The Initial Digitalization of Chinese Diplomacy (2019–2021): Establishing Global Communication Networks on Twitter

ABSTRACT

The way in which Chinese diplomats communicate has changed recently, from being mostly reactive and pragmatic to being rhetorically more combative. This has generated strong academic, media, and policy interest. However, less academic attention has been devoted to the employment of social media for China’s new diplomatic communication strategy. By analyzing the recent employment of Twitter by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), this article explores the initial digitalization of China’s public diplomacy from November 2019 to February 2021. Approaching Twitter as both a virtual network structure and an interactive strategic communication process, we collected 61,000 tweets from Chinese diplomats plus 282,000 tweets from Chinese official media and applied data analytics to examine how the MFA augmented its diplomatic digital presence by responding, reposting/retweeting, mentioning, and hashtagging. We also used discourse analysis to investigate how Chinese diplomats selected topics to generate, diffuse, and affect hegemonic discourses. We argue that China’s MFA initially adopted Twitter using a centrally controlled structure of topic, rhetoric, and discourses as well as cohesive dissemination and augmenting strategies. These communication structures created a self-referencing network closely aligned with Chinese official media on Twitter.

Acknowledgments

The authors highly appreciate the feedback provided on earlier versions of this article at two workshops held by the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Politics, Hong Kong Baptist University, and Hong Kong Metropolitan University. We are thankful to Laura Paulsen, Victor Møller Poulsen, Rasmus Rossen Thy and Mikkel Werling for their valuable research assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2023.2195811.

Notes

¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on January 13, 2020’ <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202001/t20200113_693049.html&gt; accessed Jan. 25, 2022.

² Qingjiang Yao, ‘The News as International Soft Power: An Analysis of the Posting Techniques of China’s News Media on Facebook and Twitter’ in Guobin Yang and Wei Wang (eds), Engaging Social Media in China: Platforms, Publics, and Production (Michigan State University Press 2021).

³ BCW Global, ‘Twiplomacy Study 2020’ <https://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2020/&gt; accessed Feb. 7, 2022.

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on January 13, 2020’.

⁵ Marcel Schliebs and others, ‘China’s Public Diplomacy Operations: Understanding Engagement and Inauthentic Amplification of PRC Diplomats on Facebook and Twitter’ Programme on Democracy & Technology, University of Oxford <https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/chinas-public-diplomacy-operations-understanding-engagement-and-inauthentic-amplification-of-chinese-diplomats-on-facebook-and-twitter/#continue&gt; accessed Jan. 27, 2022.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Philip M. Seib, Real-time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era (Palgrave Macmillan 2012); Corneliu Bjola and Marcus Holmes (eds), Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Routledge 2015); Andreas Sandre, Digital Diplomacy: Conversations on Innovation in Foreign Policy (Rowman & Littlefield 2015); Ilan Manor, The Digitalization of Public Diplomacy (Palgrave Macmillan 2019).

⁸ Jan Melissen, ‘The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice’ in Jan Melissen (ed), The New Public Diplomacy: soft power in international relations (Palgrave Macmillan 2007).

⁹ Ibid; Robert M. Entman, ‘Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. case’ (2008) 13 The International Journal of Press/Politics 87.

¹⁰ Manor, The Digitalization of Public Diplomacy.

¹¹ Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Kristin Anabel Eggeling, ‘Blended Diplomacy: The Entanglement and Contestation of Digital Technologies in Everyday Diplomatic Practice’ (2022) 28 European Journal of International Relations 640; Ilan Manor, ‘The Digitalization of Diplomacy: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Terminology’ Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group <http://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/sites/www.odid.ox.ac.uk/files/DigDiploROxWP2.pdf&gt; accessed Jan. 2, 2023.

¹² Zhao Alexandre Huang and Rui Wang, ‘Building a Network to “Tell China Stories Well”: Chinese Diplomatic Communication Strategies on Twitter’ (2019) 13 International Journal of Communication 2984; Zhao Alexandre Huang and Rui Wang, ‘Exploring China’s Digitalization of Public Diplomacy on Weibo and Twitter: A Case Study of the U.S.–China Trade War’ (2021) 15 International Journal of Communication 1912; Schliebs and others, ‘China’s Public Diplomacy Operations: Understanding Engagement and Inauthentic Amplification of PRC Diplomats on Facebook and Twitter’.

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¹⁶ Defined as the following countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US, and the EU. Detailed explorations of diplomatic strategic communication included only Chinese diplomatic representations communicating in English, thereby excluding France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.

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²³ People’s Daily Commentator, ‘Xi Jinping waijiao sixiang shi xin shidai Zhongguo tese daguo waijiao de genben zunxun he xingdong zhinan. Yi lun guanche luoshi Zhongyang waishi gongzuo huiyi jingshen [Xi Jinping thought on diplomacy is the basis to follow and action guide for major-country diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics in the new era. On the implementation of the spirit of the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference]’ Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] (Beijing June 24, 2018) 1; Andrew J. Nathan and Boshu Zhang, ‘“A Shared Future for Mankind”: Rhetoric and Reality in Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping’ (2021) Journal of Contemporary China 1.

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²⁶ Nadège Rolland, China’s Vision for a New World Order (The National Bureau of Asian Research 2020); Yi Edward Yang, ‘China’s Strategic Narratives in Global Governance Reform under Xi Jinping’ (2021) 30 Journal of Contemporary China 299.

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²⁹ Xi Jinping 819 jianghua quanwen: yanlun fangmian yao ganzhua ganguan ganyu liangjian [Full text of Xi Jinping’s August 19 speech: dare to grasp the opportunity, seize control, and unsheathe the sword] <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/321001.html&gt; accessed July 7, 2022.

³⁰ See e.g. Shulan Ye, ‘Zhongguo guoji huayuquan jianshe: chengjiu, tiaozhan yu shenhua lujing [The construction of China’s international discourse power: achievements, challenges, ways and means]’ (2021) 4 Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies] 26.

³¹ Ashley Esarey, ‘Propaganda as a Lens for Assessing Xi Jinping’s Leadership’ (2021) 30 The Journal of Contemporary China 888.

³² Kingsley Edney, ‘Building National Cohesion and Domestic Legitimacy: A Regime Security Approach to Soft Power in China’ (2015) 35 Politics 259.

³³ Rolland, China’s Vision for a New World Order; Ye, ‘Zhongguo guoji huayuquan jianshe: chengjiu, tiaozhan yu shenhua lujing [The construction of China’s international discourse power: achievements, challenges, ways and means]’.

³⁴ Reuters Staff, ‘China demands “fighting spirit” from diplomats as trade war, Hong Kong protests simmer’ Reuters <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy/china-demands-fighting-spirit-from-diplomats-as-trade-war-hong-kong-protests-simmer-idUSKBN1Y80R8&gt; accessed June 13, 2022;, ‘State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press’ <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/202005/t20200525_468769.html&gt; accessed June 13, 2022; Xinhua News Agency, ‘Xi Jinping zai Zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhi ju di sanshi ci jiti xuexi shi qisngdiao jiaqiang he gaijin guoji chuanbo gongzuo zhanshi zhenshi liti quanmian de Zhongguo [During the 30th collective study of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping emphasized strengthening and improving international communication work and showing a true, solid and comprehensive China]’ <http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2021–06/01/c_1127517461.htm&gt; accessed Feb. 16, 2022.

³⁵ Elizabeth Chen, ‘China Learning From Russia’s “Emerging Great Power” Global Media Tactics’ (2021) 21 China Brief 2.

³⁶ Omnicore, ‘Twitter by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics & Fun Facts’ 2022) <https://www.omnicoreagency.com/twitter-statistics/&gt; accessed July 21, 2022.

³⁷ Swaine, ‘Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics’; Suisheng Zhao, ‘Top-level Design and Enlarged Diplomacy: Foreign and Security Policymaking in Xi Jinping’s China’ (2022) Journal of Contemporary China 1.

³⁸ Guoguang Wu, ‘The Emergence of the Central Office of Foreign Affairs: From Leadership Politics to “Great Diplomacy”’ China Leadership Monitor <https://www.prcleader.org/wu-1&gt; accessed Feb. 14, 2022.

³⁹ Clyde Yicheng Wang, ‘Changing Strategies and Mixed Agendas: Contradiction and Fragmentation within China’s External Propaganda’ Journal of Contemporary China <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022.2109808&gt; accessed Jan. 3, 2023.

⁴⁰ Tao Jiang, ‘Xi Jinping makes four demands on Chinese diplomats [Xi Jinping dui Zhongguo waijiao renyuan ti sidian yaoqiu]’ <https://www.chinanews.com.cn/m/gn/2017/12–28/8411832.shtml&gt; accessed July 21, 2022; Jiechi Yang, ‘Yang Jiechi: Yi Xi Jinping waijiao sixiang wei zhidao. Shenru tuijin xin shidai duiwai gongzuo [Yang Jiechi: Taking Xi Jinping’s thoughts on diplomacy as guidance. Deeply promote foreign work in the new era]’ (Zhongguo Gongchandang xinwen wang [News website of the Chinese Communist Party], 2018) <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0802/c64094–30191578.html&gt; accessed July 21, 2022.

⁴¹ Various stakeholders such as provincial authorities and state-owned enterprises are also involved in decision-making and the implementation of China’s foreign policies, but do not speak on behalf of China. Jie Yu and Lucy Ridout, ‘Who decides China’s foreign policy?’ Chatham House Briefing <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/who-decides-chinas-foreign-policy&gt; accessed Feb. 18, 2022.

⁴² See supplemental online material Table 2.

⁴³ The re-centralization of power to the CCP has also brought a return to strong overseas state propaganda efforts by significantly increasing the scope of global media initiatives. See Thussu, Burgh and Shi, China’s Media Go Global; Wang, ‘Changing Strategies and Mixed Agendas: Contradiction and Fragmentation within China’s External Propaganda’.

⁴⁴ See supplemental online material Table 3.

⁴⁵ All the data is proprietary and has been collected through Twitter’s API v2: https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/twitter-api.

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Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD), London <https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/reply-all-inauthenticity-and-coordinated-replying-in-pro-chinese-communist-party-twitter-networks/&gt; accessed March 3, 2022.

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⁵¹ Details on methodology is available as supplemental online material.

⁵² See supplemental online material Table 2 and Table 3.

⁵³ Details on the applied network analysis are available as supplemental online material.

⁵⁴ This restriction to tweets only in English language for LDA was based on the constraints and liabilities still inherent in automated language technology translating texts in other languages into English.

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⁵⁶ Subsamples consisted of 4,879 tweets in total.

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⁵⁸ See supplemental online material Table 4.

⁵⁹ Metadata on followers and followings was retrieved on June 21, 2021 for the majority of @handles in our dataset, and a few were retrieved on Feb. 25, 2022.

⁶⁰ Followers were registered on March 29, 2022.

⁶¹ See Figure 1.

⁶² See Figure 2.

⁶³ See Figure 3.

⁶⁴ See supplemental online material Table 2.

⁶⁵ See supplemental online material Table 5a.

⁶⁶ See supplemental online material Table 5b and 5c.

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⁶⁸ Details on methodology are available as supplemental online material.

⁶⁹ See supplemental online material Figures 6a-6d.

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Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Aarhus University Research Foundation under Research Grant AUFF-E-2020-9-1.