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ABSTRACT
Britain initiated its Skynet satellite communications program in 1966 to provide assured connectivity with its forces across the world. Using recently declassified documents, this article reframes the history of British space activities by elucidating how the requirements for flexible and secure defense communications shaped U.K. space policy during the Cold War. Although Skynet inaugurated a communications revolution, it was the product of the longstanding British priority of possessing global information networks under sovereign control. In the Space Age, however, Britain had to reconcile its desire for an autonomous satellite communications network with the reality that American assistance was vital.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 ‘Annex A’ in ‘Outline Defence Communications Network Plan 1968–72, February 1, 1967, FCO 19/9, TNA.
2 For an overview of submarine cables and the British Empire, see Paul Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914’, The English Historical Review, vol. 86, no. 341 (1971); Daniel Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Bruce Hunt, Imperial Science: Cable Telegraphy and Electrical Physics in the Victorian British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).
3 As will be detailed below, Skynet functioned, in effect, as the British segment of the American defense satellite communications network. Skynet satellites were interoperable with American hardware.
4 These difficulties were not unique to satellite communications. John Krige has detailed the complexities of Anglo-American cooperation in centrifuge technologies, see John Krige, ‘Hybrid Knowledge: The Transnational Co-Production of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment in the 1960s’, British Journal for the History of Science vol. 45, no. 3 (2012) and John Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016), 119–149.
5 Charles Hill, A Vertical Empire: The History of the UK Rocket and Space Programme 1950–1971 (London: Imperial College Press, 2001). For works on the early history of U.K. space policy see, Neil Whyte and Philip Gummett, ‘The Military and Early United Kingdom Space Policy’, Contemporary Record, vol. 8 no. 2 (1994); Neil Whyte and Philip Gummett, ‘Far Beyond the Bounds of Science: The Making of the United Kingdom’s First Space Policy’, Minerva, vol. 35, nol. 2 (1997).
6 For an overview of the role of national security space technologies in Anglo-American relations, see Aaron Bateman, ‘Keeping the Technological Edge: The Space Arms Race and Anglo-American Relations in the 1980s’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 33, no. 2 (2022).
7 Information security here encompasses the physical infrastructure for securely transmitting sensitive data as well as encryption.
8 For background see Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914’, and Headrick, The Invisible Weapon, 75–78.
9 Quoted in Whyte and Gummett, UK Space Policy, 142.
10 Matthew Jones, The Official History of the U.K. Nuclear Deterrent (Volume I): From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964 (New York: Routledge, 2017), 444.
11 Whyte and Gummet, UK Space Policy, 142
12 Ibid., 148
13 Ibid., 152
14 Hill, A Vertical Empire, 93–107.
15 ‘TAT-1 Opening Ceremony, September 25, 1956’, History of the Atlantic & Undersea Communications, https://atlantic-cable.com/Cables/1956TAT–1/.
16 David J. Whalen, The Origins of Satellite Communications: 1945–1965 (Washington D.C. – Smithsonian Press, 2002), 46–48.
17 Hugh Slotten, Beyond Sputnik and the Space Race: The Origins of Global Satellite Communications (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022), 63.
18 Ibid., 77
19 Ibid., 151
20 Ibid., 152
21 Ibid
22 Quoted in a lecture entitled, ‘Telegraphic Communications’, 1937, MS. Marconi 240, Marconi Archives, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University.
23 For an overview of the role of cables in U.K. defense strategy in WWI, see Jonathan Winkler, ‘Information Warfare in World War I’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 73, no. 3 (2009).
24 For a comprehensive history of U.K. codebreaking in WWII, see John Ferris, Behind the Enigma: The Authorized History of GCHQ, Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020), 223–264.
25 For a history of Britain’s secure speech system, see Richard Aldrich, ‘Whitehall Wiring: The Communications-Electronics Security Group and the Struggle for Secure Speech, Public Policy and Administration, vol. 28, no. 2 (2012).
26 ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) Defence Satellite Communications’, July 27, 1973, DEFE 13/669, TNA.
27 The British Joint Intelligence Committee had determined in 1959 that the Soviet Union possessed the capabilities to interfere with submarine cable communications and to jam wireless transmissions. See Michael Goodman and Huw Dylan, ‘British Intelligence and the Fear of a Soviet Attack on Allied Communications. Cryptologia, 4, vol. 40, no. 1 (2016).
28 The U.S. government created the Defense Communications Agency in 1960 to centrally manage U.S. strategic communications networks, see ‘The Creation of DCA: 1947–1960’, DISA, https://www.disa.mil/about/our-history.
29 ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) Defence Satellite Communications’, July 27, 1973, DEFE 13/669, TNA.
30 ‘Annex – proposed amendments to CISG (61)23’, undated, CAB 21/5408, U.K. National Archives (TNA hereafter).
31 Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 75–78.
32 David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar: The U.S. Air Force and the Challenges of Military Satellite Communications’, in Beyond the Ionosphere, ed. Andrew Butrica (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 67.
33 Note by MoD and MOA in consultation with GPO, ‘Feasibility of Using Intelsat for Military Communications’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.
34 Spires and Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar’, 67.
35 A satellite could provide eleven tactical-quality voice circuits or five commercial-quality voice circuits, see Spires and Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar’, 67.
36 ‘Letter from McNamara to Thorneycroft’, October 14, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
37 Memo from Healey to the PM, ‘Strategic Implications of Space’, November 6, 1964, CAB 21/5445, TNA.
38 ‘Report of the Space Review Committee’, September 1965, DEFE 68/83, TNA.
39 Notably, the Bondi report underscored Britain’s limited ambitions in space. Clearly, due to the enormous costs associated with space technologies, U.K. officials preferred to leverage Britain’s relationship with the United States to get access to space services.
40 Draft of Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.
41 Britain would retain its relay station in Nairobi until 1966, see memo from chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘Collaboration with the Americans in Military Satellite Communications’, October 26, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
42 Memo from CDS to secretary of state for defence, ‘Military Satellite Communications’, October 20, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
43 G. Plowden, ‘Report of the Bondi Committee’, August 10, 1965, CAB 21/5445, TNA.
44 Ibid
45 ‘Wireless and Cables’, December 3, year illegible, MS. Marconi 240, Marconi Archives, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University. For an overview of the Imperial Wireless Chain, see Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 130.
46 Draft of Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.
47 Ibid; letter from Healey to McNamara, ‘Military satellite Communications’, November 9, 1964, DEFE 13/389, TNA; ‘Memorandum for Secretary of State’, March 23, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
48 Memorandum for P.D. Nairne, ‘Background Notes’, February 24, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA. Notably, McNamara was the key U.S. official overseeing negotiations with Britain concerning defense satellite communications. It is not clear to what extent, if any, other senior officials in the Johnson administration were involved.
49 ‘Memorandum for secretary of state’, March 23, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
50 Memorandum for the PM, ‘Commonwealth Telecommunications Conference’, May 22, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
51 ‘Memorandum from Tilling (GPO) to 10 Downing’, June 1, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
52 Slotten, Beyond Sputnik, 150
53 ‘Letter from G.H. Green to the private secretary for the secretary of state for defence’, October 15, 1965, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
54 Letter from Healey to McNamara, ‘Satellite Communications’, January 6, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
55 ‘Letter from McNamara to Healey’, January 27, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
56 Memorandum for the secretary of state, ‘US/UK satellite communications talking points’, April 26, 1966, DEFE 13/389, TNA.
57 Note on the Negotiations in Washington 21st/24th March, 1966, April 20, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.
58 ‘Note on the Negotiations in Washington 21st/24th March, 1966’, April 20, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.
59 Ibid
60 ‘Interim U.K. Defence Satellite Communications System’, June 7, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.
61 For an overview of de Gaulle’s decision, see Garret Martin, ‘The 1967 Withdrawal from NATO – A Cornerstone of de Gaulle’s Grand Strategy’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9, 232–243 (2011).
62 For background on the British rationale for withdrawal from ELDO, see John Krige, Angelina Long Callahan, and Ashok Maharaj, NASA in the World: Fifty Years of Collaboration in Space (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 59–63.
63 Britain’s pull back from space cooperation with European allies after its failed attempts to enter the European Economic Community in 1963 and 1967 made partnering with the United States on space projects even more vital.
64 John Krige details the U.S. aim to use space cooperation as a means of ‘positive disarmament’. See chapter 4 in John Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe: U.S. Technological Collaboration and Non-Proliferation (Cambridge: MIT, 2016).
65 ‘Editorial Note’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues.
66 Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe, 116.
67 Ibid
68 ‘Report on US/UK Discussions on UK Military Communications Satellite Requirements’, March 21–28, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.
69 ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defense Communications Satellite Project’, June 2, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.
70 Jonathan Winkler, Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 195–197
71 ‘UK/US Satellite Communications Talking Points, undated, DEFE, 13/389, TNA.
72 Memorandum by the secretary of state for defence, ‘Draft Overseas Policy and Defence Committee Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, June 17, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.
73 ‘Annex A’ in ‘Outline Defence Communications Network Plan 1968–72, February 1, 1967, FCO 19/9, TNA.
74 Ibid
75 William James, ‘Global Britain’s Strategic Problem East of Suez’, European Journal of International Security, 6, 2021, 180.
76 Ibid
77 Ibid., 179
78 ‘Minutes from Parliament’, March 7, 1966, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1966/mar/07/defence.
79 Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Policy Staff, ‘The Requirements for Satellite Communications’, October 10, 1969, DEFE 34/130, TNA.
80 Ibid
81 Ibid
82 James, ‘Global Britain’s Strategic Problem East of Suez’, 172.
83 Ibid. Secure encrypted voice communications required bandwidth that could not be met by existing high-frequency communications systems.
84 Background, ‘European Space Cooperation’, February 19, 1969, FCO 55/348, TNA.
85 Ibid
86 Ibid
87 Ibid
88 ‘Defence Satellite Communications − 1974 to 1978’, March 11, 1975, DEFE 72/56, TNA.
89 ‘Skynet II replenishment: Brief on the current situation’, May 17, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA. U.K. firms carried out 45% of the development work associated with Skynet-II sub-systems, see ‘Defence Satellite Communications − 1974 to 1978’, March 11, 1975, DEFE 72/56, TNA.
90 ‘Airbus’ Golden Jubilee for Skynet Secure Satellite Communications’, Airbus, November 22, 2019, https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2019–11-airbus-golden-jubilee-for-skynet-secure-satellite-communications.
91 Minute for defence secretary, ‘Communications Satellites’, undated, DEFE 72/56, TNA.
92 Letter from Weinstock to D. G. Rayner, ‘Skynet III’, May 18, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA.
93 Ibid
94 Note of a meeting in CSA’s room, ‘Satellite Communications’, November 10, 1972, DEFE 72/56, TNA.
95 ‘Satellite Communications’, July 31, 1980, DEFE 19/221, TNA.
96 Study for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘The Relative Merits of Satellite and Submarine Cable Communications for Government Long-Distance Communications’, April 11, 1963, DEFE 5/137, TNA.
97 Ibid
98 Memorandum from BG T Stanbridge, ‘Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) – Defence Satellite Communications’, May 30, 1973, DEFE 72/56, TNA.
99 For a history of Corporate, see Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War (New York: Routledge, 2005) and Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume 2: War and Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2004).
100 Richard Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 81.
101 According to a U.S. report, Britain was using 21 communications channels on the American DSCS network. See Memorandum from the acting Director of the Defense communications Agency (Layman) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, ‘US Communications Satellite Support to UK Naval Forces’, April 9, 1982, Foreign Relations of the United States 1981–1988, vol. XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984.
102 Memorandum from B.C. Farrer, ‘MoD Working Party on the Way Ahead in Space’, July 5, 1983, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.
103 Ilaria Parisi, ‘France’s Reaction Towards the SDI: Transforming a Strategic Threat into a Technological Opportunity’, in NATO and the Strategic Defence Initiative, ed. Luc-Andre Brunet (New York: Routledge, 2022), 121–124.
104 ‘Policy for the Use of Space for Defence’, April 22, 1981, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.
105 Background paper attached to minute ‘Space-Forthcoming Meeting Between S of S and Ministers of State, DTI’, sent from W. D. Reeves, November 12, 1984, DEFE 13/2066, TNA.
106 For more details concerning Zircon, see Ferris, Behind the Enigma, 322. Through Zircon the British would have also demonstrated to their U.S. counterparts that they could develop space-based intelligence systems that could contribute to their intelligence partnership.
107 Even though Skynet-3 had been cancelled, the MoD designated the new series the fourth generation since the technology was now more advanced than that planned for Skynet-3.
108 A review of U.K. military requirements called for ‘greater operational capability in the mid-1980s, including EHF [extremely high frequency], SHF [super high frequency], UHF [ultra high frequency], and resistance to ECM [electronic counter measures]’. This is to be met by a ten-year (1985–95) British Skynet IV project’. See ‘Policy for the Use of Space for Defence’, April 22, 1981, DEFE 69/1204, TNA. For a detailed explanation of the rationale for a third Skynet-4 satellite, see ‘NGASR 7123 – Skynet 4 Stage 1 Programme: Procurement of Third Satellite (Skynet 4C)’, June 12, 1983, DEFE 13/2066, TNA and ‘Skynet 4C: Operational Justification’, November 28, 1984, DEFE 24/2905, TNA.
109 Memorandum from E.J. Risness, ‘Defence Space Policy’, August 23, 1982, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.
110 Ibid
111 ‘Defence Space Policy (draft)’, August, 1982, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.
112 Ibid
113 ‘NGASR 7123 – Skynet 4 Stage 1 Programme: Procurement of Third Satellite (Skynet 4C)’, June 12, 1983, DEFE 13/2066, TNA.
114 Minute from Howe to Thatcher, ‘Launcher for Skynet 4’, December 12, 1983, PREM 19/2067, TNA.
115 Ibid
116 Ibid
117 ‘Skynet 5: A Proven and Trusted Partnership’, Airbus, https://www.airbus.com/en/products-services/defence/milsatcom/skynet-5. There are plans underway for the sixth generation as well, see ‘MoD Contracts Airbus for Skynet Telecoms Satellite’, BBC, July 20, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-53476881.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Aaron Bateman
Aaron Bateman is an assistant professor of history and international affairs at George Washington University. He is the author of the forthcoming book Weapons in Space: Technology, Politics, and the Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative (MIT Press, 2024).