Ghana’s Readiness to Combat Terrorism: Strategies of Security Institutions

ABSTRACT

Despite Ghana’s non-experience of terrorism amid the internal and external threats, scholars are yet to push this subject into the realm of discourse. Canvasing exclusive knowledge from institutional practices, we investigated the counter-terrorism strategies employed by Ghana’s security institutions to safeguard the country. Applying thematic textual analysis via interviews from twelve security personnel availed to us, we unmasked that although the diverse institutions deployed identical strategies for the same purpose, divergencies appeared in their modus operandi and the rationale for deploying such strategies. We uncovered some institutions engaged communities for de-radicalization whereas others employed the same method for the purposes of disarmament. To garner covert intelligence, personnel disguised in civilian appearances take up temporal accommodation in the communities, surreptitiously move around in plain clothes or acted on information from civilians. At border control points, security softwares are deployed for efficient identification of suspected terrorists and for ferreting out concealed goods. To combat new and varying forms of terrorism, inter- and cross-institutional training programs are held intermittently at the domestic and international level to renew knowledge of personnel and machinated at unearthing new trends in terrorism. Institutions have also partnered media houses in an attempt to educate the public, or the media are mildly cautioned on terrorism reportage.

KEYWORDS:

• Terrorism
• counter-terrorism
• Ghana
• Africa
• security

Introduction

Following the 9/11 attack, stringent security measures aimed at combating terrorist threats have been enforced by most countries around the world especially nations that have suffered terrorist attacks (Khera, 2017; Lyon, 2015). Although national governments, experts, and scholars recognize the devastating impact of global terrorist attacks and the need for tighter security policies to combat it, devising precise strategy to counter terrorism is challenging due to the diverse context and situation-dependent nature of terrorism (Spencer, 2006; Von Hippel, 2005). Existing studies however reveal strategies that are general from the UN perspective, although they may or may not be applicable in certain situations (Jones, 2018). These strategies include but not limited to targeted assassination, collaborative security training, enhanced border control management, intelligence gathering and sharing. These are built solidly on the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, unanimously adopted in September 2006 by the UN General Assembly in the form of a resolution and an annexed Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288) (Van Ginkel, 2012; Williams, Okon, & Onibasa, 2018). The literature reveals that due to the recent global events coupled with historical antecedence, these strategies may be applicable in most jurisdictions since most terrorists devise similar strategies. However, their efficacy cannot be generalized.

These generalized counter-terrorism strategies are extracted from strategies deployed by countries that have suffered terrorist attacks to the neglect of those that have no experience of terrorism. Meanwhile systematic studies reveal that terrorists stop at nothing to spread their tentacles and thus, are no respecter of boundaries. In West Africa, the operations of terrorist groups [like Ansar ed-Din (Movement of the Defenders of the Faith), Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA) and Al-Mourabitoun] which were formerly confined to countries bordering the Sahel have now encroached deeper into West Africa (Francis, 2013; Yagerman, 2016). This has resulted in terrorist casualties in countries like Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, two of Ghana’s neighbors who had no prior historical exposure to terrorist attacks (Gunaratna, 2016; Ridde, Lechat, & Meda, 2016).

What is alarming is, although Ghana shares borders with these countries, it remains among the few countries in the sub-region that have not experienced terrorist attacks. However, its geographical location, i.e., nearness to terrorism prone countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Nigeria predisposes it to terrorist attacks. Again, Ghana’s cordial relations with the US leading to the governments’ acceptance of two former Guantanamo Bay detainees and the 2018 signing of a military agreement with the U.S for the establishment of a quasi military base in Ghana’s capital Accra for counter terrorism deployment in the sub region has brought Ghana ever closer to the attention of terrorist groups both in the sub region and beyond (Anim, 2016; Dionne Searcey & Schmitt, 2018). Beyond these, the 2015 exposé on the recruitment of five Ghanaian youth by ISIS has since put the country in a precarious state and raised the security threat of the country (Zagoon-Sayeed, 2018). Furthermore, Ghana is engulfed in poor economic conditions, religious radicalism, porous national boarders, proliferation of small and light weapons (SALW), illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, intra-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts, land rights, and other resource-driven clashes which are the common precipitants of terrorism in West Africa. Despite these, the country is yet to record any veritable terrorist attacks (Christensen & Edu-Afful, 2019; Mohammed, 2018). Based on the context-dependence nature of counter-terrorism strategies defying the generalization of counter-terrorism strategies, we explore why Ghana has not experienced terrorist attacks by examining the question: what measures are employed by Ghana’s security institutions to prevent terrorist attacks in the country? Gauging from this objective, three security institutions were relevant to this study based on their role, and possession of information as regards to countering terrorism. Theoretically undergirded by the concept of National Security, we solicited information from personnel of the Ghana Police Service (GPS), the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), and the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) whose responses served as the primary data for this study.

Existing literature

Prefatory literature germane for this study are grouped into two sections with the first category exploring Ghana’s domestic and internal counter-terrorism framework for a contextual understanding of readers. The adjoining category surveys the literature on general counter-terrorism strategies, which shall feed into the analytical section, giving it a comparative and contrasting effect. We take-off by explaining our intended meaning and boundaries of counter-terrorism strategies in this study to enable a comprehension of the study in context. The UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy notably explains counter-terrorism strategy as measures or security tasks performed by the security component of a national or international authority aimed at combating and preventing terrorism (Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017). That is, these measures are used to dissuade individuals and groups with violent motives from engaging in terrorism or create an environment that is unfriendly or extremely antagonistic to terrorists and their operations but at the same time stable enough for innocent civilians.

Due to the intensified violent activities of notable terrorist groups [such as Boko Haram, Sahara Branch of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) among others in the sub-region], Ghana has increased its efforts toward combating terrorism in the country and in the region. Accordingly, Ghana has hosted a number of anti-terrorism meetings in Accra including the Accra Initiative, Chiefs of Intelligence and Security meetings, Ministerial meetings, and Head of States meetings (Sampson Kwarkye, Abatan, & Matongbada, 2019; Theroux-Benoni, 2019). This buttresses the point that an effective and sustainable national responses to the phenomenon of terrorism requires inter alia, a comprehensive multidimensional approach with links between the different domains of violence and building on principles of multi-agency collaboration among security agencies in the country, the sub-region, continent, and global partners (Gunaratna, 2018; Nan, 2015). Based on Ghana’s comprehensive policy framework for preventing and combating future terrorist activities, the National Counterterrorism Framework was developed around four mutually reinforcing main pillars, each with specific short-, medium- to long-term objectives. The pillars are: Prevent (measures to prevent terrorist attacks by addressing the root causes, minimizing vulnerability, and building resilience); Preempt (activities to detect and deter a terrorist threat); Protect (measures to protect vulnerable infrastructures and spaces); Respond (activities to mitigate impact and recover from terrorist incidents) (Christensen & Edu-Afful, 2019).

The framework was spearheaded by the Ministry of National Security (MNS) charged with the mandate of harmonizing and ensuring cooperation and collaboration among security forces operating within the country, i.e., Ghana Armed Forces (GAF); Ghana Police Service (GPS); Ghana Prisons Service; Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); Ghana National Fire Service (GNFS); Research Department (RD); and the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI). The framework mainly seeks to promote inter-agency counterterrorism efforts, to establish the responsibilities of the different stakeholders, and to define their specific functions, including the possibility for law enforcement agencies to detain and prosecute individuals suspected of terrorism (Adarkwah, 2020). The country further has at it disposal, domestic anti-terrorism legal frameworks and instruments including but not limited to the following; Anti-Terrorism Act 2008 (Act 762), the 1992 Constitution, Economics and Organized Crime Act 2010 Act 804, Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2012, the Directive Principles of State Policy and the Anti-money Laundering Act 2008, Act 749, the National Disaster Management Organization Act, 1996, (Act 517), and the Emergency Powers Act, 1994, (742) (Anim, 2016). Despite these pieces of legislations, it appears Ghana is still lacking important additional legislation that would firm up the legal framework and improve the national preparedness against critical national risks posed by the transshipment of narcotics drugs and money laundering (Norman, Aikins, & Binka et al., 2014).

At the sub-regional and continental level, Ghana has also acceded to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials and ratified the Algiers Declaration of 1999. It is a convention adopted by the African Union (AU) in combating terrorism (Darkwa, 2011; Ehiane, 2018). On the global stage, Ghana is also a member of the UN and has over the years ratified and signed several International treaties, which directly or indirectly contribute toward peace and security in combating terrorist activities. Examples include: the ratification of the following United Nations (UN) treaties; The Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism and Terrorist Financing in 2002; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism the Convection of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Klein, 2009; Wu, 2018). At the Security Council level, Ghana has adopted the UNSCRs 1267 of 1999, 1373 of 2001, and 1718 of 2006. These UNSC resolutions are all aimed at the freezing or seizure of terrorist assets and related matters (Bamba, 2014).

We now focus on the counterterrorism strategies within the confines of our definition in country-context. Firstly, the concept of radicalization used within the enclave of religion is regarded as a post-9/11 experience used synonymously with terrorism (Neumann, 2003; Schmid, 2013). As noted by Horgan and Altier (2012); Pettinger (2017), the notion of de-radicalization/counter-radicalization as a counter-terrorism strategy has to do with changing a person’s mentality or belief systems to reject extremist ideology and embrace mainstream values and deals. The difference between the two resides in de-radicalization being a post-crime process while pre-crime individuals holding radical views are called “counter-radicalization” (Horgan & Altier, 2012; Martins & Ziegler, 2018). According to Bin Hassan and Pereire (2006), there is now a greater consensus among scholars that success in the fight against terrorism cannot be achieved by military means alone, as this tends to fuel resentment, hatred, and serve to escalate the threat globally. Instead, he asserts that an innovative multi-pronged mix of methods must be applied to address the problem. Nesser (2010) identifies some generic motivations for radicalization. He contends that even though some are attracted because of the ideology and the thrills of activism, others are by personal grievances, problems, and frustrations. Yet others are attracted to terrorism by relatives and friends who recruit them for a terrorist organization. On a varying continuum, Venhaus (2010) also differentiates the radicalization stimulus among those who join jihadist networks into (i) frustrated revenge seekers, (ii) status seekers in search of recognition, (iii) identity seekers with a need to belong to a group, and (iv) thrill seekers looking for adventure.

The findings of Nesser (2010) and Venhaus (2010) reveal that terrorism occurs when opportunity, motivation, and capability meet. The prevention of terrorism therefore requires the elimination of at least one of these three factors – motivation – which is often driven by an ideology. To effectively engage in de-radicalization/counter-radicalization, Bin Hassan and Pereire (2006) draws lessons from Singapore’s experience and argues that de-radicalization has to take into cognizance the need to counter ideology because it is subject to different cultural and contextual realities. The substratum of de-radicalization/counter-radicalization strategy aims at addressing the various political, economic, sociali and any other factors which engender the spread of radicalized doctrines through which terrorist organizations can brainwash, recruit, and win support for their activities (Hendrickson, 2014). The strategy endeavours to prevent and diminish these factors by engaging with a range of actors including individuals, communities, schools, international partners and research groups etc to better understand the complexity of the phenomenon and identify victims of radicalization (Rosand, Millar, & Ipe, 2008). Key activities of the strategy also entails a focus to better understanding and address the drivers of radicalization, prioritize the prevention of violent extremism by concentrating on root causes and targeting the youth because according to the UN Counter-Terrorism Center, about 46% of the world’s population is under the age of 25 and most of these young people are disproportionately affected by inequality, marginalization, and not least by unemployment ((UNCTC), 2016).

Although deemed controversial and highly contested in some academic and political circles, countries such as Norway and Mauritania have utilized some of these deradicalization techniques with varying degrees of success. In Norway, the success stories of deradicalization programs in which the government, parents, unit of the police department devoted to violence and crime prevention and security experts pooled their resources to establish formal de-radicalization programs like “parental network groups” and encouraged the formation of peer groups to decrease prejudices and stereotypes and improved tolerance between young people involved in neo-Nazis, neo-fascists, and other white power movements groups to disconnect from these groups (Hardy, 2019). These networks proved to be so effective in convincing these young people to leave these groups that within months, almost all the children of these parents had disengaged (ibid). In Mauritania, the US through the Mauritanian government paid monthly salaries of (US $140) to approximately to 200 imams considered as moderate who fulfilled stringent selection criteria to support them tackle radicalizations. This was done by engaging members in their communities (Profile, 2017; Wehrey, 2019). The overarching aim of these initiatives is to provide an integrated, national-level multiagency approach to the challenge of radicalization, where “politicians connect with communities; frontline workers go to mosques; police interact with minority groups so that all the networks are in place (Butt & Tuck, 2014).

Secondly, the works of Tholen (2010) and Eren (2013) advance that an efficient Border Control Management (BCM) remains among the key counter-terrorism strategies in this twenty-first century. This is on the grounds of its importance as the first frontier of defence against the movement of terrorists across borders and the illegal cross-border movement of goods and cargo. Since 2001, the mobility of international terrorists has been one of the main concerns of the international community. This has driven many of the developments in border and entry controls in recent years, with a particular focus on border security as well as complementary initiatives, ranging from improvements in travel documents to increased collection of information on travelers (Gherbaoui, 2020; Salter, 2011). The findings of Kahn (2017) and Krouse (2013) maintain that the members of terrorist organizations in transiting any official access points of a country, adopt precautionary measures to conceal their identities, and it behooves on a country’s security apparatus to detect and apprehend them. This comes on the backdrop of all the hijackers involved in the 9/11 attack who entered the United States did so through legal channels (Eren, 2013; McCaul, 2016). In Guo (2015) and Miller (2014), this led to the establishment of U.S Department of Homeland Security tasked with the responsibility of securing U.S borders through coordination of all other agencies charged with the core mandate of stopping all unauthorized immigration and the prevention of all forms of terrorism.The strengthening of institutional capacities of national border control agencies like the immigration and customs agencies to effectively monitor terrorist “watchlists” and the movement of goods go a long way to combat terrorism.

The scholarships of Rostow (2001); Rosand (2004); Millard (2004) note that following the 9/11 attack, the UN Security Council in calling for greater cooperation and information-sharing among states, unanimously adopted Resolution 1373. Among the cardinal tenets of the resolution is the imposition on countries the duties to deny safe haven to terrorists and to install effective border controls, exchange information regarding terrorist actions and cooperate to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. According to these scholars, the resolution fundamentally urged nations to prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents. On the subject of the installation of effective border controls, Kershner (2005) posits that the mounting of border fence using ditches, barbed wires, high-tech sensors, multi-component barrier system are important tools against the threat terrorism brings. This method she asserts, has been used effectively by the State of Israel since 1994 around Gaza Strip along the Green Line to restrict terrorists inside Gaza and beyond from conducting suicide attacks inside of Israel. She notes that it has successfully performed their intended function of eliminating suicide terrorists and reduced the total human fatalities previously suffered by Israel through rockets and mortars launched by Hezbollah, Hamas, Fatah and other terrorist groups (ibid). Also in the EU, the maintenance of its joint national border control strategies against the threat of terrorism are managed under Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency)(Frontex, 2018; Giannetto, 2012). Frontex relies largely on technical equipment including planes, dogs, “thermal vision vans,” heartbeat detectors, boats, etc., supplied by members and also, on the technical expertise of its border guard officers recruited from member states to ensure document checking, registration, screening, intelligence gathering and registration at the various borders to detect all potential persons of interest or terrorist suspects travelling through EU borders (Frontex, 2018).

Although effective BCM as a counter-terrorism strategy depends largely on factors including the nature of the borders (land/sea/air), the availability of well resourced personnel. The envisaged difficulties that comes with it are lessened by the support of technology such as Inspection System Tools and Interoperable Applications to help in the identification and risk assessment of travellers to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks (Organisation(ICAO), 2018). This type of strategy has the potential to enhance security by providing border officials with more time and information needed to make appropriate decisions. At the same time, it promises facilitated travel for the majority of low-risk passengers (Navarrete, Mellouli, & Pardo et al., 2009). The importance of technology in BCM is supported by a survey and analysis conducted by the UN Security Council (S/2015/683) which reveals the numerous technological measures undertaken by countries with experiences of terrorism to strengthen border security and prevent terrorists travel and their related activities ((UNSC), 2015). The proliferated use of INTERPOL database to screen for potential terrorists was discovered as many countries have networked their immigration-screening processes at their entry points to INTERPOL’s database on stolen and lost travel documents (ibid) .

Another counter-terrorism strategy that has come into vogue in post 9/11 epoch is the deliberate attempt by governments to diffuse media attention received by terrorist groups. Laqueur (2000) asserts that the mass media has become the best friend of terrorists, making public their violent actions, and a type of advertising without which they would not exist anymore. Based on studies and polls performed in Germany, Israel, Canada, North Ireland, USA, and the UK, Cohen-Almagor (2005) noted that “Today’s terrorists are well aware of the power of the media and manipulate them to their advantage and needs.” This finding is concurred by other scholars who believe this has led to the development of a symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorist organisations over time, with many rightly or wrongly labelling contemporary terrorism as mass media-oriented terrorism (Anita, 2007; Libicki, Chalk, & Sisson et al., 2007). Whiles the media uses terrorist attacks to draw viewers and readers, terrorists and their organizations depend on the media to publicize their cause and spread fear and have over the time become proficient in using the media to achieve maximum effect (Nacos, 1994a). One of the roles the media plays in countering terrorism through outlets is by projecting counter-narratives of terrorists’ claims and also taking into consideration the need for media professionalism and patriotism above their commercial and monetary considerations hat constitute the primary motivations of media practice(Centre(KAIPTC), 2016). Another solution offered by Wilkinson (1997) is to reduce the utility terrorists gain from media attention. This he contends is through media censorship and statutory regulations, and also through voluntary self-restraint of the media by the media houses themselves. As a counter-terrorism strategy, many well-established democratic countries facing threats of terrorist attacks engage their media in strategic discussions on terrorism reportage. Some also have at some material times in their history employed media censorship and statutory regulations in an attempted to either ban or limit media access to terrorist organizations, notwithstanding the fact that access to free media is the bastion of liberal democratic valuesi(Anita, 2007; Spencer, 2012).

The strategy of Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering (SIG) is another important tool to fight terrorism (Houston, 2017; Jones, 2018). This entails the careful observation and monitoring of an individual or a group of persons, with the intended motive of gathering information regarding their activities albeit criminal or not. The definition and purpose of conducting surveillance in the view ofLyon (2015) is the collection of information to manage or control situations. This further buttresses the underline observation of quality information being the bedrock of the success or failure against the war on terror. As observed by Torin Monahan, the practice of surveillance has existed for centuries but the current surge in its usage is tied largely to the quest to defeat global terrorism(Monahan, 2012). He further singled out above all how the events of 9/11 have remodeled surveillance, pointing to the fact that national security protection measures globally has become more aggressive. Thus not keeping ’an eye out’ on how Surveillance practices are violating the fundamental Human Rights of citizens (ibid). SIG by human mobile is the most basic and sometimes the most critical of all the media of surveillance especially when a suspected criminal is detected and the need to avoid mistaken identity demands for a physical confirmation of the suspect. Running observations and target reconnaissance using the human eyes and ears remain invaluable to the success of surveillance effort(Houston, 2017).

Inspite of the importance of SIG, its effectiveness is dwindling in the wake of limited manpower. This is so especially when the intended targets are in multiplicity, making its practice highly cumbersome. This is not to say that it is no longer in vogue but rather, the propensity of its usage alone has reduced drastically. This is because counter-terrorism efforts have gradually transmogrified into a highly intricate process because of the high-speed advancement in communication systems and technology (Cavoukian, 2013). The current and most relied upon SIG typologies include the use of DNA mapping, facial recognition systems, biometric surveillance, CCTV, voice and fingerprint databases linked to mass surveillance programs; phone surveillance, such as wiretapping and/or eavesdropping on phone calls, internet and even satellite-phones; electronic surveillance and computer video surveillance(Cavoukian, 2013; Lyon, 2008). The reliability of SIG Asian important counter-terrorism strategy has become invaluable to global security and intelligence agencies especially the combination surveillance programs like interception software, metadata collection and massive digital databases on one hand and video surveillance. Nowadays many video surveillance systems like CCTV are fitted with audio systems and algorithmic surveillance functions that permit smart cameras to identify unusual demeanors and unique sound signatures like gunshots(Ball, Lyon, & Haggerty, 2012; Monahan, 2012).

The fight against terrorism also requires the traditional interagency security teamwork and input from all local security agencies and also at the supranational level, the establishment of security collaborations with international and regional organizations (Dyekman, 2007). The key to success is Organization, Cooperation, and Coordination. The importance of Joint Domestic and International Security Training and Education Programs (JDISTEP) as a counter-terrorism strategy resides in the duality of its purpose (Khera, 2017). Firstly, it ensures reciprocity of capacity building in the participating countries and secondly, generates mutual understanding with regard to security ethos, professionalism, and procedural processes (ibid). Such initiatives provide a durable asymmetric strategic advantage in counter-terrorism efforts to help improve the performance of securities of countries especially the developing ones whose territories have become the hatchery grounds for terrorists (Mattis, 2018; Sosuh, 2011). It also assists in improving the physical abilities of security personnel of participating countries and further supports the creation and reinforcement of global networks dedicated to the fight against terrorism (Program(CTFP), 2015). Notable among such strategies is the US global joint security training and education program CTFP, established in 2002 by the US Department of Defense helps to build partnerships in the struggle against terrorism through the provision of combating terrorism education and training for security officials, mid-to senior-level military officers from around the world and staffs of the ministry of defense of participating countries (Jalili, 2015). Since the year 2001, Archick (2010) contend that one of the top most priorities of Europe has been its collaborative intelligence cooperation and law enforcement with the United States. The effects of these collaborations he opined have been measured in the improved contacts between the EU and US officials on military, police, border control and judicial policy matters and a new dynamic in U.S–EU relations bolstering communications on strategies to curb terrorist financing and information-sharing arrangements on homeland security issues that were formerly a precursor for bilateral discussions. In Africa, the battle against terrorism-affected countries has not been without support from other nations or organizations. The AU, ECOWAS, and other regional bodies engage the security sectors of such countries in joint drills, training, education, and coordination support in the preparedness against terrorist attacks (Akanji, 2019; Okeke, 2019). Similarly, the US African Command (AFRICOM) also offers similar assistance. The leading objectives of AFRICOM include focusing on capacity building to prevent rather than fight wars; improving cooperative security and partnership between the US and African states in the effort to address transnational terrorism; and bolstering security and stability in Africa (Gänzle, 2011; Menkhaus, 2009).

Theoretical framework

The study shall employ the concept of National Security as its theoretical foundation. Traditionally, the concept of National Security implies the application of Defense Strategies of a state in the defence of the nation against territorial aggression from the sea, land or air by using all necessary strategies or approaches to prevent the threats (Brown, 1977; Stone, 2009). Notable scholars to have made invaluable contributions to the establishment of this concept include Arnold Wolfers, Barry Buzan & Harold Brown (Best Jr, 2002). The concept originally emerged with the emergence of the nation-state after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1846 culminating in the advent of issues related to both domestic and international security and bears a close association with national interests (Macnamara & Fitz-Gerald, 2002).

The concept owing to the changes in the international system after the Second World War establishing contemporary visions for the security of states, and the emergence of new concepts such as peaceful coexistence, deterrence, containment, international polarization and international balance, leading to an expansion of the concept to include all the comprehensive capabilities of the state such as economic, military, industrial, human power, cultural, social and educational capabilities etc has ensured the concept of national security is without its ambiguities as there is no single universally agreed on definition or understanding as it means different things to different people (Wolfers, 1962). In the assertion of Harold Brown, national security entails the ability of states to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory: to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to secure its frontiers; to preserve its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption from external forces (Brown, 1983). Going by this concept, this study seeks to explore the defence strategies adopted by Ghana’s security sector to protect the country against the threat of terrorism.

In Barry Buzan’s quest to illuminate and further develop the concept, he defined it as a state's quest for freedom from threat (Buzan, 1991). This according to him is of two levels namely national and international, summing up in the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and practical cohesion (ibid). In his position, the concept of national security firstly encompasses the fate of human collectivities before the personal security of individual human beings. Thus, the unit of analysis in the concept of national security is the sovereign territorial state (Alvarez, 2006). In this regard, this study investigates what national and international strategies have been employed by Ghana’s security apparatus to prevent terrorist attacks against the country. The concept, owing to its criticism as being overly state-centric and lacking the needed temerity to tackle contemporary issues threatening the survival of modern States, has evolved to include individuals, groups and communities in addressing the complex inter-woven challenges such as the need for effective measures or mechanisms to avert the threat terrorism poses to humanity. Also to curb religious extremism etc all representing legitimate concerns (Woo, 2002). This has ensured the re-evaluation of security strategies of most countries, particularly in terms of internal security (Jain, 1985; Katzenstein, 1996). In opposition to the concept of national security, the Human Security Concept has arisen as the leading provocateur. In the contention of Human Security, the concept of security is only limited to the physical survival and territorial integrity of states as postulated by Harold Brown and many others. UNDP’s 1994, Human Security Report avows that the concept of National Security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy. It has been related to nation-states more than people (Owen, 2004).

Qantson’s proposition suggests that human security should be the focal point of national security. In his estimation, national security should be identified with four basic words; survival, safety, wellbeing, and contentment. He argues that people must survive, and the survival must be decent. Having survived, they should be protected so they can feel safe. After their survival and safety, the other logical imperative security needs must be their well-being and then contentment. He concluded that the security of a nation can be at risk if the security of its human beings is threatened and that unless the security needs of the people are comprehensively and holistically addressed, national security could be a protracted risk (Millar, 2008). By this, the study shall explore whether individuals, groups and communities have contributed to the prevention of terrorism. Marc Levy in a rebuttal has argued that human security and national security have no connection, citing an example that environmental degradation, which is an integral part in the discourse on human security pose no threat to national security (Levy, 1995). In spite of the seemingly opposing views, the concept of National Security in the context of this research implies the defence strategies employed to secure the territorial integrity of the state from the threat of violence from terrorist attacks. Its importance to the research stems from the fact that terrorism is a threat to the very survival of every state and its inhibition is therefore a national security concern.

Methodology

The study deployed the qualitative method of data collection and analysis which is context-dependent, focused specifically on situations and people, processes and outcomes and the primary use of textual data rather than numerical data (Creswell, 2009; Matthews & Ross, 2014). The study is extracted from a broader research conducted in July/August 2019. The qualitative approach was relevantly needed because we were interested in knowing the counter-terrorism strategies or measures utilized by Ghana’s security agencies to protect the country against terrorism. This therefore required that we engage participants who are charged with the mandate of preventing or fighting against the threat of terrorism in Ghana. We could only deploy the qualitative approach to canvass and elicit a depth of explanations via interviews which is meant to afford the participants the opportunity to express and offer deeper insights on the counter-terrorism strategies which have aided in the prevention of terrorism in Ghana. After soliciting for their inputs via interviews which captured their voices, we converted the voices into text to represent their views. This process was only possible through the qualitative research method (Bryman, 2016). To access the information for this study, we identified 3 security agencies where we purposively sampled participants. The primary informants constituted twelve (12) Ghanaian security officers who work on the field to prevent the occurrence of terrorism. Out of the participants, three (3) were junior officers whilst nine (9) were senior officers including heads of divisions and sub-divisions who operate both on the field and in their offices and triangulate between politicians, the security institutions and the community. The twelve (12) respondents comprised a mixture of males eight(8) and four(4) females ranging between the ages of 30 and 58.

Purposive sampling was used to identify participants who possess useful information on Ghana’s security strategies in preventing terrorism (Flick, 2018; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Their roles and positions were necessary as their portfolios or department dealt with the aspect of strategizing and implementing counter-terrorism measures in Ghana. We engaged participants from the Ghana Police Service, the Ghana military service and the Ghana immigration service. The 12 participants were chosen per the guidance and direction of the leadership of these institutions who introduced us to the counter-terrorism unit of their respective institution. Most of them had a wealth of experience in counter-terrorism training both from home and abroad with years of field work experiences. The participants comprised: 5 personnel from the Ghana Police Service (GPS); 3 personnel from the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); 4 personnel from the Ghana Armed Forces. Per the different functions of these institutions and the distinctive role of our participants in countering terrorism, the findings are expected to receive contrasting and similarity effects within the Ghana counter-terrorism strategic context. To garner answers from these participants, we deployed semi-structured interviews which created room for follow up questions and clarifications. After conducting the interviews, we transcribed all the interviews in full and transcripts were coded, classified and theorized further via more categorization (Matthews & Ross, 2014). Following the ethical demands of research, we anonymized participants’ names employing letters of the alphabet instead to represent them in the empirical sections to ensure confidentiality. In the textual data which represented the inputs of our participants, we presented our findings and analysis thematically whilst quoting interviewees so that their worlds would be understood. We sought for the consent of the participants via forms which were signed by both researchers and the participants. We also signed forms not to disclose or reveal participants’ identity or play their voices to third parties and ensure that their voices were used for research purposes only. The consent form disclosed researchers’ identity, university and the purpose of study. We informed our participants not to answer any questions or even withdraw from the interview process any time they felt uncomfortable (Creswell, 2009). To access the participants, our school authorities sent introductory letters to the three institutions highlighting the purpose of this research.

Based on the sensitivity of confidential security information, we analyzed data thoughtfully and treated it with utmost care (Creswell, 2009). We protected data by creating multiple passwords on the records to avoid unauthorized access (Matthews & Ross, 2014; Wisdom & Creswell, 2013). To demonstrate transferability, dependability and confirmability, we enhanced trustworthiness and correctness in order to control our subjective biases and thus, we triangulated responses between the three institutions and checked consistency through follow up questions and made enquiries from past interviewees. The triangulation of interviewed response from the different institutions provided this study a confluence of evidence that ensured credibility (Creswell, 2009; Harrison & Startin, 2013).

Community engagement

Consistent with the Concept of National Security that implies the application of Defense Strategies of a state in the defence of the nation against territorial aggression from the sea, land or air by using all necessary strategies or approaches to prevent threats (Stone, 2009), Informants from GPS and GIS articulated that their agencies engaged communities as a strategy aimed at preventing terrorist attacks. Participants P5, P1, and G3 revealed that community engagement is a very crucial counter-terrorism strategy of their respective agencies and are in concord with the findings of Spalek and Weeks (2017) and Briggs (2010) that the use of community engagement is based on the heightened recognition among counter-terrorism analysts in the post 9/11 period about the benefits broader public and community involvement can contribute in countering the threat of terrorism. Alternatively, the traditional law enforcement pursuits. There are however dynamics in informants’ responses giving their legally assigned roles, portfolios, organizational and functional differences, intra-organizational portfolios and the need to avoid intermeddling in functional duties etc. An informant P5 from the GPS posited to de-radicalization efforts as a rationale behind the agency’s community engagement strategy and it is expressly to block the avenue through which people in communities become radicalized especially by adulterated Islamic doctrines. He mentions that:

“As part of our effort to prevent terrorism, we engage local communities especially the ’Zongos’ (Muslim dominated communities). It is within these communities that the problem of Islamic radicalization begins. This issue of Islamic radicalization does not just crop up ooooooooo(sic), it starts gradually with normal conversations in communities and mosques and then they begin to conscientize them with terrorism ideologies and the needed religious justifications to kill others. To prevent this, we visit the communities and mosques to sensitize them, especially the young men and women about the problem of radicalization and to let them know the police are their friends so they should feel free to report iffy characters to us. I must commend the Imams, they are really helping us to send this message home. The assurances we get from the Muslim communities are encouraging. I really hope it stays this way” (P5 noted).

The response expressed by informant P5 is in congruence with Jonas Gahr Store’s call for more focus on de-radicalization efforts when he wrote in the New York Times: “Political extremism does not grow in a vacuum. Ideas serve as the oxygen that allows it to flourish and spread. Extremist perspectives win sympathy and recruits because they offer narratives that claim to identify deep injustices and enemies. Without this fuel, the blaze of extremism is quickly extinguished” (Jonas Gahr Store, 2012). This is further supported by existing research that radicalizing through Islamic doctrines is arguably the best and easiest platform for terrorist organizations to recruit young Muslims into their ranks (Precht, 2007). Nevertheless, the de-radicalization agenda put forward by the informants could be contended in some arenas as discriminatory precisely from its much emphasis or focus on ’Islam’ to the neglect of other religions in the country. This has the propensity to stereotype Muslims as ’dangerous people’ in the minds of non-Ghanaian Muslims thus leading to a possible breakdown in the current harmony forged among the various religions in the country.

On a point of divergence, another informant from the GPS intimated that community engagement is also needed for disarmament and arms control instead of de-radicalizing ideas or ideologies. He explained that

“We don’t take arms control lightly at all, you said you study political science right? Tell me, have you heard of a terrorist attack anywhere on this planet that did not involve the use of weapons? We are very focused on disarming and controlling arms proliferation in this country. Let me tell you, without weapons, terrorists can’t operate. You see! in this country, there is a strong gun culture among many communities but people don’t know kraaa!(sic). I was stationed in the north, so I know from experience. Let me give you an example, among the Gonja people, I am not saying they are the only ones ioooooo, don’t get me wrong(sic), but just to support what I am saying ok. If a baby boy is born to them, they fire guns into the air. This is their custom which means every family owns a gun. Not only that but also because of the tribal disputes in the north, most people own guns for personal security. You find poor farmers owning not only guns made by our local artisans here, but I mean foreign-made guns like AK-47, Soviet PKM 7.62, Polish P64 and many more. It is a serious matter my brother, just imagine if these people become terrorists. They already have the guns and so the rest will not be hard for them to do. By mingling with them in their communities, we are able to trace the sources of supply of the guns. We are successful sometimes but not always” (P1 stated).

The strategic importance of disarmament and arms control opined by informant P1 on the same continuum of community engagement as a counter-terrorism strategy of the GPS reveals Ghana’s problem with illegal arms proliferation (Aning, 2008, 2005). The extent of this problem can be appreciated only by a brief assessment the country’s vulnerability to terrorism on condition of the ease of SALW proliferation within and outside its territories. The country since the year 2013 has ranked among the leading proliferator of SALW’s in West Africa (GIABA, 2013). This is because guns made in Ghana are now known regionally for their competitive prices, their effectiveness, and their accessibility, and represent a significant source of weaponry for some armed groups within the sub-region (ibid). The 2014 national small arms baseline survey which was the second of its kind following the 2004 survey revealed that there were over 2.3 million small arms in circulation in the country and out of the over 2.3 million, an estimated 1.1 million were illegally possessed by civilians (Osei-Appiah, 2016). The figures, according to the 2014 research, indicated an exponential increase of over 850 per cent in a space of 10 years, posing a grave threat to national security (ibid). On the basis of the above data provided, the promoting of synergy among local communities and the GPS is necessary to intercept and eliminate the sources of illicit arms trade and supply to terrorists.

On a varying continuum of community engagement, participant G3 from GIS highlighted that community engagement is needed for intelligence gathering purposes. G3’s revelation of intelligence gathering shall also later be tackled further to disclose its magnitude as a counter-terrorism approach. In his explanation, informant G3 averred that

“There is something we are now doing called community engagement which we are looking forward to getting support to do it more. Before, border management was like ‘do what I say, you understand?. What we the officers told the community is what we expected them to abide by and so we did not see them as partners. We now see the communities as partners. Why do we see them as partners? Some of them have been engaging in cross border crimes since day one, that is smuggling and transporting goods for criminals and those sort of things and they give information to these criminals that security people are here and there. So now going forward we work with them so they can report to us when somebody new comes into the community and things like that, and it is something that we have to build as trust and you don’t have to go and blow alarm or remove cover when they come to report to us so that the person will be attacked” (G3 noted).

Consequentially, from the informant’s response, the previously ’unfriendly’ civilian approach professed by informant G3 confirms the psyche of most Ghanaian security agencies and personnel as being a special group from all Ghanaian civilians. By default they have always maintained a bossy mercenary orientation towards the country’s civilian population with a cultivated mind-set that the civilians must always obey the command of a security personnel from the highest echelon to the rank and file of the agencies. This account for the extremely low perceptions of public security credibility in the country (Afrobarometer, 2014/2015; Peace(FFP), 2018): Conclusively, the necessity in the deployment of community engagement as a counter-terrorism by the GPS and GIS revealed by informants from these institutions buttresses Stephen Krasner’s observation that terrorists in their operations transit many communities and use these communities for multiple purposes such as identify recruit and radicalize vulnerable men and women with the needed psychological impetus and material incentives to become terrorists (Krasner, 1999). Thus, the need to positively engage local communities as equal partners if Ghana’s security from terrorism is to be sustained.

The application of security software in BCM

Participants from the GIS detailed the agency’s use of technology in the form of security softwares at the country’s border posts in their quest to counter terrorism. The exigency in GIS’s use of security software in BCM for counter-terrorism purposes in Ghana is not a dispensable strategy the agency can forgo giving the fragilities in the fight against terrorism in the sub-region and considering the fact that innovations in computing and telecommunication such as the widespread internet access, popular end-to-end encrypted messaging services, proliferating virtual private network (VPN) usage have all made new types of operations possible for a higher number of terrorists to plan their operations and stage attacks (Don, Frelinger, & Gerwehr et al., 2007; Steinbach, 2016). This is in accordance with the evolving dynamics in the global fight against terrorism game plan, with new security technologies emerging as the preferred policy solution to the difficult problem of screening for weapons and terrorist incursions (Ackleson, 2005). Informant G3 noted that:

“We have a system called pysis, a software we have installed in our major entry points. Of course we have not extended it to all our borders because of financial and logistical challenges. But we are hoping to extend it to all, so that when somebody comes and he is on the ‘stop list,’ he/she automatically pops up. For instance, if I am a primary user and it pops up, I quickly send it to you, who is a secondary user to look at it and if he/she is not convinced, they forward it to the tertiary user and action is taken. Other times it is just a coincidence of name. For example, you are called Prah and I have another person Prah Yaw. Once Prah comes in, it clicks and then we find out to see on which basis we are stopping this person. For instance, reasons ABC and you see that it is a different person from what we have in the data and so we let you go. This software is a very useful counter-terrorism tool for us.”

Another informant alluded to the fact that these innovative technological control systems for screening and biometric purposes have various capabilities for not only prescreening problematic travelers, but also cargos and detecting concealed material in trucks that were virtually impossible to do manually. He noted that:

“Even though our work formerly was more dependent on man-power, we now use technology too. We have softwares we use at some of the border points to screen people and goods coming in and going out of the country. I won’t tell you the name of this software because am not really convinced if your research is not for espionage purposes. But I can tell you this software is super accurate and very helpful. With it, we are able to catch suspects and fish-out concealed and undocumented goods in tracks that we could not previously. When we enter your name or the barcode on a product, all information on the goods or persons pop out. We also have another surveillance system but for now, that thing has broken down” (G2 noted).

From the findings, the use of the security software for counter-terrorism purposes expressed by the research participants are in tandem with the concept of national security that implies the application of Defense Strategies of a state in the defense of the nation against territorial aggression from the sea, land or air by using all necessary strategies or approaches to prevent threats (Brown, 1977; Stone, 2009). The use of security softwares in BCM for counter-terrorism purpose by the GIS is for the exact objective of defending Ghana’s territory from potential terrorist threats as advocated by the concept of national security. The informants’ claim of GIS upgrade from man-power BCM to the application of security software is commendable because the former assessment of traveler risks by using only the traditional methods of checking passengers’ names against “watchlists” of known or suspected criminals used by the GIS were useful in the past, howbeit given the contemporary advancement in technology, the man-power approach are largely ineffective, outmoded, needlessly time-consuming and energy-sapping (Ginsburg, 2006).

The application of security softwares in BCM per the informants’ responses provides the GIS with a high rate of security success in the detection of suspected criminals. This is in consonance with the statement of the European Group of Personalities in the field of Security that “technology itself cannot guarantee security, but security without the support of technology is impossible” ((EC), 2004). This statement thus espouses the contribution of information and communications technology (ICT) in the light of its realistic impact in countering terrorism. However, the security risk for Ghana as admitted by one of the research participants lies in the non-availability and use of the security software at all border crossing points of the country due to logistical and financial challenges as extracted from the response of informant G3 above. This confirms the position of Agbemabiesse (2011) and Salter that Ghana security agencies lack the necessary logistical support in the performance of their mandated duties.

Joint Domestic and International Security Training Programs (JDISTP)

Concurring with the Concept of National Security that involves the application of Defence Strategies of a state in the defence of the nation against territorial aggression from the sea, land or air by using all necessary strategies or approaches to prevent threats (Brown, 1977; Stone, 2009), our research participants mentioned that some of their members participate in domestic and international security training programs for counter-terrorism preparedness purposes. The JDISTPs are noted to provide a duality of advantages, firstly, it ensures reciprocity of capacity building in the participating countries and secondly generates mutual understanding with regards to security ethos, professionalism, and procedural processes (Khera, 2017). This proposition is in tandem with the response of informant G3 who explained that:

“We do regular training with our sister agencies from within and outside the country. I think we had some, recently at the Shouting Command, all the security agencies were brought on board. I mean the military police, immigration service, fire service, National Security, the national Ambulance service and all the other security agencies to see what we can do in our preparedness in terms of when there is a terrorist attack, what the various agencies are supposed to do, and in situations when there are no terrorist attacks, what are we supposed to do so that when terrorist attacks happen we will not be found wanting. When you know what to do in peace times, you will not be found wanting in times of terrorist attacks. Just recently we did one at Bawku (a city in northern Ghana-the emphasis is mine) with the security agencies from Burkina Faso, Togo and also Benin was brought on board. That was an actual operation we code-named ‘Operation Gudangu’ and we did a lot of interceptions and all these things send signals to people that we are not relaxing on our horses. The Shouting Command operation I mentioned was called ‘Epic Guardian’ and it was sponsored by the American Embassy and other foreign partners, but the American Embassy was the key sponsor” (G3 noted).

Other informants highlighted the importance of JDISTP to Ghana’s stability from terrorism as it helps the country’s security agencies to gain and tap into the wealth of experience of terrorism affected countries in Africa and around the world. The JDISTP’s they opined helps keep the agencies in the right physical and intellectual condition necessary to fight the threat of terrorism. The responses of the informants P2 and M4 are in consonance with the purpose of JDISTP as it aims to assists in improving the physical and intellectual abilities of security personnel of participating countries and further support the creation and reinforcement of global networks dedicated to the fight against terrorism (Program(CTFP) CTF, 2015). The informants' explanations further find expression in Sosuh (2011), when she stated that joint security training and education programs with local and foreign security partners helps to update security personnel on current terrorism and counter-terrorism measures to help improve the performance of securities of countries especially the developing ones whose territories have become the hatchery grounds for terrorists. In the words of informant P2:

“The other side is training and building our capacity on the international stage but especially with regional countries suffering from terrorist attacks. This is to improve our performance should terrorist attack us. This enables us to keep fit, learn new things and update our knowledge on how to combat terrorists. I will say because of the commitment of our officers, they have gone all length. If you talk about training, both the army, police, BNI, and Immigration service have done a lot of joint training and simulation exercise with very key and specialized foreign units like the SAS, Israelis and the US and also majority of our personnel have moved from here to train with the triple seven and nine in Egypt. So in terms of training and attitude which is the human aspect. I can say whatever joint training and efforts that are humanly possible, we have undertaken to prepare ourselves for any eventualities” (P2 noted).

In a similar vein, informant M4 observed that: “We train day in day out and we also do joint training support programs with our abled friends from within the continent, the US and also with Germany where you are studying. We do joint military training exercise at the ‘Bondase’ training camp and the ‘Akyease’ training camp, so we are ever ready for any terrorist attack. Just recently the Americans were here with about 500 troops in Ghana just to train and prepare to combat any terrorist attack which will come toward Ghana.”

From the findings, the informants all highlighted that their various agencies have undertaken several joint training exercises with the US army. Worthy of note is that the improved security relations between Ghana and the US guarantees security personnel from both countries to participate in bilateral international security education and training programs and other humanitarian affairs projects ((USDS), 2019). Also, selected personnel from Ghana’s security sector continues to participate in the US African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, in which the United States facilitates the development of an interoperable peacekeeping capacity among security personnel in Africa. This has made Ghana a priority country for efforts to address transnational organized crimes in West Africa under the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) (Shai, Molapo, & Sodi, 2017; Shaibu, 2014).

On the other hand, as much as these joint training operations may serve as a warning signal or a deterrent to potential terrorists and further improves cooperation among the countries ((JCS), 2017), these commendable efforts lead to a non-rhetorical question … .Does Ghana’s participation in these JDISTP’s not make the country a target for terrorists? This question begs for inquisition because Ghana’s participation in such counter-terrorism programs with the well-known terrorist targets like the US, Israel, UK etc. and other countries experiencing terrorism as revealed by the research participants reflects Ghana’s ideological alignment and support for these countries whose ideologies are often known to be an anathema to global terrorist organizations. This brings Ghana ever closer to the attention of terrorist groups within the sub-region and beyond, making the country highly susceptible to attacks from these groups.

Media consultations

In line with the Concept of National Security that involves the application of Defence Strategies of a state in the defence of the nation against territorial aggression from the sea, land or air by using all necessary strategies or approaches to prevent threat (Brown, 1977; Stone, 2009), three research participants averred to their agencies' reliance on media consultation as a terrorism defence strategy in protecting Ghana from possible terrorist attacks. Informant M1 from the GAF intimated that since terrorists use media platforms to create and spread fear, it was expedient the GAF use the same platform to address public fear and concern on issues of terrorism. The GAF’s media consultations are aimed to create public awareness and dissemination of the right information concerning the security status of Ghana with respect to terrorism for the purpose of safeguarding the country against the threats of terrorism. The position of informant G3 is in tandem with Nacos (1994b) when he asserted that as much as the media uses terrorist attacks to draw viewers and readers, terrorists and their organizations likewise depend on the media to publicize their cause and spread fear and have over time become proficient in using the media to achieve maximum effect.

“Causing fear and panic are what terrorists thrive on and they use the media to do this. If the media stops giving terrorists the attention they crave for, this problem of terrorism will die off. You are a Ghanaian, so you know the public reaction when fake news of terrorist attacks against the country crops up. The military is very careful about this and so as part of our counter-terrorism strategy, we quickly come out to debunk any false alarms that come into the press. Our Public Relations Directorate liaises with the media houses to answer their questions and provide them the right information when it comes to terrorism. We meet them regularly to discuss their role in helping to keep our country free from terror attacks. This is not a one-man job, the media houses have a role to play. In our discussions with media houses we tell them to be very circumspect in their reportage of security issues. They want to catch public attention so they say all sorts of things just to get public attention. The terrorists are using the media so we’ll also use the same platform to counter them” (M1 noted).

Another informant stressed on the competition among Ghanaian media houses to gain readership/viewership through terrorism reportage and the likelihood of these reportage serving as warning signals for suspected terrorists to elude capture and arrest thus negatively affecting the operations of the country’ security agencies in terrorism prevention. He thus opined the need for GAF to liaise with the country’s media houses to create public awareness. This disclosure by informant M3 is in consonance with Nacos (1994a) when he inferred that Terrorists have mastered the art of exploiting the media to propagate their political demands to millions or even billions of people as the media in turn want to make news attractive to readers or viewers and thus have the incentive to bring terrorist incidences to the fore.

“The press are in competition with themselves to be the first to break out stories and this is putting our security in danger. This behavior will give terrorists an upper hand over us because by the time we make any approach, they have already disappeared from the country. We operate according to our motto ’Friendship with Vigilance’. We have a very friendly relationship with the media so they can come to us to confirm reports before they send it out. I will say this is a good counterterrorism method. The media has a far-reaching audience than us, so by having good relations with them, our security sensitivity campaign especially about reporting suspicious events and characters in communities to the appropriate security agencies is far reached” (M3 noted).

Another informant expressed that regular dialogue between the media houses and security agencies in Ghana, is key. It can be deduced that the security agencies reliance on media engagement as a counter-terrorism strategy stems from the security apparatus’ realization and understanding of the symbiotic relationship between the mass media and terrorism and the need for the agencies to create a good media rapport and partnership if they are to make meaningful headways in securing Ghana against the threat of terrorism. This view is articulated by informant P1 when he intimated that:

“Interacting with the press is now very much a part of our counter-terrorism approach because we need them now than ever. I will say terrorists and the media are two bed fellows. We need the media if we are to succeed in preventing terrorism against this country. We keep advising the TV and radio stations and the newspapers not to give too much airtime to news on terrorism and also to cross-check with our public relations department before publishing sensitive security matters because it is a matter of national interest. Today you hear ISIS is coming, tomorrow Al-Qaeda and this is all the work of the TV and radio stations. Hmmmm! this is not good for the country (sic). We are drawing unnecessary attention to ourselves by fueling rumors of planned terrorist attacks against us. As I already told you, we tell them our doors are always open to them so they should first cross-check their information with us” (P1 noted).

The responses expressed by the research participants are buttressed by the knowledge that the mass media in post 9/11, is noted to fuel terrorism by promoting fear and insecurity among the global population (Lumbaca & Gray, 2011). It is, for this reason, Bruce Hoffman holds the view that media broadcasting and analytical journalism in conjunction with electronics has hugely changed the context and contents of the news, resulting sometimes in a negative influence on public opinion and it is within this arena of mass media communication that terrorists now get the springboard they did not have in the past to manipulate and influence because ’what was not released in the media, did not happen at all’ (Hoffman, 2003). It can be deduced further from the responses that the current competition among Ghanaian media stations and their desire to dominate each other in listenership or viewership coverage has resorted to reporting more on news of terrorism especially within the sub-region into the public domain knowing fully well it causes fear and panic but attracts public attention to their channels. The utilization of media engagements by security agencies as a counter-terrorism strategy expressed by the informants finds expression with Anita (2007); Spencer (2012) when they posited that many countries facing threats of terrorist attacks engage their media in strategic discussions on terrorism reportage.

Surveillance and intelligence gathering

Concurring with the Concept of National Security that implies the application of Defense Strategies of a state in the defence of the nation against territorial aggression from the sea, land or air by using all necessary strategies or approaches to prevent threats (Brown, 1977). Some informants disclosed their agencies employment of surveillance/intelligence gathering strategy, which entails the careful observation and monitoring of an individual or a group of persons. The aim is to gain superior advantage over possible enemies of the state through information for the purpose of securing frontiers of the state against threat like terrorist attacks. Informants from the GAF and the GIS disclosed the clandestine nature of their agencies' operations in which emphasis is placed on the concealment of the operation itself. Their modus operandi enabled them blend into local communities through taking up temporal residence in suspected communities or operating in civilian clothing to conceal the identities of their operatives. These practices they averred offered the security agencies the opportunity to “shadow” the activities of potential terrorists who may be operating in the country. Informant M2 noted that:

“Officers from our intelligence unit are on the ground. They rent accommodations in certain communities we believe are possible hideouts for potential terrorists. They blend in communities and gather intelligence for further assessment. If terrorists from outside will attack us, they will need local accomplices so we maintain constant surveillance on people we believe can be a threat to this nation. Any minor lead we get we follow, we don’t want to become complacent. You know, the US knew of the possibility of a terrorist attack against them prior to the 9/11 attack but they were complacent. We don’t have the resource and equipment they have but we don’t leave any intelligence to chance.”

As further noted by Houston (2017), the modus operandi of SIG as an important counter-terrorism strategy is based on confidentiality and the safeguarding of sensitive information considered dangerous to the safety of citizens of a country and other foreign countries' nationals. This is very much expressed by informant G2 when he asserted that:

“We have our intelligence units here. In a way, let me say we also have our CID (Criminal Investigation Department-the emphasis is mine). They are in plain clothes and move around to gather confidential intelligence that can harm the security of this country and our external relations if it falls into wrong hands. They are in plain clothes so whatever they’re doing or anywhere they sit, they look normal. They trail suspected people on our watch-list by monitoring their various activities. We have been intercepting people from Pakistan and other Arab regions through intelligence gathering and surveillance. They want to take advantage of the unapproved routes and we have been stopping them. This is not enough . We have to step up our game”(G2 noted)

The responses of informant M2 and G2 shows Ghana security agencies' heavy reliance on human mobile as SIG approach. This is in consonance with Houston (2017) when he inferred that human mobile is the most basic and sometimes the most critical of all the mediums of surveillance especially when a suspected criminal is detected and the need to avoid mistaken identity demands for a physical confirmation of the suspect, running observation and target reconnaissance using the human ’eyes and ears’ remains invaluable to the success of surveillance efforts. However it must be noted as observed by Cavoukian (2013),

human mobile in spite o f its importance, its effectiveness is dwindling in the wake of the limited manpower especially when the intended targets are in multiplicity, making it practice highly cumbersome. He continued by saying that it is no longer in vogue but rather, the propensity of its usage alone has reduced drastically as counter-terrorism effort have gradually transmogrified into a highly intricate process because of the high-speed advancement in communication systems and technology.

On a varying continuum, a research participant highlighted the agencies use of personal discretion in SIG because of the loads of intelligence report they receive and the need to decipher what is authentic and what not. Informant P5 noted that:

“We depend on our intelligence and surveillance teams to keep this country safe from terrorist attacks. Without accurate and reliable information to operate, we will be chasing the wind. You see! in this job, we use our discretion a lot because we depend very much on civilians to gather intelligence. You must decide in split seconds whether the intelligence you have received is credible or the person you are surveilling is the right suspect. I can recount a recent situation where a civilian reported that he had seen some suspicious activities of a group in a hidden location and when the police went, they found some explosives with them. Of course, we cannot link it up to terrorism, but it is one of the key implements for attacks. The police quickly went there to repel it. Without applying our discretion, we will be overwhelmed with false intelligence.”

We must note from the response of informant P5 that the use of personal discretion in SIG has the tendency to infringe on people’s fundamental human rights. This is to say that how be it useful SIG might be, relying on personal discretion has the possibility to be a manipulative tool in the hands of intelligence agencies against ordinary civilians especially in instances of selective treatment, wrong profiling or even blackmailing and this can ultimately lead to the destruction of liberal principles and democracy

(Karlsson Norman, 2018; Richards, 2012).

Overall, the varying responses of informants, laid clarity to the capacity of surveillance/intelligence gathering to facilitate the interception of terrorist’s plans and operations based on information impossible to obtain otherwise. Ghana security agencies’ reliance on surveillance/intelligence gathering bolsters David Lyon’s position that it has become one of the most preferred counter-terrorism strategies in the post 9/11 epoch (Lyon, 2015). An issue for concern from the finding in addition to the use of discretion is the security apparatus’ too much focus on targeted surveillance also referred to as targeted interception that involves human mobile with the capacity to investigate a specific or hand full individuals rather than the use of computer programs and sophisticated technological gadgets involving the surveillance of a larger population(Houston, 2017). This poses a greater security threat to Ghana because the use of human mobile leads to the neglect of many other suspects who might pose similar or higher security threat to the country because of the associated limitations with targeted surveillance. The responses of informants in this regard further expose the technological and logistical deficiencies of Ghana’s security agencies.

Overall, Ghana’s strategies to combat terrorism are influenced by both domestic and transnational security challenges in the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) sub region. Although Ghana collaborates with its neighbors on matters of common security concerns like terrorism, however the differences in the subregional security cultures in West Africa do not effectively complement each other in providing a holistic response to the transnational security challenges facing countries in the subregion (Bryden & N’Diaye, 2011; Marc, Verjee, & Mogaka, 2015). This mounts considerable pressure on Ghana’s security infrastructure and counter-terrorism measures to safeguard the country against both domestic and transnational terrorists’ attacks. Citing a recent concern, between January and June 2019, available statistics indicate the influx of about 2000 migrants fleeing extremist attacks from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger into Northern Ghana due to the southward spread of extremist groups from these countries. One of the concomitant effects of this influx is an emerging surge in kidnapping and abduction of both locals and foreign nationals for ransom. This has raised genuine concerns over possible cross border incursion by terrorists into Ghana and an increased widespread anxiety and expression of public fear for life and security in the country ((WANEP), 2019). This further calls into question the long term efficacy of Ghana’s counter-terrorism strategies to protect the country against terrorism.

Conclusion

Sequels to the findings in this study, the following measures were generated by the study apropos to the counter-terrorism tactics employed by Ghana’s security services. The security services’ media consultations were itemized as a counter-terrorism plan. Terrorists’ use of the mass media to create fear and panic plus solicit for attention, had necessitated the use of the same platform by law enforcement bodies to counteract the stated objectives of terrorists. The agencies through the media are able to properly address public fears by providing better and more authentic security updates, in addition to engaging media practitioners in healthy dialogue about the need to minimize terrorism-related news coverage to avoid its exploitation by would be terrorists against the nation. Another discovery was the strategy of Surveillance/Intelligence Gathering. It was noted to be a combating terrorism game-plan exercised to amass copious information on activities of belligerent citizens and foreigners in the country who might have terrorism motives and by this effect, the needed arrests. The use of security software in BCM also emerged as an indispensable counter-terrorism tool. In its usage, the security software was noted to deliver a more accurate output in identifying suspects and concealed goods than previously achieved manually. The challenge in the use of the security software was found to be its’ none availability at all the border entry and exit points of the country. Additionally, the Joint Domestic and International Security Training Programs were disclosed as one of the security organizations’ counter-terrorism methods. This method is believed to have improved the physical and intellectual abilities of Ghana’s security agents in modern terrorism, counter-terrorism trends, tactics and additionally supported and strengthened the country’s global networks and links in the fight against terrorism. Last but not least, Community Engagement was also mentioned as an indispensable counter-terrorism approach. The benefits derived from community engagement as a stratagem was revealed in the strategy’s aptitude to boost de-radicalization efforts, promote arms control along with its use as a conduit for intelligent gathering purposes.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah

Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. Prior to receiving his Masters degree in Political Science from the University of Osnabrueck, he obtained a Bachelors degree in Political Science from the University of Ghana, Legon.

Timothy Chanimbe

Timothy Chanimbe is currently a PhD student in the Department of Government and International Studies at the Hong Kong Baptist University who also holds Masters and Bachelors degree in Political Science from the University of Osnabrueck and the University of Ghana respectively.