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ABSTRACT
Russia’s Armed Forces have long struggled in combat operations to fix and locate enemy targets and follow up with precision strikes. The new Reconnaissance-Fire System (ROS) allows combined-arms units to conduct operations in real time and greatly increases the speed and accuracy of Russian fires on the future battlefield. This process has already made significant progress, with its future development earmarked as a high priority in Moscow’s defense planning. The ROS is a network-centric capability offering vastly enhanced target acquisition and strikes across the range of Russian systems capable of targeting ground targets and especially benefits artillery systems. This article examines the evolution of the concept of the ROS and the progress towards its development but does not assess the problems and challenges its use encountered in the Russia-Ukraine War that began in February 2022.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
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3 Author interviews by video teleconference (VTC) with retired Russian military officers, Moscow, 3 March 2021.
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5 O.V. Tikhanychev, ‘O roli i meste sistematicheskogo ognevogo vozdeystviya v sovremen-nykh operatsiyakh’, Voyennaya Mysl’, 4 (2016) pp. 39–45; A.Ya. Chernysh, V.S. Morgun, and S.V. Chvarkov, ‘Ognevoye porazheniye protivnika raket-nymi voyskami i artilleriyey v operatsiyakh koalitsionnykh gruppirovok voysk’, Voyennaya Mysl’, 3 (2003), pp. 12–16.
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7 S.V. Morozov and O.A. Kudrenko, ‘O podkhode k sozdaniyu yedinoy statsionarnomobil’noy avtomatizirovannoy sistemy upravleniya voyskami i oruzhiyem obyedinyonnogo strategicheskogo komandovaniya’, Voyennaya Mysl’, 1 (2013) pp. 126–134; O.A. Kudrenko and S.V. Morozov, ‘Uchyot morfologicheskikh, sintaksicheskikh i stilisticheskikh osobennostey operativnykh dokumentov pri sozdaniyi ASU spetsnaznacheniya’, Voprosy Radioelektroniki 2 (2013) pp. 23–31.
8 S.V. Golubev and V.K. Kiryanov, ‘Sovremenniye sistemy upravleniya bespilotnymi letatel’nymi apparatami inostrannykh armiy’, Vestnik Voyenno-Vozdushnoy Akademiyi, Voronezh 2(23) (2015; S.V. Plotnikov and S.V. Golubev, ‘Osobennosti ispol’zovaniya sputnikovykh sistem svyazi dlya informatsionnogo obespecheniya boyevykh deystviy obyedineniy i soyedineniy sukhop-utnykh voysk vooruzhonnykh sil Soyedinyonnykh Shtatov Ameriki’, Vestnik Voyenno-Vozdushnoy Akademiyi, Voronezh, 3(24) (2015); A. Dronov, ‘Vzglyady komandovaniya Bundesvera na primeneniye BLA’, Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye 12 (2014); V. Rusinov, ‘Sostoyaniye i plany razvitiya nazemnykh robototekhnicheskikh kompleksov SShA’, Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, (3) (2013).
9 Author interviews by VTC with Russian military subject matter experts (SMEs), Washington DC, 25 February 2021.
10 A. Artem’yev and O. Kharchenko, ‘Vozdushnaya razvedka’, Armeskiy Sbornik, 8 pp. 40–45.
11 Vladislav Morenkov and Andrey Tezikov, ‘Istoricheskiy aspekt razvitiya ASU PVO’, Vozdusho-Kosmicheskaya Oborona, 1, http://www.vko.ru/oruzhie/istoricheskiy-aspekt-razvitiya-asu-pvo, February 7 2015; Igor M. Kuptsov, ‘Bor’ba s giperzvukovymi letatelnami apparatami (GZLA): Novaya Zadacha I trebovaniya k sisteme vozdushno-kosmicheskoy oborony (VKO)’, Voyennaya Mysl’, 1 (2011), pp. 10–17;
‘Soyedineniya armii Yuzhnogo voyennogo okruga (YuVO), dislotsirovannyye v Volgogradskoy i Rostovskoy oblastyakh prinimayut uchastiye v dvukhstoronnem komandno-shtabnom uchenii’, Tvzvezda.ru, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201810011602-mil-ruj6tgf.html, 1 October 2018.
12 Grigoriy Maslov, ‘They Will Divide the Russian Armed Forces by the Compass’, www.infox.ru, 30 April 2010.
13 See: Roger McDermott, ‘Russia’s Entry to Sixth Generation Warfare: the ‘Non-Contact’ Experiment in Syria’, The Jamestown Foundation, April 2021.
14 Aleksey Leonkov, ‘Nash asimmetrichnyy otvet na amerikanskiye setetsentricheskiye voyny’, Zvezdaweekly.ru, https://zvezdaweekly.ru/news/20181041654-460kh.html, 16 October 2018.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Aleksey Ramm and Aleksandr Kruglov, ‘Minoborony razvernet Akatsiyu za 21 mlrd: Obshchevoyskovyye armii pereydut pod avtomatizirovannoye upravleniye v rezhime real’nogo vremeni’, https://iz.ru/761052/aleksei-ramm-aleksandr-kruglov/minoborony-razvernet-akatciiu-za-21-mlrd, Izvestiya, 5 July 2018.
18 Aleksey Ramm, Aleksey Kozachenko, and Roman Kretsul, ‘Pamyatnaya bigdata: generalam pomozhet iskusstvennyy intellekt’, Izvestiya, https://iz.ru/941925/aleksei-ramm-aleksei-kozachenko-roman-kretcul/pamiatnaia-bigdata-generalam-pomozhet-iskusstvennyi-intellekt, 13 November 2019.
19 Author interviews by VTC with Russian military SMEs, Washington DC, 25 February 2021.
20 Artilleriyskaya razvedka: uchebnik, Kazan: KVVKU (VI), 2008.
21 A.V. Anan’yev and S.V. Filatov, ‘Obosnovaniye neobkhodimosti sozdaniya mezhvidovogo razvedyvatel’noudarnogo kompleksa bespilotnykh letatel’nykh apparatov malogo klassa dlya aviatsionnogo formirovaniya’, Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily: Teoriya i Praktika, 13 (2020).
22 See: Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, Russian Artillery Fire Control for Large Scale Combat Operations’, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO 2018) p. 1.
23 See: https://dictionary.mil.ru/folder/123101/item/127720/, Accessed 29 March 2021.
24 Aleksei Byabenin, ‘Artilleriyskiye roboty: ot mekhatroniki k iskusstvennomu intellektu’, https://soyuzmash.ru/docs/prez/prez-krrt-230818-2.pdf, Accessed 5 March 2021.
25 Discussed in more detail below.
26 Lester Grau and Charles K. Bartles, ‘Russian Artillery Fire Control for Large Scale Combat Operations’, Op.Cit., p. 9.
27 Author interviews by video teleconference (VTC) with retired Russian military officers, Moscow, March 3, 2021.
28 I.N. Fomin, Teoreticheskiye osnovy planirovaniya artilleriyskoy razvedki (SPb: VAU 2000).
29 Krasnaya Armiya i Vtoraya Mirovaya voyna. Rech’ i vystupleniya I.V.Stalina na priyeme v chest’ vypusknikov voyennykh akademiy 5 maya 1941 goda, http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/stalin-5-5-41.shtml, Accessed 27 March 2021.
30 Lester Grau and Charles K. Bartles, ‘Russian Artillery Fire Control for Large Scale Combat Operations’, Op.Cit., P. 10.
31 Aleksandr Khramchikhin, ‘Test na loyal’nost’ Na ucheniyakh Tsentr-2019 kazhdaya strana rabotala po svoim tselyam’, Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/52889, 8 October 2019.
32 See: Roger McDermott, ‘Russia Tests Network-Centric Warfare in Tsentr 2019’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 16(131), https://jamestown.org/program/russia-tests-network-centric-warfare-in-tsentr-2019/, 25 September 2019.
33 ‘O sozdanii razvedki i ognya kompleks s BPLA Orlan-10 dlya vypolneniya osobo otvetstvennykh zadach’, Tsentr Spetsial’nykh Tekhnologiy Voyennoy Artilleriyskoy Akademii Rossiyskoy Federatsii (St. Petersburg, 2017).
34 A.S. Vorob’yev and V.S. Morozov, Sbor i obrabotka razvedyvatel’nykh svedeniy v artilleriyskikh shtabakh (SPb: VAU 2002); A.S. Vorob’yev, Osnovy matematicheskogo modelirovaniya protsessov funktsionirovaniya sil i sredstv artilleriyskoy razvedki (SPb.: VAA 1997).
35 Khramchikhin, ‘Test na loyal’nost’ Na ucheniyakh Tsentr-2019 kazhdaya strana rabotala po svoim tselyam’, Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, Op.Cit.
36 Ibid; ‘Dal’noboynyy Pion poluchit tsifrovoye tseleukazaniye’, Topwar.ru, https://topwar.ru/134885-dalnoboynyy-pion-poluchit-cifrovoe-celeukazanie.html, 30 January 2018.
37 Dal’noboynyy Pion poluchit tsifrovoye tseleukazaniye’, Ibid.
38 ‘Pushki-mastodonty. Zachem Rossiya moderniziruyet Malki i Tyul’pany’, RIA Novosti, https://ria.ru/20191006/1559442060.html, 6 October 2019.
39 ‘Genshtab: osobennost’’u konfliktov budushchego stanet primeneniye robotov I kosmicheskikh sredstv’, TASS, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5062463, 24 March 2018.
40 ‘Podrazdeleniya raketnykh voysk i artillerii YuVO v ramkakh kontro’’noy proverki ob’yedinili v yedinyy razvedyvate’’no-ognevoy kompleks’, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12352256@egNews, 2 April 2021.
41 Barkovskiy A.F, Teoreticheskiye osnovy upravleniya udarami i ognem raketnykh voysk i artillerii: Uchebnik. – SPb: MVAA, 2005.
42 A.I. Chuprin and A.A. Polyakov, ‘Analiz boyevykh vozmozhnostey otechestvennykh i zarubezhnykh razvedyvatel’no-ognevykh kompleksov pri vypolnenii spetsial’nykh operatsiy’, Intellektual’nyye sistemy, upravleniye i mekhatronika, 2018; M.M. Matveyevskiy, ‘Raketnyye voyska i artilleriya. Razvitiye form i sposobov boyevogo primeneniya’, Armeskiy Sbornik 4 (2017).
43 Lieutenant-General M.M. Matveevsky, Colonel M.A. Saronov, ‘Organizatsiya i vedeniye razvedki v interesakh boyevogo primeneniya raketnykh voysk i artillerii v sovremennykh operatsiyakh’, Voyennya Mysl’, https://vm.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/117170/, October 2017.
44 Author’s emphasis.
45 M.M. Matveevsky and Colonel M.A. Saronov, ‘Organizatsiya i vedeniye razvedki v interesakh boyevogo primeneniya raketnykh voysk i artillerii v sovremennykh operatsiyakh’, Op. Cit.
46 Oxenstierna, Susanne, and Bengt-Goran Bergstrand, ‘Defence Economics’, in Carolina Vendil Pallin (Ed), Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective - 2011 (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Resarch Agency 2011), pp. 43–64.
47 Dmitry Gorenburg, ‘Russia’s Military Modernization Plans: 2018-2027’, Russian Military Blog, https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2017/11/27/russias-military-modernization-plans-2018-2027/, 27 November 2017.
48 Russia’s Armed Forces is currently modernizing all of its reconnaissance assets: UAVs (Orlan-10, Eleron-3SV, Granat-1, Forpost); signal intelligence (Sbor-1M SIGINT Geolocator); counter battery radar (Aistenok, Zoopark-1M; acoustic location (AZK-7M acoustic location complex); electro-optical (PRP-4A mobile reconnaissance station, LPR-2/LPR-4 laser range finder); ground surveillance radar (GSR) (SBR-5, PSNR-8M, Kredo-1C, SNAR-10M1); however, there is little information publicly available on planning for space-based ISR. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, ‘Russian Artillery Fire Control for Large Scale Combat Operations’, PPT Presentation, Accessed 10 March 2021.
49 Author’s emphasis.
50 Johan Norberg, Training to Fight– Russia’s Major Military Exercises 2011–2014’, (Stockholm: FOI 2015) p, 61.
51 Bruce Menning, ‘Train Hard Fight Easy: The Legacy of A. V. Suvorov and his ‘Art of Victory’, Air University Review, (November-December 1986), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/nov-dec/menning.html, Accessed on 19 October 2020.
52 Author interviews by VTC with Russian military SMEs, Berlin, 17 March, 2021.
53 O.Yu Kashirina, Ye.I. Kashirina V.V. Kulakov, and V.A. Shamanov, ‘Osnovnyye napravleniya razvitiya perspektivnykh avtomatizirovannykh kompleksov v interesakh Sukhoputnykh voysk’, Izvestiya Instituta inzhenernoy fiziki, 4(54) (2019); A.V. Polyanskov and M.S. Spirin, ‘Sistemnyye napravleniya razvitiya razvedyvatel’no-informatsionnogo obespecheniya podsistemy upravleniya raketnymi voyskami i artilleriyey yedinoy sistemy upravleniya takticheskogo zvena’, Nauka i Voyennaya Bezopasnost’, 3(3) (2015).
54 A.V. Karpenko, ‘Kompleks takticheskogo zvena razvedki upravleniya i svyazi (krus) “strelets,”’ Bastian-opk.ru, http://bastion-opk.ru/strelec-asu/, 16 November 2019.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Lester Grau and Charles K. Bartles, ‘Russian Artillery Fire Control for Large Scale Combat Operations’, Op.Cit., p. 10.
58 V.N. Krasil’nikov, A.N., Kozar, V.S. Moiseyev, and O.V. Krasil’nikov, ‘Perenosnyye kompleksy avtomatizirovannogo upravleniya ognem artillerii takticheskogo zvena’, Kazanskoye vyssheye artilleriyskoye komandnoye uchilishche (voyennyy institut) imeni marshala artillerii M.N. Chistyakova. Izdatel’stvo Otechestvo, 2009.
59 Karpenko, ‘Kompleks takticheskogo zvena razvedki upravleniya i svyazi (krus) “strelets,”’ Op.Cit.
60 Karpenko, ‘Kompleks takticheskogo zvena razvedki upravleniya i svyazi (krus) “strelets,”’ Op. Cit.
61 General Marusin compares the Strelets to its closest foreign analog as the US Army’s Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System—REMBASS: Aleksandr Stepanov, ‘Nayti i unichtozhit’ za sekundy: kak rabotayet voyennaya razvedka’, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, http://www.mk.ru/politics/2017/11/02/nayti-i-unichtozhit-za-sekundy-kak-rabotaet-voennaya-razvedka.html, November 2, 2017.
62 The All-Russian Scientific Research Institute Signal (VNII Signal) Joint Stock Company located in Kovrov, to High-Precision Systems holding of Rostec State Corporation. According to the company website: “VNII Signal performs research and development in the following areas: Artillery fire-control systems; Land/marine/airborne laying and stabilization systems; Navigation and survey systems; Hydrostatic transmissions, electrohydraulic control systems and hydraulic machines; Robotics. VNII Signal, https://vniisignal.ru/en, accessed 14 April 2021.
63 Aleksandr Denisov and Oleg Falichev, ‘V nashikh razrabotkakh – samyye posledniye dostizheniya nauchnoy mysli Denisov’, Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kur’yer, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/48294, February 12, 2019.
64 N.A. Rudianov and V.S. Khrushchev, ‘Obosnovaniye oblika boyevykh i obespechivayushchikh robototekhnicheskikh kompleksov Sukhoputnykh voysk’, Inzhenerniy Zhurnal: Nauka i Innovatsiyi 8 (20) (2013), pp. 937–944.
65 S.A. Mosiyenko and V.I. Lokhtin, Kontseptsiya postroyeniya nazemnogo robototekhnicheskogo udarnogo kompleksa. Izdaniye vtoroye, dopolnennoye (Moscow: Izd-vo Sampoligrafist 2014); S.A. Mosiyenko, Nazemnyye robototekhnicheskiye udarnyye i razvedyvatel’nyye kompleksy dlya takticheskikh podrazdeleniy Sukhoputnykh voysk (Moscow: Izd-vo Sampoligrafist 2014); S.A. Mosiyenko, V.I. Lokhtin, and V.G. Arsen’yev, Razrabotka razvedyvatel’no-ognevoy sistemy motostrelkovogo batal’ona s mobil’nymi robototekhnicheskimi kompleksami. – Mobil’nyye robototekhnicheskiye kompleksy. Sbornik statey (Moscow: Izd-vo Sampoligrafist 2014).
66 S.A. Mosiyenko and V.I. Lokhtin, Kontseptsiya postroyeniya nazemnogo robototekhnicheskogo udarnogo kompleksa. Izdaniye vtoroye, dopolnennoye (Moscow: Izd-vo Sampoligrafist 2014); S.A. Mosiyenko, Nazemnyye robototekhnicheskiye udarnyye i razvedyvatel’nyye kompleksy dlya takticheskikh podrazdeleniy Sukhoputnykh voysk (Moscow: Izd-vo Sampoligrafist 2014).
67 I.V. Demidyuk, ‘Problemniye voprosy i perspektivy sozdaniya i sovershenstvovaniya kompleksov sredstv avtomatizatsiyi upravleniya ognyom v usloviyakh primeneniya bespilotnykhletatel’nykh apparatov’, Sovremennoye sostoyaniye i napravleniya razvitiya uchebnotrenirovochnykh sredstv dlya podgotovki spetsialistov Raketnykh voysk i Artilleriyi, Mikhailovskaya (St. Petersburg: Military Artillery Academy Press, 2018) pp. 666–670; V.I. Babichev, A.V. Ignatov, Ya.S., Pyatnitsky, and A.V. Shigin, ‘Avtomatizirovannaya ognevaya sistema na baze bespilotnogo letatel’nogo apparata (BLA) s tseleukazaniyem’, Voprosy Oboronnoy Tekhniki, Series 16: Tekhnicheskiye Sredstva Protivodeystviya Terrorizmu, 78 (2014.)
68 Reserve Colonel S. Zyuzin, Lieutenant-Colonel S. Umerenkov, Major S. Shadrin, ‘Voyuyut roboty’, Armeskiy Sbornik, May 2019, pp.15-23.
69 Author’s emphasis.
70 Ibid.
71 Reserve Colonel S. Zyuzin, Lieutenant-Colonel S. Umerenkov, Major S. Shadrin, ‘Voyuyut roboty’, Armeskiy Sbornik, May 2019, pp. 15–23.
72 Ibid.
73 Byabenin, ‘Artilleriyskiye roboty: ot mekhatroniki k iskusstvennomu intellektu’, Op.Cit.
74 V.V. Taletsky, A.A. Petrov, and N.V. Medvedev, ‘Perspektivniye kompleksniye trenazhorniye sredstva dlya podgotovki podrazdeleniy Raketnykh voysk i Artilleriyi’, Sovremennoye sostoyaniye i napravleniya razvitiya uchebnotrenirovochnykh sredstv dlya podgotovki spetsialistov Raketnykh voysk i Artilleriyi, Mikhailovskaya (St. Petersburg: Military Artillery Academy Press 2018) pp. 724–726; S.A. Bakaneyev, ‘Robototekhnicheskiye kompleksy voyennogo naznacheniya dlya Raketnykh voysk i Artilleriyi Sukhoputnykh voysk’, Noviy Oboronniy Zakaz: Strategiyi 2 (44) (2017), pp. 46-51.
75 Sergey Mosiyenko, ‘Razvedyvatel’no-ognevaya sistema motostrelkovogo batal’ona sukhoputnykh voysk na baze mobil’nykh robototekhnicheskikh kompleksov’, Arms-expo.ru, https://www.arms-expo.ru/articles/armed-forces/razvedyvatelno-ognevaya-sistema-motostrelkovogo-batalona-sukhoputnykh-voysk-na-baze-mobilnykh-roboto/, 19 June 2016.
76 Ibid.
77 V. Litvinenko, ‘Perspektivy primeneniya artilleriyskikh sredstv razvedki v yedinom razvedyvatel’nom informatsionnom prostranstve’, Armeskiy Sbornik, http://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/115354/, 10 May 2018.
78 Litvinenko outlines this as consisting of the following: “the composition and capabilities of automated surveillance systems and reconnaissance means must correspond to the volume of reconnaissance tasks necessary for the effective management and use of means of fire destruction; it is necessary to carry out a mandatory periodic review (confirmation) by intelligence agencies of the systems and means of reconnaissance of all objects assigned for fire destruction, their location or the nature of actions; the opening of enemy targets, and, first of all, reconnaissance signs of fire engagement targets must be carried out to the required depth and ensure their guaranteed recognition and classification; for the reliable use of artillery fire, it is necessary that errors in determining the coordinates of targets in the interests of fire for barrel artillery do not exceed 10–20 m; for MLRS 50–70 m; when using homing (guided) ammunition 80–120 m; all reconnaissance information should be stored in a certain set of databases, which are the functional core of the information support of the commander and his means of destruction. Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Mosiyenko, ‘Razvedyvatel’no-ognevaya sistema motostrelkovogo batal’ona sukhoputnykh voysk na baze mobil’nykh robototekhnicheskikh kompleksov’, Arms-expo.ru, Op.Cit.
81 See: ‘Katalog nazemnykh voyennykh robotov razlichnogo naznacheniya’,http://robotrends.ru/robopedia/katalog-nazemnyh-voennyh-robotov-razlichnogo-naznacheniya, Robotrends, accessed September 20, 2019; Natsional’naya strategiya razvitiya iskusstvennogo intellekta (II) na period do 2030 goda, (National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for the Period Until 2030), Garant.ru, https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/72738946/, 14 October, 2019; Sam Bendett, ‘Sneak Preview: First Draft of Russia’s AI Strategy’, Defence One, https://www.defenceone.com/technology/2019/09/whats-russias-national-ai-strategy/159740/, 30 September, 2019.
82 ‘Dal’noboynyy Pion poluchit tsifrovoye tseleukazaniye’, Op.Cit; ‘Genshtab: osobennost’’u konfliktov budushchego stanet primeneniye robotov i kosmicheskikh sredstv’, Op.Cit; Stepanov, ‘Nayti i unichtozhit’ za sekundy: kak rabotayet voyennaya razvedka’, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Op.Cit.
83 See: Mary C. Fitzgerald, ‘Evolving Russian Blueprints for the New RMA: 2000-2025’,in Dr. R. Matthews, ed., Managing the RMA, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001; Mary C. Fitzgerald, ‘The Impact of New Technologies on Soviet Military Thought’, in Roy Allison, ed., Radical Reform in Soviet Defense Policy Under Gorbachev, London, England: Macmillan Press, 1991; Mary C. Fitzgerald, ‘The Strategic Revolution Behind Soviet Arms Control’, Arms Control Today, 17(5), 1987.
84 Oleg Vladykin, ‘Zapad-2017 natselen na zashchitu Vostoka’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2017-09-15/1_965_west2017.html, September 15, 2017; ‘Pochemu Zapad-2017 vyzval isteriyu na Zapade’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, http://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2017-09-08/2_964_nvored.html; ‘Sily PVO Zapadnogo voyennogo okruga razvernulis’ v novykh rayonakh na ucheniyakh Zapad-2017’, TASS, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4567491, September 16, 2017; ‘Kompleks upravleniya Sozvezdiye ispytan na uchenii Kavkaz-2016’, https://topwar.ru/100528-kompleks-upravleniya-sozvezdie-ispytan-na-uchenii-kavkaz-2016.html, September 11, 2016; ‘Tsentr 2015’, http://politrussia.com/vooruzhennye-sily/tsentr-sily-510/, September 16, 2015; ‘Krupneyshiye ucheniya Tsentr-2015 startovali na poligonakh TsVO’, TVZvezda, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201509141042-3qno.htm, September 14, 2015; Yury Gavrilov, ‘Prikaz po Tsentru’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, https://rg.ru/2015/09/14/ucheniya-site.html, September 14, 2015; Oleg Vladykin, ‘Ucheniye Tsentr-2015 zavershilos’ udarno’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, http://www.ng.ru/armies/2015-09-21/2_uchenie.html, September 21, 2015.
85 Author interviews by video teleconference (VTC) with retired Russian military officers, Moscow, March 3, 2021.
86 Karpenko, ‘Kompleks takticheskogo zvena razvedki upravleniya i svyazi (krus) ‘strelets’,’ Op. Cit;
Stepanov, ‘Nayti i unichtozhit’ za sekundy: kak rabotayet voyennaya razvedka’, Op.Cit.
87 See: Anderson, James, ‘Russian Artillery: Adapting Ancient Principles to Modern Paradigms, Part 2’,OEE Red Diamond 8, No. 11, November 2017,pp. 18-31; Bellamy, Chris, Red God of War: Soviet Artillery and Rocket Forces, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1986.
88 Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of Russian Ground Forces (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office 2016); Anton Lavrov, ‘Aircraft, Tanks and Artillery in the Donbass’, in Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, eds., Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, Second Edition, (MN: East View Press 2015), pp. 228–35; A. Cohen and Robert Hamilton, The Russian Military and the Georgian War: Lessons and Implications, Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College, Carlisle, PA, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1069.pdf, 2011; Svante E. Cornell, and S. Frederick Starr, eds., The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009).
89 See: Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, ‘Russian Campaign in Syria—Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(2), 2020, pp. 104–125.
90 Colonel S.G. Chekinov (Res.), Lieutenant-General S.A. Bogdanov (Ret), ‘Evolyutsiya sushchnosti i soderzhaniya ponyatiya ‘voyna’ v XXI stoletii’, Voyennaya Mysl’ 1 (2017), pp. 30–43.
91 Zyuzin, Umerenkov, Shadrin, ‘Voyuyut roboty’, Op.Cit.
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Roger N. McDermott
Roger N. McDermott is a leading authority on the Russian military. He is Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King’s College, London; Research Associate, Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies (MECACS), University of St. Andrews, Scotland; Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC; Non-Resident Research Fellow, International Center for Defense and Security, Tallinn, Estonia; and guest lecturer on Russian military strategy, Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg, Germany. His most recent book is titled Russia’s Path to the High-Tech Battlespace (2022).