Political violence, political ends: the story of the Zealots’ underground

ABSTRACT

This article sheds light on a historical episode that has garnered minimal academic focus: the emergence and activities of Brit Ha-Kanaim (Alliance of the Zealots) a religious underground active in Jerusalem from 1950–1951. Advocating for the Jewish halakha to become the law in Israel, they committed a series of violent acts aimed at reshaping the relationship between state and religion. This research situates Brit Ha-Kanaim’s actions within the wider framework of political violence, showcasing a unique blend of religious fervor and nationalism. It underscores their distinctive presence amidst the violent occurrences of that era, identifying them as Israel’s pioneering example of violence fueled by religious fanaticism intertwined with nationalistic ambition.

KEYWORDS:

• Political violence
• state-religion relations
• religious fundamentalism
• nationalism
• emergency legislation
• undergrounds

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Internal Memo 72/51, The Attorney General Vs. Rider, Rulings 5 (District Courts), 410.

2. Bar-Zohar, Ha-memuneh, 4; An analysis of the religious underground’s documents, an internal police report, May 31, 1951, ISA L-2175/5.

3. “Hakirat atzurei Brit Ha-Kanaim li-krat siyuma: le-ma’ala me-elef mismakhim be-beit ha-mishpat [The Interrogation of the Brit Ha-Kanaim Detainees Nears the End: More than One Thousand Court Documents],” Ha-Tzofe, June 19, 1951, 4.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. An analysis of the religious underground’s documents, an internal police report, May 31, 1951, ISA L-2175/5.

7. “Mismakhim shel shitat mahteret ha-kanaim bifnei beit ha-mishpat [Court Documents Concerning the Methods of Brit Ha-Kanaim],” Ha-Tzofe, June 20, 1951, 4.

8. Bar-Zohar, Ha-memuneh, 97.

9. Harel, Bitahon ve-demokratia, 180.

10. ”Mefakhei ha-mishtara mosrim edut keitzad nigbu ha-hodaot me-pi neeshamei ‘brit ha-kanaim’ [Police Inspectors Give Evidence How Confessions Were Elicited from the Defendants of Brit Ha-Kanaim],” Ha-Tzofe, June 1, 1951, 8.

11. Sprinzak, Alimut politit, 34; “Neetsru 42 hashudim be-kesher le-nisayon Brit Ha-Kanaim le-hitnakesh ba-Knesset [42 arrested in ‘Brit ha-kanaim’s attempt to assassin the Knesset],” Haaretz, May 16, 1951, 1.

12. “Takanon ve-huka makifim shel ha-misgeret [Comprehensive Constitution and Regulations of the organization],” May 29, 1951, 12, Israel State Archives (hereafter ISA) 16/32; “Mismakhim shel shitat mahteret ha-kanaim be-beit ha-mishpat [Court Documents Concerning the Methods of the Brit Ha-Kanaim Underground],” Ha-Tzofe, June 20, 1951, 4.

13. “Ba’aelei moniot mutzatot me’idim be-mishpat ha-kanaim [Drivers of Burned Taxis Give Evidence in the Trial of Ha-Kanaim],” Ha-Tzofe, June 4, 1951, 4.

14. For the police report on arson cases in Jerusalem, see Report by A. Shiloni, first head of Police Investigations Division, April 8, 1951, ISA L-86/16.

15. ibid. See also Harel, Bitahon ve-demokratia, 180; “Ba’aelei moniot mutzatot me’idim be-mishpat ha-kanaim” [Drivers of Burned Taxis Give Evidence in the Trial of Ha-Kanaim], Ha-Tzofe, June 4, 1951, 4.

16. Harel, Bitahon ve-demokratia, 181.

17. ISA, L-86/16, Report by A Shiloni, The first head of the Police Investigations Division, April 8, 1951, 4 of the police report; Harel, Bitahon ve-demokratia, 181.

18. ”Pekudat Mivtzah Nezek [Operation command ‘damage’],” ISA L-86/16; Harel, Bitahon ve-demokratia, 180-181.

19. Harel, Bitahon ve-demokratia, 182.

20. Bar-Zohar, Ha-memuneh, 95-97.

21. Harel, Bitahon ve-demokratia, 183.

22. “Sikkum pesha’im yomi [Daily crime summary],” May 16, 1951, ISA L-86/16. See also Divrei ha-Knesset [Knesset Record] (hereafter DK) 9 (1951): 1779; “Mefaked mishteret Yerushalayim megaleh be-mesibat itonaim: Mahteret kanai Shabbat nista le-habel ba-Knesset be-Yerushalayim [Police Chief Reveals at Press Conference that the Shabbat Zealots Tried to Sabotage the Knesset],” Ha-Boker, May 16, 1951, 1.

23. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 3-4.

24. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 30.

25. Gurr, Why Men Rebel; Della Porta, Social Movements.

26. Bloxham and Gerwarth, Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe; Miller, The Foundations of Modern Terrorism.

27. Conteh-Morgan, Collective political violence, 33.

28. Sprinzak, Ish ha-yashar.

29. Hasenclever and Rittberger, “Does Religion Make a Difference?”

30. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God; Altemeyer and Hunsberger, “Authoritarianism, Religious.”

31. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations. Huntington’s thesis remains at the center of a lively intellectual discourse and has given rise to continued research, developments and also criticism.

32. Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion; Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling.”

33. Daskal, Hitnahagut opozitzionit.

34. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution; Fuller, The Morality of Law; Scalia, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules;” Rawls, A Theory of Justice.

35. Goldstein and Shavit, Le-lo psharot; Shavit, Me-rov le-medina; Y. Weitz, Ha-tnu’a ha-revizionistit, 349.

36. David Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary that some of the underground’s members were former members of the Etzel and Lechi. Eventually, however, charges were not pressed against them. David Ben-Gurion’s diary June 12, 1951, BGA.

37. Heruti, Emet ahat, 208–213.

38. Daskal, Hitnahagut opozitzionit, 23.

39. Friedman, “Neturei Karta,” 224-229.

40. Friedman, Ha-hevra ha-haredit, 63-65.

41. Sprinzak, Alimut politit; Friedman, “Neturei Karta;” Caplan, Amram Blau, 15-16.

42. “Skira mishtartit (Nishleha le-sar ha-mishtara mi-mafkal ha-mishtara Y. Nachmias) [Police Report Sent from the Police Commissioner to the Minister of Police],” August 7, 1951, 120-124, ISA C-331/64; Friedman, Ha-hevra ha-haredit, 63-64; Levenkron, “Tafkida,” 120-124.

43. Friedman, “Neturei Karta,” 234-235.

44. ibid., 239.

45. “Skira mishtartit (Nishleha le-sar ha-mishtara mi-mafkal ha-mishtara Y. Nachmias) [Police Report Sent from the Police Commissioner to the Minister of Police],” August 7, 1951, 120-124, ISA C-331/64.

46. Sprinzak, Alimut politit, 24; Friedman, Ha-hevra ha-haredit, 63-65.

47. An exception is the death of Pinchas Segelov who was killed by policemen during the dispersal of a demonstration. Levenkron, “Tafkida,” 143-147.

48. Sprinzak, Alimut politit, 26

49. ibid., 25.

50. Friedman, Ha-hevra ha-haredit, 63-65.

51. Sprinzak, Alimut politit, 26.

52. Friedman, Ha-hevra ha-haredit, 69.

53. Leon, “Yeshivat Porat Yosef.”

54. Sprinzak, Alimut politit, 25.

55. ibid., 26. See also Leon’s comment that this affair warrants a separate study.

56. Tzameret, “Va’adat Frumkin,” 406.

57. ibid., 407.

58. ibid.

59. A. Nevo. “Hakham Mordechai ha-ish ve-darko [Hacham Mordechai – the Man and his Ways],” Yediot Ahronot,April 11, 1985, 6.

60. Tzameret, “Va’adat Frumkin,” 408.

61. ibid., 427.

62. DK 8 (1951): 1037-1110.

63. DK 8 (1951): 1108-1109; Don Yehiyeh, Mashber u-tmura, 381.

64. Don Yehiyeh, Mashber u-tmura, 275-396; Hacohen, Olim be-se’ara, 223-234.

65. See Clause 11 of the law.

66. Bick, “Equality, Orthodoxy and Politics,” 512; Warhaftig, Huka le-Yisrael, 247-248; Unna, Be-drakhim nifradot, 279.

67. Bick, Citizenship and Service, 43; On these grounds, Agudat Yisrael would resign from the government several months afterward. Friedman, Ha-hevra ha-haredit, 60-63.

68. A. Nevo. “Haham Mordechai ha-ish ve-darko” [Haham Mordechai – the Man and his Ways],Yediot Ahronot,April 11, 1985, 6, 7.

69. Sharet was the Prime Minister’s substitute, while Ben-Gurion was abroad.

70. DK 9 (1951): 1803.

71. Ibid., 1779.

72. Ibid., 1777. Several months later, Jabotinsky left Herut, amongst other reasons, as a result of continuing disputes regarding state-religion relations.

73. Ibid., 1778.

74. “‘Hatra’a’ karoz ha-liga neged kfiya datit” [‘A Warning’ – a poster by the League Against Religious Coercion], ISA L-86/16.

75. “Doh al mikrey hatzatat mekhoniot al yedey kana’im le-shmirat shabat” [Report of Car Torchings by Shabbat zealots], March 9, 1951, ISA L-86/16.

76. DK 9 (1951): 1777.

77. ISA K-25/60, Protocol of Internal Affairs Committee, May 22, 1951.

78. DK 9 (1951): 1803.

79. M.D., “Dvar Ha-yom” [Daily Editorial], Davar, May 16, 1951, 1.

80. “Din ha-dat ke-saif?” [religion as fencing?], Al ha-mishmar, May 17, 1951.

81. David Ben-Gurion’s diary June 12, 1951, BGA.

82. Certain doubts, limited to “the bride operation” (namely, the attempt to throw a bomb in the Knesset), were also raised by Menachem Begin, who argued that the security forces learned in advance about the plan from a undercover agent inside the underground. Begin wondered whether this agent was just an informer or rather a “provocateur,” more than hinting that the attempt to throw a bomb in the Knesset was in fact staged by the Shin Bet (Menachem Begin, “rak bli ‘kvetch’ rabotai” [No “Shriek,” Gentlemen], Herut, May 18, 1951; the protocol of the 33/3 meeting of the external affairs and security committee of the Knesset May 22, 1951). The involvement of the Shin Bet with the underground was also presented in a recent study: Gruweis-Kovalsky, “Religious Radicalism, the Zionist Right, and the Establishment of the State of Israel.” Indeed, the primary sources that were revealed thus far confirms the existence of undercover agents in the underground (Jerusalem police report, June 11, 1951, ISA, L-3331/64, ISA, L-2175/5). Moreover, it confirms that the Shin Bet was notified in advance of the plan to attack the Knesset. These facts were also openly declared in court during the trial of the underground’s leadership (see for example: “Matrot ve-pe’ulot mahteret ha-kanaim tuaru al-yedei praklit ha-medina be-mishpat ha-kanaim ha-datiim [The aims and actions of the zealots underground were described by the attorney general in the religious zealots tria],” Ha-boker March 4, 1952). Furthermore, a police report states that in real-time two agents who were unaware of each other’s identities, were present at the Knesset and physically held the bomb: “… We have decided to arrest the men in the Knesset, while the bomb is in their hands. Unfortunately, the bomb was carried by an informer of the security forces, who tried to pass it on to another informer of ours … ” (see Jerusalem police report, June 11, 1951, 5). Eventually, a decision was reached to forego the arrest of the informers. Consequently, the arrests of the underground members were executed later that day, following their departure from the Knesset. These documents (and others) therefore prove the existence of agents in the underground, prior knowledge of the security forces regarding the “bride operation” and the presence of informers on the scene. They do not, however, establish a conclusion that the operation was staged by the security forces, a conclusion which requires further and profound evidence. By any means, the claim of conspiracy became in many ways redundant several months later, as the members of the underground admitted during their trial to the allegations regarding the operation.

83. DK 9 (1951): 1977.

84. ibid., 1814.

85. ibid., 1852.

86. DK 10 (1951): 551.

87. For example: a teacher at the Bais Yaakov school; Chief Rabbi Uziel’s secretary; two instructors at the Porat Yosef hostel and the manager of the hostel, the institution’s right-hand man; four instructors from Midreshet No’ar Sinai; the secretary of Ze’irei Agudat Yisrael in Jerusalem.

88. DK 9 (1951): 1777.

89. ibid., at 1817.

90. Ha-Modi’a, May 18, 1951, 2.

91. Kalman Kahana, “Al ha-hasatot ve-ha-hatzatot [On the slandering and arson],” Ba-Shearin, May 24, 1951.

92. DK 9 (1951): 1817.

93. Specifically, arrests were made under Regulation 111 authorizing military officials at the time of the Mandate to carry out administrative detentions.

94. “Be-histadrut orkhei ha-din [In the Lawyer’s Union],” Ha-praklit 3 (1946): 58.

95. Law and administration ordinance, 5780-1948, official gazette 2 (1948):7.

96. “Be-ein homer ha’ashama maspik ha-atzurim huglu lefi hukei herum [Without Sufficient Evidence to Bring Charges, the Detainees were Expelled under the Emergency Regulations],” Ha-Tzofe, May 18, 1951, 1.

97. DK 9 (1951): 1802.

98. ibid.,1817.

99. ”Hukey ha-herum ha-britiyim huf’elu neged mahteret ‘Brit ha-Kanaim’[British Emergency Regulations Used against the Kanaim Underground],” Ma’ariv, May 17, 1951; “Ha-memshala hif’ila hukey cherum britim, [The Government Used British Emergency Regulations],” Herut, May 18, 1951, 1.

100. For a description of the parliamentary campaign and the crucial role played by Begin and Herut, see Bader, Ha-knesset ve-ani, 44-47.

101. DK 9 (1951): 1828. 1831.

102. “Ha-Knesset bitla hukey ha-herum [The Knesset Abolished the Emergency Regulations],” Ha-Tzofe, May 23, 1951, 1; “Ha-Knesset hehlita be-nigud le-emdat ha-memshala: Takanot ha-herum ha-britiyot nogdot la-yesodot shel medina demokratit [The Knesset’s Decision is at Odds with the Government’s Position: The British Emergency Regulations Contradict the Foundations of a democratic state],” Al Ha-Mishmar, May 23, 1951, 1; “Ha-Knesset hehlita etmol be-rov kolot: Hukey ha-herum ha-britiyim be-nigud le-yesodot ha-medina ha-demokratit” [A Knesset Majority Decided Yesterday: The British Emergency Regulations Contradict the Foundations of a Democratic State”), Herut, May 23, 1951, 1.

103. DK 10 (1951): 581.

104. ibid.

105. The various reasons for the extension of emergency legislation in Israel and the defense regulation from 1945 in particular, beyond the state’s nation-building stages, have long preoccupied historians and legal scholars. Hofnung argues that the main explanation lies in the fact that the defense regulations were the legal authority for the military government imposed on the Arab citizens of Israel during 1948–1966 (Hofnung, Yisrael, 81–83). Another explanation can be found in the political theory of emergencies> The crux of the argument is that the Government wishes to possess extensive authority. If it pleases – these authorities would be used, if not – restraint would be applied (Tzur & Kremnitzer, takanot, 97. Also see: Mark, Pitronot. To conclude this point it is worth noting that regulation 111 under which the underground members had been detained remained in place until its repeal, almost 30 years later, by the first Begin government the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 1979). The new law ordains that the president of the district court must approve the detention within 48 hours, and is authorised to cancel or shorten it. Furthermore, the decision may be appealed. The detention has to undergo judicial review every 3 months and after 6 months the court is required to issue a renewal.

106. Letter from Zelig Gayer to the Officer in Charge of Yagur Police Station (Jalame), May 16, 1951, ISA L-16/86.

107. See for example pp. 2-4 of the committee’s report.

108. For information about violent confrontations between ultra-Orthodox demonstrators and the police, see Levenkron, “Tafkida;” Friedman, “Neturei Karta;” Caplan, Amram Blau.

109. “Mishtar eimim ve-ta’alulim naziyim be-mahane ha-ma’atzar Jalami”[A Reign of Terror and Nazi Shenanigans at the Jalame Detention Camp],” Ha-Tzofe, May 25, 1951, 1.

110. “Mahane rikuz akhzari lefi dugma nazit muvheket [A Brutal Concentration Camp according to the Nazi Model],” Ha-Kol, May 25, 1951.

111. “Ha-yedi’ot al ha-yahas la-atzurim be-mahane Jalame oreru hitmarmerut gdola ba-tzibur ha-rahav [News of the Treatment of Detainees in the Jalame Camp Enrages the General Public],” Ha-Tzofe, May 27, 1951, 1.

112. “Ha-am ha-medina hizda’aze’a al ha-na’ase be-Jalame [The Public and the State Were Outraged by what Happened at Jalame],” She’arim, May 31, 1951, 1.

113. “Al ha-hasatot ve-al ha-hatzatot” [On Inciting and Igniting],” She’arim, May 24, 1951, 1.

114. ibid.

115. Ha-Modi’a, August 8, 1951, 8.

116. DK 9 (1951): 1817.

117. Harel, Bitahon ve-demokratia, 184.

118. Letter for Police Commissioner Sahar to the Minister of Police B. Shitrit, May 28, 1951, ISA C-331/64.

119. Harel, Bitahon ve-demokratia, 185. Letter from the Minister of Police, B. Shitrit, to the Knesset Speaker, June 24, 1952, ISA C-331/64.

120. ibid.

121. See Knesset protocols May 28, 1951; May 29, 1951; June 4, 1951. See also Flexer, Marot Ha-Knesset, 69-79.

122. The committee members were: Yohanan Bader, Herzl Berger, David Hacohen, Zerach Warhaftig, Idov Cohen, Yosef Sapir and Hannah Lamdan who was elected committee chair. For the committee’s report see: DK 9 (1951): 2196-2201.

123. Tzameret, “Va’adat Frumkin,” 132.

124. DK 10 (1951): 537-541, 571-582.

125. Letter from the Minister of Police, B. Shitrit, to the Knesset Speaker, June 24, 1952, ISA C-331/64; Letter from the Deputy Police Commissioner to the Minister of Police Shitrit, June 19, 1952, ISA C-331/64.

126. Criminal Case 72/51 Attorney General Vs. Rider, Clauses 1-3, 10-12, 17-29 to the Indictment.

127. “Ha-Kanaim zuku me-ashmat bgida [The Kana’im Found Not Guilty of Treason],” Ma’ariv, February 20, 1952, 1 (The trial of the underground members calls for scrutiny that is outside the scope of this article.)

128. Criminal Case 72/51 Attorney General Vs. Rider, Psakim Mehoziyim 5, 406, 409. Also see:“Ha-neeshamim hodu be-kol ha-ashmot [the Defendants Pled Guilty in all Counts],” Ha-Boker , March 7, 1952.

129. Y. Amikam, “Kitza ha-shalev shel ‘mahteret mesukenet’ [The Peaceful End of the ’Dangerous Underground’],” Ma’ariv, March 26, 1952, 2.

130. DK 10 (1951): 544.

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Maya Mark

Maya Mark is an Assistant Professor at the Ben-Gurion Research Institute for the Study of Israel and Zionism, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.