The COVID-19 intelligence failure. Why warning was not enough

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Notes

1. International Society for Infectious Diseases, ProMED-mail post, 30 December 2019, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/kleelerner/files/20191230_promed_-_undiagnosed_pneumonia_-_china_hu-_rfi_archive_number-_20191230.6864153.pdf, np. Note: This is a copy of the original email Archive Number 20,191,230.6864153 which is currently not available on the ProMED website.

2. Eric J. Dahl, The COVID-19 Intelligence Failure. Why Warning Was Not Enough (Washington DC: Georgetown UP, 2023), 4–7.

3. Ibid, 14–17.

4. Ibid, 23.

5. Ibid, 11–23.

6. Ibid, 28–46

7. Ibid, 53–57

8. Ibid, 68–75

9. Ibid, 108.

10. Ibid, 108.

11. Ibid, 44–45.

12. World Health Organization, Press Conference 13 March 2020, Geneva, Switzerland. Transcript, np. Quote at 00:28:26. https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/transcripts/who-transcript-emergencies-coronavirus-press-conference-full-13mar2020848c48d2065143bd8d07a1647c863d6b.pdf

13. S.B. Sitkin, “Learning through Failure – The Strategy of Small Losses”, Research in Organizational Behaviour (January 1, 1992): 231–266.

14. Dahl, 122–134.

15. Harrison White, Identity and Control, A Structural Theory of Social Action. (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 1992) 65–70. White first argued that networks emerge out of the failure of formal organizations.

16. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organization, 53, 4 (1991): 699–725.

17. Dahl, 134–142.

18. Dahl, 136–138.

19. Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails. Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War, (Ithaca NY: Cornell UP, 2010): 156–157.

20. Ibid, 160–163.

21. Ibid, 165–167.

22. Ibid, 167–170

23. Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power. The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis, (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, 2000): 2–3, 387.

24. Ibid, 404.