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Abstract
Over the last six months, China has no longer seemed ascendant in the Middle East. As the United States has assumed a leading role in both regional and global diplomacy over the conflict in Gaza, China has drifted increasingly to the margins. It is becoming clear not only that China does not aspire to replace the United States in the Middle East, but also that China and most Arab states alike want the United States to maintain committed to Middle Eastern security. At the same time, however, both China and the Arab states appear driven to loosen what they see as an undesirable US grip on the region and to forge a more multipolar future. In pursuit of it, they find common purpose in a single, simple idea: China presents a new model for domestic and international governance, and there are large parts of China’s model that are worth emulating. A striking feature of this pursuit is its vagueness.
Notes
1 Quoted in Vivian Nereim, ‘China and Saudi Arabia Sign Strategic Partnership as Xi Visits Kingdom’, New York Times, 8 December 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/08/world/middleeast/china-saudi-arabia-agreement.html.
2 Xi Jinping, ‘Carrying Forward Our Millennia-old Friendship and Jointly Creating a Better Future’, Al-Riyadh, 8 December 2022, reprinted in English by Xinhua, https://english.news.cn/20221208/cc10b8d41b3749a78ec981ceeda6b26b/c.html.
3 See Fahad Abuljadayel and Abeer Abu Omar, ‘Saudi Arabia Says $50 Billion Investments Agreed with China’, Bloomberg, 11 December 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-11/saudi-arabia-says-50-billion-investments-agreed-at-china-summit.
4 White House, ‘Remarks by President Biden on His Meetings in Saudi Arabia’, 15 July 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/07/15/remarks-by-president-biden-on-his-meetings-in-saudi-arabia/.
5 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest, no. 16, Summer 1989, p. 3.
6 This includes Iran. President Mohammad Khatami’s surprise electoral victory as a reformist in 1997 seemed to portend a decisive shift, and Khatami himself advanced the idea of a ‘dialogue of civilisations’ to help reduce tensions between the Middle East and the West. In an effort to grow the relationship, in early 2000 the Clinton administration lifted bans on the import of Iranian carpets, pistachios and dried fruit, which Iranian interlocutors had advised would have strong symbolic value.
7 S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World (Gurugram: HarperCollins India, 2020), p. 21. Jaishankar used the same formulation with a specifically Middle Eastern focus in a closed-door meeting in 2019.
8 See Naguib Mahfouz, ‘China for Us’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 31 January–6 February 2002.
9 Mohamed Bin Huwaidan, ‘Arabs and the Chinese Model’, Al-Bayan, 6 March 2008.
10 Joseph Fewsmith, ‘Debating “the China Model”’, China Leadership Monitor, no. 35, Summer 2011, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/CLM35JF.pdf.
11 Francis Fukuyama, ‘US Democracy Has Little to Teach China’, Financial Times, 17 January 2011, https://www.ft.com/content/cb6af6e8-2272-11e0-b6a2-00144feab49a.
12 See Yuen Yuen Ang, ‘The Real China Model’, Foreign Affairs, 29 June 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2018-06-29/real-china-model.
13 Xi Jinping, ‘Working Together to Build a Better World’, keynote address at the CPC Dialogue with World Political Parties High-level Meeting, 1 December 2017, printed in China Insight, December 2017, p. 2, https://www.bjreview.com/2017pdf/Chinainsight13.pdf.
14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation’, 14 May 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201705/t20170527_678618.html.
15 Ibid.
16 ‘Xi Jinping’s Speech at the General Debate of the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, CGTN, 23 September 2020, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-09-23/Full-text-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-at-General-Debate-of-UNGA-U07X2dn8Ag/index.html.
17 Elizabeth Economy, ‘Exporting the China Model’, Testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 13 March 2020, p. 2, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/USCCTestimony3-13-20%20(Elizabeth%20Economy)_justified.pdf.
18 See Charles Edel and David Shullman, ‘How China Exports Authoritarianism’, Foreign Affairs, 16 September 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-09-16/how-china-exports-authoritarianism.
19 Hal Brands, ‘Democracy vs Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes Great-power Conflict’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 5, October– November 2018, p. 62.
20 Wang Jisi, ‘The Plot Against China?’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, no. 4, July/ August 2021, pp. 48–57.
21 Ibid.
22 See The World Bank and The Development Research Center of the State Council, ‘Four Decades of Poverty Reduction in China: Drivers, Insights for the World, and the Way Ahead’, World Bank Group, 2022, p. ix, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/e9a5bc3c-718d-57d8-9558-ce325407f737/content.
23 See, for example, Rayham Ahmad Khafaji, ‘Al-wujūd al-sīnī fī al-sharq al-awsat: al-ālīyāt wal-hudūd’ [China’s presence in the Middle East: mechanisms and limits], Al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi, vol. 45, no. 522, August 2022, pp. 22–37.
24 While much of this evidence is anecdotal, it is consistent and strong. The Arab Barometer project conducted a 2021 survey that asked respondents in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia which country has a reputation for ‘building the highest quality’. Germany led in every country, the United States and China were equal in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia, and the United States prevailed in the remainder. See Arab Barometer, ‘Fragile Popularity: Arab Attitudes Towards China’, 15 December 2021, https://www.arabbarometer.org/2021/12/fragile-popularity-arab-attitudes-towards-china/.
25 World Bank, ‘Employment in Industry – China, Egypt, Arab Rep.’, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.IND.EMPL.ZS?locations=CN-EG.
26 See Mohamed El Dahshan, ‘Egyptian Exceptionalism in a Chinese-led World’, Chatham House, 10 February 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/02/egyptian-exceptionalism-chinese-led-world.
27 ‘China’s Wisdom Prevails in the Middle East: Former Egyptian Diplomat’, Global Times, 1 July 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202207/1270694.shtml.
28 Author interview with businessperson with academic and government background, Cairo, Egypt, 16 March 2022.
29 Author interview with business-person, Cairo, Egypt, 17 March 2022.
30 Author interview with senior government official involved in economic development, Cairo, Egypt, 17 March 2022.
31 Author interview with business-person, Cairo, Egypt, 17 March 2022; and interview with senior government official involved in economic development, Cairo, Egypt, 17 March 2022.
32 See ‘Chinese Company to Construct Cairo’s Sixth Metro Line’, Egyptian Streets, 2 January 2016, https://egyptianstreets.com/2016/01/02/chinese-company-to-construct-cairos-sixth-metro-line/.
33 See Alicja Siekierska, ‘Bombardier Signs Agreement with Egypt to Develop Proposal for New Cairo Metro Line’, Financial Post, 12 July 2017, https://financialpost.com/transportation/bombardier-ssigns-agreement-with-egypt-to-develop-proposal-for-new-cairo-metro-line/wcm/e02a9b95-99a1-4ce1-b2fe-7aa142d6b1a3.
34 Author interview with business-person, Cairo, Egypt, 17 March 2022.
35 Author interview with businessperson with academic and government background, Cairo, Egypt, 16 March 2022.
36 Author interview with business-person, Cairo, Egypt, 17 March 2022.
37 Wilson B. Bishai, ‘Review of Ragaei el-Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 468, July 1983, p. 249.
38 Ibid, p. 257.
39 See Martin Hvidt, ‘The Dubai Model: An Outline of Key Developmentprocess Elements in Dubai’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 41, no. 3, August 2009, pp. 397–418.
40 See Jill Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 19–20.
41 Author interview with Dubai think-tank scholar, 4 November 2021.
42 Author interview with senior Arab League official, 16 March 2022.
43 Robert Zoellick, ‘Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?’, Remarks to the National Committee on US–China Relations, US Department of State, 21 September 2005, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm.
44 Author interview with US military veteran, 24 January 2023.
45 See Jon B. Alterman, ‘What the Red Sea Crisis Reveals About China’s Middle East Strategy’, Foreign Policy, 14 February 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/14/red-sea-crisis-china-middle-east-strategy-egypt-yemen/.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Jon B. Alterman
Jon B. Alterman is senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). This article is drawn from a longer CSIS study that will be published at www.csis.org.