Western Narratives and Russian Disinformation, Three Years into Great-Power Conflict

ABSTRACT

This special issue here marks the third year of the Russia-Ukraine War. The included essays discuss Western narratives that explain pre-war perspectives of a potential conflict as well ongoing Russian disinformation campaigns. The introduction argues that expectations about a quick Russian victory, while proven wrong, had considerable reasoning, and that current expectations of Russian defeat are premature. Disinformation that targets Ukraine, the wider West, and even domestic Russian audiences, is discussed extensively in these pages. This information warfare is seen as an enduring and serious threat. Papers in this issue look at active-measures campaigns tied to both nuclear and biological weapons. Other pieces look to understand the poor military performance of the Russian military by explaining Moscow’s coup-proofing strategies; another approach looks to the shortcomings of military indoctrination and ideology since the 1990s.

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Dr. Heather Rellihan for providing feedback on this essay and for her publishing advice along the way, as this issue was compiled.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Aleksei Ramm, ‘The Russian Army: Organization and Modernization,’ Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), October 2019, https://www.cna.org/reports/2019/10/IOP-2019-U-021801-Final.pdf, IOP-2019-U-021801-Final.

² Charles K. Bartles, ‘Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 24:1, 55-80, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2011.549038.

³ Serdyukov gained this moniker because of his background reforming the Federal Tax Service and for his previous involvement running various furniture companies in St. Petersburg.

⁴ Michael S. Coffey, ‘The Dedovshchina Abides: How Discipline Problems Endure Despite Years of Military Reform,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 35:3-4, 283-299, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2022.2156080.

⁵ Mark Galeotti, Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya To Ukraine (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2022) pp. 231-35.

⁶ Kathryn Stoner, Russia Resurrected: Its Power And Purpose In A New Global Order (New York: Oxford University Press 2021) pp. 190-92.

⁷ Benoit Gorgemans, ‘The Caspian Flotilla: Russia’s Offensive Reinvention,’ Proceedings vol. 147/8/1,422, August 2021, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/august/caspian-flotilla-russias-offensive-reinvention.

⁸ Alia Shoaib, ‘Ukraine Likely Destroyed 3 of Russia’s Prized S-400 Missile Systems Worth $1.5 billion, Weakening Its Air Defenses, Says UK Intel,’ Business Insider, 4 November 2023, https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-likely-destroyed-3-russian-s-400-missile-systems-2023-11.

⁹ Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, ‘Not Built For Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-fated Force Design,’ War on the Rocks, 2 June 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/.

¹⁰ ‘Crimea Crisis: Pro-Russians Seize Ukrainian Naval Bases,’ BBC News, 19 March 2014, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26643141.

¹¹ Olzhas Auyezov, ‘Russia Sends Troops to Put Down Kazakhstan Uprising as Fresh Violence Erupts,’ Reuters, 6 January 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/troops-protesters-clash-almaty-main-square-kazakhstan-shots-heard-2022-01-06/.

¹² Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, ‘What Kind of Victory for Russia in Syria?’ Military Review, Army University Press, 24 January 2018, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/Russia-in-Syria/.

¹³ Phillips P Obrien, ‘The Ukrainian Offensive has Barely Started: And Its Only Been a Short Time Since Feb 2022,’ Phillips’s Newsletter on Substack, 22 June 2023 https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/the-ukrainian-offensive-has-barely.

¹⁴ Deborah Sanders, ‘Ukraine’s Third Wave of military Reform 2016–2022 – Building a Military Able to Defend Ukraine Against the Russian invasion,’ Defense & Security Analysis 39:3, 312-328, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2201017, pp. 312-13.

¹⁵ Brendan Cole, ‘Ukraine Gets Bradleys Boost After Losing Multiple Armored Vehicles,’ Newsweek, 13 June 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/bradley-tanks-ukraine-kyiv-1806229.

¹⁶ Olena Roshchina, ‘Things Didn’t Go According to Plan, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Had To Change Tactics – WP on Counteroffensive,’ Ukrainska Pravda, 4 December 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/12/4/7431595/#.

¹⁷ Ellie Cook, ‘Is Ukraine’s Army Now the Best in the World? Major Countries Compared,’ Newsweek, 1 April 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-army-best-world-compared-russia-us-military-china-1791441.

¹⁸ Anatoly Kurmanaev, ‘Wagner’s Mutiny Has Century-Old Echoes of Another Russian Debacle,’ The New York Times, 28 June 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/28/world/europe/russia-rebellion-prigozhin-1917-kornilov.html.

¹⁹ ‘Another Russian General Reportedly Fired In Latest Military Shake-Up Post-Mutiny,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 16 July 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-general-fired-latest-shakeup-post-mutiny/32505576.html.

²⁰ Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine as of October 29, 2023, 3:00 pm ET, Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, by the Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats, https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375.

²¹ David Axe, ‘Nine Days After Wrecking 21 Russian Helicopters, Ukraine’s M39 Missiles Are Dealing the Same Damage To Russian Air-Defenses,’ Forbes, 26 October 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/10/26/nine-days-after-wrecking-21-russian-helicopters-ukraines-m39-missiles-are-dealing-the-same-damage-to-russian-air-defenses/?sh=31453bae861c.

²² ‘Explained: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive and the Problem of ‘Fighting Weather’,’ Kyiv Post, 11 September 2023, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/21489.

²³ Phillips P Obrien, ‘Weekend Update #52: Avdiivka, ATACMS, Mike Johnson Avdiivka; ATACMS–Where was the detailed follow up?; Mike Johnson and Ukraine,’ Phillips’s Newsletter on Substack, 29 October 2023, https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/weekend-update-52-avdiivka-atacms.

²⁴ Frederick W. Kagan, ‘What Stalemate Means in Ukraine and Why it Matters,’ ISW, 22 March 2022, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/what-stalemate-means-ukraine-and-why-it-matters.

²⁵ Elena Goncharova, ‘ISW: Russian Forces Continue Offensive Operations Near Avdiivka,’ Kyiv Independent,

4 November 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/isw-russian-forces-continue-offensive-operations-near-avdiivka/.

²⁶ Veronika Melkozerova, ‘Ukrainian Attacks Force Russia to Relocate Black Sea Fleet,’ Politico, 6 October 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-attack-crimea-russia-ships-relocate/.

²⁷ Isabel van Brugen, ‘Ukraine’s Crimea Operation Is Going to Plan,’ Newsweek, 14 September 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-crimea-operation-explosions-black-sea-fleet-kerch-bridge-1827002.

²⁸ It is understood that the sham election is a foregone conclusion but this does not eliminate concerns about domestic unrest that Putin will confront as the wartime economy shortchanges funds that would normally be used to prop up popular support for the regime.

²⁹ Lili Bayer, ‘Ukraine Likely to Get NATO Support Message, Not Full Invite, US Ambassador Says,’ Politico, 9 June 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-nato-support-message-not-full-invite-us-ambassador-julianne-smith/.

³⁰ ‘Zelenskyy Accepts Ukraine Cannot Become a NATO Member Until the War Ends,’ NPR Weekend Edition with Scott Simon, 3 June 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/06/03/1179979756/zelenskyy-accepts-ukraine-cannot-become-a-nato-member-until-the-war-ends.

³¹ Luke Coffey, ‘Ten Myths About US Aid to Ukraine,’ Hudson Institute, 20 October 2022, https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/ten-myths-us-aid-ukraine-luke-coffey.

³² ‘Kremlin Sees U.S. Budget Setback for Ukraine as Harbinger of Western War Fatigue,’ Reuters, 2 October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-sees-us-budget-setback-ukraine-harbinger-western-war-fatigue-2023-10-02/.

³³ ‘Corruption Concerns Involving Ukraine Are Revived as the War With Russia Drags On,’ 20 July 2022, The Associated Press via NPR, https://www.npr.org/2022/07/20/1112414884/corruption-concerns-involving-ukraine-are-revived-as-the-war-with-russia-drags-o.

³⁴ Alexander Vindman, ‘Ukraine’s Sovereignty Prospects Dim in 2024: A Candid Assessment of the War, Part 1,’ Why It Matters on Substack, 11 December 2023, https://alexandervindman.substack.com/p/ukraines-sovereignty-prospects-dim?r=laqg2&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web.

³⁵ ‘East: Frozen Conflicts Not So ‘Frozen’ After All,’ 10 November 2006, RFE/RL, https://www.rferl.org/a/1072643.html.

³⁶ S. Neil MacFarlane, Thomas de Waal, James Coyle, among many others, have noted that these conflicts are not necessarily frozen, and that there is also little to prevent a ‘thaw’ that can turn up violence fairly quickly.

³⁷ Artem Shaipov and Yuliia Shaipova, ‘It’s High Time to Decolonize Western Russia Studies,’ Foreign Policy, 11 February 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/11/russia-studies-war-ukraine-decolonize-imperialism-western-academics-soviet-empire-eurasia-eastern-europe-university/.

³⁸ Peter Rutland, ‘Neoliberalism and the Russian Transition,’ Review of International Political Economy 20, no. 2 (2013): 332–62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42003296, pp. 332-333.

³⁹ Casey Michel, ‘Decolonize Russia: To Avoid More Senseless Bloodshed, the Kremlin Must Lose What Empire it Still Retains,’ The Atlantic, 27 May 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/russia-putin-colonization-ukraine-chechnya/639428/.

⁴⁰ Anatoly Kurmanaev, ‘Protests in Russia Put Spotlight on Wartime Ethnic Grievances”, The New York Times, 18 January 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/18/world/europe/protests-russia-bashkortostan.html.

⁴¹ Борис Ельцин, ‘Берите столько суверенитета, сколько сможете проглотить,’ 6 August 2015, Ельцин Центр, speech in Kazan, Russia, 6 August 1990, https://yeltsin.ru/news/boris-elcin-berite-stolko-suverineteta-skolko-smozhete-proglotit/.

⁴² Andrei Kolesnikov, Alexei Levinson, Denis Volkov, ‘How Proponents and Opponents of Political Change See Russia’s Future,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 January 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/14/how-proponents-and-opponents-of-political-change-see-russia-s-future-pub-83607.

⁴³ Heather Wilson, ‘Missed Opportunities: Washington Politics and Nuclear Proliferation,’ The National Interest, no. 34 (1993): 26–36. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42894908, p. 26.

⁴⁴ Some of these stories would be laughable if the stakes were not so serious: In one narrative, the US created and then infiltrated COVID into China in order to subsequently blame Beijing for creating and spreading the global pandemic.

⁴⁵ Michael McFaul, ‘Vladimir Putin Does Not Think Like We Do,’ The Washington Post, 26 January 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/01/26/vladimir-putin-does-not-think-like-we-do/.

⁴⁶ Prigozhin gained this moniker for his ownership of catering companies that received considerable government contracts.

⁴⁷ Olivia Yanchik, ‘Human Wave Tactics are Demoralizing the Russian Army in Ukraine,’ UkraineAlert at the Atlantic Council, 8 April 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/human-wave-tactics-are-demoralizing-the-russian-army-in-ukraine/.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Michael S. Coffey

Michael S. Coffey is an assistant professor of history and political science at the College of Southern Maryland. His research interests include Eurasian states’ relations with a focus on Russian foreign policy and Central Asian defense and security. He previously served as a senior intelligence analyst for the Defense Department on political-military issues.