How narratives of female sexual agency conceal vulnerability to rape: an analysis from South Australian rape trials

ABSTRACT

The legal requirement of consent presumes women conduct their sexual relations in the twenty-first century from a place of increased sexual liberation and agency, concealing the sexual double standard by which female sexual behaviour is judged. Consent-based reforms on their own, therefore, provide little recourse for rape victims when evidence of their past sexual history or sexual behaviour, such as flirting or sexting, may be admissible at trial. Informed by a thematic analysis of District and Supreme Court judgments from South Australia between 2012 and 2023, this article explores how accused persons may rely upon a victim’s sexual history or behaviour to create a narrative of implied consent or to support their belief in consent. Considering these findings, I argue that the progression towards more egalitarian sexual attitudes remains a double-edged sword for women as it sanctions their portrayal as sexual agents while concealing their vulnerability to rape.

KEYWORDS:

• Consent
• law
• feminist jurisprudence
• rape
• rape shield laws
• sexual double standard

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 This article uses female pronouns when referring to victims and masculine pronouns when referring to accused persons. This is not to deny that men can be victims of rape or that women can be perpetrators, nor to perpetuate myths of female victimisation and male aggression. Rather, it is to properly reflect the fact that women are far more likely to be victims of sexual assault (84% of reported sexual assaults in Australia (2022) and that most rapists are men (93% of reported sexual assaults in Australia (2021–22). See Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Recorded Crime – Victims, 2022’ <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/crime-and-justice/recorded-crime-victims/2022>; Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Recorded Crime – Offenders, 2021–22’ <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/crime-and-justice/recorded-crime-offenders/2021-22#data-downloads>.

2 Daly and Bouhours (2010), pp 576–578; Kennedy et al (2012), p 336.

3 The term victim is used to reflect the fact that people generally do not lie about being raped and even when a court finds an accused not criminally responsible the victim still experiences victimisation. Studies estimate approximately 2–10 percent of sexual crime allegations are false: Lisak et al (2010); Wall and Tarczon (2013).

4 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) ss 75–76; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 294CB; Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act 1983 (NT) s 4; Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) s 4; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 194M; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 341–342, s 352; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 36B-36BC.

5 See e.g. Coumarelos et al (2023). For a definition of rape myths see Gerger et al (2007), p 423.

6 Burt (1980), pp 210–217; Torrey (1991), p 1025; Stewart et al (1996), pp 160–161; Ellison and Munro (2009), p 304; Ryan (2011), p 775; Burrowes (2013), p 6; Dufraimont (2019), pp 332–333; Gunby et al (2013), pp 95–99; Coumarelos et al (2023), pp 171–173.

7 Stewart et al (1996), p 161.

8 Thompson et al (2020). See also Penhollow et al (2017).

9 See Penhollow et al (2017), p 93.

10 Comack and Peter (2005), p 308; Gotell (2002), p 258.

11 Hall and Wright (2008), p 64; Brook (2022), pp 120–121. See also Finfgeld-Connet (2014).

12 Hall and Wright (2008), pp 66, 88.

13 Hawkins (2018), p 2; Nowell et al (2017), p 2.

14 Estrich (1986), p 1122; Dripps (1992), pp 1780–1781; Coughlin (1998), pp 1–5; Stevenson (2000), p 347; McGregor (2005), p 27.

15 Brownmiller (1975), p 376; MacKinnon (1989), p 175; Coughlin (1998), p 5.

16 Griffin (1971), p 32; Brownmiller (1975), p 377; Clark (1987), p 24; Chamallas (1988), pp 789–790; Stevenson (2000), p 354.

17 Griffin (1971), p 30; Brownmiller (1975), p 17; Toner (1977), p 86; Anderson (2002), pp 61–64.

18 Griffin (1971), p 30; Estrich (1986), p 1127; Anderson (2002), p 53. The marital immunity was abolished by statute in South Australia in 1976.

19 Clark (1987), p 44; Brundage (1987), p 64; Henderson (1992), p 135; Coughlin (1998), p 8.

20 Griffin (1971), p 30; Stevenson (2000), pp 354. See Fisher and Ammett (1992), p 686.

21 Brundage (1987), p 64; Dripps (1992), p 1781; Henderson (1992), p 135; Coughlin (1998), p 8.

22 Griffin (1971), p 32; Pateman (1980), p 158; Estrich (1986), p 1986; Dripps (1992), p 1781; Coughlin (1998), p 6.

23 Chamallas (1988), pp 788–789; Dripps (1992), pp 1780–1781. Cf Coughlin (1998), p 10.

24 Clark (1987), p 27; Chamallas (1988), pp 788–789; MacKinnon (1989), p 175.

25 Griffin (1971), p 30; Pateman (1980), p 158; Chamallas (1988), pp 788–789; Pineau (1989), p 226; Brown (1992), p 9; Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994), p 136; Stewart et al (1996), p 161; Stevenson (2000), pp 360, 365; Abrams et al (2003), pp 112–113; Tuerkheimer (2012), p 1477. See also Anderson (2002), pp 60–61.

26 Odgers (1986), pp 74–75; Mason (1995), p 51.

27 Henning and Bronitt (1998), p 78 discussing Clarke (1817) 2 Stark 241.

28 Mason (1995), pp 54–55; Henning and Bronitt (1998), p 77. See also Stevenson (2000), p 360; Anderson (2002), pp 52–53; Tuerkheimer (2012), p 1470; Dufraimont (2019), p 334.

29 Odgers (1986), pp 74–75; Henning and Bronitt (1998), pp 78–79. See also Anderson (2002), p 54; Tuerkheimer (2012), pp 1462, 1470.

30 Torrey (1991), p 1014; Anderson (2002), p 56; Cossins (2020), pp 178–179.

31 Crawford and Popp (2003), p 14; Anderson (2002), p 143; Burkett and Hamilton (2012), p 816.

32 See n 4; Bronitt and Easteal (2018), p 17.

33 See e.g. Muehlenhard and McCoy (1991); Crawford and Popp (2003); Bay-Cheng and Eliseo-Arras (2008); Farvid et al (2017); Woerner and Abbey (2017); Thompson et al (2020); Wesson (2022).

34 Crawford and Popp (2003), p 22; Bordini and Sperb (2013), p 702.

35 Crawford and Popp (2003), p 23; Farvid et al (2016), p 545; Woerner and Abbey (2017), p 724; Penhollow et al (2017), p 92.

36 Woerner and Abbey (2017), p 718; Thompson et al (2020), p 1; Wesson (2022), p 1321.

37 Crawford and Popp (2003), p 23; Lyons and Willott (2008), p 705; Grubb and Turner (2012), p 447. See Coumarelos et al (2023), p 173. e.g. 7% of respondents agreed that meeting up with a man from a dating app renders a woman partly responsible for her assault.

38 Gotell (2008), pp 877–876, 880. See e.g. 21% of respondents in the 2021 National Community Attitudes towards Violence Against Women Survey, thought a woman who sends her partner a naked image is partly responsible if he shares it without consent. Likewise, around 1 in 10 respondents thought forced sex was justified when the woman had initiated intimacy: Coumarelos et al (2023), pp 142, 144.

39 Comack and Peter (2005), p 298; Drakopoulou (2007), p 10. See discussion on agency and choice in Rutherford (2018), pp 626–628.

40 Burkett and Hamilton (2012), pp 817–818.

41 Evidence Act Amendment Act 1976 (SA).

42 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L(1)(a).

43 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L(1)(b).

44 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L(1)(b) and (2).

45 R v AP [2022] SADC 136 at 33.

46 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L(2). See Henning and Bronitt (1998), pp 84–85.

47 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L(3).

48 Henning and Bronitt (1998), pp 84–85; Burman (2009), pp 385–386; Carline and Easteal (2014), pp 191–192, 196.

49 For similar findings see Kennedy et al (2012), pp 337–338; Burgin and Flynn (2021), pp 345–350. See also Cossins (2020), pp 415–417; McDonald (2014), pp 493–494.

50 McGlynn (2017), pp 371–373.

51 Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75 at 101 (Gibbs ACJ and Mason J), quoted in Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 335 (Deane J); Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 50, 54 (Brennan J). See comments in R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 at 38 (Lord Steyn).

52 Spigelman (2004), pp 44–45. See also DPP (Nauru) v Fowler (1984) 154 CLR 627 at 630.

53 R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 at 91–92, 94 (Lord Hope). See also McGlynn (2017), p 373.

54 Law Commission (2023), p 27.

55 See e.g. Law Commission (2023) Ch 4.

56 See McGlynn (2017), p 329 for similar conclusions in the UK context.

57 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L(2)(b).

58 See Pateman (1980), p 158; Henning and Bronitt (1998), p 89; Edwards et al (2011), pp 767–768.

59 Law Commission (2023), p 144. See discussion of a mock-jury study in Anderson (2002), p 129.

60 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64.

61 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 24–5, 30–32.

62 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 24–5, 30–32.

63 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 104.

64 See also Burgin and Flynn (2021), pp 342–343.

65 See Pineau (1989), p 230.

66 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53.

67 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 164.

68 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 55, 70, 183–184.

69 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 164.

70 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 182–185.

71 R v Green [2016] SADC 29 at 21–22.

72 R v Green [2016] SADC 29 at 24–25, 28.

73 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 169.

74 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 169.

75 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 169.

76 See e.g. Jordan (2004), p 51.

77 See Henderson (1992), p 140; Abrams et al (2003), p 113.

78 Dufraimont (2019), p 332.

79 Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L(2)(a).

80 Carline and Easteal (2014), p 191.

81 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125.

82 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125 at 29.

83 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125 at 32.

84 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125 at 37.

85 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125 at 38.

86 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125 at 64.

87 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125 at 131–132.

88 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125 at 131.

89 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125 at 135, 142.

90 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125 at 221, 234.

91 R v L OS [2021] SADC 125 at 229.

92 Fisher and Ammett (1992), p 686.

93 Henning and Bronitt (1998), p 79; Anderson (2002), p 60; Carline and Easteal (2014), p 190; Burgin and Flynn (2021), p 349.

94 Cf Powell et al (2013), p 467.

95 R v Brady [2014] SASCFC 7.

96 R v Brady [2014] SASCFC 7 at 22.

97 R v Brady [2014] SASCFC 7 at 15, 28.

98 R v Brady [2014] SASCFC 7 at 33.

99 E.g. R v Green [2016] SADC 29 at 20; R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 143.

100 See discussion in 3.1.

101 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 24 (see fn 12) and 25.

102 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 25.

103 In cross-examination the victim initially denied sending a photograph to the accused on Instagram initiating a sexual encounter, however, she was presented with a copy of the message and agreed that she could have sent it. Likewise, she agreed that she could have sent the accused nude photographs or videos of herself on Snapchat: R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 30–32.

104 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 109.

105 R v Moores [2017] SASCFC 95 at 193.

106 R v Moores [2017] SASCFC 95 at 13.

107 R v Moores [2017] SASCFC 95 at 15–16.

108 R v Moores [2017] SASCFC 95 at 18.

109 R v Moores [2017] SASCFC 95 at 191.

110 R v Moores [2017] SASCFC 95 at 194. See Schaffer (2023), pp 623–624 for a discussion of this case with respect to myths of resistance as relevant to an accused's belief in consent.

111 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 98.

112 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 109. See Schaffer (2023), pp 618, 626 for a discussion of this case with respect to myths of resistance as relevant to an accused's belief in consent.

113 See Ellison and Munro (2009), pp 296–297; Gunby et al (2013), p 101.

114 R v Tennant [2021] SADC 95 at 83, 85, 86.

115 R v Tennant [2021] SADC 95 at 83, 85, 86.

116 R v Tennant [2021] SADC 95 at 89.

117 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 70 see fn 79.

118 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at [70].

119 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 119, 154.

120 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 169–170.

121 See Finch and Munro (2004), p 36.

122 See e.g. Randall (2010), p 409.

123 Rutherford (2018), p 623.

124 Pateman (1980), pp 162–163; Estrich (1986), p 1127.

125 Muehlenhard and McCoy (1991), p 459; Ellison and Munro (2009), pp 295–296; Gravelin et al (2019), p 2435; Kettrey et al (2021), p 2.

126 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 121, 127. For a definition of implied consent see Burgin and Flynn (2021), p 338.

127 R v Green [2016] SADC 29 at 25. For further examples see Powell et al (2013), p 467; Burgin and Flynn (2021), pp 339–345.

128 R v Cleland [2012] SADC 42.

129 R v Cleland [2012] SADC 42 at 28, 32.

130 R v Cleland [2012] SADC 42 at 79. See Schaffer (2023), pp 626–629.

131 R v Cleland [2012] SADC 42 at 93.

132 R v Cleland [2012] SADC 42 at 78–79.

133 See e.g. Gotell (2008).

134 Pateman (1980), pp 162–163; Henderson (1992), p 143.

135 Mardorossian (2014), p 32. See also Bay-Cheng and Eliseo-Arras 2008), p 395.

136 Pateman (1980), pp 162–163; MacKinnon (1989), pp 168–170; Naffine (1992), p 764; Kasplew (1995), p 355; Mardorossian (2014), pp 35. See Gavey (2019), pp 129–135.

137 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 64, 66, 70–71, 75–77.

138 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 154.

139 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 170.

140 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 169.

141 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 155–156, 169.

142 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 171.

143 Chamallas (1988), p 783; MacKinnon (1989), pp 174–183; Pineau (1989), pp 222–224; Powell et al (2013), pp 459–460; Cossins (2019), p 471. See also Basile (1999); Gavey (2019) Ch 4.

144 R v De Wilde [2022] SADC 116 at 157. For an explanation of the freeze response see Moor et al (2013).

145 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 3.

146 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 35–38.

147 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 49–50.

148 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 55.

149 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 35, 37–38.

150 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 60, 64, 164.

151 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 20, 76, 164.

152 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 61.

153 R v Dobbs [2022] SADC 53 at 61.

154 See Gotell (2008), p 880.

155 See Estrich (1992), p 10.

156 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 45.

157 R v Esposito [2023] SADC 64 at 45.

158 Larcombe (2002), p 134; Randall (2010), p 409. See also Gotell (2008), pp 866–867.

159 Henderson (1992), p 140.

160 Brownmiller (1975), pp 17–18; MacKinnon (1989), pp 238–239; Torrey (1991), p 1060.

161 McGlynn (2017), p 373. For a discussion of the sexual violence justice gap see Horan (2021).

162 Torrey (1991), p 1030; Coughlin (1998), p 16; Campbell et al (2001), pp 1240–1241; Bluett-Boyd and Fileborn (2014), p 12.

163 Burkett and Hamilton (2012), p 829.

Additional information

Funding

This research has been supported by funding from an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.

Notes on contributors

Jessica Schaffer

Jessica Schaffer is a PhD student at Bond University. Her PhD is entitled ‘The Excuse of Mistaken Belief in Australian Rape Law’. She has a Bachelor of Laws and a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Queensland and a LLM in Public International Law from Leiden University in the Netherlands. She is admitted to practice law in Queensland.