China and the Middle East security governance in the new era

ABSTRACT

In the 21st century, conflicts in the Middle East can generally be classified into four types, namely: conflicts between outside powers and Middle Eastern countries; between Middle Eastern countries themselves; between different political parties and religious sects within a sovereign country; as well as transnational and cross-border conflicts. The mode of China’s participation in Middle Eastern security governance includes political, security and social conflicts. There are three categories of domestic mechanisms in Chinese practice, specifically: the special envoy mechanism by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the procession and peace-keeping mechanisms by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense; and the foreign aid mechanism by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The China–Arab States Cooperation Forum, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, the United Nations and other international organizations constitute the major international regimes for China’s security governance. China’s Middle Eastern security governance creates not only ‘public goods’ for the region but also a means for China to build constructive great power relations with the United States, the European Union and Russia, among others. The styles of Chinese and Western security governance in the Middle East vary with the Chinese side placing most emphasis on improving the well-being of Middle Eastern peoples and placing this as the top priority on the agenda, followed by a ‘bottom-up’ roadmap, and the seeking of incremental, consultative, inclusive and selective governance in Middle East conflict resolution.

KEYWORDS:

• Diplomacy
• global governance
• Middle East security governance
• China’s Middle East diplomacy
• mediation diplomacy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to the Shanghai Pujiang Talents Project and the Shanghai International Studies University Research Team for their joint support.

Notes

1 On March 8, 2015, ‘Boko Haram’ declared allegiance to the ‘Islamic State’.

Additional information

Funding

The author is indebted to China’s Ministry of Education programme entitled ‘Theoretical and Empirical Studies of China’s Participation in the Middle East Security Affairs’ [grant number 16JJDGJW011]; to the ‘Shu Guang’ Project of the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission and the Shanghai Education Development Foundation [grant number 15SG29].