Radicalization ecosystem as a confounder of violent extremism’s drivers

ABSTRACT

Violent extremism is a destabilizing force; its underlying confounding influence should be accounted for to understand this phenomenon. Previous studies have identified its potential risk factors or drivers. This study of Sharia-invoking Salafi extremism addresses whether these factors or drivers are affected by the confounding influence of the radicalization ecosystem. Starting secularly, the newly-formed Eastern European nation of Kosovo became radicalized. Using the 2013 data obtained from Pew Research Center, this study computes measures of confounding influence by using public support levels for radical Islamist agendas before and after radicalization in Kosovo. Utilizing these data and those relating to the worldwide number of jihadist fighters in different periods, this study asserts that the ecosystem acts as a confounder of the risk factors and drivers of violent extremism, thus creating spurious correlations between the two. This study invokes a published theoretical framework for understanding the radicalization ecosystem behind the confounding vis-à-vis Salafi extremism. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the present study finds that mitigating the influence of the ecosystem offers the most comprehensive way of reducing violent extremism. Such a conclusion has implications for the direction of terrorism research.

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© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

KEYWORDS:

• Causation
• radicalization
• extremism
• Salafism
• Hamas
• Taliban

Acknowledgments

I want to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. The Taliban and Salafis hold similar views regarding Sharia and armed jihad. Like the Taliban (Hamid, 2021), Hamas (Alsoos, 2021) also invokes Sharia. The current study discusses jihad only in the armed context (as a religious war), although there are multiple interpretations of what it entails (Kepel, 2002).

2. Derivation of the formula R = 100(Q–0.01*S*P)/(100–S): If a is the total number polled, b represents those who supported the Sharia measure, c represents those who supported the radical agenda of concern, and d represents those who supported Sharia and the radical agenda, then Q/100=c/a, S/100=b/a, and P/100=d/b. Accordingly, R/100=(c – d)/(a – b). Expressing the variables a, b, c, and d in terms of P, Q, and S leads to the above-mentioned equation for R. The said formula for R was used to generate the entries in Columns 6 and 9 from the previous two pairs of columns in Table 1. A significant percentage of those surveyed either did not know what to answer or refused to provide an answer to the questions on the said measures (PRC, 2013). Their responses were added to the negative category as they were deemed less influenced by the radicalization ecosystem, just like those who gave explicit negative responses. This approximation, if anything, only serves to lower the extent of the quantitative impact of the ecosystem.

3. Here, the Muslim “religious leaders” designation applies to those who, through formal religious training or self-study, are recognized as such by their communities; the term entails command of the scriptures and Islam’s history.

4. The presence of a jihadist group in countries of concern was ascertained on the basis of the data in the START (Study of Terrorism And Responses to Terrorism) database (Muthuswamy, 2016: p. 15). The following designations represent the relative strengths of home-grown jihadist attacks: “No” reflects either no known presence of jihadist groups or only a meagre presence of transnational groups such as al-Qaeda and without an occurrence of a terrorist attack in the past five years. “Weak” indicates that the country has not witnessed any major terrorist attack by home-grown jihadists in the past five years, although it has an active presence of home-grown jihadist groups. “Strong” reflects at least one major act of terrorism within the past five years by home-grown jihadists (p. 17).

5. South Asian Muslim religious leaders are trained in religious seminaries called “madrasas.” These seminaries typically utilize a syllabus created in the 17^th century that includes Islamic law (Ahmad, 2004).

6. The high support levels of radical agenda and the strong presence of jihadist groups (Table 1) suggest the existence of a potent radicalization ecosystem in Pakistan.