Modelling the intelligence requirements and priorities process: the US response to the Rwandan genocide

ABSTRACT

In the US, national security outcomes tend to be categorised as either the responsibility of the intelligence or policy community. Few discuss systemic outcomes emanating from the requirements and priorities (R&P) process, a top-level collaborative effort that determines national security objectives and establishes the means to address them. Here, a holistic model is introduced to examine the R&P process alongside the binary functions of intelligence and policy, and tested against two mandates of the US response to the Rwandan genocide: evacuation of American expats, and broader intervention. Such macroscopic investigations can better identify the root causes of national security outcomes.

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This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, 7–9.

2. Hedley, “Learning from Intelligence Failures,” 443.

3. DCI, “Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974”.

4. DCI, “National Intelligence Topics”.

5. DNI, “Intelligence Community Directive 204”.

6. Davies, Intelligence and Government, 32.

7. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 34.

8. A more detailed explanation of the mechanics of intelligence prioritization can be found in Abdalla et. al., “Intelligence, Policy, and Mandate,”105–124.

9. For example, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency specializes in geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), as well as signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).

10. Interagency coordination most commonly refers to (but is not strictly limited to) federal agencies. It can include cooperation between state, territorial, and local level agencies, as well as private agencies, NGOs, and foreign agencies. See: Department of Defense, ‘Joint Publication 3–08’, I-6.

11. Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 62.

12. For example, the Canadian Intelligence system has struggled with coordination efforts. See: Wark, “Intelligence-Law Enforcement Nexus,” 147–183.

13. Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 59.

14. Johnson, National Security Intelligence, 40.

15. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 109.

16. Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 60.

17. US Congress. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 5–6.

18. A series of examples discussing attempts at reform are available in Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence.

19. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 2–3.

20. Kerr, in “Analyzing Intelligence,” 51–52

21. Brand, ‘Intelligence, Warning, and Policy’, 198.

22. ibid., 201.

23. ibid., 211.

24. Beach et. al, Process-tracing Methods, 14–18.

25. Punton et. al, “Straws-in-the-wind,” 2.

26. Beach et. al, Process-tracing Methods, 13–20.

27. Graham Allison poses key questions about Soviet and US intentions and observes the crisis from the ‘Rational Actor’, “Organizational Behavior,” and “Governmental Politics” models. See: Allison, Essence of Decision.

28. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails.

29. In the quarter century since the genocide, numerous attempts have been made to provide an accurate estimate of the casualties, with wide-ranging variations on the number. The final tally remains uncertain. See: Meierhenrich, “How Many Victims,” 72–82.

30. Valentino, “Still Standing By,” 566.

31. Kuperman, “Rwanda in Retrospect”., 94.

32. Assistant Secretary of Defense, “Rwanda: Current Situation; Next Steps”.

33. Bush, “State of the Union,” paragraph 2.

34. NSC, “Presidential Decision Directive 25”.

35. Gore, ‘The Intelligence Community’, 14.

36. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “Presidential Review Directive/NSC-13”.

37. NSC, “Presidential Decision Directive 25”.

38. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence, 227.

39. HPSCI, IC21, 93.

40. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence, 227.

41. Cheng et. al, ed., “Snyder Commission Report,” chapter 2.

42. Cheng et. al, ed., “Snyder Commission Report,” chapter 3.

43. Arkin, “At DIA, Excess Is in the Details”.

44. Lake, Anthony. “Confronting Backlash States,” 45.

45. McCurry, “Press Briefing”.

46. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Rwanda”.

47. Moose, “Ghosts of Rwanda”.

48. HPSCI, IC21, 8.

49. Ramsay, “Operation Gothic Serpent,” 210.

50. NSC, “Presidential Decision Directive 25,” paragraph 4.

51. Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” 90.

52. NSC, “Presidential Decision Directive 25,” paragraph 6.

53. Bushnell email, “Death of Rwandan and Burundi Presidents”.

54. Ibid.

55. CIA, “NID 7 April 1994”.

56. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. ‘Turmoil in Rwanda’.

57. Ibid.

58. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. “Rwanda/Burundi: Violence Update”.

59. Ibid.

60. Cohen, One-Hundred Days of Silence, 187.

61. HPSCI, IC21, 94.

62. Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” 90.

63. Department of State, “Working Group formation”.

64. Assistant Secretary of Defense, “Rwanda: Current Situation; Next Steps”.

65. Ibid.

66. Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” 93.

67. Power, A Problem from Hell, 338.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. CIA, “NID April 7, 1994”.

71. CIA, “NID April 8, 1994”.

72. Ibid.

73. Ferroggiaro, ed. “U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994,” section 2 paragraph 3.

74. Department of State, Executive Secretariat. “Situation Report No. 24”.

75. Department of State, African Affairs. “Situation Report No. 25”.

76. Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” 93.

77. Clinton, “Letter to Congressional Leaders,” paragraph 3.

78. Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” 97.

79. Ibid, 93.

80. Directorate of Intelligence, “Africa Review,” 4.

81. Ibid.

82. Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” 88.

83. Cohen, One-hundred Days of Silence, 29.

84. Prunier, History of a Genocide, 168

85. UNHCR, “Extrajudicial, summary, arbitrary executions,” paragraph 167.

86. CIA, “NID April 7, 1994”.

87. CIA, “NID April 8, 1994”.

88. UNAMIR- Kigali, “Situation Report: 12 April 1994”.

89. CIA, “NID 13 April 1994”.

90. CIA, “NID 18 April 1994”.

91. CIA, “NID 26 April 1994”.

92. Department of Defence, “Discussion Paper- Rwanda,” 1.

93. BBC News, “Timeline: 100 Days of Genocide”.

94. Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” 96–97.

95. A 2012 study found that 10 per cent of the participation in the violence during could be attributed to the effects of the radio, and a further 9 per cent of victims were killed because of radio propaganda. See: Yanagizawa-Drott. “Propaganda and Conflict,” 24.

96. Under Secretary of Defense, “Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts”.

97. Power, A Problem from Hell, 381.

98. Ibid.

99. HPSCI, IC21, 111.

100. Ibid.

101. NRO Review, “The NRO at the Crossroads,” 51.

102. Zegart, Spying Blind, 97.

103. Ibid.

104. ODNI, “National Intelligence Priorities Framework”.

105. Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy, 99.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Neveen Abdalla

Dr Neveen Shaaban Abdalla is a lecturer of Intelligence, Defense and Security at Brunel University London, and a member of the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies. Her research explores the role of the requirements and priorities processes in cases of early warning success and failure, putting forth a model for holistic investigations into national security outcomes.