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Research Article

Chapter IV: The Balance of Power in the Air

 

Notes

1 Matthew Melino and Heather Connely, ‘The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence’, CSIS, <https://www.csis.org/features/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence>, accessed 21 April 2021.

2 Matthew Melino, Heather A Conley and Joseph S Bermudez Jr, ‘Ice Curtain S-400 Deployments and Enhanced Defence of Russia’s Western Arctic’, CSIS, 30 March 2020, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-s-400-deployments-and-enhanced-defense-russias-western-arctic-rogachevo-air>, accessed 28 November 2020.

3 Malte Humpert, ‘Russia Activates Newest S-300 Air Defence System in Arctic’, High North News, 7 April 2020, <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-activates-newest-s-300-air-defense-unit-arctic>, accessed 10 March 2021.

4 Justin Bronk, ‘Modern Russian and Chinese Combat Air Trends’, RUSI Occasional Papers (October 2020), pp. 20–35.

5 For more information on the MIG-31BM, see ibid.; Russian assets identified by imaging, samples of which are provided in Figures 15A and 15B and cross-referenced with David Batashvilli, ‘Russian Military Forces: An Interactive Map’, Rondelli Foundation, <https://www.gfsis.org/maps/russian-military-forces>, accessed 9 May 2021.

6 Michael Koffman, presentation given at RUSI Seapower Conference 2021, 25 February 2021.

7 Authors' IMINT analysis.

8 Authors' IMINT analysis.

9 On Russia’s approach to offensive counter air, see Dima Adamsky, Moscow’s Aerospace Theory of Victory: Western Assumptions and Russian Reality (Washington, DC: CAN, 2021).

10 Johan Norberg and Martin Goliath, ‘The Fighting Power of Russia’s Armed Forces’, in Westerlund and Oxenstierna (eds), Russian Military Capability in a Ten Year Perspective-2019, p. 67.

11 Rossoboronexport, ‘Long Range Air Surveillance Radar “Resonance-NE” for Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems and Low Observable Target Detection’, <http://nic-rezonans.ru/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/eng-rls-resonance-n.pdf>, accessed 21 December 2021.

12 See, for example, Michael Pelosi and Amy Honeycutt, ‘Cruise Missile Integrated Air Defense System Penetration: Modelling the S-400 System’, International Journal of Aeronautics and Aerospace (Vol. 4, 2017), pp. 1–20.

13 The Voronezh series has wavelengths in the decimetre and metre band – enabling very long-range early-warning, albeit with low granularity. See, for example, Globalsecurity, ‘Voronezh High Depot Readiness (HDR) Variants’, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/voronezh-variants.htm>, accessed 21 December 2021.

14 For more on the Zaslon, see Shepard Media, The Concise Industry Guide to Radar Systems (Derbyshire: Shepard Media, 2018), p. 14.

15 Globalsecurity, ‘AA-9 Amos’, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/aa-9.htm>, accessed 21 December 2021.

16 Roger McDermott, Russian Perspectives on Network Centric Warfare: The Key Aim of Serdukovs Reforms (Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO Books, 2011).

17 Bronk, ‘Russian and Chinese Combat Air Trends’, p. 13.

19 Ibid.

20 Naval Technology, ‘Slava Class Guided Missile Cruiser’, <https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/slavaclassguidedmiss/>, accessed 12 April 2021.

21 Naval Technology, ‘The Sovremenney Class Destroyer’, <https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/slavaclassguidedmiss/>, accessed 12 April 2021.

22 Naval News, ‘Admiral Gorshkov Frigate Qualifies Poliment-Redut SAM Against Air & Surface Targets’, October 2018, <https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/october-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/6579-admiral-gorshkov-frigate-qualifies-poliment-redut-sam-against-air-surface-targets.html>, accessed 21 December 2021.

23 Russian Ships Info, ‘Project 20380’, <http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_20380.htm#>, accessed 12 April 2021.

24 For a more detailed discussion see Chapter II.

25 Radartutorial.eu, ‘91N6’, <https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/06.missile/karte013.en.html>, accessed 21 December 2021.

26 Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance, ‘S-400 Triumf Air Defence System’, <https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/russia/russia-anti-access-area-denial/s-400-triumf-air-defense-system/>, accessed 21 December 2021.

27 Carlo Kopp, ‘Almaz S-300P/PT/PS/PMU/PMU1/PMU2 Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf SA-10/20/21 Grumble/Gargoyle’, Air Power Australia, <http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Grumble-Gargoyle.html#mozTocId106894>, accessed 21 December 2021.

28 FAS, ‘S-300PMU’, <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-300pmu.htm>, accessed 21 December 2021.

29 Bronk, ‘Russian and Chinese IADS’, p. 10.

30 On the F-35, see Marcus Hellyer, ‘Projecting Power With the F-35: How Far Will it Go?’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 27 September 2019, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/projecting-power-with-the-f-35-part-1-how-far-can-it-go/>, accessed 2 May 2021.

31 Bronk, ‘Russian and Chinese IADS’, p. 28.

32 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, p. 200.

33 Based on attrition rates from the Yom Kippur War, Vietnam War and Second World War. See Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978); Historical Evaluation and Research Service, The Development of Soviet Air Defence Doctrine and Practice (Dunn Loring, VA: T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1981), pp. 30–35; Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, p. 220.

34 Michael Kofman, ‘Russian A2/AD: It Is Not Overrated, Just Poorly Understood’, Russian Military Analysis blog, <https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2020/01/25/russian-a2-ad-it-is-not-overrated-just-poorly-understood/>, accessed 10 May 2021.

35 For examples of this modelling for Russian and US systems, see Michael Pelosi and Amy Honeycutt, ‘Cruise Missile Integrated Air Defence System Penetration: Modelling the S-400’, International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics and Aerospace (Vol. 4, No. 3), pp. 1–24; Thomas Shugart and Javier Gonzales, First Strike: The Chinese Missile Threat to US Bases in East Asia (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2018,) p. 12.

36 Christopher Blockom, Military Suppression of Enemy Air Defences: Assessing Future Needs (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), p. 6.

37 Thomas Withington, ‘Offence for Defence?’, Armada International, 7 July 2021, <https://armadainternational.com/2021/01/offence-for-defence/>, accessed 21 December 2021.

38 See, for example, Nathan Strout, ‘How 2 Space Norway Satellites Will Help the Air Force in the Arctic’, C4ISRNet, <https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/2019/07/05/how-2-space-norway-satellites-will-help-the-air-force-in-the-arctic/>, accessed 21 December 2021.

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