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Abstract
The emergence of nuclear tripolarity among the United States, Russia and China presents important challenges for the credibility of US security assurances. The three central challenges are to synchronise assurances to allies across diverse geographic theatres, resolve ambiguities in assurances to nuclear adversaries, and curtail global proliferation stemming from the looming normalisation of nuclear weapons as tools of statecraft. Overall, the United States and its allies need to appreciate the interconnected nature of various types of assurances to anticipate unintended consequences arising from prioritising one type over others.
Notes
1 See Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, ‘Strategic Non-nuclear Weapons and the Onset of a Third Nuclear Age’, European Journal of International Security, vol. 6, no. 3, February 2021, pp. 257–77.
2 See US Department of Defense, ‘2022 Nuclear Posture Review’, p. 4, available at https://armscontrolcenter.org/2022-nuclear-posture-review/.
3 See Center for Global Security Research, ‘China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy’, Spring 2023, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_Two_Peer_230314.pdf; and Heather Williams et al., ‘Project Atom 2023: A Competitive Strategies Approach for U.S. Nuclear Posture Through 2035’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2023, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-09/230929_Williams_ProjectAtom_2023.pdf.
4 See Jeffrey W. Knopf (ed.), Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
5 See Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era’, in Vipin Narang and Scott D. Sagan (eds), The Fragile Balance of Terror (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2023), pp. 12–38.
6 See US Department of Defense, ‘2022 Nuclear Posture Review’, p. 4.
7 See Talmadge, ‘Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era’.
8 See Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘Varieties of Assurance’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 3, April 2012, pp. 375–99.
9 See Heather Williams et al., ‘Alternative Nuclear Futures: Capability and Credibility Challenges for U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2023, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-05/230508_Williams_AlternativeNuclearFutures.pdf.
10 See US Department of Defense, ‘2022 Nuclear Posture Review’, pp. 3, 8, 11, 14. See also Alexander Mattelaer, ‘Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence: A European Perspective’, CSDS Policy Brief 13/2022, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, 23 May 2022, https://brussels-school.be/sites/default/files/CSDS%20Policy%20brief_2213.pdf; and Adam Mount, ‘The US and South Korea: The Trouble with Nuclear Assurance’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 2, April–May 2023, pp. 123–40.
11 See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, revised ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 4, 74. See also Matthew D. Cebul, Allan Dafoe and Nuno P. Monteiro, ‘Coercion and the Credibility of Assurances’, Journal of Politics, vol. 83, no. 3, July 2021, pp. 975–91; and Thomas J. Christensen et al., ‘How to Avoid a War Over Taiwan’, Foreign Affairs, 13 October 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/how-avoid-war-over-taiwan.
12 US Department of Defense, ‘2022 Nuclear Posture Review’, p. 9.
13 See Williams et al., ‘Alternative Nuclear Futures’, in which the term ‘synchronisation challenge’ was coined.
14 See Talmadge, ‘Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era’.
15 See Knopf, ‘Varieties of Assurance’; and Knopf, Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation.
16 On the distinction between horizontal and vertical proliferation, see Benoît Pélopidas, Repenser les choix nucléaires (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2022).
17 See M. Eliane Bunn, ‘Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Assuring Allies’, in Charles Glaser, Austin Long and Brian Radzinsky (eds), Managing U.S. Nuclear Operations in the 21st Century (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2022), pp. 166–94.
18 See Glenn H. Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, July 1984, pp. 461–95.
19 See Robert Jervis, ‘Deterrence and Perception’, International Security, vol. 7, no. 3, Winter 1982–83, pp. 3–30.
20 Heather Williams, Tailored Assurance: Balancing Deterrence and Disarmament in Responding to NATO–Russia Tensions (Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, 2018), p. 14. See also Iain Henry, Reliability and Alliance Interdependence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022), p. 173.
21 See Bunn, ‘Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Assuring Allies’.
22 See Tongfi Kim and Luis Simón, ‘A Reputation Versus Prioritization Trade-off: Unpacking Allied Perceptions of US Extended Deterrence in Distant Regions’, Security Studies, vol. 30, no. 5, December 2021, pp. 725–60.
23 See Tongfi Kim and Luis Simón, ‘Power and Perceptions: How Allies View America’s Reputation and Prioritisation After Ukraine’, CSDS Policy Brief 16/2023, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, 31 May 2023, https://csds.vub.be/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/CSDS-Policy-brief_2316.pdf.
24 This does not necessarily apply to conventional capabilities. See, for example, Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Spindel, ‘Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention’, Security Studies, vol. 27, no. 4, July 2018, pp. 575–606.
25 See Kim and Simón, ‘Power and Perceptions’; and Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Primacy and Punishment: US Grand Strategy, Maritime Power, and Military Options to Manage Decline’, Security Studies, vol. 29, no. 4, August 2020, pp. 769–96.
26 Henry, Reliability and Alliance Interdependence, p. 17.
27 See Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, ‘Sole Purpose Is Not No First Use: Nuclear Weapons and Declaratory Policy’, War on the Rocks, 22 February 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/sole-purpose-is-not-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-and-declaratory-policy/.
28 See Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, ‘United States Nuclear Forces, 2020’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 76, no. 1, January 2020, pp. 46–60; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence’, International Security, vol. 41, no. 4, Spring 2017, pp. 9–49.
29 See Dallas Boyd, ‘Challenging Nuclear Bromides’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 5, October–November 2023, pp. 75–94.
30 See ibid.; and Charles L. Glaser, James M. Acton and Steve Fetter, ‘The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Can Deter Both China and Russia’, Foreign Affairs, 5 October 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/us-nuclear-arsenal-can-deter-both-china-and-russia.
31 See Center for Global Security Research, ‘China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer’.
32 See Glaser, Acton and Fetter, ‘The US Nuclear Arsenal Can Deter Both China and Russia’.
33 See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002).
34 See Talmadge, ‘Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era’, p. 23.
35 US Department of Defense, ‘2022 Nuclear Posture Review’, p. 6. See also Brad Roberts, ‘Tripolar Stability: The Future of Nuclear Relations Among the United States, Russia, and China’, IDA Paper P-3727, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2002, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA409682.pdf; and Talmadge, ‘Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era’, p. 23.
36 See Talmadge, ‘Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era’.
37 See Brendan R. Green, The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), pp. 21–3; and Talmadge, ‘Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era’, p. 25.
38 See Paul Avey, ‘Just Like Yesterday? New Critiques of the Nuclear Revolution’, Texas National Security Review, vol. 6, no. 2, Spring 2023, pp. 9–31.
39 See Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, ‘Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Pacific During the Second Nuclear Age’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham Denmark and Travis Tanner (eds), Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014); and Talmadge, ‘Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era’, p. 25.
40 See Richard Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987); Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020); Earl C. Ravenal, ‘Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection’, International Security, vol. 6, no. 4, Spring 1982, pp. 26–43; and Erich Weede, ‘Some (Western) Dilemmas in Managing Extended Deterrence’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 22, no. 3, September 1985, pp. 223–38.
41 See Mark Bell, Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-armed States Behave (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2023), pp. 144–5; and Francis Gavin, Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020), p. 95.
42 See ‘Book Review Roundtable: The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution 30 Years Later’, Texas National Security Review, 30 April 2020, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-roundtable-the-meaning-of-the-nuclear-revolution-30-years-later/; Brendan Green and Austin Long, ‘The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance’, Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 4, October 2017, pp. 606–41; Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution; and Weede, ‘Some (Western) Dilemmas in Managing Extended Deterrence’.
43 See ‘Book Review Roundtable’.
44 See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
45 See Anna Clara Arndt, Liviu Horovitz and Lydia Wachs, ‘The US “Sole Purpose” Debate: A Backgrounder’, SWP Working Paper no. 3, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2021; and Brad Roberts, ‘On Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament: Past Lessons, Future Prospects’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2019, pp. 7–30.
46 See George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, ‘Security Assurances to Non-nuclear-weapons States’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 1, no. 1, Fall 1993, p. 13. See also Virginia Foran (ed.), Security Assurances: Implications for the NPT and Beyond (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); and US Department of State, ‘Secretary Anthony J. Blinken’s Remarks to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference’, 1 August 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinkens-remarks-to-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference/.
47 See Joseph F. Pilat, ‘Reassessing Security Assurances in a Unipolar World’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, Spring 2005, pp. 159–70.
48 See George Bunn, ‘The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-nuclear Weapon States’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 4, no. 3, Spring–Summer 1997, pp. 1–17; and Pilat, ‘Reassessing Security Assurances in a Unipolar World’.
49 See Pilat, ‘Reassessing Security Assurances in a Unipolar World’.
50 See Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil, ‘Alliances and Nuclear Risk: Strengthening US Extended Deterrence’, Survival, vol. 64, no. 1, February–March 2022, pp. 77–98; and Knopf, ‘Varieties of Assurance’, p. 389.
51 Knopf, ‘Varieties of Assurance’, p. 389.
52 See Paul Meyer and Tom Sauer, ‘The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign of Global Impatience’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 2, April–May 2018, pp. 61–72.
53 See Knopf, Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation.
5 See Mount, ‘The US and South Korea’; and Lauren Sukin and Toby Dalton, 'Reducing Nuclear Salience: How to Reassure Northeast Asian Allies', Washington Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2021, pp. 143-58. For a related argument, see Ariel E. Levite, 'Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited', International Security, vol. 27, no. J, Winter 2oo2/oJ, pp.59-88.
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Linde Desmaele
Linde Desmaele is a post-doctoral fellow in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a senior associate researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at Vrije Universiteit Brussel.