Virtue Ethics and Person-Place Relationships

ABSTRACT

Indigenous knowledge and work in social science demonstrates the importance for well-being of people’s relationships with places, but western moral theorists have said little on this topic. This paper argues that there is a neo-Aristotelian virtue associated with forming a relationship with a place or places; that is, human beings can form relationships with places that affect their perceptions, emotions, desires and actions, and such dispositions, when properly developed, increase the chance that people will flourish. As well as discussing the virtue, the paper considers related vices and briefly outlines implications of this virtue for dispossession, pro-environmental action, and education.

KEYWORDS:

• Virtue ethics
• place attachment
• sense of place
• ahi kā

Introduction

Individuals’ relationships with places affect their well-being. This is old news. Indigenous peoples from diverse cultures and places have long recognized the importance of their connections to places to their identity and well-being (Bhattacharyya et al., 2012; Panelli & Tipa, 2009; Wilson, 2003). The relationship between people and the places they inhabit has a long history of playing an important role in the work of phenomenologists (Husserl, 2004; Merleau-Ponty, 2012), with recent work investigating the relationship between people, place, culture, and wellbeing (Relph, 1976, 2008; Seamon, 2018, 2021). Over the last 40 years, social science researchers have also explored the complexity and importance of people-place relationships (See, for example, Hidalgo & Hernandez, 2001; Low & Altman, 1992; Scannell & Gifford, 2017; Tuan, 2012; Twigger-Ross & Uzzell, 1996). Factors that affect well-being are as important for understanding ethics as they are for social science. In particular, the way in which people’s beliefs, emotions and actions affect their well-being is relevant to neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Neo-Aristotelian virtues are psychological dispositions that increase the likelihood people with those virtues will flourish. (When used here, flourishing refers to a high level of emotional, psychological, and social well-being.) This paper argues that people have a disposition to form relationships with places, and that this disposition, when cultivated and developed in the right way, increases the likelihood that people will flourish.

When writing about virtues and environmental ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse comments that ‘the introduction – or discovery – of a new virtue is a formidable task’ (Hursthouse, 2007, p. 160). One reason the task is formidable is that lists of virtues and vices have been contested for literally thousands of years, and the argument given here assumes that there are virtues that are not on any academic ethicist’s list. The virtues most commonly considered within Western philosophy are those from the Greek philosophical traditions or Christianity. This reflects where academic ethics developed. This project looks outside those dominant philosophical traditions. This discussion of person-place relationships, while not a work of comparative philosophy, draws on indigenous knowledge to help reveal the importance of our relationships with places to our flourishing, and uses information about Māori cultural practices to help reveal what a virtuous disposition toward a place or places would include. Because of this reliance on Māori knowledge, the word ‘ahikā’ is used to refer to the proposed virtue associated with relevant person-place relationships.

For a place to be the kind of thing with which people can have a virtuous or vicious relationship, it will need to be a location with which people can have a meaningful relationship. This means that the conception of place used here corresponds to, or overlaps with, a concept of place adopted by phenomenologists and some geographers (Casey, 2009; Fullilove, 1997; Seamon, 2021; Tuan, 2012). Seamon writes that:

Phenomenologically, place can be defined as any environmental locus that gathers human experiences, meanings, and actions spatially and temporally … . In this sense, places are spatial-temporal fields that integrate, activate, and interconnect things, people, experiences, meanings, and events. (2021, p. 29)

The kinds of places that are relevant here also correspond to Seamon’s, ‘[ranging] in scale from a furnishing or some other environment element to a room, building, neighborhood, city, landscape, or region’ (2021, p. 29). A corner of a library, a boat or a lake could also be places in the relevant sense of the word.

‘Person’ is used in the way common to virtue ethicists, that is, to refer to human beings with a certain capacity for rationality who develop that rationality and become persons through interactions with other people and the environment (Hacker-Wright, 2009; Hursthouse, 2012). The sense of personhood at the foundation of virtue ethics is compatible with accounts of personhood that emphasize the interconnectedness of individuals within a community, where one’s identity, values, and well-being are inextricably intertwined with those of others. The relationship between virtue ethics and indigenous practices is explored more later.

The most relevant relationships between people and places discussed in phenomenology and social science are place identity, place attachment and sense of place. Place identity is the simplest of these concepts to define: Lewicka (2008) describes it as ‘self-categorization in terms of place’ (p. 212); Seamon (2021) describes it as a person ‘[accepting and recognising a] place as integral to … personal and communal identity and self-worth’ (p. 37). Place attachment is often used to refer to the bond felt to a place. Low (1992) describes it as ‘an individual’s cognitive or emotional connection to a particular setting or milieu’ (p. 165). However, place attachment is sometimes treated solely as an emotional attachment. Hidalgo and Hernandez (2001), for example, call it, ‘a positive affective bond between an individual and a specific place, the main characteristic of which is the tendency of the individual to maintain closeness to such a place’ (p. 274). Sense of place is the most inclusive of these three terms. It has been used to refer to ‘the collection of meanings, beliefs, symbols, values, and feelings that individuals or groups associate with a particular locality’ (Williams & Stewart, 1998, p. 19). It has also been treated as including place identity and place attachment (Jorgensen & Stedman, 2001). However, sense of place, like place attachment, has been used to refer to many different concepts (J. Nelson et al., 2020). The proposed virtue associated with people’s relationships to places described here incorporates elements of each of these concepts but is not the same as any of them. This becomes clear below.

After briefly explaining the nature of neo-Aristotelian virtues, the paper shows that a set of dispositions that could be associated with a person’s relationship to a place or places can have the characteristics necessary for it to be a virtue. First, people can develop dispositions that affect the relationships they form with a place. Second, such dispositions can affect people’s perceptions, emotions, desires and actions. Third, a virtuous disposition to have a relationship with a place or places will have related vices. Finally, evidence suggests that possessing this virtue would improve the likelihood that a person will flourish. The paper ends with a brief outline of some implications for dispossession and pro-environmental action of there being such a virtue.

What Is a Neo-Aristotelian Virtue?

On a neo-Aristotelian account, virtues are character traits, ingrained dispositions that affect what a person believes and desires, and the way a person perceives, experiences, and acts toward the world (Hursthouse, 1999, pp. 11–12; York & Becker, 2012). Being an ingrained disposition is not sufficient for a character trait to be a virtue. Vices are ingrained dispositions too. However, unlike vices, virtues reliably contribute to a person’s flourishing (Hursthouse, 1999, pp. 167–170, 9–10; McKinnon, 1999, pp. 26, 153). Being virtuous contributes to flourishing because acting virtuously increases the chance of having positive experiences, just as playing the piano well can provide a fun way to interact with others. However, acting virtuously is also part of what it is to live a flourishing life, just as playing the piano well can be part of what it is to enjoy music. Being virtuous is not, however, a guarantee that a person will flourish, because external conditions also affect a person’s life.

For a character trait to be a virtue, children need to be born with an ability to develop that character trait (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 251, 2007, pp. 160–161). People learn virtues from watching and being taught by others. However, being virtuous involves choosing to develop and maintain a character trait because it will help you become who you want to be (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 136). In other words, being virtuous involves valuing the virtues and choosing to be virtuous as well as having a disposition to act virtuously.

To illustrate what it is for a character trait to be a virtue, consider the virtue of generosity. Someone with this virtue will have a number of characteristics. First, it will be a reliable character trait. The generous person can be relied on to act with generosity when this is appropriate. The generous person will believe that there are circumstances where people should act generously. But they will have other beliefs. For example, they will not believe that those toward whom they act generously are less worthy of respect or believe that generosity must be repaid. The generous person will also want to act generously; they will have generosity-related desires. For example, they may want to improve the lives of those who are homeless. The generous person will also experience emotions that help them identify when generosity is called for and what generosity requires. They may empathize with another person’s situation, empathize with another person’s feelings about being the beneficiary of a generous act, and feel good about being generous, or feel annoyed when pressured to give more than they can give while still flourishing. The generous person will perceive when generosity is called for and when an act of giving is not virtuous. When the generous person acts, these different aspects of their disposition to be generous will help them determine what generosity requires, and that generosity will contribute to the virtue-holder’s flourishing, for example, indirectly, by helping them develop good relationships with others, and directly, through the increase in well-being that has now been shown to flow from acts of giving (Marks & Shah, 2004).

My claim is that the features of the disposition of generosity that make it a virtue are shared by a virtuous disposition to form a relationship with a place or places.

Ahikā: A Virtuous Disposition to Form a Relationship with a Place or Places

The Māori term ‘ahi kā’ literally means keeping fire burning; it refers to the continuous occupation of a piece of land by an iwi (tribe) or hapū (kinship group). ‘Continuous occupation’ does not mean constant occupation; it means reliably being at and interacting with a place over a period of time. For Māori, as for many other indigenous communities, continuous occupation of a piece of land traditionally gave that group the right to use that land:

Te Horetā Te Taniwha commented about one area of land: ‘Our tribe was living there at that time. We did not live there as our permanent home, but were there according to our custom of living for some time on each of our blocks of land, to keep our claim to each, and that our fire might be kept alight on each block, so that it might not be taken from us by some other tribe.’ (John White, 1887, cited in Meredith, 2008)

But, as explained below, keeping fire alight in a place meant more than living there.

In using ‘ahikā’ to refer to having a virtuous relationship to a place or places I somewhat follow Acushla O’Carroll, who writes, ‘ahikā has become a term used for the people who keep the metaphorical and literal home fires burning; those who are keeping things functioning at the coalface of hapū [sub-tribe] and iwi [tribe] communities’ (O’Carroll, 2013, p. 231). It is this disposition and practice of working to ‘keep the metaphorical and literal home fires burning’ that I argue is a virtue. (The lack of a ready English name to refer to ahikā and any associated vices is not a reason to doubt their existence. Aristotle had the same problem when he searched for names to associate with virtues and vices. See, in particular, the unnamed virtues in Nicomachean Ethics Book IV (Aristotle & Irwin, 1985).)

Developing Ahikā

If there is a neo-Aristotelian virtue associated with the way people form relationships with places, then that virtue can be, and ought to be, developed in children and adults. Aristotle points out that virtues are products of nature and nurture: ‘the virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature. Rather, we are by nature able to acquire them and reach our complete perfection through habit’ (1985, 1103a24–25). People have the capacity to form the relationships necessary for a virtue such as ahikā: we know that people, including children, commonly come to feel connected to particular places (Chawla, 1992, pp. 66–69, 83; Marcus, 1992; Scannell & Gifford, 2017, p. 359). The standard approaches to teaching and learning virtues will also succeed with ahikā, for example exhibiting the kinds of desires, affect, and perceptions explained here, and making apparent to children the ways in which the virtue supports flourishing.

There are many ways in which children and adults can learn to think of themselves as connected to a place. The practice of burying a child’s placenta in a place that is special to the family, and raising the child to know that their placenta lies in that place, teaches a child that there is a link between that place and their family (Abel et al., 2001, p. 1142; Jones & Kay, 2003). In Aotearoa New Zealand, school children are taught to introduce themselves by identifying the places related to their family history or to which they feel they belong. This practice encourages children to think about their relationship to the environment that is part of their personal history as well as giving them the ability to verbally express one form of place-identity.

Developing ahikā requires more than a recognition of a connection with a place; ahikā is a particular kind of a relationship with a place. Kenneth Olwig argues:

To encourage the development of … [an attachment to a place] in the child is to provide the basis both for the understanding of the processes shaping its environment, and for the sense of personal concern which is necessary if it is to take an active interest in the future of its environment. (Owlig, 1982, cited in Chawla, 1992, p. 83)

This understanding and active interest can be developed through parenting, education and involving children in the kinds of socio-cultural practices described above. For example, research on education and the environment shows that listening to stories can help children understand nature (Tooth & Renshaw, 2009, pp. 99–101; Yılmaz et al., 2020). Place-based education has also been shown to improve children’s understanding of, attachment to, and sense of responsibility for their local environment (Sobel, 2004). Showing that people can learn to form relationships to a place or places does not show that there is a virtue such as ahikā, but it does show that it can be developed, which is a pre-requisite for there being such a virtue.

Ahikā, Perception and Action

Ahikā will affect virtuous people’s actions and their perceptions of the places to which they are connected, their perceptions of themselves (that is, their self-identity), and their perception of their responsibilities. The perceptions and actions associated with virtues are context dependent. Just as virtuous perceptions and actions associated with generosity are affected by variations in situations, relationships, and people’s roles, the perceptions and actions associated with ahikā will be context dependent. Ahikā could involve many different kinds of relationship to a place, and the nature of the relationship with a place will affect the perceptions a person with ahikā has of that place and the actions that will count as virtuous.

Ahi kā, the practice from which I have adopted the term ‘ahikā’, is associated with a continuous connection to a place with which one’s family has had a multi-generational relationship. Such a place will have been cared for by many family members and have been a source of physical and mental sustenance to their family. Those with the virtue of the ahikā will perceive the land to be an important part of their identity. Those with ahikā but without a multigenerational connection to a place may never experience the related perceptions or be called on to make related actions. This does not make them less virtuous. It merely illustrates one way in which the virtue is context dependent.

People may also form virtuous relationships with a place that their extended family or community has not been associated with. Someone with ahikā who has gone hunting in an area since childhood will have a bond with the area and be able to see aspects of the place that most others will not. For example, they may detect environmental damage to the area that others lack the knowledge to identify. Similarly, someone with the virtue of ahikā who has lived in a town for years will see valuable features of that town that others may not be able to see. They may, for example, see beauty, interesting features and interesting information in the local cemetery that enables them to give cemetery tours to help others see ways in which the place is special.

Someone with the virtue of ahikā will see themselves as having a responsibility to care for the place with which they have a bond. Some social scientists make a conceptual link between place attachment and caretaking. For example, Mindy Fullilove (1997) argues that place attachment involves a ‘caretaking bond between a person and a beloved place’ (p. 1516). Empirical research on whether place attachment results in pro-environmental behavior has mixed results (Carrus et al., 2014; Daryanto & Song, 2021). That some people who are attached to a place fail to act in ways that support the environment is unsurprising; people often fail to care for things to which they are emotionally attached. However, place attachment has been reliably correlated with pro-environmental attitudes and actions, particularly attitudes and actions toward the specific places to which people are attached (Carrus et al., 2014; Daryanto & Song, 2021). Ahikā is not the same as place attachment. However, the correlation between place attachment and caring for the environment suggests that people can be disposed to see themselves as having a caretaking role toward places to which they are attached. This aspect of ahikā is consistent with indigenous relationships to places and with place attachment.

The Māori concept of ahi kā is about valuing the land and having the right kind of relationship with the land as well as about having authority over the land; it is associated with kaitiakitanga, guardianship or stewardship of that place (Moorfield, 2011, p. 82; Simmonds et al., 2016). Tina Ngata, claims that ‘kaitiakitanga is inseparable from ahi kaa’ (Warne, 2018). Merata Kawha draws similar links: ‘Maintaining ahi ka assured … rights of a particular kin group to implement all forms of kaitiakitanga within a designated territory’(Kawharu, 2000, p. 362, italics in original). Kaitiakitanga involves valuing the land, not just accepting that one has a responsibility to care for the land (or air or water).

Like Māori, the Tsilhqot’in Nation also take their relationship with the lands where they keep fires burning to incorporate guardianship. In ‘It’s who we are: Locating cultural strength in relationship with the land’, the authors write: ‘The relationship that people have with the land in the present is an expression of their past and future in that place’ (Bhattacharyya et al., 2012, p. 216). Those interviewed describe themselves as ‘caretakers’ and discuss the importance of protecting the land (pp. 215–216) and treating the land with respect (Bhattacharyya et al., 2012, pp. 216–218). There are cultural differences in attitudes and actions, but the core ideas overlap, and it is these core ideas that are associated with the virtue of ahikā.

Although they are discussed separately below, desires and emotions associated with ahikā, are intertwined with the perceptions and actions associated with ahikā, just as desires and emotions associated with generosity are intertwined with perceptions and actions associated with generosity. Consider the psychological difficulties associated with trying to feel proud of, rejoicing in, or wanting to maintain a connection to a place that one has not taken care of, that one has, for example, polluted or allowed to become polluted. People with the virtue of ahikā will, therefore, be aware of ways in which the places with which they have bonds need to be altered or protected. They will reflect on the ways in which their actions and the actions of others could, or have, affected a place. They will, for example, be wary of acting in a way that will harm a place for the sake of short-term profit.

Environmental psychologists Proshansky et al. (1983) call this kind of perceptiveness toward a particular environment ‘environmental understanding’ and ‘environmental competence’ (p. 72). They write that people with environmental understanding and competence ‘[know] what’s “right” and “wrong” with the physical setting and what has to be done to bring about change in it’ (Proshansky et al., 1983, p. 70). Although Proshansky et al. are not discussing ahikā, this understanding of a place has the same form as the understanding that comes with this virtue.

Needless to say, someone could be able to see that a place is being altered, say through erosion, without knowing how to act, that is, how to protect the land or water affected by that erosion. However, someone with ahikā will notice the erosion and be motivated to learn whether it is harmful or a natural feature of a place and learn what actions may protect that environment.

Ahikā Affect and Desires

As mentioned above, ahikā, like other virtues, will be associated with certain emotions and desires. Empirical evidence shows that people sometimes have an affective bond to a place and that they want to have a relationship with a place (Hidalgo & Hernandez, 2001; Kamalipour et al., 2012; Qingjiu & Maliki, 2013). This aspect of person-place relationships is beautifully expressed by Richard Nelson:

As time went by, I also realized that the particular place I’d chosen was less important than the fact that I’d chosen and focused my life around it. Although [where I live] has taken on great significance for me, it’s no more inherently beautiful or meaningful than any other place on earth. What makes a place special is the way it buries itself inside the heart … . Every place, like every person, is elevated by the love and respect shown toward it, and by the way in which its bounty is received. (R. K. Nelson, 1989)

This is not evidence that there should be such bonds, only that such bonds occur. Evidence that person-place relationships can support flourishing are presented later. This section explains what it would be for there to be emotions and desires arising from the proposed virtue, ahikā.

People with the virtue of ahikā will have first- and second-order desires to maintain the physical and psychological connection they have to the place with which they have a bond, that is, they will want to maintain a connection to that place and want to want to maintain a connection to that place. If people with the virtue of ahikā are unable to maintain a physical and psychological connection to a place with which they have clear and meaningful ties, then they will want to identify a place with which they can form a meaningful connection and form and maintain a connection to that place. They may, for example, want to develop a connection to a place associated with another family member, a religious group, their past experiences, a shared community space, or a place that has environmental value.

If ahikā is indeed a virtue, then those with the virtue will want children who are part of their family or community to share this desire to be connected to a particular place, and may feel a sense of loss when children or community members do not choose to maintain this connection. This grief will arise not just because the virtuous want to maintain a connection to the next generation and want their community to flourish, but also because they believe that those without ahikā lose something important for flourishing.

As a virtue, ahikā will bring with it a certain set of affective responses. These will include the place-attachment mentioned above, but involve more than ‘a positive affective bond’ (Hidalgo & Hernandez, 2001, p. 274). As with other virtues, these affective responses will be context dependent, varying with changes in the situation and the nature of the relationship between the person and the place (Giuliani, 2016). For example, ahikā associated with land to which one’s family has been linked for generations will produce different affective responses from ahikā associated with a place with which one is building a new relationship. These affective responses may include fondness, pride, distress when a place is harmed, and feelings of responsibility or guardianship toward a place and perhaps also those in that place. It may involve a feeling that this place is, in a rich sense of the word, home: a sense that this place is one’s tūrangawaewae, the place in which one feels one belongs, a feeling of being connected to the land, supported by the land, and empowered by that connection (Brown, 2014). Just as the virtuous person’s emotions and desires will alter their perception of the land and what they feel called to do in response to events on the land, the virtuous person’s perception of the land and their related actions will alter their affective responses to the land.

Virtues are sometimes described as involving the proper regulation of particular affective states. For example, courage involves the proper regulation of and response to fear (Aristotle & Irwin, 1985, 1115a6–10) and temperance involves the proper regulation of and response to pleasure (Aristotle & Irwin, 1985, 1117b21–26). It might be claimed that this shows that ahikā is not a virtue, as ahikā does not involve the proper regulation of and response to a single emotion. However, not all Aristotelian virtues have this association with the regulation of easily identified, distinct emotions. Although there are emotions associated with, for example, generosity, justice and proper ambition, associating these virtues with distinct emotional states would fail to capture what they involve emotionally and cognitively. Similarly, ahikā can be a virtue without being associated with the proper regulation of a particular affective state.

Vices Associated with Ahikā

Investigating what it means to not possess a virtue helps reveal what it is to have a virtue. Aristotle claims that virtues often lie between two vices, a vice of excess and a vice of deficiency (Aristotle & Irwin, 1985, 1106a26–b28). For example, generosity lies between a vice of deficiency, a disposition to give too little, and a vice of excess, a disposition to give too much. ‘Excess’, ‘deficiency’, ‘too much’ and ‘too little’ are misleading because they suggest that the difference between virtues and vices is solely quantitative. The factors that make a virtue a virtue mean that the difference between virtues and vices is qualitative. Someone who gives the right amount, but intends to cause the recipient to feel shame does not have the virtue of generosity. Like most Aristotelian virtues, ahikā also lies between a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess. The vice of deficiency for ahikā involves a failure to form or maintain the right kind of relationship with a place. This might be thought of as a form of rootlessness, ‘placelessness’ or an indifference toward having a relationship with a place (Lewicka, 2011, p. 677). The vice of excess could take at least two forms. A vice of excess could involve forming relationships with places that is too strong or rigid to be conducive to flourishing. Alternatively, a vice of excess could involve forming a relationship with the wrong place, just as the vice of excess for generosity could involve giving too generously or giving to the wrong person. For example, a person’s relationship with a place is not virtuous if they use their political power to obtain access to a place, intending to undermine the relationship to that place of others with a valuable prior relationship.

Those who lack ahikā because they fail to form relationships with places or form relationships that are too weak to promote flourishing are less likely to flourish than those who possess the virtue. To briefly consider the plausibility of this claim, consider one commonly used list of factors that are correlated with positive well-being: ‘self-acceptance, positive relations with others, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life, and personal growth’ (Ryff, 1989, p. 1069). If, as claimed above, ahikā includes seeing oneself as a steward of a place, ahikā will support environmental mastery, purpose in life, and personal growth. I have also argued, above and below, that ahikā helps develop positive relations with others. Although it is seldom mentioned in this paper, ahikā will also contribute to a person’s self-identity, which will in turn affect self-acceptance. The claim is not that ahikā is the only way of supporting flourishing. However, the placeless person lacks a virtue that is an important contributor to these things.

One way in which the vice of deficiency associated with ahikā can harm flourishing is by damaging relationships with people. A post on Facebook for Ruataniwha Marae illustrates both one person’s belief about the importance of ahikā and one way in which a deficiency of this virtue can harm relationships:

Something to think about… there are 3 types of Ahi…

Ahikaaroa – those living at home keeping the home fires burning at the marae [local community meeting ground]

Ahi tere – those who live away from home but go home to help at the marae when possible

Ahi Mātao – those who have left home and don’t return to put a wood on the fire every now and then so their flame has gone cold.

Which one are you? It’s interesting to see whānau [family] when we have tangi [funeral] at the marae and our marae doesn’t have many working at the back, sometimes it’s been lucky to be 10 people… yet the day of the tangi. wow…. heaps have come home to be manuhiri and expect to be treated like manuhiri! LoL

(Ruataniwha Marae Wairoa Hawke’s Bay, 2015)

‘Manuhiri’ are guests, people given access to a place and provided with food and shelter. Guests are not expected to take care of a place or help provide others with food and shelter. In this example, the failure of people who have a family connection to a place to exhibit ahikā toward that place leads to resentment from those who accept that their relationship to a place comes with associated responsibilities. Arguably, this post also supports the claim that some people act as though there is a virtue of ahikā. If there was no belief that people should develop such a virtue, a failure to exhibit the virtue would be less likely to harm relationships.

A vice of excess associated with ahikā could take many forms. It could involve forming too strong an attachment with a place (Fried, 2000). This could lead people to be obsessed with carrying out acts that tie them to a place, trying to force others to maintain a connection to a place which they do not (and perhaps ought not) feel, or unreflectively excluding others from land to which they have ties. A vice of excess may also lead people to form relationships with too many places, which will lessen their ability to properly maintain their relationships with any place. Such people will lack the depth of understanding of a place that enables them to understand how to care for it well, and will lack time to properly invest in the place and their relationship with the place. A vice of excess may also be associated with striving to form a relationship to the wrong place, which will harm people’s ability to flourish.

Like the vice of deficiency, the vice of excess can also damage relationships with people. Analogies with the harm that can be caused by possessiveness within a relationship are useful here. If Ari is excessively possessive in a relationship with Maria, Ari may try to restrict Maria in ways that will harm their relationship. Similarly, attempting to control a place with which you have a relationship by excluding others with ties to that same place, is likely to harm relationships.

Behavior resembling ahikā has led to tragedies. If these tragedies inevitably arise from possessing the disposition of ahikā, the claim that ahikā is a virtue should be rejected. Territoriality, for example, is a form of place attachment that has led to conflicts at the individual and group level. It has been defined as ‘the relationship between an individual or group and a particular physical setting, that is characterized by a feeling of possessiveness, and by attempts to control the appearance and use of the space’ (Brower, 1980, p. 180). Territorial conflicts in Northern Ireland, Israel and Ukraine have led to death, disability, and life events that are incompatible with flourishing. Based on the description thus far, ahikā also seems likely to involve control of the use of a place and feelings resembling possessiveness. However, these can be explained without giving up the notion that ahikā is a virtue.

Ahikā incorporates an emotional attachment to a place that it seems reasonable to think of as place attachment, but what geographers and psychologists call ‘place attachment’ is not the only form of attachment to a place. Storz et al. (2020) studied place attachment and what they termed ‘collective psychological ownership’, that is, ‘people’s perception that an object, place, or idea belongs to their own group’ (p. 404). Their research participants came from areas known for territorial conflict: Serbs in Serbia and Kosovo, Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, and Jews in Israel (Storz et al., 2020, p. 408). Their results show that place attachment is distinct from collective psychological ownership, and that collective psychological ownership, but not place attachment, is related to territorial conflict (Storz et al., 2020, pp. 412, 418–419). Place attachment was associated with belonging to a place, while collective psychological ownership was associated with a ‘perception that a place belongs to a group’ (Storz et al., 2020, p. 406). While this does not show that place attachment is a component of virtuous person-place relationships, it does indicate that territorial conflict is compatible with there being such a virtue.

Research on place attachment and territoriality in Israelis and Palestinians illustrates another difference between ahikā and territoriality. Wnuk and Oleksy (2021, pp. 2–3) distinguished between ‘traditional place attachment’, which is unreflective and developed through spending an extended time in a place and ‘active place attachment’, developed through consciously forming a relationship with a place (See also, Lewicka, 2011). They found that for Israelis, only traditional place attachment was likely to lead to territorial conflict (Wnuk & Oleksy, 2021, pp. 7–8). This research into different kinds of place attachment provides another way in which the existence of territorial conflict could be consistent with the existence of the proposed virtue, ahikā. Neo-Aristotelian virtues, such as ahikā, are reflective. The virtuous person develops a disposition that will lead them to habitually act in a virtuous way, but they choose to accept, develop and act on that disposition (Hursthouse, 1999, pp. 123–136).

Ahikā and Flourishing

To be a neo-Aristotelian virtue, ahikā must reliably and nonaccidentally contribute to flourishing; it must develop and maintain a kind of person-place relationship that directly and indirectly helps people flourish. Virtues contribute to flourishing indirectly when exercising those virtues reliably helps people access something that helps them to flourish. For example, ahikā indirectly contributes to flourishing by supporting access to life-sustaining goods and the formation and maintenance of relationships. Virtues contribute to flourishing directly when someone flourishes by acting virtuously. For example, generosity has as its associated disposition a particular form of giving, and such giving has been shown to benefit well-being (Smith & Davidson, 2014). Note that being virtuous never guarantees that a person will flourish. Someone with the virtue of generosity may be harmed by their generosity due to factors outside of their control. Similarly, it might be worried that ahikā leads to territorial conflict. As above, many apparent examples can be explained away via two distinctions – reflective place attachment versus (i) psychological ownership and (ii) merely traditional place attachment. Still, the possibility of conflict remains in the face of external evil. This is not a problem, but characteristic of virtue.

The importance for flourishing of access to such things as food and shelter is clear. Historically, people who consistently lived on and cared for a piece of land maintained their, and their families, access to food, water and shelter. Among Māori, those who took on the roles that sustained ahi kā maintained their family’s relationship with a place, enabling them to enjoy and use that land’s resources (Sinclair, 1977). Relatedly, the forcible removal of Cheslatta T’En people from their ancestral lands ended their access to resources and hunting grounds, and left many dependent on state support (Windsor & McVey, 2005, pp. 156–157). The access to resources that results from the relationship and stewardship that is consistent with ahikā still contributes to flourishing across the world.

As with access to resources, virtuous place attachment has historically, and still does, contribute to social well-being and the development and formation of personal and community relationships (Rollero & De Piccoli, 2010). The formation of relationships is affected by people’s proximity and their pursuit of joint projects. Ahikā involves a consistent relationship with a place, which supports forming consistent relationships with others associated with that place or those nearby. Ahikā can also facilitate community building by contributing to the establishment of groups with a shared sense of belonging to a place or neighboring places. It can help people develop an understanding of themselves as part of a group, whether large or small, working together for a goal that has joint meaning (Jaśkiewicz & Besta, 2018). When your actions and the actions of those with whom you feel a bond have contributed to the maintenance and development of a place, this can contribute to a sense of identity, belonging and community, all of which contribute to flourishing.

There have been many investigations into direct links between place attachment and well-being, and ahikā incorporates an emotional attachment to a place that forms a kind of place attachment. Many articles claim that place attachment is correlated with well-being (See, for example, DeMiglio & Williams, 2016; Proshansky et al., 1983). Scannell and Gifford (2017) argue that positive place attachment can improve a person’s feeling of ‘belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaning’, each of which has been shown to foster well-being (p. 362). The earlier section on developing ahikā describes the practice of teaching children to understand their relationship to the places in which they or their ancestors have lived. Māori who learn to consciously associate themselves with places that matter to them, or mattered to their ancestors, are significantly less likely to feel isolated than those who do not, and feeling isolated is known to harm well-being (Russell, 2018). Relatedly, research on people’s relationships with places shows that developing place attachments is correlated with improved well-being and disruptions to such relationships are correlated with a decline in well-being (Brown & Perkins, 1992; Harris et al., 1995, pp. 316–317). Disruptions to place attachment have been linked to physical health problems, psychological distress, disruptions to personal identity and personal relationships, and poor school and work performance (Fullilove, 1997; Twigger-Ross & Uzzell, 1996; Windsor & McVey, 2005). The quantity and diversity of research into place attachment and well-being suggests that there are important direct links between flourishing and relationships with places, which in turn supports the possibility of a neo-Aristotelian virtue, ahikā.

Does it Matter Whether There Is a Person-Place Relationship Virtue?

If the proposed virtue, ahikā, exists, this has consequences for individuals, communities and states. Most obviously, it follows that we should care about forming relationships with at least some places and care about the kinds of relationships we form with places. We should also care about other people’s relationships to places. Human beings are social animals; the flourishing of individuals is affected by other people’s ability to flourish. Knowing about ahikā affects where we should look when someone is not flourishing and how we should respond when someone’s relationship with a place is disrupted. For this reason, ahikā has implications for policy at all levels, from local communities to the state. The examples of implications given below are unsurprising, but they support existing arguments about person-place relationships. First, ahikā adds increases our understanding of the harms associated with dispossessing indigenous peoples of ancestral lands and of attempts to respond to these harms. Second, ahikā may have implications for improving pro-environmental action. Finally, if ahikā is a virtue, this offers additional support for educational activities that develop person-place relationships in children. The explanations of the relevance of ahikā to each of these issues are necessarily brief.

The ill effects of dispossessing indigenous peoples of land, water or air with which they have a bond is now well known. When a person-place relationship is broken, people lose more than just access to resources, they may also lose a source of their personal identity, a form of connection to their extended family and ancestors, and an important part of their culture, all of which support well-being. When the Mayagna community sued the Nicaraguan government to retain land rights, the Judges overseeing the case commented on the relationship between flourishing and retaining connections to ancestral land. One judge mentioned the ‘unique bond’ indigenous communities have with ‘ancestral lands’, mentioning not only its role in survival, but also its importance for ‘moral fulfillment’ Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (2001), Concurring Opinion of Judge Hernán Salgado Pesantes, para 3). Other Judges stated that if the community were dispossessed of their historic land, they ‘would be deprived of practicing, conserving and revitalizing their cultural habits, which give a meaning to their own existence, both individual and communitarian’ Sumo (2001), Joint Separate Opinion of Judges A. A. Cançado Trindade, M. Pacheco Gómez, and A. Abreu Burelli, para 8). Examples such as this support the claim that relationships with a place contribute to flourishing, but also help illustrate the harm caused by dispossessing indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands.

Those who have been dispossessed but possess the virtue ahikā will be able to form new relationships to new places, just as someone who is generous can start giving to a new person when someone they had a relationship with has died. However, even if those with ahikā form relationships to new places, their well-being will be harmed by dispossession. First, and least important, forming new relationships takes time. The period in which indigenous peoples establish relationships and develop their understanding of a place, provides reduced opportunities to flourish. More importantly, when indigenous peoples lose their relationships with ancestral lands, they lose relationships that cannot be replaced with anything else. Replacing ancestral lands with an area of land the same size with identical flora and fauna – or even slightly better flora and fauna – is better than nothing, but will not restore the original relationship, nor can any sum of money. This does not show that forming a relationship with ancestral land is not virtuous. It is an example of one way in which external forces can affect the likelihood that virtuous people will flourish. Understanding the virtue ahikā can help deepen the existing understanding of the wrongness of dispossession.

Ahikā can also contribute to increasing levels of pro-environmental action. Changing the way that people treat the environment requires more than accepting that change should happen or pointing to ethical theories that say that people ought to live sustainably (Hursthouse, 2007; Jordan & Kristjánsson, 2017; York & Becker, 2012). Being told that you ought to act in some way will not, on its own, develop the kind of motivation or habits required for you to act in that way. A virtue-based approach to environmental action promotes the development of psychological dispositions that lead people to act in ways that care for the environment and increase the likelihood that people will flourish.

Unsurprisingly, research indicates that a person’s relationship with a place affects their willingness to work to protect the environment. People with a sense of place relationship have been shown to experience distress when that place is harmed (Albrecht et al., 2007; Ellis & Albrecht, 2017). Similarly, research on people living in Svalbard found that the strength of a person’s relationship with a place ‘could be a … predictor of how people will react to environmental impacts. Those with a strong sense of place seem, not surprisingly, more rooted, less indifferent and more committed to solving problems’ (Kaltenborn, 1998, p. 185). Those in the study who had weak relationships to the area in which they lived were less likely to react to environmental problems or try to solve those problems (Kaltenborn, 1998, p. 184). People with ahikā are likely to have pro-environmental attitudes and act on those attitudes.

Karen Jordan and Kristján Kristjánsson (2017) criticize virtue ethics approaches to environmental ethics other than their own for:

[considering the] human-nature relationship and worldview, [in a way] which fails to encompass interconnectedness and the interrelatedness of environmental and social issues; or … not [extending] the implications of such a conception to include a more holistic view of human flourishing as necessarily situated within nature. (p. 1207)

Although the approach taken here differs from that of Jordan and Kristjánsson, the virtue of ahikā involves the formation of person-place relationships that recognize the connections between individual, social and environmental flourishing. A recognition, and deeper investigation, of ahikā will improve our understanding of ways in which we can relate well to the environment.

If ahikā is a virtue, then educational systems that help develop the virtue will benefit learners, the environment and their communities. There are already many examples of children and young adults being taught to think about their relationships with places around them (Ritchie, 2013; Sobel, 2004; Tooth & Renshaw, 2009; Yılmaz et al., 2020; York & Becker, 2012). Classroom-based story-telling has been shown these to improve children’s understanding of the environment and increase their empathy toward the environment (Yılmaz et al., 2020). Relatedly, when schools incorporate the Māori practice of teaching children to introduce themselves by stating the places with which they or their ancestors have a relationship, this may help students develop an understanding of themselves and their family as connected to the environment. However, teaching children and youth about the existing and potential relationships they have with places and the importance of those relationships must involve more than theory if it is to support the development of a virtue, just as a discussion of theories of generosity will not be sufficient for a person to become virtuously generous. Virtues are teachable psychological dispositions, but those dispositions affect the way people perceive the environment. Contact with the environment will be part of developing such perception (See also: Sobel, 2004; York & Becker, 2012). In other words, the virtue of ahikā can be used to support existing arguments in support of incorporating place-based education across educational levels and in a diverse range of subjects, not just subjects such as biology and geography.

Conclusion

Indigenous peoples have been aware of the importance of person-place relationships for well-being for generations, while geographers and environmental psychologists have been working in this area for decades. This article draws on work by these groups to deepen the understanding of the importance of person-place relationships for ethics, arguing that there is a neo-Aristotelian virtue, ahikā, associated with people’s relationships with places. Like other neo-Aristotelian virtues, ahikā affects the way people experience and respond to their social and physical environment. Those with the virtue will act as stewards of the places with which they have relationships, but possessing the virtue will also increase the likelihood that the virtuous person will flourish.

Knowledge of ahikā helps illuminate the importance of work on person-place relationships and well-being, particularly research within geography and environmental psychology. It adds an additional reason, beyond the already important issue of cultural preservation, to look to the knowledge of indigenous peoples when considering how we all should live. It may also help underpin investigations of ways in which person-place relationships can go wrong, potentially damaging people and the environment. Finally, understanding ahikā can help more people develop the virtue, and hence, improve the likelihood that they will flourish.

Acknowledgments

I sincerely thank Aaron Hāpuku, Doug Campbell, Emma Marshall, Michael-John Turp, and anonymous referees of this journal for reading and commenting on the manuscript, and Diane Proudfoot for support throughout the writing process. I also acknowledge and respect Māori as tangata whenua of Aotearoa New Zealand.

Tēnā tātou katoa. Kei te mihi, kei te whakawhetai au ki a koutou mō ō koutou āwhina. Nāu te rourou, nāku te rourou, ka ora ai te iwi. Kia uru kahikatia ki tū. Mauri ora!

Greetings, all. I acknowledge and thank you all for your assistance. With your contribution and mine, the people will prosper. Success through unity of purpose. Be Well!

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).