory of that municipality. In cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, the executive body is the president. In the legislative area, the mayor or president prepares the drafts of local laws and budget, works out the development plans and implements the acts of legal laws and budget. For more, see: Jolanta Itrich-Drabarek (ed.), Encyklopedia administracji publicznej [Encyclopedia of Public Administration] (Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa 2018).
14 The earlier major administrative reform which entered into force in 1999 introduced three subnational territorial levels – municipalities (gminy), districts (powiaty) and provinces – voivodeships (województwa). It led to the development of process of decentralisation and a relatively strong territorial self-government – with a high autonomy of local and regional authorities in terms of tasks and competences but limited financial autonomy (related among others to the presence in the administrative model at the level of provinces of voivodeship governors – representatives of the central administration). For more, see Jerzy Regulski, Local Government Reform in Poland: An Insider’s Story (Open Society Institute 2003) <https://decentralization.gov.ua/pics/upload/57-81b7d00b5b7cc23737bfd1c4d96c4dbe.pdf> accessed 16 September 2023.
15 Note from in-depth interview no. 9, 19 December 2023, online.
16 Laurent Pech, Patryk Wachowiec and Dariusz Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 Hague J Rule Law 1–43 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-021-00151-9> accessed 13 September 2023.
17 Dawid Sześciło, Recydywa centralizmu? Zmiany w polityce państwa wobec samorządu po 2015 roku [Recurrence of Centralism? Changes in the State Policy Towards the Self-Government After 2015] (Batory Foundation 2018).
18 E.g. Allyson Lucinda Benton, ‘Bottom-Up Challenges to National Democracy: Mexico’s (Legal) Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves’ (2012) 44 Comparative Politics 253–71; Anastassia Obydenkov and Alexander Libman, ‘National Autocratization and the Survival of Sub-National Democracy: Evidence from Russia’s Parliamentary Elections of 2011’ (2013) 48 Acta Politica 459–89; Manuel Enrique Mera, National Democracies, Local Autocracies: The Uneven Democratization of Subnational Governments in Argentina and Brazil (Georgetown University 2016); Amanda Fidalgo, ‘How Democratic is Government Really? The Impact of Subnational Regime Variation on Evaluations of Democracy’ (2022) 35 Governance 1077–94.
19 The Civic Legislation Forum has been operating since 2009 under the auspices of the Stefan Batory Foundation. It brings together representatives of non-governmental organisations and academic researchers. The Forum’s task is to monitor the legislative process, especially the process of social consultations.
20 Kelly McMann, ‘Measuring Subnational Democracy: Toward Improved Regime Typologies and Theories of Regime Change’ (2018) 25 Democratization 19–37.
21 We use the term ‘seized institutions’ here, not to deny the right of the winning party to fill the institutions with its own candidates, but because of the use of legal tricks to fill these institutions, bypassing the legal procedures previously used in Poland.
22 Wojciech Sadurski, ‘How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding’ (2018) 18 Sydney Law School Research Paper 1–71.
23 Bojan Bugarič, ‘Central Europe’s Descent into Autocracy: On Authoritarian Populism’ (2018) CES Harvard Open Forum Series 2018–2019 13; Maciej Bernatt and Michał Ziółkowski, ‘Statutory Anti-Constitutionalism’ (2019) 28 Washington International Law Journal 487.
24 The concept of fighting with ‘impossibilism’ has been elaborated by Kaczyński. An important element of the electoral campaign of his party was fighting with ‘impossibilism’ of the previously ruling coalition of the Civic Platform and the Polish Peasants Party who had stated that some of the elements of their political program had been impossible to implement (due to both ideological reasons as the supporters of the Polish Peasants Party were mainly conservative and Catholic as well as economic/fiscal reasons such as excessive deficit procedure imposed by the EU). Fight against ‘impossibilism’ became a ‘label’ of the Law and Justice in their electoral campaign in 2015 and 2019 and allegedly helped win with their counterparts. See: TVP.Info. ‘Kaczyński: Zmierzamy ku temu, by zlikwidować imposybilizm polskiego państwa’ [Kaczyński: We are Moving Towards Eliminating the Impossibilism of the Polish State] (TVP Info, 11 May 2019) <https://www.tvp.info/42587867/kaczynski-zmierzamy-ku-temu-by-zlikwidowac-imposybilizm-polskiego-panstwa> accessed 5 January 2023.
25 More on the hostile takeover of the Constitutional Tribunal here: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/analytical-brief/2018/hostile-takeover-how-law-and-justice-captured-polands-courts> accesssed 5 January 2023.
26 More on these practices: Laurent Pech, Patryk Wachowiec and Dariusz Mazur, ‘Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU’s (In)Action’ (2021) 13 Hague J Rule Law 1–43 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-021-00151-9> accessed 13 September 2023 and Łukasz Zamęcki, Viktor Glied, ‘Article 7 Process and Democratic Backsliding of Hungary and Poland. Democracy and The Rule of Law’ (2020) 34 Online Journal Modelling the New Europe 57–85.
27 E.g. case K 18/95 or K 7/12 of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal.
28 Lech Garlicki, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Komentarz [Constitution of Republic of Poland Commentary] (Wolters Kluwer 2016).
29 Grażyna Kopińska, Krzysztof Izdebski, Maciej Berek, Piotr Frączak and Piotr Wołejko, Polski BezŁad Legislacyjny. Raport Obywatelskiego Forum Legislacji z prac IX kadencji Sejmu (2015–2023) [Polish Legislative Disorder. Report of the Citizens’ Legislation Forum on the Work of the 9th Term of Office of the Sejm] (Batory Foundation 2023) <https://www.batory.org.pl/publikacja/polski-bezlad-legislacyjny-raport-obywatelskiego-forum-legislacji-z-prac-ix-kadencji-sejmu/> accessed 11 October 2023.
30 Piotr Frączak, Krzysztof Izdebski, Grażyna Kopińska, Witold Michałek and Agnieszka Vetulani-Cęgiel, Polski BezŁad Legislacyjny. Rządowy i parlamentarny proces legislacyjny w pierwszych dwóch latach IX kadencji (15 listopada 2019–15 listopada 2021) [Polish Legislative Disorder. The Government and Parliamentary Legislative Process in the First Two Years of the 9th Term of Office (November 15, 2019–November 15, 2021)] (Batory Foundation 2022) 9–11 <https://www.batory.org.pl/publikacja/polski-bezlad-legislacyjny-raport-obywatelskiego-forum-legislacji-z-pierwszych-dwoch-lat-ix-kadencji-sejmu/> accessed 11 October 2023.
31 ibid. 12–15.
32 ibid. 28.
33 ibid. 29.
34 Kopińska and others (n 29).
35 Haggard and Kaufman (n 6).
36 The EU’s agenda ensuring evidence-based, transparent EU law-making based on the views of those impacted.
37 Rada Ministrów, Resolution No. 190 of the Council of Ministers of 29 October 2013, Regulations of the Work of the Council of Ministers (M.P. item 797 2013).
38 Rada Ministrów, Wytyczne do przeprowadzania oceny przewidywanych skutków społeczno-gospodarczych zgodnie z § 24 ust. 3 uchwały nr 190 Rady Ministrów z 29 października 2013 r. Regulamin pracy Rady Ministrów [Guidelines for Conducting Impact Assessments in Accordance with § 24 para. 3 Resolution No. 190 of the Council of Ministers of 29 October 2013. Regulations of the Work of the Council of Ministers]; Rada Ministrów, Wytyczne w zakresie prowadzenia konsultacji publicznych zgodnie z § 36 ust. 1 uchwały nr 190 Rady Ministrów z 29 października 2013 r. Regulamin pracy Rady Ministrów [Guidelines for Conducting Public Consultations in Accordance with § 36 sec. 1 of Resolution No. 190 of the Council of Ministers of 29 October 2013. Rules of Procedure of the Council of Ministers].
39 The current Rules of Procedure of the Council of Ministers divide the existing public consultation into two separate processes: in the course of public consultation, a draft is presented to social organisations or other interested entities or institutions whose opinion is desirable given the content of the draft law, in the course of opinion-forming, a draft is submitted to specific entities when such an obligation arises from separate regulations or when it concerns the activities of these entities. Submission for public consultation, i.e. making the draft law public, is mandatory; it is at the discretion of the consulting entity to transmit the document directly to the social partners concerned. In the latter case, the Rules of Procedure oblige to take a position (pursuant to §43(3)) and to forward the draft as amended (pursuant to §48(2)(2)). The obligatory consultation (opinion) resulting from the applicable laws is based on §38(2) of the Rules of Procedure. Government documents (i.e. not authored by Members) must be obligatorily consulted. The deadlines for taking a position are set out in §40 of the Rules of Procedure. As a general rule, the setting of a time limit for taking a position which is shorter than 7 days, or, in the case of a draft normative act, shorter than 14 days (21 days in the case of a bill), after the draft has been made available requires detailed justification. In principle, longer deadlines of at least 21 days are advisable. See: Rada Ministrów, Wytyczne w zakresie prowadzenia konsultacji (n 38). Public consultations should aim to take into account the opinions of citizens and civil society institutions in the law-making process, including not only the improvement of the law, but also its better legitimacy. The commencement of work on the act is publicly announced on the appropriate website.
40 Frączak and others (n 30) 9–11.
41 KPRM, ‘Transcript of the Exposé of Mateusz Morawiecki’ (KPRM 2019) <https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/stenogram-expos-mateusza-morawieckiego-2019> accessed 5 December 2022.
42 Jan Ruszkowski, ‘48 godzin, czyli jak nie prowadzić konsultacji społecznych’ [48 Hours – How Not to Conduct Public Consultations] (Rzeczpospolita.pl, 18 October 2021) <https://energia.rp.pl/klimat/art18995501-48-godzin-czyli-jak-nie-prowadzic-konsultacji-spolecznych> accessed 13 August 2023.
43 Grażyna Leśniak, Krzysztof Koślicki, Robert Horbaczewski and Jolanta Ojczyk, ‘Nawet RCL nie wytrzymał – z legislacją tak źle jeszcze nie było’ [Even the Government Legislation Center Didn’t Hold Up – It Hasn’t Been This Bad with Legislation Before] (prawo.pl,13 September 2021) <https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/jak-wyglada-proces-legislacyjny-i-jakie-zastrzezenia-do-trybu-w-jakim-tworzone-jest-prawo-maja-prawnicy-i-eksperci,510545.html> accessed 19 August 2023.
44 ibid.
45 Jawny Lobbing [Open Lobbing] <https://jawnylobbing.pl/czym-jest-lobbing/> accessed 5 January 2023.
46 Frączak and others (n309) 7.
47 Barometr prawa Analiza stabilności otoczenia prawnego w polskiej gospodarce, Edycja 2022 [Law Barometer Analysis of the Stability of the Legal Environment in the Polish Economy, Edition 2022] <https://grantthornton.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Barometr-prawa-2022-RAPORT-Grant-Thornton-16-03-2022.pdf> accessed 11 September 2023.
48 Forum Idei Fundacji Batorego, Ustawa w 2 godziny 20 minut. XIII Komunikat Obywatelskiego Forum Legislacji podsumowujący aktywność legislacyjną rządów Zjednoczonej Prawicy, Sejmu VIII kadencji i Senatu IX kadencji (2015–2019) [Act in 2 h 20 min. 13th Announcement of the Civic Legislation Forum Summarizing the Legislative Activity of the Governments of the United Right, the Sejm of the 8th Term and the Senate of the 9th Term (2015–2019)] (Batory Foundation 2019) 7 <https://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Komunikat_2019-1.pdf> accessed 11 September 2023.
49 Frączak and others (n 30) 9–11.
50 Ela Glapiak, ‘W Polsce prawo jest pisane na kolanie. Często tworzy patologie zamiast z nimi walczyć’ [In Poland, the Law is Written on the Knee. It Often Creates Pathologies Instead of Fighting Them] (Business Insider, 29 June 2020) <https://businessinsider.com.pl/twoje-pieniadze/prawo-i-podatki/ustawy-koronawirusowe-w-polsce-prawo-gospodarcze-niekonstytucyjne/4t9trlv> accessed 5 January 2023.
51 Kopińska and others (n 29).
52 Maria Pankowska, ‘“Trzeba anulować, bo przegramy”, czyli jak PiS nocą wybrał sobie KRS. Posłuchaj tego nagrania’ [“We Need to Cancel or We Will Lose” – How Law and Justice Elected the National Judicial Council by Night] (oko.press, 22 November 2019) <https://oko.press/trzeba-anulowac-bo-przegramy-czyli-jak-pis-noca-w-sejmie-wybral-czlonkow-krs> accessed 14 August 2023.
53 Justyna Suchecka, ‘Awantura na komisji edukacji. Posłowie opozycji opuścili posiedzenie’ [Brawl at Education Committee. Opposition Deputies Left the Meeting] (tvn24.pl, 11 July 2023) <https://tvn24.pl/polska/awantura-na-komisji-edukacji-poslowie-opozycji-opuscili-posiedzenie-7216902> accessed 14 August 2023.
54 The vote took place in the Column Hall, i.e. outside the Sejm chamber occupied by opposition MPs in protest at not being allowed to speak. Opposition MPs, in turn, were not allowed to enter the Column Hall, which made the vote in that hall effectively illegal. Agnieszka Jędrzejczyk, ‘Pamiętacie 16 grudnia 2016? Wtedy zaczęło się w Sejmie to, co mamy dziś. Przypominamy tamten skandal’ [Do You Remember December 16, 2016? That’s When It Began What We Have Today in the Sejm. We Remind You of That Scandal] (oko.press, 12 August 2021) <https://oko.press/pamietacie-16-grudnia-2016-wtedy-zaczelo-sie-w-sejmie-to-co-mamy-dzis-przypominamy-tamten-skandal> accessed 14 August 2023, see also: <https://ruleoflaw.pl/the-disciplinary-chamber-has-suspended-judge-tuleya-and-allowed-criminal-charges-to-be-brought-against-him/> accessed 12 August 2023.
55 Gazeta Prawna, ‘Komisja nie uwzględniła wniosków opozycji o odrzucenie projektu ws. KRS’ [The Commission Did Not Grant the Opposition’s Motions to Reject the Draft on the NJC] (gazetaprawna.pl, 9 May 2017) <https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/1040995,komisja-sejm-reforma-krs.html> accessed 15 August 2023.
56 Jan Skórzyński, 'PiS po raz piąty zmienia ustawę o SN. TK: prezydent miał prawo ułaskawić Kamińskiego. Kronika Skórzyńskiego (14–20 lipca 2018)’ [PiS Changes SC Law for the Fifth Time. CT: President Had the Right to Pardon Kaminski. Skórzynski Chronicle (July 14–20, 2018)] (oko.press, 21 July 2018) <https://oko.press/pis-po-raz-piaty-zmienia-ustawe-o-sadzie-najwyzszym-tk-prezydent-mial-prawo-ulaskawic-kaminskiego-kronika-skorzynskiego-14-20-lipca-2018> accessed 18 August 2023.
57 Forum Idei Fundacji Batorego (n 48) 7.
58 Consultations of a draft law with NGOs, trade unions and other societal stakeholders. Usually, ministries have databases of such entities and they invite them, but in certain cases (usually draft laws of high priority for the stakeholders) the initiative comes from the societal organisations.
59 Marek Domagalski, ‘Projekt Resortu Ziobry dzieli Zjednoczoną Prawicę. Nowe przepisy poczekają’ [The Project of the Ziobro Resort Divides the United Right. The New Rules Will Wait] (Rzeczpospolita Prawo, 3 October 2022) <https://www.rp.pl/w-sadzie-i-w-urzedzie/art37167041-projekt-resortu-ziobry-dzieli-zjednoczna-prawice-nowe-przepisy-poczekaja> accessed 4 January 2023.
60 Frączak and others (n 30) 9–11.
61 Kopińska and others (n 29) 28.
62 Emily Walsh, ‘Political Accountability: Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Constraints on Governments’ (2020) 22 V-dem Policy Brief <https://v-dem.net/media/publications/pb_22_final.pdf> accessed 15 August 2023.
63 Dawid Sześciło, ‘Komisja Wspólna Rządu i Samorządu: potrzeba nowej formuły’ (Batory.org, 26 July 2023) <https://www.batory.org.pl/blog_wpis/komisja-wspolna-rzadu-i-samorzadu-potrzeba-nowej-formuly/> accessed 13 August 2023.
64 Barometr prawa Analiza stabilności otoczenia prawnego w polskiej gospodarce, edycje od 2015 do 2023 [Law Barometer Analysis of the stability of the legal environment in the Polish economy, editions from 2015 to 2023] <https://grantthornton.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/BarometrPrawa_GT_luty2016.pdf>, <https://grantthornton.pl/publikacja/produkcja-prawa-w-koncu-spowolnila/>, <https://grantthornton.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Barometr-prawa-2021-RAPORT-Grant-Thornton-04-03-2021-1.pdf>, <https://grantthornton.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Barometr-prawa-2022-RAPORT-Grant-Thornton-16-03-2022.pdf>, <https://barometrprawa.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Barometr-prawa-2023-RAPORT-Grant-Thornton-23-03-2023.pdf> accessed 11 September 2023.
65 Obywatelskie Forum Legislacji, Praktyka stosowania Regulaminu pracy Rady Ministrów Informacja o projekcie Obywatelskiego Forum Legislacji i czwarte kwartalne podsumowanie obserwacji [Practice of Implementation of the Regulations of the Work of the Council of Ministers Information on the Citizens’ Legislative Forum Project and Fourth Quarterly Summary of Observations] (Batory Foundation 2015) <https://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Odpowiedzialne%20Panstwo/Komunikat%20IV.pdf> accessed11 September 2023.
66 Fundacja Stefana Batorego, Przejrzystość w procesie stanowienia prawa [Transparency in the Process of Law-Making] (Batory Foundation 2014) <http://www.batory.org.pl/programy_operacyjne/przeciw_korupcji/przejrzystosc_w_procesie_stanowienia_prawa_1/obserwacje_rzadowego_procesu_tworzenia_praw> accessed 13 September 2023.
67 Patryk Wachowiec, ‘Communication 26/2017: Presidential Law on the Supreme Court – Rolling Unconstitutionality. Summary of Changes’ (2017) <https://for.org.pl/en/a/5672,communication-26/2017-presidential-law-on-the-supreme-court-rolling-unconstitutionality-summary-of-changes> accessed 12 August 2023; also, Human Rights Watch, ‘Poland: Draft Law Threatens Supreme Court EU Should Act on Moves to Undermine Judicial Independence’ (2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/20/poland-draft-law-threatens-supreme-court> accessed 12 August 2023.
68 Forum Idei Fundacji Batorego (n 48) 12.
69 Opinia Stowarzyszenia Sędziów Polskich ‘Iustitia’ w sprawie projektu ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym (druk nr 1727) [Opinion of The Association of Polish Judges ‘Iustitia’ on the draft law on the Supreme Court (print No 1727)] (2017) <https://www.iustitia.pl/dzialalnosc/opinie-i-raporty/1816-opinia-stowarzyszenia-sedziow-polskich-iustitia-w-sprawie-projektu-ustawy-o-sadzie-najwyzszym-druk-nr-1727> accessed 12 August 2023; also Forum Idei Fundacji Batorego (n 48) 12.
70 Opinia Prawna Zespołu Ekspertów Prawnych przy Fundacji Im. Stefana Batorego w sprawie oceny zgodności z Konstytucją ustawy z dnia 20 lipca 2017 r. o Sądzie Najwyższym (druk sejmowy nr 1727) [Legal Opinion of the Panel of Legal Experts at The Stefan Batory Foundation on the Assessment of the Constitutionality of the Act of 20 July 2017 on the Supreme Court (Parliamentary Print No. 1727)] (Batory Foundation 2017) <https://obserwatoriumdemokracji.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Opinia_Ustawa-S%C4%85d-Najwyz%CC%87szy-p.pdf> accessed 12 August 2023.
71 Jan Krysiak, ‘Demokracja samorządowa w Polsce: rozwój czy regres?’ [Local Democracy in Poland: Progress or Regress?] (2014) 28 Prace Naukowe Wałbrzyskiej Wyższej Szkoły Zarządzania i Przedsiębiorczości 9–19.
72 In the Polish political and constitutional system, the legislative and control bodies (vis-a-vis the executive bodies) at the local and regional level are: municipality councils (in towns/cities – town/city councils), district councils and regional assemblies, operating in three basic types of units: local self-government (municipalities and districts) and regional self-government (voivodeships). They are elected by citizens for a 5-year period and their legislative competences cover adoption of acts of local law (resolutions) including the local budgets, taxes and fees, area development plans and economic programmes. For more, see: Itrich-Drabarek (ed.) (n 13).
73 Notes from in-depth interviews no. 2, 3 and 5, 1 June, 5 June and 30 June 2023 (1 and 30 June – online; 5 June – Rzeszów).
74 Note from in-depth interview no. 2, 1 June 2023 (online). Cf. Lucyna Rajca, ‘The position of mayor within local authority relations in Hungary and Poland in a comparative perspective’ (2021) 18 Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne 71–88.
75 Note from FGI I, 20 September 2022.
76 Tímea Drinóczi and Ronan Cormacain, ‘Introduction: Illiberal Tendencies in Law-Making’ (2021) 9 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 269–75, 274; Bień-Kacała (n 5) 276–94.
77 Note from in-depth interview no. 2, 1 June 2023 (online).
78 Note from FGI II, 21 September 2022.
79 Note from in-depth interview no. 9, 19 December 2023 (online).
80 Note from in-depth interview no. 10, 22 December 2023 (online).
81 Note from in-depth interview no. 3, 5 June 2023 (Rzeszów).
82 For more, see: I. Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.), Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation (Springer 2021).
83 Note from FGI I, 20 September 2022.
84 E.g. Notes from in-depth interviews no. 2, 6 and 8, 1 June, 14 November and 5 December 2023 (online).
85 Note from FGI I, 20 September 2022; Note from FGI II, 21 September 2022. Cf. Miłosz Czopek and Ewa Żołnierczyk, ‘Konsultacje społeczne jako forma dialogu ze społecznością lokalną’ [Social Consultations as a Form of Dialogue with a Local Community] (2017) 1 Społeczności Lokalne. Studia Interdyscyplinarne 85–94.
86 Wojciech Karpieszuk, ‘Pierwszy budżet obywatelski. Mieszkańcy sami zdecydują’ [The First Participatory Budget. The Residents Will Decide for Themselves] (Gazeta Wyborcza Warszawa, 20 September 2012) <https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,12516840,pierwszy-budzet-obywatelski-mieszkancy-sami-zdecyduja.html> accessed 12 August 2023; idem, ‘Budżetowa wspólna sprawa’ [Budgetary Common Matter] (Gazeta Wyborcza Warszawa, 31 March 2016) <https://wyborcza.pl/AkcjeSpecjalne/7,157247,19841633,budzetowa-wspolna-sprawa.html> accessed 12 August 2023.
87 Note from FGI I, 20 September 2022; Note from FGI II, 21 September 2022.
88 Note from in-depth interview no. 11, 2 February 2024.
89 According to research by the Urban Policy Observatory, turnout in participatory budgeting rarely exceeds several percent of eligible voters. Cf. Borys Martela, Liliana Janik and Kamil Mróz, Barometr Budżetu Obywatelskiego. Edycja 2022 [Participatory Budget Barometer. Edition 2022] (Instytut Rozwoju Miast i Regionów 2023) < https://obserwatorium.miasta.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Martela-B.-Janik-L.-Mroz-K.-2023-Barometr-BO.-Edycja-2022.pdf> accessed 12 August 2023.
90 Michał Wojtczuk, ‘Budżet obywatelski w kryzysie. Jak go poprawić? A może niech decydują radni, nie mieszkańcy’ [Participatory Budget in Crisis. How to Improve It? Or Maybe Let the Councillors Decide, Not the Residents] (Gazeta Wyborcza Warszawa, 3 July 2018) <https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,23626027,budzet-obywatelski-w-kryzysie-jak-go-poprawic.html> accessed 13 August 2023.
91 According to the laws on self-government in municipalities (1990), districts and voivodeships (1998) the local and regional authorities can organise consultations with citizens in the cases provided for in the law or on issues important for local/regional communities. In the former case, the consultations are often obligatory, e.g. with reference to area development plans, investments in sectors impacting the environment or projects of development strategy. For more, see: Regulski (n 14).
92 Note from FGI II, 2022b, 21 September 2022.
93 Note from FGI I, 2022a, 20 September 2022.
94 Katarzyna Ludwińska, ‘Czy Radom jest miastem obywatelskim?’ [Is Radom a Citizen City?] (Gazeta Wyborcza Radom, 30 September 2018) <https://radom.wyborcza.pl/radom/7,143526,23985077,czy-radom-jest-miastem-obywatelskim.html> accessed 5 September 2023.
95 Michał Wojtczuk, ‘Dobrze pytać o zdanie mieszkańców. Ale po co konsultować pomysły absurdalne?’ [It is Good to Ask for the Opinion of Residents. But Why Consult Absurd Ideas?] (Gazeta Wyborcza Warszawa, 6 September 2018) <https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,23867104,wojtczuk-dobrze-pytac-o-zdanie-mieszkancow-ale-po-co-konsultowac.html> accessed 13 August 2023.
96 Note from FGI I, 2022a, 20 September 2022.
97 Note from in-depth interview no. 11, 2 February 2024.
98 Note from in-depth interview no. 10, 22 December 2023.
99 Note from FGI I, 2022a, 20 September 2022.
100 Note from in-depth interview no. 5, 30 June 2023.
101 Note from FGI II, 2022b, 21 September 2022; Note from in-depth interview no. 11, 2 February 2024.
102 Melis G. Laebens, ‘Beyond Democratic Backsliding: Executive Aggrandizement and Its Outcomes’ (2023) Users Working Papers <https://v-dem.net/media/publications/UWP_54.pdf> accessed 15 August 2023.