Chapter V: Russian Land and Amphibious Capabilities in the Arctic

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Notes

1 Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, The Russian Way of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), p. 30.

2 Grau and Bartles, The Russian Way of War; David Batashvili, ‘Russian Military Forces: Interactive Map’, Rondeli Foundation, first published 7 August 2018, <https://www.gfsis.org/maps/view/russian-military-forces>, accessed 10 May 2021.

3 Charles Bartles, ‘Change Is Coming for Russian Naval Infantry Brigades’, Foreign Military Studies Office, 1 January 2020, <https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/348896>, accessed 20 November 2021.

4 Anastasia Dagaeva, ‘Antonov: The Unsung Victim of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict’, Carnigie Moscow Center, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/75944>, accessed 14 November 2021.

5 H I Sutton, ‘The Russian Navy’s Relay Resupplying Syria Continues’, Naval News, 24 March 2020, <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/03/the-russian-navys-bosphorus-relay-resupplying-syria-continues/>, accessed 21 December 2021.

6 Boulègue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic. While this sort of attack by NATO may be unlikely, similar potential actions were planned during the Cold War as forms of horizontal escalation to offset Soviet strengths in Central Europe, see Mearsheimer, ‘A Strategic Misstep’.

7 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, pp. 50–60.

8 Batashvili, ‘Russian Military’; Boulègue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic.

9 BMPD Journal, ‘Modernizirovannyye tanki T-80BV morskoy pekhoty Severnogo flota’ [‘Modernised T-80BV Tanks of the Northern Fleet Marine Corps’], March 2018, <https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3187758.html>, accessed 21 December 2021; Batashvili, ‘Russian Military Forces’.

10 WeaponSystem.net, ‘T-80BVM’, <https://weaponsystems.net/system/835-T-80BVM>, accessed 1 May 2021; there is some disagreement on the suitability of the vehicle for the Arctic, see Alex Tarasoff, ‘T-80BVM Flatters to Deceive as an Arctic Tank’, Shephard, 15 April 2021.

11 Boulègue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic.

12 WeaponSystem.net, ‘Pantsir-SA’, <https://weaponsystems.net/system/151-Pantsir-SA>, accessed 14 November 2021.

13 Boulègue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic.

14 Tom Waldwyn, ‘Russian Military Lift Risks Atrophy’, IISS Military Balance Blog, 6 July 2017.

15 Joseph Trevithick, ‘Russia Is Extending One of the Runways at its Syrian Airbase’, The Drive, 5 February 2021.

16 Anton Lavrov, ‘Russian Military Reforms from Georgia to Syria’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 35.

17 RussianShips.info, <http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_775.htm>, accessed 10 May 2021.

18 Naval Technology, ‘Project 11711 Ivan Gren Class Landing Ships’, <https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/project-11711-ivan-gren-class-landing-ships/>, accessed 10 May 2021.

19 GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Project 775 Ropucha Class Tank Landing Ship’, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/775.htm’>, accessed 10 May 2021; on the Syrian resupply operation, see Foreign Military Studies Office, ‘Russian Military Expeditionary Capability: A Relatively Low Priority’, <https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/w/o-e-watch-mobile-edition-v1/22721/russian-expeditionary-capabilities-a-relatively-low-priority/>, accessed 10 May 2021.