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ABSTRACT
In recent years, scholars have grappled with the risks and conditions of nuclear-conventional entanglement. One of the examples of entanglement discussed in the academic literature is U.S. nuclear command and control satellites, which have historically served both nuclear and conventional missions. From 2017 to 2019, the U.S. Air Force made a series of programmatic decisions that would, at least in part, reverse this entanglement, separating nuclear from non-nuclear spacecraft. This reversal of nuclear-conventional entanglement in outer space poses strategic consequences, but it was less a strategic choice made by U.S. leadership than the result of acquisition reforms and bureaucratic dynamics.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Frederic Agardy, Aaron Bateman, Robin Dickey, Timothy McDonnell, Jamie Morin, and John Orem for reviewing and offering insights on the draft.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Author contribution
Robert Samuel Wilson is a Systems Directors at Aerospace’s Center for Space Policy & Strategy, and Russell Rumbaugh is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller.
Notes
1 Paul Stares, ‘Space and US national security’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 6/2 (1983), 40–42.
2 U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review’, Feb. 2018, pp. 56–57.
3 James M. Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War’, International Security 43/1 (Aug. 2018), 63–65.
4 For scholarship on nuclear-conventional entanglement, see: See: Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 1991); David C. Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing? The dimensions, drivers, and risks of nuclear-conventional entanglement in China’, The Journal of Strategic Studies (2020), 1–52; Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 56–99; Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States’, International Security 41/4 (Spring 2017), 50–92; Joshua Rovner, ‘Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/5 (2017), 696–730; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Dangerous Confidence: Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation’, International Security 44/2 (Fall 2019), 61–109; Wu Riqiang, ‘Assessing China-U.S. Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation’, International Security 46/3 (Winter 2021/2022), 128–162; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and U.S.-China Security Relations’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (August 2012), 453–471; Nina Tannenwald and James M. Acton, Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Emerging Risks and Declining Norms in the Age of Technological Innovation and Changing Nuclear Doctrines, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences 2018), 32–52; and Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control’, Foreign Affairs, (Nov/Dec. 2018); and Tong Zhao and Li Bin, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement: A Chinese Perspective’, in James M. Acton, (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2017), 47–75.
5 Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland, Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, (Strategic Studies Institute 2012), ix.
6 Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ p. 51.
7 This article adopts a narrow definition of disaggregation. Besides separating nuclear and non-nuclear spacecraft, the term disaggregation is also often used to describe adding more spacecraft to conduct the same mission, regardless of whether nuclear or non-nuclear. Instead of relying on fewer large and complex systems, this approach emphasizes higher numbers of small and modular systems. See, for example, GAO-14-328T, ‘Space Acquisitions: Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but Challenges persist for Current and Future Programs’, Government Accountability Office (Mar. 2014). This use of disaggregation has receded as proliferated architectures have changed the scale from dozens of additional spacecraft to thousands. For the purposes of this article, disaggregation refers strictly to the separation of nuclear and non-nuclear spacecraft.
8 This article adopts the language used by the U.S. Department of Defense for military satellite communications systems. Strategic satellite communications are designed to provide nuclear-survivable communications capabilities for U.S. leadership and U.S. nuclear forces, such as ballistic missile submarines. Tactical satellites are designed to provide higher-bandwidth communications to and from deployed conventional forces, such as Army brigade combat teams and conventionally armed attack submarines.
9 This paper discusses the disaggregation of strategic communications spacecraft; it does not discuss missile warning space assets, the other core element of space-based nuclear command and control.
More abstractly, a weapon or effect could be construed as ‘strategic’ even if it is not ‘nuclear’. Theoretically, the mission of strategic communications satellites could expand to non-nuclear forces and for environments degraded by non-nuclear effects. Nevertheless, the next generation of strategic communications satellites will be dramatically more disaggregated than its predecessors, even if it does occasionally support non-nuclear forces. For more on the strategic-non-nuclear debate, see Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, ‘Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age’, European Journal of International Security, 6/3 (Aug 2021), 257–277; and James Acton, ‘Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, pp. 1–149.
10 GAO-21-520T, ‘Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges and Opportunities with Acquiring Space Systems in a Changing Environment’, Government Accountability Office, (May 2021), p. 10. See also, U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, ‘The Future of DoD SATCOM: Delivering Fighting SATCOM’, Milsat Magazine, (Apr. 2019); and Sandra Erwin, ‘U.S. to ramp up spending on classified communications satellites’, SpaceNews (1 May 2022).
11 David C. Logan wrote an article on China’s entanglement of its nuclear- and conventional-armed missiles that, among other things, examines the implications of such entanglement and assesses how it came about. This article seeks to address similar issues for the U.S. decision to disaggregate military satellite communications systems. Logan suggests entanglement of its missiles may not have been a strategic choice for China; this article suggests the disaggregation of U.S. space systems may not have been a strategic choice for U.S. leadership either. See: Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 1–52.
12 See, for example: Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 57–58; Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p. 2; Acton, Entanglement: Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, 1.
13 See, for example: Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ pp. 57–64; Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 6–12; Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 61–66, 82–92; and Zhao and Li, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement’, pp. 51–55.
14 Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 4–22.
15 See, for example: Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ pp. 57–64; Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 13–15; Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 67–82; Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’, pp. 460–461; and Zhao and Li, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement’, pp. 55–58.
16 Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ p. 63.
17 See, for example: Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 58–60; Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’, pp, 453–467; Zhao and Li, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement’, pp. 47–51; Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p. 5; Rovner, ‘Two kinds of catastrophe’, pp. 702–706.
18 Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p. 13.
19 See Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History 2015), 213–280, 442–449; A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC: National Defense UP 1986), 71–127; David S. Yost, ‘The history of NATO theater nuclear force policy: Key findings from the Sandia conference’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 15/2 (June 1992), 231.
20 Carter, Forging the Shield, 40–287.
21 Nichols, Stuart, and McCausland, Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, viii.
22 Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Josef Schulze, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A Response to an American Proposal for Renouncing the First Use of Nuclear Weapons’, Foreign Affairs(Summer 1982), pp. 159–160; Nichols, Stuart, and McCausland, Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, xv. For debate on this issue, see James M. Garrett, ‘Nuclear weapons for the battlefield: Deterrent or fantasy?’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 10/2 (1987), 168–188.
23 U.S. Space Force Space Operations Command, ‘Fact Sheet – Milstar Satellite Communications Systems (Milstar)’, Aug. 2021; U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF), As of FY 2021 President’s Budget’, Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval, pp. 7–44.
24 Space Force, ‘Fact Sheet – Milstar Satellite Communications Systems’; Department of Defense, ‘Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite’, pp. 7–44.
25 John R. Hoehn, ‘Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Modernization’, Congressional Research Service (8 Dec 2020); GAO/NSIAD-99-2, ‘Military Satellite Communications: Concerns With Milstar’s Support for Strategic and Tactical Forces’, Government Accountability Office (Nov 1998).
26 For example, see Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, ‘The Future of DoD SATCOM’; Erwin, ‘U.S. to ramp up spending on classified communications satellites’.
27 Interview with Frederic Agardy, who for 17 years has served as the Chief Architect for U.S. military satellite communications at The Aerospace Corporation, a portfolio that includes ESS and PTS (May 2023).
28 U.S. Department of the Air Force, ‘Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 23 Budget Estimates – Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation, Space Force’, (Apr. 2022), pp. 215–237, 499.
29 Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, p. 95. As another example, a CSIS 2021 report says: ‘An adversary may not be able to distinguish between satellites that are intended for different missions, and even if such differences are disclosed, an adversary may not trust this distinction and attack both anyway’. See: Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Makena Young, ‘Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space: Protecting Space Systems from Counterspace Weapons’, Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Feb. 2021), p. 11.
30 Elbridge Colby, ‘From Sanctuary to Battlefield: A Framework for U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space’, Center for a New American Security, (Jan. 2016), pp. 21–22.
31 See, for example: Rovner, ‘Two kinds of catastrophe’, pp. 700–714; Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 13–15; Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ pp. 50–52; and Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’, pp. 460–461.
32 Rebecca Reesman and James R. Wilson, ‘The Physics of Space War: How Orbital Dynamics Constrain Space-to-Space Engagements’, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation (Oct. 2020), pp. 14–15.
33 James A. Vedda and Peter L. Hays, ‘Major Policy Issues in Evolving Global Space Operations’, The Aerospace Corporation and Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, (Feb. 2018), pp. 44–45. For other examples of proximity operations and capabilities in space, see Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson (ed.) ‘Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment’, Secure World Foundation, (Apr. 2023), and Kaitlyn Johnson, Thomas G. Roberts, and Brian Weedon, ‘Mitigating Noncooperative RPOs in Geosynchonous Orbit’, Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower and Spacepower, 1/4 (Winter 2022).
34 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Challenges to Security in Space’, (Mar. 2022), pp. 18–29.
35 Reesman and Wilson, ‘The Physics of Space War’, pp. 14–15.
36 Reesman and Wilson, ‘The Physics of Space War’, p. 15.
37 James Acton and Thomas MacDonald, ‘Nuclear Command-and-Control Satellites Should Be Off Limits’, Defense One, 10 Dec. 2021.
38 HASC No. 114–110, ‘House Armed Services Committee Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services; Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Hearing on Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request for National Security Space’, (15 Mar. 2016).
39 HASC No. 114–110.
40 HASC No. 114–110.
41 HASC No. 114–110.
42 There is no universal definition of an attack in space; however, it could include physical strikes, electronic warfare, and cyber-attacks. A noted by Aaron Bateman, during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had not even defined ‘interference’ with respect to space systems. See: Aaron Bateman, ‘Mutually assured surveillance at risk: Anti-satellite weapons and cold war arms control’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 45/1 (Jan. 2022), 7–11.
43 AFD-130821-034, ‘Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures’, U.S. Air Force Space Command, (2013).
44 Tom Risen, ‘Disaggregation’, Aerospace America, Apr. 2017.
45 ‘Fast Space: Leveraging Ultra Low-Cost Space Access For 21st Century Challenges’, Air University, (13 Jan. 2017), p. 8. For another example of this argument, see Harrison, ‘The Future of Milsatcom’, p. 38.
46 For example, a 2021 CSIS report notes the debate without supporting a specific argument. Against disaggregation, it says, ‘disaggregation of strategic and tactical missions may make attacking the tactical system in a conventional conflict more attractive if the risk of strategic escalation is reduced’. In support of disaggregation, it says: ‘If the strategic and tactical payloads are disaggregated into separate space systems, an adversary could target the tactical system only and leave the strategic system unharmed if it does not want to risk nuclear escalation’. See: Harrison, Johnson, and Young, ‘Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space’, pp. 11–12.
47 HASC No. 114–110.
48 Documentary evidence shows that space was never considered outside of the fray of competing states, including attacks on space assets, despite the assertions of these pieces. See: Robin Dickey, ‘The Rise and Fall of Space Sanctuary in U.S. Policy’, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation, (1 Sept. 2020).
49 In 2017, Todd Harrison estimated and compared the costs of three different military satellite communications systems: AEHF, Wideband Global Satcom, and the Mobile User Objective System. See Todd Harrison, ‘The Future of Milsatcom’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, (2013), p.17.
50 Ron Burch, ‘The Case for Disaggregation of U.S. MILSATCOM’, IEEE MILCOM 2011 Military Communications Conference, (Nov. 2011).
51 See: Institute for Defense Analysis Paper P-2857, ‘Estimating the Costs of Nuclear-Radiation-Hardened Military Satellites’, (Nov. 1994); Testimony of Mr. Gordon K. Soper, Group Vice President, Defense Group, Inc. in Hearing, House Small Business Committee, Subcommittee on Government Programs and Oversight, (1 June 1999); Paul Nordin, ‘Other Hostile Environments’, in Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz (ed.), Space Mission Design and Analysis 2nd ed., (Microcosm Inc. and Kluwer Academic Publishers: 1992), 226.
52 Air Force Space Command, ‘Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures’.
53 Dax Linville and Robert A. Bettinger, ‘An Argument against Satellite Resiliency: Simplicity in the Face of Modern Satellite Design’, Air and Space Power Journal (Spring 2020).
54 Burch, ‘The Case for Disaggregation of U.S. MILSATCOM’.
55 Katherine Wagner, ‘Optimization of Disaggregated Space Systems Using the Disaggregated Integral Systems Concept Optimization Technology Methodology’, unpublished dissertation, (June 2020).
56 Thomas D. Taverney, ‘Resilient, disaggregated, and mixed constellations’, The Space Review, (29 Aug. 2011).
57 Even when these arguments were being made, there were skeptics these advantages would be achieved, equating disaggregation with other past claims that doing things differently would be both better and cheaper simultaneously. See: Loren Thompson, ‘Satellite Disaggregation: The Space Community’s Newest Way of Wasting Money’, Lexington Institute, (8 Feb. 2013).
58 Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, p. 92; Zhao and Li, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement’, p. 68.
59 Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, p. 24.
60 Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, p. 8.
61 Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, p. 30.
62 Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, p. 35.
63 Sandra I. Erwin, ‘Pentagon Undecided on Future Path for Space Systems’, National Defense Magazine, 22 Apr. 2014.
64 This study was officially called the ‘Protected Satellite Communications Services Analysis of Alternatives Follow-on for Resilience (PAFR) Study’.
65 Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, p. 38.
66 Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, pp. 39–41 (citing November 2016 draft Programmatic Decision Memorandum).
67 Douglas W. Burbey, Mindy Gabbert and Kathryn Bailey, ‘Middle-tier acquisition authority features flexible prototype and fielding options’, Army AL&T Magazine, (12 Sept. 2019).
68 GAO-19-439, ‘Leadership Attention Needed to Effectively Implement Changes to Acquisition Oversight’, Government Accountability Office, (June 2019), p. 26.
69 DOD Inspector General Report No. DODIG-202 1–131, ‘Audit of Department of Defense Middle Tier of Acquisition Rapid Prototyping and Rapid Fielding Programs’, (28 Sept. 20210), p. 4.
70 GAO-21-222, ‘Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Updated Program Oversight Approach Needed’, Government Accountability Office’, (June 2021), p. 29.
71 DOD Inspector General Report No. DODIG-2020-109, ‘Special Report: Lessons Learned for Department of Defense Acquisition Officials During Acquisition Reform’, (31 July 2020), p. 10.
72 Aaron Mehta, ‘Policy shift: DoD is pushing major program management back to the military’, Defense News, (11 Dec. 2017).
73 GAO-19-439, p. 13.
74 The FY 2018 president’s budget also initiated the Midterm Polar MILSATCOM System (MPS) and the Protected Tactical Enterprise System (PTES) in line with DOD direction. MPS would ensure XDR payloads over the polar regions when the existing systems aged out. PTES would be a ground system to process the protected tactical waveform transmitted over Wideband Global Satellites.
75 Air Force FY18 RDT&E Budget Justification, Vol II, (2017) p. 323; and Air Force FY19 RDT&E Budget Justification, Vol II, (2018) p. 37.
76 Air Force FY20 RDT&E Budget Justification, Vol II, (2019), p. 471.
77 A standard argument in the bureaucratic politics literature is organizations seek autonomy to favor approaches that advance their own interests, not their political masters even when those approaches may not be the most effective way to achieve the organization’s stated mission. See: Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928, (Princeton University Press: 2002) and James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, (Basic Books, 1989), pp. 179–194. Given that that the power to use strategic capabilities, such as nuclear weapons, rests with the heads of state, disaggregating strategic communications satellites would imply a broader sphere of autonomy for organizations operating space forces. The disaggregated strategic system would remain the purview of the highest levels of leadership, but the disaggregated tactical system would reasonably be delegated to military agents. It is notable that the most vocal advocates for disaggregation were also advocates for greater autonomy for space forces. For the correlation between disaggregation advocates and advocacy for greater autonomy for space forces, see Doug Loverro, ‘Why the United States needs a Space Force’, Space News, (June 26, 2018); John Hyten, ‘Thoughts on National Security Space Organization’, Letter to House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, (11 Jan. 2017); and Alison Snyder and Andrew Freedman, ‘NASA administrator throws support behind Trump’s “Space Force”’, Axios, (27 June 2018).
78 Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p. 1. As another example, Edward Hampshire argues that the controversial UK 1981 Defence Review, which dramatically cut the capabilities of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet, was as much based on assumptions and perceptions of key decision-makers as it was based on strategic and budgetary factors. See Edward Hampshire, ‘Strategic and Budgetary Necessity, or Decision-making “Along the Grain”? The Royal Navy and the 1981 Defence Review’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 39/7 (2016), 956–978.
79 Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p.35.
80 Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p.36.
81 See, for example: Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 14–15; Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 93–94.
82 ‘Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 23 Budget Estimates’, pp. 215–237.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Robert Samuel Wilson
Robert Samuel Wilson is a Systems Director for the Center for Space Policy and Strategy at The Aerospace Corporation. In this role, he leads work on the convergence of nuclear weapons and outer space. Wilson has authored papers covering the technical characteristics of the broader missile environment, the effect of space technologies on nuclear proliferation, and the U.S. hypersonic missile debate, among other issues. His work has appeared or been covered in The Washington Post, The Financial Times, Politico, and The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, among other outlets. Prior to joining Aerospace, Wilson served as a senior defense analyst at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. There, he led reports on strategic force structure; arms control; and nuclear command, control, and communications.
Russell Rumbaugh
Russell Rumbaugh is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller. Prior to taking this role and while writing this article, he served as Systems Director for the Center for Space Policy and Strategy at The Aerospace Corporation, where he was responsible for conducting projects and research on how institutional defense policy affects U.S. operations in space. Rumbaugh has had multiple stints in the Pentagon and Congress. He was also the director of the Stimson Center’s budgeting for foreign affairs and defense program. In his time at Stimson, he published work in Foreign Affairs, Joint Force Quarterly, and The New York Times. He has also served as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, teaching graduate seminars on U.S. defense budgets and planning.