Conceptualizing the European military-civilian-industrial complex: the need for a helicopter perspective

ABSTRACT

In his 1961 farewell address, US President Eisenhower coined the term “military-industrial complex,” referring to the coalescing of military, industrial, and political interest groups. In contemporary Europe, the military-industrial complex is arguably transforming into a complex with a noteworthy commercial civilian dimension, blurring traditional military and arms-focused understandings of European defence and security. Our emphasis on an added corporate civilian component captures the expansion of defence and security beyond the traditional military domain. Coalescing of industry and politics is observed in Europe, blurring the military-civilian divide, technologically as well as in organization and governance, particularly through public-private partnerships. Eisenhower, himself a decorated WWII general, warned of how the US military-industrial complex could lead to “disastrous use of misplaced power.” Rather than reiterating such a conclusion in the European context, our paper examines how the European military-civilian-industrial complex is emerging, looking at how elite participants shape the public-private structure of the complex, and specifically how policies on dual-use and emerging technologies influence developments in Europe. The focus herein is on novel actors, characteristics, and the European Union and charts out defining conceptual features of the defence and security industry in Europe.

KEYWORDS:

• Defence industry
• dual-use
• emerging technologies
• military-civilian
• public-private partnerships
• PESCO

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Special issue submission

Please note that this paper is submitted for the Special Issue on European defence industry, with guest editors Giampiero Giacomello (Bologna University), Johan Eriksson (Södertörn University) and Francesco Guimelli

Notes

1. Simply put, dual-use technology is “technology that can have both civilian and military application” (Martins and Ahmad 2020; cf.; Bromley 2022), but these and other researchers point out that the distinction is often not easily made, and is rife with ethical issues, only some of which have begun to be tackled with for example so-called Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) approaches in the EU and”Dual-Use Research of Concern” in the US (Ulnicane 2020, 4–5). Notably, RRI in the EU is at odds with other central concepts and agendas vigorously applied in dual-use in the EU such as Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation (RIS3) (Fitjar, Benneworth, and Asheim 2019). Dual-use technology may also be referred to as “spin-off” technology when military technology is used in civil applications or “spin-in” when civilian technology is used in military applications (Acosta et al. 2017, 823), but from which direction the terms are used should of course depend on vantage point. “Spillover” denotes a “situation in which the research is conducted within one domain and then adopted without change to another domain” (Oliveira et al. 0000, 63).

2. It has been argued that the originator of the concept was speechwriter Malcolm Moos, and that navy captain Ralph Williams had some input (Fallows 2002, 46).

3. A recent report from the NATO Science & Technology Organization aimed at assisting military and civilian decision-makers identifies the following key emerging and disruptive technologies: Data; AI; Autonomy; Space; Hypersonics (assessed as predominately disruptive in nature); and Quantum; Biotechnology and Materials (“assessed as being emergent, requiring significantly more time (10–20 years) before their disruptive natures are fully felt on military capabilities”) (Reding and Eaton 2020 vi-vii)

4. Notably, the role of academia in the European military-civilian-industrial complex is expanding, for example in the context of university, industry and government “triple helix” and strategic research-based innovation (cf. Meyer et al. 2019) and Public-Private Innovation (PPI) in for example cluster networks (CSES and PROGNOS 2021). Specifically with respect to defence and defence-related R&D in the EU, Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation (RIS3) agendas guide PPI and investment through the multiple levels – EU, national and regional (Fernández López et al. 2021). Defence and civil defence education are noted in several European countries even at the high-school level as part of regular curriculum (cf. Urych and Matysiak 2022). Future research should thus consider the significance of academia and education – as well as more closely examining PPI – within the MCIC.

5. The COVID-19 pandemic provided a similar opportunity for among other things, dual-use development application funding in the form of a “Recovery and Resilience Facility” (RRF) and NextGenerationEU (NGEU) instrument where for example broadly-defined crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity and digitalization are two of six focal areas (Official Journal of the European Union 2021 L57/34). The mammoth initiative for 2021–2026 is a combination of grants (€338 billion) and loans to MS (€386 billion); 10% of the NGEU (€83 billion) “will be used to reinforce centrally managed EU programmes such as Horizon Europe and the Just Transition Fund” (European Commission, Directorate General for Budget 2022, 4).

6. NATO – both through its political branch in form of the Strategic Council, and its military HQ – is undoubtedly playing a core role in European defence (Howorth 2017), particularly following the invasion of Ukraine (Maurer and Wright 2023). Relations between NATO and the EU are of importance, both with respect to various institutional mechanisms, and as there is considerable overlap of members states between the two organizations (cf. Fiott 2017; Reykers and Adriaensen 2022). Yet, it is our contention that EU-related institutions of the European MCIC are sufficiently rich, dynamic and interesting in themselves – and also relatively under-researched. This piece chiefly addresses EU-core institutions; a more complete and comprehensive analysis of the European MCIC should also take into account international corollaries, constellations identified herein for further study at a later time.

7. With Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom as members (represented by their respective Ministers of Defence) and many other EU MS plus Turkey as affiliates and the EDA and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) as partners, OCCAR “facilitate[s] and manage[s] cooperative European Armament Programmes through their life cycle” (OCCAR 2023).

8. “Collaborative opportunities”, the development of which are monitored in CARD, are listed under six “’focus areas’ for cooperation, namely: Main Battle Tanks; Soldier Systems; Patrol Class Surface Ships; Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems; Defence Applications in Space and Military Mobility” (European Commission and HR/VP 2022, 6).

9. Official bodies or agencies are not always easily distinguishable from industry groups and endeavors and may have begun as PPPs but transitioned into commercial actors. Just one example of this is the benchmarking and legitimating organization, the European Secretariat for Cluster Analysis (ESCA) which “is an offspring of the 2009 European Cluster Excellence Initiative (ECEI), a pan-European initiative by the European Commission with the aim to create more world-class clusters across the EU by strengthening cluster management excellence. ESCA was established in November 2010 by one of the 13 European project partners, VDI/VDE Innovation + Technik GmbH” (ESCA, undated). This is a different organization from the European Cluster Collaboration Platform (ECCP), which along with “European Strategic Cluster Partnerships have been launched by the European Commission through financial incentives (under COSME program) to encourage clusters from Europe to intensify collaboration across regions and sectors” (ECCP 2020).

10. With roots in France, global actor Airbus is not only a leader in passenger aircraft but is a multi-divisioned defence contractor – like American-based Boeing.

11. In the Horizon 2020 FP for Research and Innovation defence-related research fell under “Secure societies – protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens” (European Commission 2014, 11); the current and ninth FP “Horizon Europe” (2021–2027) has increased the applied defence and security focus in R&D (Ulnicane 2023).

12. COSME was a €2.3 billion funding programme from 2014–2020 (European Commission, undated).for SMEs – defined by the EC as “enterprises employing fewer than 250 persons that have a turnover of less than 50 million euros and/or a balance sheet total of less than 43 million euros” (Eurostat 2022).

13. Quadruple helix or 4 helix is an EU-buzzword in some circles, as a way of adding citizens, in for example Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). The citizen aspect is however virtually non-existent in defence, defence-related and dual-use technology development due to dual objectives (security and intellectual property) for limiting transparency and insight.

14. Over the almost seventy-year period the EU has existed, the concept of solidarity has been progressively underscored in EU treaties and directives. Berchtold (2020, 15) points out that solidarity is “declared to be a core value of the EU (Art. 2 TEU) and builds the basis for reasoning the fight against social exclusion and intergenerational equality (Art. 3 TEU). It is established as a guiding principle for the Union’s action on the international scene (Art. 21 TEU) as well as for its Common Foreign and Security Policy (Art. 24 and 31 TEU). Furthermore, primary legislation relates solidarity to policies on asylum, immigration and external border control (Art. 67 TFEU and Art. 80 TFEU), economic policies (Art. 122 TFEU), energy policy (Art. 194 TFEU) and disasters (Art. 222 TFEU). In parallel, solidarity is mentioned in secondary legislation and policy initiatives at the European level encompassing a broad range of policy fields.”

15. Another dual-use example within the EU’s regulation concerns cyber-surveillance, described in detail in a study by Mark Bromley (2022).

16. The current DG DEFIS seconded to HaDEA in the area of Digital Industry and Space is Marko Curavic with an entrepreneurship, venture financing, management and development economics profile and business administration education and expertise. It is relevant to examine the communities of practice in which experts are engaged, in order to distil profiles that are regarded of essence for the DGs and EU agencies.

Additional information

Funding

EIBURS (European Investment Bank University Research Sponsorship)Research Project: “JEDI” (Joint Effort for the Defence Industry).

Notes on contributors

Lindy Newlove-Eriksson

Lindy Newlove-Eriksson is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the Swedish Defence University.

Johan Eriksson

Johan Eriksson is Professor of Political Science at Södertörn University.