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ABSTRACT
The article advances the research on compliance negotiations in the context of the EU’s external relations. It develops further the framework on EU compliance negotiations, introduced by Jönsson and Tallberg in 1998, and provides empirical evidence from a case study on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement’s implementation. The article suggests three arguments for the expansion of the original framework. Firstly, we add to the framework the case of pre-emptive compliance negotiations, i.e. negotiations in view of anticipated non-compliance. Secondly, it is suggested to supplement the original framework with the ‘object of negotiations’ category, as the issue at stake influences other variables in compliance negotiations, such as the power relations between the parties and the conflictive vs. cooperative nature of the negotiations. Thirdly, the article unpacks the role of multistakeholder networks in the dynamics of compliance negotiations in the EU’s external relations.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. Following up on their initial contribution, the authors presented their framework in a book chapter, without significant changes (Tallberg and Jönsson Citation2005). This article refers to both sources.
2. Here and later throughout the article, we will use the term ‘compliance negotiations’, rather than ‘compliance bargaining’ as done by Jönsson and Tallberg (Citation1998). Bargaining and negotiating have been used interchangeably in the literature and positions have been forwarded in favour of each term as being the more general one. We prefer the term negotiation in order to avoid any confusion with the bargaining mode of negotiation, which has been contrasted to the problem-solving and arguing modes. Furthermore, this notion captures better the role of the cooperative, problem-solving component in the EU-Ukraine compliance-related interactions in the EU AA implementation context, which is less salient in the analysis of respective interactions under the infringement procedure, as offered by Tallberg and Jönsson (Citation2005).
3. Tallberg and Smith (Citation2014) use a similar distinction into interstate and supranational. We keep the original formulation.
4. The legal basis for the infringement procedure is constituted by Art. 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and has not changed since the publication of the work by Jönsson and Tallberg (Citation1998).
5. The EU-Ukraine AA explicitly provides for the creation of four Subcommittees: Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Subcommittee (Art. 64), Customs Subcommittee (Art. 83) Subcommittee on Geographical Indications (GI) (Art. 211) and the Trade and Sustainable Development Subcommittee (Art. 300). At the same time, the Decision of the Association Council No 2/2014 provided for forming two sectoral Subcommittees: Subcommittee on Freedom, Security and Justice and the Subcommittee on Economic and other Sectoral Cooperation, consisting of six clusters (e.g. cluster 1 ‘Macroeconomic cooperation, public finance management: fiscal policy, internal control and external audit, statistics, accounting and auditing, anti-fraud’ or cluster 3 ‘Energy cooperation, including nuclear, environment, including climate change and civil protection, transport’) (EU-Ukraine Association Council Citation2014).
6. As of today, Ukraine has not got market access yet in any of the areas, where this is possible under the DCFTA (e.g. trade in goods, trade in services, public procurement).
7. For the structure of clusters, see footnote 5 and/or visit https://eu-ua.kmu.gov.ua/en/association-committee.