The de facto Autonomous Governance and Stability in the Middle East: The Case of Kurds in Rojava

ABSTRACT

While the fight against ideological warfare of the Islamic State (ISIS) would not be possible without an effective counter ground operation led by the Kurds, these unique players in regional stability have contributed to the mitigation, and in some cases the elimination of Islamist extremist ideology, conducing to the human security of the region. Viewing these actions within a pro-democracy approach, this paper will demonstrate why the international community, led by the United States and EU, needs to, indeed ought to consider the Kurdish de facto autonomous region model as an element for stability. The resulting outcome could help contribute to the regional security of the Middle East, and also prevent the perpetration of any future atrocities against the Kurds and other minorities. Through a collective case study and a qualitative set of data, this paper will evaluate the de facto autonomous governance experience of the Kurds, its impact, and its potential.

KEYWORDS:

• Human security
• ISIS
• Kurds
• Rojava
• Syria
• terrorism

Introduction

The Middle East has endured a plethora of political tumult, interventions, and wars spanning the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. These tumultuous events have instigated external interventions often striving to mitigate political violence, but also inadvertently becoming instigators of additional strife. Looking outside the scope of foreign intervention to de-escalate conflict in the Middle East, there is a need for local players in the game to achieve political balance. For some, this has been seen in the actions of the Kurdish Protection Units in Rojava since its inception in 2011. After ISIS created a power vacuum in the Northeast region of Syria, and with Bashar Al-Assad losing control, the Kurds gained an opportunity to establish a de facto autonomous region known as Rojava. Kurdish advocates portray the Kurds as a unique partner in the efforts to combat radical extremism at close range,¹ providing a home for internally displaced persons (IDPs),² and serving as a shelter for those persecuted by the Syrian government and other regimes.

The question is how accurate is this portrayal and what kinds of evidence can we find to support it? The argument being made in the present paper is that the gradual consolidation of the de facto autonomous region of Rojava has generated some modest benefits for the Levant and may continue to do so if supported by the international community. It may be hypothesized (though it remains too early to tell) that the lessons from the Rojava autonomous model may allow for the democratic and human security challenges in other areas to also be resolved.

The Rojava region has been portrayed as multicultural, inclusive, and generally stable in its communal democratic system of governance, as well as illustrating the potential of creating an environment of sustainable peace.³ This may prove to be the unique factor that allows this area to flourish and to be placed in a better position to resist extremism and its aftereffects. In short, the Rojava regional experiment is allowing for the potential of a unique achievement in human security, providing and protecting a haven for vulnerable individuals, while also offering stable governance in a chaotic and conflict-ridden regional environment.

In the following sections, this study will explore the Rojava experiment from different viewpoints. This includes interviews with the leadership from the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the President of the Executive Authority of the Syrian Democratic Council, and Kurdish and non-Kurdish participants. In addition to the interviews, a qualitative case study was conducted using existing literature to explore similar trends in autonomous regions and their results in Kosovo, South Sudan, and the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI). These are examined to find what lessons can be learned from past bids for autonomy and comparison to the Rojava case. Other positions from media and academic sources will also be reviewed to examine the risk factors for Rojava’s future, successes of the Rojava region, and how and why the model might be adapted to other conflict areas that face similar dilemmas. Through this research, we will point to how and why Rojava and their model of governance have the potential to be mirrored to other conflict regions, despite the risk to their sustainability.

Successes of the de facto region

Repelling extremism and sustaining governance in conflict areas

As has been seen around the world, the Kurds were appreciated as an important partner in the United States-led coalition group, comprising several Western and Arab states, most of whose operations were limited to “air strikes, training and equipping local security forces, and targeted special operations.”⁴ Through the alliance with ground units, some of which led by the People’s Protection Group (YPG), Kurdish peshmerga from Iraq, and moderate Syrian rebels, ISIS was driven from the territory of their self-declared Caliphate.⁵ Through their various operations, the Kurdish forces became familiar with ISIS’s behavior and military strikes conduct, thus enhancing Kurdish ability to deal with this type of military action and tactics.⁶ According to Saleh Moslem, Member of the Co-Presidency Council for the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Rojava, the Kurds in Rojava are the most experienced in facing extremism, can deal with these issues directly, in cooperation with US-backed coalition forces, and should be consulted in providing advice and solutions to extremism in the area.⁷ This argument of facing extremism is not only confined within the kinetic response to extremism and terrorist groups, but within the reluctance of the international community to repatriate their ISIS-affiliated citizens; the deradicalization and disengagement of ISIS-affiliates in the camps become a major debate issue in the literature and among policymakers.⁸ In a subsequent deradicalization process, one participant emphasized that although the Kurds in Rojava did not have the expertise or experience in dealing with the complex problems that deradicalization poses, they were perfectly situated to deal with them.⁹ Another advantage that Kurds in Iraq and Syria had is that they were unlikely situated to incubate radicalization, because this type of polarized ideology is something rejected within the Kurdish culture, whereas within Arab areas, such ideologies continue to make a resurgence among vulnerable communities that may foster an environment for radicalization.¹⁰ This is simply explained by the sectarian tension between Arab Sunni and Shiite groups in Syria and Iraq where ISIS and other radical extremist groups have capitalized on sectarianism, and utilized the grievances emanating from it for the purpose of recruitment and mobilization.¹¹ Ilham Ahmed, President of the Executive Authority of the Syrian Democratic Council, also supported this idea, noting that one of the greatest defenses against radicalization was to develop projects, whether educational, economic, or defensive – not only in the military sense but intellectually and socially, where individuals can defend themselves against extremist ideas.¹² This comes as ISIS begins to make a resurgence in IDP camps, and as the remnants of their ideology endure among the children and wives of former members, or with the detained members of extremist groups themselves.¹³ The most prominent example of the Kurdish contribution to fighting extremism is the battle for Kobani, a city of northern Syria that was positioned to fall when ISIS entered the area,¹⁴ and is a prime example of a Kurdish resistance success story. It was important enough to the point that one participant asserted that the Kobani fight changed the course of history in the region.¹⁵ A journalist familiar with Rojava also noted that the region had organizations and charities aimed at the reintegration of radicalized soldiers in order to prevent another generation of jihadis from joining extremist groups like ISIS.¹⁶ One of the interviewees, Mr. Moslem, noted the importance of such resistance, arguing the Kurds were placed in a situation where they had to resist and protect themselves, prompting the international community’s assistance; indeed, claimed Moslem, had the Kurds not shown the determination and organization they had, it will have been unlikely the international community would have continued backing their resistance.¹⁷

Ground extension of the US coalition

As the Syrian conflict continued to pose a grave humanitarian crisis in the Middle East, the area was dealt yet another setback: ISIS rose to prominence and was able to overtake large swathes of land in both Iraq and Syria. US officials scrambled to formulate a response against ISIS that utilized “capable, indigenous forces.”¹⁸ Previously, the United States, under former President Barack Obama, attempted to train moderate Syrian opposition groups to act as the ground extension of the American intervention.¹⁹ By October 2015, this operation had largely failed, as the Syrian fighters “were more focused on fighting the Syrian President, Bashar Al-Assad” than ISIS itself.²⁰ The Kurds became a proxy party to the war, being used as a ground unit by the United States against ISIS.²¹ The importance and value of Kurdish involvement and extension of the Self-Administered region in Rojava, became evident particularly in the small Syrian border town of Kobani, a critical supply route that bordered Turkey. An article published by NBC News on October 13, 2014 noted that the Kurds were engaged in fighting against ISIS, and that there was mounting concern among US defense leadership that the Kurds’ ground operation would not be enough to save the town “from falling to militants.”²² As has been seen worldwide, enhanced by Western media coverage, the female fighters in Kobani raised the international profile of Kurdish women and offered a glimpse into the fight that all Kurds undertook to push back extremism.²³ Under former President Obama’s administration, the US acknowledged the “value of the Kurdish militias in Syria and Iraq and vowed not to abandon them.”²⁴ Indeed, the Kurds made important headway in Syria, and were “able to take advantage of U.S.-led air power to maneuver and seize back territory.”²⁵ Not only were they successful pushing back ISIS and their affiliates, but they also assisted in cutting off ISIS supply lines to Raqqa, specifically in Tal Abyad, again with assistance from US coalition airstrikes alongside Syrian opposition rebels’ support.²⁶

With the Self-Administered region in Rojava being perceived as ideologically inspired by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization, particularly by neighboring Turkey, this has increased regional interferences in Rojava.²⁷ When in intense periods that Turkish President Erdogan targeted PKK-affiliated members, this often bled into Syria, with the targeting of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a main ruling party in Rojava.²⁸ Erdogan continued to monitor the PYD and finally received an opportunity to strike after the withdrawal of the US military from the area.²⁹ With a long history of acting as proxies the Kurds are frequently used “as the playthings of world powers, used in proxy fights when it serves someone’s interest and then discarded.”³⁰ An article published by Tom Arango in September 2016 foreshadowed the repeat of history, noting how with the withdrawal of US troops from northeastern Syria in October 2019 Turkey was afforded an opportunity to quell the rising power of the Kurds near its borders, which might have potentially given Kurds from Turkey impetus to rise up against the Turkish government.

Normalizing Arab and Kurd relations and diversification

Kurds and Arabs have traditionally maintained a fairly fragile relationship according to Saleh Moslem. Both were distanced by years of separatist thinking, with one group advancing over the other, adding to the escalation of power politics.³¹ However, within the fragility of this complex and historic relationship between Kurds and Arabs, there were advances made to improve relational ties and strengthen Rojava’s case through diversity. Leadership in this area includes Hevrin Khalaf, a prominent Syrian Kurdish politician who aimed at improving Kurdish-Arab relations. Unfortunately, and as described below, Khalaf’s work was cut short by her subsequent assassination in October 2019. Yet, the sentiment and view remained that Rojava could not continue without the inclusion of the Kurds’ Arab counterparts in any future outlook toward democracy.

Saleh Moslem also argued that the path forward in Rojava should include all ethnicities and religions, including Arabs and other non-Kurds.³² Mr. Moslem described how the Kurds had to prove they were sincere in their wish to forge partnerships with all groups in the region, noting that if people felt like partners in the Rojava project, they would likely be more willing to take part in and contribute to that model.³³ Furthermore, Mr. Moslem believed that ethnicities in the surrounding Rojava subregions (Raqqa, Afrin, Jazira etc.), were better able to express themselves and even teach about their own cultures in schools, thanks to the Rojava experiment.³⁴ In terms of countering violent extremist ideology, a Syrian-Arab journalist who was interviewed for this research also noted that broad-minded school curricula would automatically contribute to the elimination of extremism and radicalization.³⁵ This, he noted, is in stark contrast to official state-education in Syria, which was ideologically inclined toward Baʿthist beliefs, focused on “just one language, one party, one politics.”³⁶ The Kurds embraced a multicultural approach, and classes are taught in the local Kurdish dialect, Kurmancî, but also valorizing and teaching Arabic and Syriac.³⁷ In this capacious Rojava context, educational policies focused on the students’ “own culture and histories as well as those of others, which reasserts their own suppressed identities and builds tolerance of others.”³⁸

Hevrin Khalaf

While Arab-Kurdish relations in Syria might have been traditionally strained, there were some politicians concerned with the task of reuniting Arab and Kurd into a single national family. Hevrin Khalaf, a Kurdish politician, activist, and Secretary General of the Future Syria Party, was allegedly murdered by the Ahrar al-Sharqiya, a Turkish-backed proxy Syrian rebel group.³⁹ As a result of the US military withdrawal in October 2019, these Turkish-backed groups were accused of stopping civilians at highway checkpoints and meting out summary executions, with video evidence of those violations later disseminated on social media. By contrast, Hevrin Khalaf’s Future Syria Party aimed at uniting Syria and the Syrians, advance principles of gender equality and diversity,⁴⁰ and do so through democratic means.⁴¹ Khalaf’s approach was community dialogue, and based on the testimony of Arab activist in the Party, Khalaf “didn’t differentiate between people” and “was intent on the communities within Syria to be united.”⁴² Despite Khalaf’s martyrdom (as her death is depicted from a “Kurdish cause” angle), her legacy lives on, empowering other women to stand against human insecurity and human rights violations in the region, and support the progress and well-being of women in the area.⁴³ This is often an overlooked aspect in human security and the role of women in surrounding autonomous regions, including the leadership and contribution of women to these causes, and the heavy toll that advocacy in this direction takes on women especially, with some paying for it with their own lives.

Detaining ISIS remnants to prevent the spread of terrorism

With ISIS winding down its reign of terror in the Middle East, remnants of the group and their family members have survived, with some detained at various Kurdish camps in the region, including the densely populated Al-Hol camp and others in the Rojava cantons. Some of these alleged ISIS remnants included men, women, and children, with men and young boys being held separately from women and children. Some of the detainees are foreign fighters and their families, as well as ISIS sympathizers and other locals from Syria or Iraq. The conditions in Al-Hol, one of the salient remaining “legacies” of the Islamic State according to the United States Institute of peace, resemble a “mini-Caliphate” where women detainees have become drivers of the next generation of jihadis.⁴⁴ According to one research participant who worked with an NGO at the camp, Al-Hol is for all intents and purposes under the control of ISIS women,⁴⁵ and is enduring deteriorating living conditions ranging from infant and children malnutrition,⁴⁶ to the enforcement of Sharia law administered by women,⁴⁷ to instances of indiscriminate killings and beatings meted out on women “infidels.”⁴⁸ According to one participant, the detention of these groups is unsustainable, increasingly becoming fertile ground for the flourishing of radicalization.⁴⁹ As argued by Mr. Moslem, some Syrian families are being released from Al-Hol to compensate for the pressures of resource deficits, and to appease local tribes often demanding that their kinsmen be released.⁵⁰ In early October 2020 Ilham Ahmed, an ethnic Kurdish politician and advocate of a multi-ethnic future Syria, officially announced that all Syrians, notably all Arabs, would be removed from the camp completely, accounting for 28,000 out of the nearly 70,000 in the camp. This measure was announced as a way to give relief to the resource-strapped Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, the acting legislature of Rojava), and to address rising security incidents in the camp.⁵¹ Another participant further confirmed that this lack of resources was creating a problem for the Kurdish security forces in Al-Hol, and that the longer detainees remained in custody, the likelier the conditions becoming rife for the emergence of future generations of jihadists.⁵²

Lessons learned: Kosovo, South Sudan, and Kurdish Regional Government

Kosovo

Kosovo, originally part of former Yugoslavia, exercised its right to self-determination under Serbia in the late 1980s.⁵³ While the de facto leader of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, was intent on peaceful resistance to Serbia’s discriminatory policies against ethnic Albanians excluding them from government and denying basic state resources and care, he was later compelled to yield to armed struggle, opting to fight for independence and equality rather than waiting for “peaceful means” to do their magic.⁵⁴ This shift in approach was met with brutal force from the Serbian side, resulting in the NATO bombings of Serbia during the 1990s.⁵⁵ The Kosovo case also marked an important shift in international attitudes, garnering “wider acceptance of the principle of self-determination” and in favor of Kosovo’s bid for independence.⁵⁶ Similar to South Sudan, which is discussed below, Kosovo was also backed by American interests, looking with favor at the region’s autonomy and eventual independence.⁵⁷ Serbs on the other hand had historical claims over Kosovo, deeming it an important place of memory for their people. In fact, despite the majority Muslim population of Kosovo, Serbs considered the region, with its ancient Christian sites and monasteries, of great symbolic significance to their history.⁵⁸ In the late 1980s, Serbs began “asserting Serbian power” in the area, and by the early 1990s, they were “poised to pounce for control of all of Yugoslavia.”⁵⁹ Tensions between the groups had been simmering for nearly eight years, until the breakup of Yugoslavia, when Belgrade’s politics shifted from regressive policies to an offensive against Albanians.⁶⁰ International delays in reviewing Kosovo’s situation were due to there being no “urgent need to deal with the question,” and given that the focus on peaceful resistance under Rugova’s de facto leadership had lulled the international community into a false sense of security suggesting the fragile peace between Serbs and Albanians was relatively speaking under control.⁶¹ Following a difficult struggle, the Kosovars finally gained independence from Serbia in 2008.

South Sudan

As is the case in many other autonomous regions, South Sudan had its own history of ethnic violence, and was involved in two civil wars both spanning decades respectively, beginning in 1955.⁶² A war-fatigued South Sudan continued in a peace process with its counterparts in the north, and eventually, a fragile peace agreement termed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), began paving the path to independence for the south.⁶³ Similar to the sectarian struggle in Syria, Sudan’s two colonial ruling countries, Britain and Egypt, might have stoked up ethnic strife, further distancing the country’s ethnic groups from one another.⁶⁴ With the variety of religious groups in South Sudan, some felt estranged from northern Sudan, which was majority Muslim and Arab, pushing for Sharia law in the south, and thus whipping up dissent among Christians and other groups who felt that Islam was being forced on them.⁶⁵ Fortunately, the CPA endured and allowed South Sudan to achieve independence in July 2011. To keep peace in the region, and in view of the oil-rich south, it was agreed that oil revenues would be divided evenly between the North and South.⁶⁶ However, with the fallen oil prices in 2015, South Sudan was no longer able to pay fees owed to its economically struggling counterpart in the north.⁶⁷ The South also enjoyed varying degrees of US support and interest. During former US President George W. Bush’s tenure, the US had stakes in the peace talks between Sudan and South Sudan due to allegations that North Sudan was involved in international terrorism post-9/11.⁶⁸ As is the case of Rojava, a constitution was drafted in South Sudan; however, South Sudan struggled in the absence of international guarantors and was not able to establish its own constitution immediately following the withdrawal of the British and Egyptians. This left South Sudan without a solid constitution or governance ability, which was not the case in northern Sudan.⁶⁹ While the case in South Sudan had several setbacks, the Southern Sudanese followed similar patterns of Rojava’s autonomy, and were eventually able to attain independence. This latter point, independence, sets the Southern Sudanese apart from the Rojava Kurds who wish to remain within the country of Syria, while also affirming their autonomy. While the goal of remaining within Syria may change in the future, such a move can also hinder international recognition of Rojava as an autonomous region in control of its borders and nation.

Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

Similar to the examples of Kosovo and South Sudan, the autonomy of the Kurdish Region in Iraq was preceded by decades of turmoil and violence, punctuated by the rise of ISIS in the region.⁷⁰ Upon this foundation, the Kurds began their first formal stage of de facto statehood in the Kurdish region. Through the UN Security Council, no-fly zones were established, and the UN called for the end of aggression in 1991 after the Gulf War, prompting the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kurdish-majority regions, with primary backing from the United States.⁷¹ During this period, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) furnished great efforts building government structures and operating as a quasi-autonomous region.⁷² The KRG has been characterized as a quasi-state that “thrives off a weak central government, nationalist sentiment, external patronage, and international recognition.”⁷³ The KRG also operates outside of the Iraqi state’s realm of influence, engaging in foreign affairs and diplomatic relations, forging independent economic policy attracting new businesses and investors, and using “its reputation as both a ‘haven of “stability” as well as possessing a functioning democratic system for leverage.”⁷⁴ Similar to arrangements in South Sudan, the oil-rich KRG is an important source of revenue to both the Iraqi central government and the Kurds, and crude from the KRG region was for some time sold through the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Company (SOMO).⁷⁵

Despite the fact that the KRG worked with the central government of Iraq, circumventing the weakened state also proved to contribute to an economic downturn, with Baghdad withholding funds from the KRG’s budget.⁷⁶ In a 2015 article, Denise Natali asserted that the KRG had failed to create a strong private sector economy, instead focusing on its “patronage networks by bloating civil servant jobs” accounting for 72 percent of the KRG’s annual budget and amounting to $720 million dollars annually.⁷⁷ With the 2014 decline in oil prices, the KRG also suffered, and again the inflated civil servant sector (accounting for “three out of four workers” in the region) was the worst impacted, necessitating sizable salary cuts.⁷⁸ Coupled with the rise of ISIS, the KRG had to absorb costs related to “anti-ISIS military operations, massive refugee flow, and enhanced border security.”⁷⁹ Similar to its neighbors in Rojava, the KRG struggles with the lack of international backing that can effectively boost its economy, autonomous goals, and international recognition.⁸⁰ More recently, these same struggles have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The KRG situation shows that de facto states do not necessarily shift toward full independence, and even when an autonomous state is tolerated or accepted by the sovereign nation-state, there are still issues arising as part of that arrangement and power balance.

Autonomous region and relation to Rojava

As seen in the cases of Kosovo, South Sudan and the KRG, there was involvement from the United States to facilitate talks and help provide legitimacy to claims of autonomy. Each bid for autonomy was preceded by intense conflict and ethnic struggles, often involving discriminatory practices from the ruling party of the nation-state in question. Following the patterns of the three countries mentioned here, and their relation to Rojava, we can see similar patterns of autonomy claims: violence and infighting, intervention from the US and eventually the international community, fragile peace agreements, and processes and incorporation of multi-ethnic entities and dynamics into the regions under consideration. Another point is that these countries, in their original form, were created with disregard for tribal lands, indigenous lands, and areas with uniform ethnicities and religious beliefs.⁸¹ Moreover, the traditional lands of the Kurds have been broken into four areas, causing conflict in separating a large ethnicity.⁸² Similar cases are also found in South Sudan with the majority-Christian south,⁸³ Kosovo’s Muslim majority vs. the Orthodox Christianity in Serbia,⁸⁴ and the KRG’s ethnic Kurdish population. Another striking similarity between these three cases is the search for a secular autonomous region, where each religion and ethnicity is accepted and granted full and equal status before the law. This is also true in Rojava’s governance approach and the search for a secular policy and constitution. However, it seems that the structure of the international approach toward de facto states creates pressure for those within the de facto state to move toward full statehood structure in order to gain access to international recognition.⁸⁵ Included in this pressure is the impulse to “display institutional and particularly democratic development as part of their ‘pitch’ for accession to the international community.”⁸⁶

With the exception of Kosovo, the other cases have arguably involved indigenous populations seceding from their “colonial past,” including actors that stepped in after the original colonizers vacated (e.g. France, Britain, and Egypt). There are also deep-rooted tensions against minorities or power imbalances that may only be solved through autonomy and independence. Ignoring the tell-tale signs and red flags of tension from autonomous regions is a major problem for the international community, and the signs of such are being largely ignored in the Rojava region. Ilham Ahmed also noted that delaying this necessary international support affects everyone in the region and adds to the existing friction.⁸⁷ With the KRI also wishing to remain autonomous for the time being, similar to Rojava, it may always be striving for international recognition. With the US playing major roles in the secession of autonomous states or opportunities to create autonomous areas, it seems Rojava may require support from their difficult ally to fully actualize their plans of autonomy in the area. The KRG’s failings are also a lesson learned for Rojava politics: focus on the private sector and refraining from establishing high numbers of workers in the civil servant sector is a protection against economic consequences and emergencies.

Risk factors of sustainability in Kurdish-led regions

The strength in having Rojava deemed an international entity is found in the political and fragmented weakness in the Middle East and within Rojava itself. In view of the Turkish incursion of October 2019, and the humanitarian crisis in Kurdish-controlled detention camps like Al-Hol, these problems demonstrate how the Kurds are situated to effectively address these issues without the backing of the international community; e.g. issues of foreign intervention, terrorism, radicalization during detention and in camps, and continued geopolitical movements that destabilize the area. These challenges limit Kurdish freedom in the region, and while the international focus remains on ISIS remnants in camps and repatriation issues, only a fraction of the broader challenges facing the Kurds receives attention.⁸⁸ These concerns are detailed below to illustrate current obstacles that the Kurds face in establishing their mode of governance in the Middle East. By understanding these issues in depth and the potential benefits of supporting a de facto Kurdish state, a new type of governance might emerge, allowing for the region to stabilize and for the West to gain a reliable local ally in a region fraught with different and sometimes hostile regimes.

Although Rojava Self-Administration was declared in 2013, one of the region’s biggest obstacles, as noted by Saleh Moslem, is being under constant threat from foreign intervention.⁸⁹ As stated previously, the Turkish incursion after the withdrawal of a majority of US support emboldened Turkish-backed armed groups such as Suleiman Shah Brigade and Hamza Division, fighting under the banner of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA),⁹⁰ to move into the area and quell the perceived threat of Kurdish leadership. This culminated in allegations of war crimes, including political assassinations and genocide,⁹¹ as well as the use of chemical weapons by Turkey and Turkish-backed militias against Kurds and other groups in the area near the Turkish-Syrian border.⁹² This move by the US allies left Kurds with a sense of betrayal:⁹³ many regional and international players in the region were interested in oil rather than the effect this military intervention would have on Rojava. They only offered a meaningless acknowledgment for their assistance in fighting extremism and ISIS.⁹⁴ In addition to these issues, there is also the added pressure from being landlocked by the bordering states of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. The difficulties of being a landlocked entity range from closed borders, blockades, blocked NGO aid and forced IDP movements into Rojava.⁹⁵ In fact, according to more pessimistic outlooks on Rojava’s future, the de facto experience would be too difficult to continue, as the area was “surrounded by authoritarians, sclerotic failed states, and genocidal fundamentalists.”⁹⁶ With so many interferences in Rojava from all sides, there is no benefit to any sides,⁹⁷ and any long-term plans for peacebuilding have been stalled; unless those challenges are dealt with, there is little chance for increased stability.⁹⁸ There are some that are optimistic about Rojava’s impact on the region; one participant was cautiously optimistic about a model based on human rights and civil society; principles that were not possible even during the most optimistic “liberal” phases of the Syrian Baʿth regime.⁹⁹ Open border points are also subject to closures due to pressures from other foreign actors, such as Turkey and Russian forces, on behalf of the Syrian regime.¹⁰⁰ These types of attacks also shift resources away from IDPs and allow for an already depleted supply of resources to be moved toward constant threats to the de facto region.

Another glaring issue, which is also the case with other examples of autonomous states, is international support and recognition. As with Kosovo, South Sudan, and the KRI, most often the international community remained static in its attempts to help minorities gain access to stability through independence or support of their de facto state. This is another issue that plagues Rojava. As noted by Saleh Moslem, another problem is that the international community is unwilling to see the reality and deal with Rojava directly because it is not recognized as the legal government of the area.¹⁰¹ This also delays humanitarian assistance to the various camps in Rojava, including Al-Hol, where access negotiations are brought to the Syrian government for permission instead of Rojava.¹⁰² The lack of international recognition or a formal status was proven more problematic for the international community hours after the earthquake that hit southern and central Turkey and northern and western Syria on February 6, 2023. In the absence of recognition, the international community could not direct humanitarian aid to those affected areas. Indeed, dealing directly with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Rojava in this case, and for the purpose of bringing emergency humanitarian aid, would have been much more prompt and efficient. Instead, the international community waited until aid was given to Turkey to be then redistributed to those regions in Syria. Worse yet, assistance had to be stalled until the Syrian president allowed international humanitarian aid to pass through two crossings.¹⁰³ A time that many victims did not have.

Other issues pertaining to sustainability in the Rojava region are the reliance on the West for backing and support. Yet, as demonstrated in the case studies on Kosovo, South Sudan, and KRI, these types of support are needed. For example, no-fly zones allowed the KRG to establish itself in the absence of the central government and pushed Iraqi forces out of the KRI.¹⁰⁴ Other supports, including airstrikes in Kosovo’s favor,¹⁰⁵ and the US push for peace talks in South Sudan and Sudan,¹⁰⁶ all demonstrate the importance of a strong ally in autonomy ambitions, something that changes with the incumbent leaders and geopolitical interests. The Kurds already resorted to other allies in the area, and even sought support from the Assad government and the Russians for protection against Turkey’s October 2019 advance into Rojava.¹⁰⁷

Another problem facing Kurds is the remnants of ISIS, including “jihadi brides” and former extremists that are separated into different camps. Women and children were previously separated from the male population, but since mid 2019, the conditions have deteriorated and spiraled out of control. Even providing necessities to the camp is difficult under current conditions, and frequently Kurdish leadership of camps, including Al-Hol, cannot guarantee food for some refugee camps.¹⁰⁸ Some participants of this study as well as media sources, reported that radicalization is also taking place at an alarming rate inside these camps, and through the extension of women within the camp, it has developed into a mini caliphate run by the women.¹⁰⁹ Here, women are running the camps and actively enforce strict rules set by ISIS during their reign in 2014 and also a continued threat to the next generation of children and youth that endure harsh conditions within Al-Hol camp and other camps.¹¹⁰

Adapting the Rojava experiment to other conflict areas

In order for the Rojava model to work effectively and be adapted to other regions, it would seem that there is a prerequisite for international support for the model to continue. From the case studies and interviews surveyed here, it may be argued that this type of model is sustainable in post-conflict areas.¹¹¹ Being a unique experiment, the Rojava model does, as noted earlier, struggle with difficulties. Yet the key to its success is its experiment with a grassroots democracy, which emboldens citizens to be their own decision-makers rather than following the designated elites of society.¹¹² Another participant agreed that the longstanding issue of political and government corruption makes it difficult to participate in the political system because the corruption of the elite has been a persistent fixture of Middle Eastern models for decades.¹¹³ Despite the strain of resources in Rojava and the unpredictable blockades from surrounding regional powers, Mr. Moslem stressed the importance of resources in Rojava, including commodities based on agriculture, water, and oil – and using these resources according to principles based on ecology.¹¹⁴ As demonstrated by the 2019 US withdrawal from Rojava and Syria, the Kurds continue to be abandoned in their effort to continue the Rojava experiment, and often have to rely on themselves for such necessary resources. In effect, if they are not able to sell these commodities to other markets, they distribute them among the local market for local consumption.¹¹⁵

In addition, if there are other conflicts where a group has been accused of wartime atrocities like ISIS, there needs to be an international mechanism whereby these offenders can be charged and repatriated to their country of origin. This would ensure the drain of resources does not fall to vulnerable groups in the area and would be a burden shouldered by the international community. As Rojava is not an internationally recognized entity, any type of war tribunal set up in Rojava is not currently possible or supported.¹¹⁶ Rojava has also demonstrated sensitivity to gender equality issues in its rotating and gender-based cochair system, where leadership has appointed both male and female co-leaders with equal powers. This allows for increased visibility for women in the area and encourages other women, similar to Hevrin Khalaf, to contribute in meaningful ways to their society through governance and peacekeeping. Tied to this is the secular and democratic structure, which is often a prerequisite for international support of autonomous regions. This also enables the protection of vulnerable groups, as autonomous groups are notably “peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation”¹¹⁷ before seeking autonomy or secession.

Conclusion

This research has assessed the question of how accurate is this portrayal – the representation of the de facto autonomous region of Rojava – and what kinds of evidence can we find to support it? The argument made is that the gradual consolidation of the de facto autonomous region of Rojava has generated some modest benefits for the Levant and may continue to do so if supported by the international community. It was argued that the lessons from the Rojava autonomous model could allow for the democratic and human security challenges in other areas that have seen conflict to also be resolved.

Despite the possibilities of de facto states, the international community has been slow in their support, particularly when those seeking autonomy are “exercising clear and effective authority over a territory but lacking international recognition.”¹¹⁸ The international community has traditionally been mostly reactive, and as demonstrated through multiple examples in Kosovo, South Sudan, KRI, and now Rojava, the rights and needs of those seeking autonomy are often violated before the point of action. Action often comes in the form of the US circumventing international protocols on engagement. Unfortunately, “these entities exist in a legal and temporal limbo in their search for membership of the society of states.”¹¹⁹ The regional experiment represents a real opportunity for not only security between states but also for human security aimed at protecting populations and individuals who are on the receiving end of conflict and violence. As for Rojava, the value in having a secular and democratic ally in the center of the Middle East is invaluable for preventing further conflict. Furthermore, continued conflicts eventually make their way to the West, through mass migration movements, domestic terror plots, or radical ideology. The Kurds appear interested and potentially well-positioned to assume a key diplomatic and strategic role in this context, given the international backing and support. The fact that Rojava has endured for ten years despite constant threats and challenges to their existence demonstrates their resilience, not to mention their contribution as ground units in the fight against ISIS. The presence of Rojava in the region would possibly quell further extremist movements, provide regional stability, and have a lasting impact on generations to come in defeating the cycle of trauma and violence, and creating a model that might enhance regional stability and peace elsewhere.

Acknowledgments

The authors express sincere gratitude to the participants of this research, whose invaluable contributions made this study possible. Additionally, we extend our appreciation to the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA) for their generous funding, which played a pivotal role in supporting various aspects of this research. Their commitment to advancing scientific inquiry has greatly facilitated the exploration of important questions within the scope of this study.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa.

Notes on contributors

Haval Ahmad

Haval Ahmad is an associate faculty at Royal Roads University, teaching human security, social policy, conflict, peace, and terrorism studies. His research focuses on de-radicalization, terrorism, counter-violent extremism (CVE), Kurdish affairs, conflict, and human security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. He is the Canadian Defence and Security Network (CDSN) 2023 Capstone Laureate.

Emma MacTavish

Emma MacTavish is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham in the UK. Her research area includes peace, stability, refugees, feminism, and Kurdish feminism. She has presented her research findings at different international conferences and webinars in collaboration with Canadian and Kurdish Universities. Emma is currently active in research on the role of Kurdish feminism on stability in the region.

Kenneth Christie

Kenneth Christie is the Director of the School of Humanitarian Studies, and Professor and Program Head in Human Security and Peacebuilding at Royal Roads University, British Columbia, Canada. He is the author, co-author, editor and co-editor of twelve books. Kenneth has held senior appointments at universities in the UK, USA, Singapore, South Africa, Norway and the UAE. He is a regular speaker on international news channels, including the CBC and BBC.

Notes

¹ See Ömer Taspinar and Bayram Balci, “Turkey, Russia and Iran in the Middle East: Establishing a New Regional Order,” Essay. in Syria, the Kurds and the End of the Turkish-American Alliance (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 213–33, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80291-2_12; and Melissa Dalton, “Defeating Terrorism in Syria: A New Way Forward,” Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly 16 (2017), https://search-proquestcom.lomc.idm.oclc.org/docview/1872372441?accountid=14746.

² See Neil J. Saad, “The Al Hol Camp in Northeast Syria: Health and Humanitarian Challenges,” BMJ Global Health 5, no. 7 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020–002491; and Spencer Louis Potiker, “Exit-With-Autonomy or Autonomy-Without-Exit? Divergent Political Trajectories in Rojava and the Kurdish Regional Government,” Critical Sociology 49, no. 1 (2023): 115–32, https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205211048547.

³ See Jemma Nottm, “Syria: Why Rojava is Different,” Green Left Weekly 1040, no. 1040 (2015): 20; Anahita Hosseini, “The Spirit of the Spiritless Situation: The Significance of Rojava as an Alternative Model of Political Development in the Context of the Middle East,” Critique (United Kingdom) 44, no. 3 (2016): 253–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/03017605.2016.1199631; and Yasin Duman, “Peacebuilding in a Conflict Setting: Peace and Reconciliation Committees in De Facto Rojava Autonomy in Syria,” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 12, no. 1 (2017): 85–90, https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2017.1285245.

⁴ Kathleen J. McInnis, “Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State,” Congressional Research Service, 2, Aug. 24, 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44135.pdf.

⁵ See Ed Nash, Alaric Searle, and Cano Rodríguez Irene, Kurdish Armour against ISIS: YPG/SDF Tanks, Technicals and AFVs in the Syrian Civil War, 2014–19, New Vanguard Ser (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2021), http://public.eblib.com/choice/PublicFullRecord.aspx?p=6661038; and John Holland-McCowan, “From the Siege of Sinjar to the Battle for Baghuz: The PYD, the YPG, and Their Global Coalition-Backed Campaign against Isis” (Dissertation, King’s College London, 2021).

⁶ See Holland-McCowan, “From the Siege of Sinjar to the Battle for Baghuz”; and Dominique Soguel, “Facing Isis Threat, Kurdish Fighters Favor us Air Power,” The Christian Science Monitor 7 (2014): 7.

⁷ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020.

⁸ See Anne Speckhard and Ardian Shajkovci, “Waiting for the Return of the Islamic State Caliphate among ISIS Enforcers in Syria’s al Hol, Ain Issa and Roj Camps,” International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) (2019); Isabel Coles and Benoit Faucon, “Refugee Camp Fans Flames of Resurgent Islamic State – Al-Hol’s Female Bosses Run People-Smuggling Rackets, Enforce Ideology,” Wall Street Journal A.1 (2021): 1; Vera Mironova, “Life Inside Syria’s al-Hol Camp,” Horizon Insights (2020): 52; and Alexia Cervello, “‘Deviant Women:’ An Examination of the Fate of ISIS Women after the Caliphate and the Deradicalization Efforts Available to Them” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2022).

⁹ MH CM7 (journalist) in discussion with the author, June 2020.

¹⁰ OSH CL2 (academic) in discussion with the author, June 2020.

¹¹ See Syeda Fizza Abid and Muhammad Moiz Khan, “Critical Study of Emergence and Consolidation of the Islamic State and the Dabiq,” Journal of Mass Communication Department, Dept of Mass Communication, University of Karachi 12 (2015); and Haian Dukhan, and Sinan Hawat, “The Islamic State and the Arab tribes in eastern Syria,” E-International Relations 31 (2014).

¹² Ilham Ahmed in discussion with the author, June 2020.

¹³ Holly Josh Levs Yan and Elise Labott, “U.S. Military: Airstrikes against ISIS won’t Save Key City of Kobani,” CNN, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/10/08/world/meast/isis-threat/index.html.

¹⁴ Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families,” Human Rights Watch, July 23, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/23/syria-dire-conditions-isis-suspects-families.

¹⁵ DJ CL4 (academic) in discussion with Haval Ahmad, June 2020.

¹⁶ MH CM7 (journalist) in discussion with the author, June 2020.

¹⁷ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020.

¹⁸ Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt, “Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS,” The New York Times, Oct. 9, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-state-syria.html.

¹⁹ Fred Kaplan, “Obama’s Way: The President in Practice,” Foreign Affairs 95 (2016): 48.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Arshad Mohammed and Tom Perry, “French, U.S. Planes Strike Islamic State, Britain to Join Coalition,” Reuters, Sept. 24, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-idUSKCN0HJ1H120140925.

²² Richard Engel, Jim Miklaszewski, Courtenay Kube, and Alastair Jamieson, “Syrian Border City Kobani ‘Holding off’ ISIS Militants: Kurds,” NBC News, Oct. 13, 2014, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/syria-border-city-kobani-holding-isis-militants-kurds-n224606.

²³ See Fereshteh Mohammadi, “Framing Kurdish Female Fighters: A Qualitative Content Analysis of Media Representations of Female Fighters of Kobane in Arabic, Kurdish and Russian Media” (2019); and Mari Toivanen, and Bahar Baser, “Gender in the Representations of an Armed Conflict: Female Kurdish Combatants in French and British Media,” Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 9, no. 3 (2016): 294–314.

²⁴ Dan De Luce, “Has the U.S. Just Sold Out the Kurds?” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/28/has-the-u-s-just-sold-out-the-kurds/.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ben Hubbard and Maher Samaan, “Kurds and Syrian Rebels Storm ISIS-held Border Town,” The New York Times, June 15, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/middleeast/kurds-and-syrian-rebels-push-to-evict-isis-from-border-town.html.

²⁷ Zeynep Kaya and Robert Lowe, The Curious Question of the PYD-PKK Relationship (Hurst, 2017).

²⁸ Ibid. and John Holland-McCowan, War of Shadows: How Turkey’s Conflict with the PKK Shapes the Syrian Civil War and Iraqi Kurdistan (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2017).

²⁹ Peter Galbraith, “The Betrayal of the Kurds,” The New York Review of Books 21 (2019).

³⁰ Tom Arango, “Kurds Fear the U.S. will again Betray them, in Syria,” The New York Times, Sept. 1, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/world/middleeast/kurds-syria-turkey.html.

³¹ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ AA CM5 (journalist) in discussion with the author, July 2020.

³⁶ Elise Boyle Espinosa, “New Education System was Central to the Kurds’ Rojava Revolution in Northern Syria – now it’s Under Attack,” The Conversation, Oct. 11, 2019, https://theconversation.com/new-education-system-was-central-to-the-kurds-rojava-revolution-in-northern-syria-now-its-under-attack-125153.

³⁷ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020. See also Espinosa, “New Education System.”

³⁸ Espinosa, “New Education System.”

³⁹ See Margaret Evans, “Turkey ‘Outsourcing War Crimes’ to Armed Groups, Amnesty Says after Kurdish Politician’s Murder,” CBC News, Oct. 20, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/syria-turkey-1.5328109; and Doga Eralp, “The Safe Zone for Undesirables on the Turkey-Syria Border,” Peace Review 32, no. 2 (2020): 181–189.

⁴⁰ Sheena Goodyear, “Kurdish Politician Slain in Syria Wanted to Unite the Country in Peace, says Friend,” CBC News, Oct. 15, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-tuesday-edition-1.5321570/kurdish-politician-slain-in-syria-wanted-to-unite-the-country-in-peace-says-friend-1.5321575.

⁴¹ Tom Perry and Ellen Francis, “For Syrian Kurds, A Leader’s Killing Deepens Sense of U.S. Betrayal,” Reuters, Oct. 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-kurds-future-idUSKBN1X11HZ.

⁴² Evans, “Turkey ‘Outsourcing War Crimes’ to Armed Groups, Amnesty says after Kurdish Politician’s Murder.”

⁴³ Nijbir Othman and Essam Abdullah. “Havrin Khalaf … Made Modern History, Left Timeless Legacy of Hope,” www.hawarnews.com; https://www.hawarnews.com/en/, Oct. 12, 2020; https://www.hawarnews.com/en/haber/havrin-khalaf-made-modern-history-left-timeless-legacy-of-hope-h19865.html.

⁴⁴ See Speckhard and Shajkovci, “Waiting for the Return” and Ian MacVicar, “What About the Camp Followers – and their Children?” Journal for Deradicalization 22 (2020): 319–378.

⁴⁵ BA NGO3 (NGO Director) in discussion with the author, June 2020.

⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch, “Syria.”

⁴⁷ Richard Hall, “Tunnels, Knives And Riots: This Syrian Camp Holding Thousands of Isis Wives is at Breaking Point,” The Independent, Dec. 9, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-wives-al-hol-camp-syria-islamic-state-terror-uk-a9236221.html.

⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch, “Syria.”

⁴⁹ MD NGO4 (NGO Director) in discussion with the author, July 2020.

⁵⁰ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020.

⁵¹ Ellen Francis, “Kurdish Official says Thousands of Syrians to Leave Crowded Camp in Northeast,” Reuters, Oct. 5, 2020, https://ca.reuters.com/article/uk-syria-security-northeast-alhol/kurdish-official-says-thousands-of-syrians-to-leave-crowded-camp-in-northeast-idUKKBN26Q2NQ.

⁵² OSH CL2 (academic) in discussion with the author, June 2020.

⁵³ Christopher J. Borgen, “Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition,” American Society of International Law 12, no. 2 (2008).

⁵⁴ James Ker-Lindsay, “From Autonomy to Independence: The Evolution of International Thinking on Kosovo, 1998–2005,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 2 (2009): 145.

⁵⁵ Albert Rohan, “Kosovo’s Path to Independence,” European Council on Foreign Relations, Feb. 2, 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kosovos_path_to_independence.

⁵⁶ Ker-Lindsay, “From Autonomy to Independence,” 141.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 143.

⁵⁸ Carole Rogel, “Kosovo: Where it all Began,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 17, no 1 (2003): 169.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 172.

⁶⁰ Richard Caplan, “International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo,” Royal Institute of International Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 745.

⁶¹ Caplan, “International Diplomacy,” 751.

⁶² See Clemence Pinaud, “South Sudan: Civil War, Predation and the Making of a Military Aristocracy,” African Affairs 113, no. 451 (2014): 192–211; and, Øystein H. Rolandsen, Helene Molteberg Glomnes, Sebabatso Manoeli, and Fanny Nicolaisen, “A Year of South Sudan’s Third Civil War,” International Area Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2015): 87–104.

⁶³ See Douglas H. Johnson, “New Sudan or South Sudan? The Multiple Meanings of Self-determination in Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” Civil Wars 15, no. 2 (2013): 141–156; and Mansour Khalid and Luka Biong Deng, “The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” in The Kenana Handbook of Sudan (Routledge, 2014), 811–822.

⁶⁴ Ricky Hanzich, “Struggles in South Sudan,” Harvard International Review 33, no. 1 (2011): 39.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 40.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 40.

⁶⁷ Laura James, “Fields of Control: Oil and (in)Security in Sudan and South Sudan,” Small Arms Survey, Nov. 2015, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP40-Oil.pdf.

⁶⁸ Oystein Rolandsen, A History of South Sudan from Slavery to Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 134.

⁶⁹ Hanzich, “Struggles in South Sudan,” 39.

⁷⁰ See Michael J. Totten, “The Trouble with Turkey: Erdogan, ISIS, and the Kurds,” World Affairs (2015): 5–12; and Patrick Martin and Christopher Kozak, “The Pitfalls of Relying on Kurdish Forces to Counter ISIS,” Institute for the Study of War 3 (2016).

⁷¹ See Benjamin MacQueen, “Democratization, Elections and the ‘de facto state dilemma:’ Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government,” Cooperation & Conflict 50, no. 4 (2015): 432; and Bahar Baser, “Homeland Calling: Kurdish Diaspora and State-Building in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in the Post-Saddam Era,” Middle East Critique: Trajectory for the Kurds 27, no. 1 (2018): 82.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Denise Natali, “The Kurdish Quasi-State: Leveraging Political Limbo,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (2015): 145.

⁷⁴ MacQueen, “Democratization, Elections,” 433.

⁷⁵ Natali, “The Kurdish Quasi-State,” 145.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 152.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 153.

⁷⁸ Biner Aziz, “Emerging Risks and Reforms: The KRG’s Challenges in Building a Post-Coronavirus Economy.” The Washington Institute, May 7, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/KRG-KRI-Economy-Corruption-Reforms-COVID19.

⁷⁹ Natali, “The Kurdish Quasi-State,”152.

⁸⁰ See Loqman Radpey, “The Legal Status of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in International Law,” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 39, no. 4 (2014): 397–435; and Loqman Radpey, “Kurdish Regional Self-rule Administration in Syria: A New Model of Statehood and its Status in International Law Compared to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 17, no. 3 (2016): 468–488.

⁸¹ See Paula Kitching, “The Sykes-Picot Agreement and Lines in the Sand,” Historian 128 (2015): 18; and Adnan Khan, 100 Years of the Middle East: The Struggle for the Post Sykes-Picot Middle East, www.maktabaislamia.com, 2016.

⁸² See Ofra Bengio, The Kurds in a Volatile Middle East (Ramat Gan, IL: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2017); and Khan, 100 Years of the Middle East.

⁸³ See Andrew S. Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know (OUP USA, 2012); and Jacqueline Wilson, The Religious Landscape in South Sudan (United States Institute of Peace, 2019).

⁸⁴ Robert Muharremi, “The ‘Washington Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia,” The American Society of International Law (ASIL) (2021).

⁸⁵ MacQueen, “Democratization, Elections,”425.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ilham Ahmed in discussion with the author, June 2020.

⁸⁸ BY NGO9 (civil society activist) in discussion with the author, July 2020.

⁸⁹ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020.

⁹⁰ Elizabeth Hagedorn, “US Sanctions Turkey-Backed Syrian Militias over Rights Abuses in Afrin,” Al-Monitor, Aug. 17, 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/08/us-sanctions-turkey-backed-syrian-militias-over-rights-abuses-afrin.

⁹¹ Ahed Al Hendi, “The Dream of Syrian Democracy was Killed by U.S.-backed Jihadis,” Foreign Policy, Nov. 6, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/06/hevrin-khalaf-murder-syrian-revolution-jihadis/.

⁹² See Tom Vanden Brook, “Blumenthal: Turkish Offensive against Kurds in Syria ‘on the Cusp of Genocide,’” USA Today, Oct. 18, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/10/18/turkeys-war-syrian-kurds-approaching-genocide-blumenthal-says/4021680002/; Al Hendi, “The Dream of Syrian Democracy was Killed by U.S.-backed Jihadis,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/06/hevrin-khalaf-murder-syrian-revolution-jihadis/; Dan Sabbagh, “Investigation into Alleged use of White Phosphorus in Syria,” The Guardian, Oct. 18, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/18/un-investigates-turkey-alleged-use-of-white-phosphorus-in-syria; Anne Speckhard, “Is Turkey Fueling a New Jihad in Northeast Syria?” International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism vom 11 (2019): 2019; and Michael Gunter, “Turkey’s Dealing with the Syrian Kurds (Part II),” in The Commentaries – Volume 1, 2021 (Transnational Press London, 2021), 39–47.

⁹³ Lara Aziz, “The Syrian Kurds in the US Foreign Policy: Long-term Strategy or Tactical Ploy,” Centre d’étude des Crises et Conflits Internationaux (2020).

⁹⁴ BY NGO9 (civil society activist) in discussion with the author, July 2020.

⁹⁵ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020.

⁹⁶ Joshua Keating, “The Foreseeable Tragedy of the Kurdish Experiment in Syria,” Slate Magazine, Oct. 14, 2019, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/10/rojava-kurdish-enclave-syria-doomed-start-turkey-trump.html.

⁹⁷ BY NGO9 (civil society activist) in discussion with the author, July 2020.

⁹⁸ MH CM7 (journalist) in discussion with the author, June 2020.

⁹⁹ TI CM4 (Syrian writer) in discussion with the author, June 2020.

¹⁰⁰ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch, “Syria.”

¹⁰³ See Annie Slemrod, “Why is un Aid so Slow to Reach Syrian Earthquake Survivors?” The New Humanitarian, Feb. 16, 2023, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2023/02/10/why-un-aid-so-slow-reach-syrian-earthquake-survivors; and AFP, Le Monde with, “Syria’s Al-Assad Agrees to Open Two Border Crossings to Facilitate Aid to Earthquake Victims,” Le Monde.fr. Le Monde, Feb. 13, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/02/13/syria-agrees-to-open-two-more-border-crossings-to-facilitate-aid-to-earthquake-victims_6015637_4.html.

¹⁰⁴ See Julia Maenza, “The Kurdish Struggle for Autonomy from the 1970s to the Present” (2019); and John Bugnacki, “A Dream Deferred: The United States’ Role in the Development of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) from 1991–2011” (2014).

¹⁰⁵ Etain Tannam, “Kosovo and Serbia,” International Intervention in Ethnic Conflict: A Comparison of the European Union and the United Nations (2014): 118–149.

¹⁰⁶ Aleksi Ylönen, “Security Regionalism and Flaws of Externally Forged Peace in Sudan: The IGAD Peace Process and its Aftermath,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 14, no. 2 (2014): 13–39.

¹⁰⁷ Mireille Court and Chris Den Hond, “Is this the End of Rojava?” The Nation, Feb. 18, 2020, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/rojava-kurds-syria/.

¹⁰⁸ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020.

¹⁰⁹ BA NGO3 (NGO Director) in discussion with the author, June 2020.

¹¹⁰ See Gina Vale, “Women in Islamic State: From Caliphate to Camps” (2019); Speckhard and Shajkovci, “Waiting for the Return” and Eva Kahan, “ISIS Poised to Exploit Mass Releases of Displaced Persons from Syrian Camp” (2020).

¹¹¹ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ OSH CL2 (academic) in discussion with the author, June 2020.

¹¹⁴ Saleh Moslem in discussion with the author, Oct. 2020.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Dan E. Stigall, “The Syrian Detention Conundrum: International and Comparative Legal Complexities,” Harvard National Security Journal 11 (2020): 54.

¹¹⁷ Dinah Shelton, “Self-determination in Regional Human Rights Law: From Kosovo to Cameroon,” The American Journal of International Law 105, no. 1 (2011): 61.

¹¹⁸ MacQueen, “Democratization, Elections,” 424.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.