Reassessing Military Assistance to the Civil Powers: Are Traditional British Anti-Terrorist Responses Still Effective?

Abstract

The provision of Military Assistance to the Civil Powers (MACP) encapsulates the traditional approach towards countering terrorism on the British mainland, which emphasises minimum force, proportionality, police primacy and the rule of law, with the military retained as a supporting instrument, being employed only as a measure of last resort. Recent terrorist incidents in major urban centres do, however, question the effectiveness of these established methods. This analysis initially codifies the conceptual issues that underscore the tensions between civil policing and military anti-terrorist approaches in the UK, and proceeds to evaluate and compare a number of operations that indicate the nature of the challenges facing the MACP apparatus. In particular, potential shortcomings in the MACP provisions are identified in the form of threat perception and deployment and enforcement gaps. The assessment finds that there are facets of MACP that are of enduring relevance in the current era, yet a continuing need persists to reconcile police and military imperatives toward serious civil disorder contingencies and conditions of emergency.

Notes

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