![Sample our Law journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5942/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Law.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
As data have become an increasingly important asset of modern companies in the digital era, certain types of data, known as ‘essential data’, have become particularly crucial in market competition. The refusal to share ‘essential data’ may raise competition-relevant concerns, and the intervention by competition law to ensure its sharing is thus in demand. Yet, three dimensions should be carefully assessed before the legal interventions are deployed and applied. First, clear criteria should be crafted for identifying ‘essential data’. Second, it is vital to assess the role of ‘essential data’ concerning potential abuses of market dominance and merger control by corporations. Finally, the reasonable conditions under which the sharing of ‘essential data’ is compelled should be specified.
Acknowledgements
The author extends heartfelt gratitude to Prof. Peicheng Wu for his insightful commentary on this article. Additionally, the author wishes to express thanks to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback and acknowledges the exceptional efforts of the Asia Pacific Law Review editorial team from the submission to the publication process. Special recognition is also extended to Xinyi Lin, Jiayi Wang, and Manling Ye for their substantial contributions in material collection and paper revision.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 According to the acquisition channels and data holders, data are divided into personal data, enterprise data, and government data. Unless otherwise specified, the data referred to in this paper refers to enterprise data only, i.e. data collected and processed by enterprises and held by them.
2 Fusheng Xie, Yue Wu and Shengsheng Wang, ‘A Political Economy Analysis of the Globalization of Platform Economics’ (2019) 12 Social Sciences in China 71. 谢富胜、吴越、王生升,《平台经济全球化的政治经济学分析》,《中国社会科学》2019年第12期, 第71页.
3 The essential facilities doctrine is a basic principle of the trade denial regime in antimonopoly law, which is mainly used to solve the problem of interconnection between railroads, bridges, ports, and power facilities. When an undertaking is deemed to have essential facilities under antimonopoly law, the enterprise is obliged to open their facilities to others on reasonable terms. The doctrine of essential facilities is a breakthrough in traditional freedom of contract and property rights rules that, if left unrestricted, may harm the incentive of enterprises to invest and innovate, and thus harm the interests of consumers. Its legitimacy has been questioned for many years, and all jurisdictions are cautious in its application.
4 On the eve of the introduction of the Personal Information Protection Law, Jingdong, Douyin, and Taobao updated their order information encryption notices and system upgrade programmes to anonymize and encrypt sensitive personal consumer information. They no longer provide merchants and service providers with the personal information of consumers in plain text. This retraction of access to data have led to accusations that the platforms have increased their monopolies.
5 On 17 November 2021, Eefung filed suit in the Changsha Intermediate People’s Court, arguing that Sina had restricted its access to data used to analyse public opinion. Eefung asked the court to order Sina to allow Eefung to use Weibo data on reasonable terms.
6 The meaning of ‘essential data’ here is similar to that of ‘essential facilities’ in the traditional essential facilities doctrine. If certain data are deemed to constitute an essential facility in antimonopoly law, the holder of it is obligated to make it available to others on reasonable terms.
7 The countries mentioned have all pointed out in relevant studies, policy documents, or cases that data have become a key element for undertakings to participate in market competition, and the doctrine of essential facilities in antimonopoly law should be used to ensure the open circulation of data. For instance, in hiQ v. LinkedIn, the US court ordered LinkedIn to open up the data at issue to hiQ under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The European Parliament pointed out in 2015 that digitalized economy is based on digital technologies that can be summarized as communication and data processing. The German Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB) extends the scope of the essential facilities doctrine to include ‘refusal to provide relevant data’ as one of the circumstances in which an undertaking may abuse its dominant market position by refusing to deal. Report of Study Group on Data and Competition Policy issued by the Japan Fair Trade Commission Competition Policy Research Centre points out, if a specific company which has control over dominates a certain market collects data essential in that market or other markets through its business activities and restrict the access to data without reasonable grounds, and it is difficult technically or economically for other parties to obtain the alternative data and restricting access to the data from other parties without reasonable grounds, which could be assessed as ‘refusal to trade as a means of achieving unreasonable objectives under the Antimonopoly Act’. The Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs also mentions, in Big data and Competition, that data-driven markets can apply the ‘essential data’ doctrine, and forcing data controllers to open up their data does not diminish the appetite for investment. The Competition Bureau Canada illustrates in its report Big Data and Innovation: Key Themes for Competition Policy in Canada that the topic of big data and competition law enforcement continues to garner significant attention and elicit concern.
8 See, e.g. Xiaojin Huang, ‘The Boundary of Competition Law in Data Sharing and Grabbing in the Era of Big Data’ (2018) 2 Research on Financial and Economic Issues. 黄晓锦,《大数据时代数据分享与抓取的竞争法边界》,《财经问题研究》2018年第2期; Darren S. Tucker and Hill B. Wellford, ‘Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data’ (14 January 2015) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2549044> accessed 15 December 2022; Anja Lambrecht and Catherine E. Tucker, ‘Can Big Data Protect a Firm from Competition?’ (22 December 2015) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2705530> accessed 15 December 2022; D. Daniel Sokol and Roisin Comerford, ‘Does Antitrust Have a Role to Play in Regulating Big Data?’ in Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property and High Tech (Cambridge University Press 2016).
9 See Giuseppe Colangelo and Mariateresa Maggiolino, ‘Big Data as Misleading Facilities’ (2 June 2017) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978465> accessed 15 December 2022; Vikas Kathuria and Jure Globocnik, ‘Exclusionary Conduct in Data-Driven Markets: Limitations of Data Sharing Remedy’ (22 February 2019) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3337524> accessed 15 December 2022.
10 See, e.g. Dong Yang and Junheng Zang, ‘The Predicament and Breakthrough of Competitive Regulation of Data Production Element’ (2020) 6 Journal of National Prosecutors College. 杨东、臧俊恒,《数据生产要素的竞争规制困境与突破》,《国家检察官学院学报》2020年第6期; Xiaying Mei and Jian Wang, ‘The Theoretical Response to the Dispute over the Falseness and Truth of the Proposition of “Data Monopoly”’ (2021) 5 Legal Forum. 梅夏英、王剑,《“数据垄断”命题真伪争议的理论回应》,《法学论坛》2021年第5期; Zachary Abrahamson, ‘Essential Data’ (2014) 124 (3) The Yale Law Journal; Vikas Kathuria, ‘Greed for Data and Exclusionary Conduct in Data-driven Markets’ (2019) 35 (1) Computer Law & Security Review.
11 Paragraph 2, Article 14 of the Guidelines for antimonopoly in the Field of Platform Economy provides that: ‘the determination of whether the relevant data constitute essential facilities generally requires a comprehensive consideration of whether the data are indispensable for participation in market competition, the existence of alternative channels of access to the data, the technical feasibility of opening up the data, the possible impact of opening up the data on the undertakings and who holds the data, among other factors’.
12 See Frank A. Pasquale, ‘Privacy, Antitrust and Power’ (2013) 20 (2) George Mason Law Review 1009, 1015.
13 Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, ‘When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines’ (2016) 18 Yale Journal of Law & Technology 29.
14 See Fair Search, ‘Google’s Transformation from Gateway to Gatekeeper: How Google’s Exclusionary and Anticompetitive Conduct Restricts Innovation and Deceives Consumers’ (14 February 2017) <http://www.fairsearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Googles-Transformation-from-Gateway-to-Gatekeeper.pdf> accessed 15 December 2022.
15 In 2009, Yahoo and Microsoft jointly announced a ten-year partnership agreement in the search engine business aimed at challenging Google. Since the two have the second and third largest market shares in the search engine services market, antitrust filings were made in the United States, the European Union, and other jurisdictions to determine whether their cooperation would harm competition.
16 See U.S Department of Justice, ‘Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and Paid Search Advertising Agreement Between Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc’ (18 February 2010) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-its-investigation-internet> accessed 15 December 2022.
17 Case No COMP/M.5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, para 223, 225.
18 Data collection is seen as an intangible core asset with economic value, and companies are collecting data for competitive advantage. See Julien Chaisse and Cristen Bauer, ‘Cybersecurity and the Protection of Digital Assets: Assessing the Role of International Investment Law and Arbitration’ (2020) 21 (3) Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 556, 560.
19 Jiejiao Liu, ‘Digital Platform Antitrust Regulation: Frontier Issues, Theoretical Difficulties and Strategies’ (2022) 3 Research on Financial and Economic Issues 4. 刘戒骄,《数字平台反垄断监管：前沿问题、理论难点及策略》,《财经问题研究》2022年第3期, 第4页.
20 See Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (Oxford University Press 2016) 170.
21 See Nathan Newman, ‘Taking on Google’s Monopoly Means Regulating its Control of User Data’ (24 September 2013) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-newman/taking-on-googlesmonopol_b_3980799.html> accessed 15 December 2022.
22 See Bundesgerichtshof bestätigt vorläufig den Vorwurf der missbräuchlichen Ausnutzung einer markt beherrschenden Stellung durch Facebook, aaO.
23 Lin Xie and Junsen Zeng, ‘A Review of the Right to Data Portability’ (2019) 1 Electronics Intellectual Property 32. 谢琳、曾俊森,《数据可携权之审视》,《电子知识产权》2019年第1期，第32页.
24 Tilman Kuhn and others, ‘Big Data and Data-Related Abuses of Market Power’ (20 January 2022) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4013118> accessed 15 December 2022.
25 Jian Wang and Zongze Wu, ‘Research on Data as an Essential Facility under the Antitrust Law’ (2021) 2 Research on Rule of Law 114. 王健、吴宗泽,《论数据作为反垄断法中的必要设施》,《法治研究》2021年第2期, 第114页.
26 Viviane Reding, ‘The EU Data Protection Regulation: Promoting Technological Innovation and Safeguarding Citizens’ Rights’ (Press Release, 4 March 2014) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-175_en.htm> accessed 15 December 2022.
27 See Xixin Wang, ‘Right to Data Portability and Distributive Justice of Data Governance’ (2021) 6 Global Law Review 9. 王锡锌,《个人信息可携权与数据治理的分配正义》,《环球法律评论》2021年第6期, 第9页.
28 See European Commission, ‘Data Act: Proposal for a Regulation on Harmonized Rules on Fair Access to and Use of Data’ (23 February 2022) <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/data-act-proposal-regulation-harmonised-rules-fair-access-and-use-data> accessed 15 December 2022.
29 See Phillip Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’, (1990) 58 (3) Antitrust Law Journal 853; Michael Boudin, ‘Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor’ (1986) 75 (2) Georgetown Law Journal 395.
30 See Giuseppe Colangelo and Mariateresa Maggiolino, ‘Big Data as Misleading Facilities’ (1 June 2017) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978465> accessed 15 December 2022.
31 See Nils-Peter Schepp and Achim Wambach, ‘On Big Data and Its Relevance for Market Power Assessment’ (2015) 7 (2) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 123.
32 Catherine Tucker, ‘Digital Data, Platforms and the Usual [Antitrust] Suspects: Network Effects, Switching Costs, Essential Facility’ (2019) 54 Review of Industrial Organization 683.
33 PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v Twitter, Inc. 2013 WL 843032 (N.D. Cal.2013).
34 hiQ v LinkedIn, Case No. 17–cv–03301–EMC.
35 See Carl Franzen, ‘Craigslist vs. 3taps: Who Owns Your Content?’ (1 October 2012) <https://talkingpointsmemo.com/idealab/craigslist-vs-3taps-who-owns-your-content> accessed 15 December 2022.
36 Ibid.
37 Facebook, Inc. v Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-5780 JF (RS), 2009 WL 3429568.
38 See Jin Sun and Yuan Zhong, ‘Antitrust Law Analysis on the Data Constructing Essential Facilities Under the Age of Big Data’ (2018) 5 Electronics Intellectual Property 43. 孙晋、钟原,《大数据时代下数据构成必要设施的反垄断法分析》,《电子知识产权》2018年第5期, 第43页.
39 Autorité de la concurrence, Décision n 14-MC-02 du 9 septembre 2014 relative à une demande de mesures conservatoires présenteé par la société Direct Energie dans les secteurs du gaz et de l’électricité.
40 Decision 2015-P/K-27 of 22 September 2015 of the Belgian Competition Authority, Stanleybet Belgium/Stanley International Betting and Sagevas/World Football Association/Samenwerkende Nevenmaatschappij Belgische PMU v. Nationale Loterij.
41 See Mark McLaughlin, ‘Regulating Artificial Intelligence in International Investment Law’ (2023) 24 (2) The Journal of World Investment and Trade 275.
42 Jian Li, Research on Essential Facilities Doctrine of Antitrust Law (Shanghai Jiaotong University Press 2015) 7–8. 李剑,《反垄断法核心设施理论研究》, 上海交通大学出版社2015年版, 第7-8页.
43 See Darren S. Tucker and Hill Wellford, ‘Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data, Antitrust Source’ (1 December 2014) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2549044> accessed 15 December 2022.
44 Vikas Kathuria and Jure Globocnik, ‘Exclusionary Conduct in Data-driven Markets: Limitations of Data Sharing Remedy’ (2020) 8 (3) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 521.
45 See, e.g. Fangyu Fei and Zixin Yan, ‘Competition Policy in the Perspective of Big Data Economics’ (2018) 2 Research on Financial and Economic Issues 6. 费方域、闫自信,《大数据经济学视域下的竞争政策》,《财经问题研究》2018年第2期, 第6页; Jin Sun and Yuan Zhong, ‘Antitrust Law Analysis on the Data Constructing Essential Facilities Under the Age of Big Data’ (2018) 5 Electronics Intellectual Property 53. 孙晋、钟原,《大数据时代下数据构成必要设施的反垄断法分析》,《电子知识产权》2018年第5期, 第53页; Xiaoye Wang, ‘Considerations on Data Interoperability Under Competition Law’ in Xianlin Wang (ed), Competition Law and Policy Review (Law Press China 2021) 7. 王晓晔,《数据互操作的竞争法思考》，载王先林主编:《竞争法律与政策评论》,法律出版社2021年版, 第7页.
46 Xiaying Mei, ‘On the Interests on Enterprise Data: From Property to Control’ (2021) 5 Peking University Law Journal 1199. 梅夏英,《企业数据权益原论：从财产到控制》,《中外法学》2021年第5期, 第1199页. In this sense, open data help enable digital innovation, especially for SMEs that may use open datasets to provide customized digital solutions. See Neha Mishra and Ana Maria Palacio Valencia, ‘Digital Services and Digital Trade in the Asia Pacific: An Alternative Model for Digital Integration?’ (2023) 31 (2) Asia Pacific Law Review 503.
47 See Zachary Abrahamson, ‘Essential Data’ (2014) 124 (3) The Yale Law Journal 876.
48 See Harry van Til, Nicolai van Gorp and Katelyn Price, ‘Big data and competition’ (13 June 2017) <https://www.eerstekamer.nl/overig/20170710/big_data_and_competition/document> accessed 15 December 2022.
49 Yongwei Chen, ‘Should the Data Apply the Essential Facilities Doctrine? Analysis Based on “Two Types of Errors” ’ (2021) 4 Competition Policy Research 7. 陈永伟,《数据是否应适用必需设施原则？——基于“两种错误”的分析》,《竞争政策研究》2021第4期, 第7页.
50 Hovenkamp J. Herbert, ‘Antitrust Interoperability Remedies’ (15 February 2022) <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2814> accessed 15 December 2022.
51 See Zachary Abrahamson, ‘Essential Data’ (2014) 124 (3) The Yale Law Journal 897.
52 Ensuring free data flaw is a must to increase the share of core digital economy in China’s national GDP. See e.g. Fengan Jiang, ‘China’s Legal Efforts to Facilitate Cross-border Data Transfers: A Comprehensive Reality Check’ <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10192557.2023.2232613> accessed 17 October 2023; Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Establishing a Data Base System to Maximize a Better Role of Data Elements (Hereinafter referred to as the Opinions).
53 See ‘Tencent and Huawei Data Dispute, Authorization is the Imperial Sword? (腾讯华为数据之争,授权是尚方剑？)’ (Press Release, 11 August 2017) <http://www.xinhuanet.com//tech/2017-08/11/c_1121465577.htm> accessed 15 December 2022.
54 See ‘State Post Bureau Coordinated Late-night, Shunfeng and Cainiao Fully Resume data Transmission (国家邮政局深夜协调 顺丰菜鸟全面恢复数据传输)’ (Press Release, 13 June 2017) <http://www.xinhuanet.com//fortune/2017-06/03/c_1121081262.html> accessed 15 December 2022.
55 See case ‘Unfair Competition Dispute between Hunan Eefung Software Co Ltd and Beijing Wei Meng Chuang Ke Network Technology Co Ltd’ (2019) Jing 73 Minzhong No .3789. (湖南蚁坊软件股份有限公司与北京微梦创科网络技术有限公司不正当竞争纠纷上诉案 (2019)京73民终3789号).
56 See case ‘Abuse of Dominant Market Power Dispute between Shanghai Yuhan Automotive Technology Co and Beijing Yuchexing Information Technology Co’ (2022) Jing 73 Minchu No.1330. (上海彧菡汽车科技有限公司与北京与车行信息技术有限公司滥用市场支配地位纠纷案 (2022)京73民初1330号).
57 See Yue Zhang and Bing Chen, ‘Multi-tool Regulation Framework of Data Crawling under Optimized Platform Economy’ (2022) 6 Nankai Journal (Philosophy, Literature and Social Science Edition) 163. 张悦、陈兵,《优化平台经济下数据爬取多工具规制框架研究》,《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》2022年第6期, 第163页.
58 For more details on the above standards, see Yongwei Chen, ‘Should the Data Apply the Essential Facilities Doctrine? Analysis Based on Two Types of Errors’ (2021) 4 Competition Policy Research 11–13. 陈永伟,《数据是否应适用必需设施原则？——基于“两种错误”的分析》,《竞争政策研究》2021第4期, 第11-13页.
59 Liyang Hou and Jirong Wang, ‘An Analysis of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine: Implications for China’ in Xianlin Wang (ed), Competition Law and Policy Review (Law Press China 2015) 48. 侯利阳、王继荣,《欧盟必需设施原则考析：兼论对我国的启示》, 载王先林主编：《竞争法律与政策评论》, 上海交通大学出版社2015年版, 第48页.
60 See, e.g. Damien Geradin and Monika Kuschewsky, ‘Competition Law and Personal Data: Preliminary Thoughts on a Complex Issue’ (12 February 2013) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2216088> accessed 15 December 2022; Tilman Kuhn and others, ‘Big Data and Data-Related Abuses of Market Power’ (20 January 2022) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4013118> accessed 15 December 2022; Inge Graef, Thomas Tombal and Alexandre de Streel, ‘Limits and Enablers of Data Sharing: An Analytical Framework for EU Competition’ (27 November 2019) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3494212> accessed 15 December 2022.
61 hiQ v LinkedIn, Case No. 17–cv–03301–EMC.
62 Ibid.
63 See Autorité de la concurrence française and Bundesbehörde der bundeskartellbehörde, Competition Law and Data (10 May 2016) 39–41 <http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf> accessed 15 December 2022.
64 Two-level entry barriers may also arise from this, where a competitor must enter the upstream market to obtain data before it starts business in the downstream market. See Jianzhong Shi and Zongze Wu, ‘Digital Platform’s Obligations of Interconnection and Interoperability as Antitrust Remedies (时建中、吴忠泽: 数字平台的互联互通义务作为反垄断补救措施)’ (20 December 2022) <https://doi.org/10.15886/j.cnki.hnus.202205.0058> assessed 17 October 2023.
65 Xiping Zhou, ‘Protection of the Rights and Interests of Enterprise Data in the Era of Big Data’ (2022) 5 Law Science 173. 周樨平,《大数据时代企业数据权益保护论》,《法学》2022年第5期, 第173页.
66 SeeInge Graef, Thomas Tombal and Alexandre de Streel, ‘Limits and Enablers of Data Sharing: an Analytical Framework for EU Competition’ (27 November 2019) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3494212> accessed 15 December 2022.
67 See Wei Wang, ‘An Antitrust Analysis of Platform’s Killer Acquisitions’ (2022) 1 Peking University Law Journal 88. 王伟,《平台扼杀式并购的反垄断法规制》,《中外法学》2022年第1期, 第88页.
68 hiQ v LinkedIn, Case No. 17–cv–03301–EMC.
69 Paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Guidelines provides that: ‘platform operators may refuse to trade for the following justified reasons: (1) Trading is unable to be conducted due to force majeure and other objective reasons; (2) Trading security is affected for reasons attributable to the counterparty; (3) Trading with a counterparty will cause inappropriate loss to the interests of the platform operators ; (4) A counterparty actually fails to comply with the platform rules of fairness, rationality, and non-discrimination; (5) Other reasons that can justify the conduct’.
70 Super platforms often use this as a reason to deny any form of data interconnection, thus strengthening their dominant position. See Jingwu Zhao and Xiaoyu Sun, ‘The Implementation Principle and Institutional Form of ‘Interconnection and Interoperability’ from the Perspective of antimonopoly Law (赵精武、孙小雨: 反垄断法视角下“互联互通”的实施原则与规范表达)’ (7 March 2023) <http://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/61.1329.c.20230306.1621.010.html> assessed 17 October 2023.
71 See Jin Sun and Yuan Zhong, ‘Antitrust Law Analysis on the Data Constructing Essential Facilities Under the Age of Big Data’ (2018) 5 Electronics Intellectual Property 48. 孙晋、钟原,《大数据时代下数据构成必要设施的反垄断法分析》,《电子知识产权》2018年第5期, 第48页.
72 Haitao Jiao, ‘Protection of Personal Information through Anti-Trust Law-From Subsidiary Protection to Independent Protection’ (2021) 4 Law Science 124. 焦海涛,《个人信息的反垄断法保护：从附属保护到独立保护》,《法学》2021年第4期, 第124页; Zhanjiang Zhang, ‘Personal Information Protection from the Perspective of Anti-monopoly Law’ (2022) 3 Peking University Law Journal 701.张占江,《个人信息保护的反垄断法视角》,《中外法学》2022年第3期, 第701页.
73 hiQ (n 43). hiQ v LinkedIn, Case No. 17–cv–03301–EMC.
74 Tilman Kuhn and others, ‘Big Data and Data-Related Abuses of Market Power’ (20 January 2022) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4013118> accessed 15 December 2022.
75 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG [2004] ECR I-50.
76 See European Union Commission, ‘Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (2009/C 45/02)’ (24 February 2009) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN> accessed 15 December 2022.
77 See European Commission (n 28). ‘Data Act: Proposal for a Regulation on Harmonized Rules’.
78 For details of the above data asset valuation methods, please refer to the Guidance on Data Asset Evaluation (Draft for Comments) (《数据资产评估指导意见（征求意见稿）》) issued by the China Appraisal Society.
79 As data flows increase, concerns about the negative impact of data abuse in terms of national security, public morality, and individual privacy have arisen. See Julien Chaisse, ‘“The Black Pit”: Power and Pitfalls of Digital FDI and Cross-Border Data Flows’ (2023) 22 (1) World Trade Review 79.
80 Jens Prufer and Inge Graef, ‘Governance of Data Sharing: A Law & Economics Proposal’ (2021) 50 (9) Research Policy 21.
81 See European Commission, ‘Data Act: Proposal for a Regulation on Harmonized Rules’.