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ABSTRACT
Journalism plays a crucial role in providing reliable information and holding those in power accountable. However, newspapers have experienced a significant drop in profitability, with digital platforms controlling the industry's main revenue sources being one contributing factor. To tackle this problem, the EU has granted press publishers the right to demand payment for copyright licenses from digital platforms. This article examines the nature and history of the new neighbouring right introduced by the EU Directive 790/2019 (DCSM) and considers the relationship between copyright and competition law in this area. While this move aims to enhance the bargaining power of publishers, it alone might not be sufficient to safeguard the public's right to information, freedom of speech, and a diverse news media landscape. Consequently, the effectiveness of the EU Directive will require additional regulatory measures, including bargaining codes, information-sharing mechanisms, and the implementation of specific ‘choice architectures’.
Acknowledgement
The author thanks Michal Gal, Rossana Ducato, Masako Wakui, and all the participants to the Ascola 2019 conference for helpful comments on previous drafts. A special thanks to Abbe Brown for her thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. All errors are my own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Among the many studies on the issue, see N Newman and others, ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020’ (Reuter Institute for the Study of Journalism 2020) <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-06/DNR_2020_FINAL.pdf>; News Media Alliance, ‘News Media Alliance Calls for Legislation to Address Impact of Digital Duopoly on News Organizations’ (News Media Alliance, 10 July 2017) <https://www.newsmediaalliance.org/release-digital-duopoly/>; News Media Alliance, ‘Google Benefit from News Content: Economic Study’ (2019) <http://www.newsmediaalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Google-Benefit-from-News-Content.pdf>; ‘Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessmnet Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Promoting Fairness and Transparency for Business Users of Online Intermediation Services, COM(2018) 238 Final – SEC(2018) 209 Final – SWD(2018) 139 Final’; Lionel Bently and others, ‘Strengthening the Position of Press Publishers and Authors and Performers in the Copyright Directive’, Study for the JURI committee PE 596.810- September 2017, the available at <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596810/IPOL_STU%282017%29596810_EN.pdf>.
2 Digiday Editors, ‘Digiday Research: Publisher Satisfaction with Platforms Plummets in 2019’ (Digiday, 4 November 2019) <https://digiday.com/media/digiday-research-publisher-satisfaction-platforms-plummets-2019/> accessed 31 October 2022.
3 Newman and others, ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020’ (n 1) 22 ff.
4 ibid 22–23.
5 Natalia Drozdiak, ‘EU Defends Proposals Granting Publishers New Rights’ Wall Street Journal (2016) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-defends-proposals-granting-publishers-new-rights-1473083853> accessed 8 June 2020.
6 A snippet is a small extract of a piece of news, sometimes accompanied by an image or an illustration.
7 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market (OJ L 130) Recital (54); Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment on the modernisation of EU copyright rules, SWD(2016) 301 final 20 ff.
8 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment on the modernisation of EU copyright rules, SWD(2016) 301 final 155–156.
9 DG COMM, ‘Eurobarometer: Internet Users’ Preferences for Accessing Content Online’ (2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eurobarometer-internet-users-preferences-accessing-content-online>.
10 Damien Geradin, ‘Complements and/or Substitutes? The Competitive Dynamics between News Publishers and Digital Platforms and What It Means for Competition Policy’ (2019) 003 TILEC Discussion Paper <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338941>.
11 Pew Research Center, ‘Trends and Facts on Online News | State of the News Media’ (Pew Research Center's Journalism Project) <https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/digital-news/> accessed 4 June 2020.
12 Claudio Lombardi, ‘Competition in Online News, Algorithmic Curation, and Advertising: Between Markets and Democracy’ (Social Science Research Network 2020) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3582360 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3582360> accessed 19 August 2021.
13 Rasmus Kleis Nielsen and Sarah Anne Ganter, The Power of Platforms: Shaping Media and Society (Oxford University Press 2022) 67.
14 CMA and Ofcom, ‘Platforms and Content Providers, Including News Publishers Advice to DCMS on the Application of a Code of Conduct, November 2021’ 41 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/advice-to-dcms-on-how-a-code-of-conduct-could-apply-to-platforms-and-content-providers>; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ‘Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report (26 July 2019)’ <https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry>; Frances Cairncross, ‘The Cairncross Review: A Sustainable Future for Journalism’ (Technical report, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, HM … 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-cairncross-review-a-sustainable-future-for-journalism>.
15 See below, Sections 1.2. and 2.3.
16 Directive 2019/790 of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market OJ L 130.
17 This article refers, alternatively, to ‘ancillary rights’, ‘neighbouring rights’, and ‘related rights’ to address the new right introduced with Article 15, Directive 2019/790.
18 For a comparative overview of the Directive and the reason why other countries, and in particular the US, may not follow suit, see Pamela Samuelson, ‘Regulating Technology through Copyright Law: A Comparative Perspective’ (2020) 42 European Intellectual Property Review 214.
19 See Section 5.1.
20 See also Lombardi (n 12).
21 See Recital (54) and the more detailed analysis of these aspects below. See also Bently and others (n 1) 11.
22 But also in the advertising industry, see Lombardi (n 13).
23 See Section 3 below.
24 Thus, other aids or regulatory solutions, such as State subsidies or antitrust exemptions for press publishers are not discussed in this article.
25 Andrew Pettegree, The Invention of News: How the World Came to Know about Itself (Yale University Press 2015); Lucy Brown, Victorian News and Newspapers (Oxford University Press, USA 1985).
26 Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, ‘Intellectual Property in News? Why Not?’ in Megan Richardson and Sam Ricketson (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property in Media and Entertainment (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 11.
27 ibid 12.
28 For a detailed historical reconstruction see Sam Ricketson, ‘The Public International Law of Copyright and Related Rights’ in Isabella Alexander and H Tomás Gómez-Arostegui (eds), Research Handbook on the History of Copyright Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 288 ff.; Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, ‘Intellectual Property in News? Why Not?’ in Megan Richardson and Sam Ricketson (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property in Media and Entertainment (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 10 ff.
29 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works signed on 9 September 1886 (4 May 1896) 331 UNTS 217, entered into force 5 December 1887, last revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 and amended on 28 September 1979 (Berne Convention), Art.2(8).
30 Article 7 of the Berne Convention.
31 Article 9(1).
32 See also the WIPO's guide to Article 2(8), World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971), available at <https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/615/wipo_pub_615.pdf>.
33 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as revised at Brussels 26 June 1948, Article 10(1).
34 ibid para 10.6. Moreover, the guide specifies that the news is not left undefended against parasitic exploitation, as ‘for example the laws of unfair competition allow for action against newspapers which filch their news from competitors rather than subscribe to news agencies’, para 2.28.
35 Samedan draft, Art.2: (1940), see Ricketson (n 30) 26–27.
36 Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, 11 June to 14 July 1967, vol.1 (Stockholm Intellectual Property Conference, WIPO 1971) 115. On the relationship between copyright and public interest concerns, see Isabella Alexander, Copyright Law and the Public Interest in the Nineteenth Century (Bloomsbury Publishing 2010).
37 On the relationship between copyright and public interest concerns, see ibid.
38 Actes de la Conférence réunie a′ Berlin du 14 octobre au 14 novembre 1908 (Bureau de l’Union international littéraire et artistique 1909) 251ff. Furhermore, the Convention's drafters believed that the commercial issues ensuing from using the news of the days were already protected under ‘unfair competition statutes’. In particular, under Article 10bis (2), Resolution of the International Congress of Press Agencies, Berne 1924, reproduced in Actes de la Conférence réunie à La Haye du 8 octobre au 6 novembre 1925 (Bureau international de l’Union 1926) 100–1; see Ricketson and Ginsburg (n 30) 23. However, also the Paris Convention rejected the proposal of according special protection to publishers on the ground that the parasitic conducts denounced by some of them failed to fit within the object of unfair competition Actes de la Conférence 1925 (n 52) 478–9 (report of fourth subcommittee). Other international laws protecting the neighbouring rights are the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organizations, 1961, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996, and the TRIPS, which accord special protection to performers and broadcasters and protect collective management of performers, however, excluding newspapers.
39 In Germany, some of the most prominent newspapers filed a complaint, through their collective management organisation, VG Media, to receive payment of copyright fees, but ultimately conceded free access to their content to Google. At the same time, they denied the same free license to other news aggregators; see Bently and others (n 1) 31; ‘News zu News bei Google’ (Der offizielle Blog von Google Deutschland) <https://germany.googleblog.com/2014/10/news-zu-news-bei-google.html> accessed 8 June 2020.
40 In Spain, Google news was shut down in 2014, after the copyright reform introduced an inalienable ancillary right. Despite this, some newspapers gave a free license (contra leges!) to Google, see Raquel Xalabarder, ‘The Remunerated Statutory Limitation for News Aggregation and Search Engines Proposed by the Spanish Government-Its Compliance with International and EU Law’ [2014] IN3 Working Paper Series 31 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2504596> or <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2504596>. 31; Pedro Posada de la Concha, A Gutiérrez and H Hernández, Impacto Del Nuevo Artículo 32.2 de La Ley de Propiedad Intelectual (NERA Economic Consulting, July 2015); After the entry into force of the CDSM Directive, Google News returned to Spain, see Google blog, Google News to return to Spain, <https://blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/google-news-in-spain/>.
41 Valentina Moscon, ‘Use and Abuse of Neighbouring Rights and the Growing Need for a Sound Understanding: The Case of Online News Protection in Europe’ in Susy Frankel (ed), The Object and Purpose of Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar Publishing 2019) 315–316.
42 See infra Section 3.
43 On the relationship between copyrights and freedom of information, see Christophe Geiger and Elena Izyumenko, ‘Freedom of Expression as an External Limitation to Copyright Law in the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows the Way’ (2019) 41 European Intellectual Property Review; Giulia Priora, ‘Diritto d’autore e Accesso All’informazione Giornalistica: Accanimento o Lungimiranza Del Legislatore Comunitario?(Copyright Protection and Access to News Information: Dogged Determination or Prescient Vision of the EU Legislator?)’ (2021) 4 Diritto dell’Informazione e dell’Informatica 833, 835; Elena Izyumenko, ‘The Freedom of Expression Contours of Copyright in the Digital Era: A European Perspective’ (2016) 19 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 115.
44 Thomas Hoppner, Martin Kretschmer and Raquel Xalabarder, ‘CREATe Public Lectures on the Proposed EU Right for Press Publishers’ (2017) 39 European Intellectual Property Review 607.
45 The right to information is generally combined with the freedom of expression as in a dyadic relationship: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression’ Art 10 European Convention on Human Rights and Art 11 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. See, for example, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of speech utilizing phrases such as ‘freedom of information’ and ‘right of access to information’ and ‘right to information’ interchangeably, David Kaye, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression ’ (UN, 2018) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1631686> accessed 24 August 2021.
46 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. Article 9(2) establishes that ‘Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.’
47 See also WR Cornish, David Llewelyn and Tanya Frances Aplin, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (Ninth edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2019) part IV; Eleonora Rosati, ‘The Idea/Expression Dichotomy: Friend or Foe?’, Handbook on the Economics of Copyright (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014); Edward Samuels, ‘The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law’ (1988) 56 Tenn L Rev 321; Amy B Cohen, ‘Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgements’ (1990) 66 Ind LJ 175; Abraham Drassinower, ‘A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law’ (2003) 16 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 3; Rosati.
48 Moscon (n 58) 17.
49 This is happening, especially to local and investigative reporting, see Newman and others, ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020’ (n 1).
50 The expiration time is provided at Article 15(4).
51 As defined in Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
52 Article 2(4).
53 A different approach was followed by the Australian News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code which defined ‘core news content’ as ‘content that reports, investigates or explains: (a) issues or events that are relevant in engaging Australians in public debate and in informing democratic decision-making; or (b) current issues or events of public significance for Australians at a local, regional or national level’, thus focusing on public interest journalism, see Article 52, Bill 2021.
54 Recital 56 Directive 790/2019.
55 Ula Furgal, ‘The EU Press Publishers’ Right: Where Do Member States Stand?’ (2021) 16 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 887, 9.
56 Mason Walker and Katerina Eva Matsa, ‘News Consumption Across Social Media in 2021’ (Pew Research Center's Journalism Project, 20 September 2021) <https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/09/20/news-consumption-across-social-media-in-2021/> accessed 11 April 2022.
57 Article 15 (1)(2).
58 Recital (69).
59 Article 15 (1)(3).
60 Article 15 (1)(4).
61 Recital (58).
62 Article 15(5).
63 CMA and Ofcom (n 14) 5.7.
64 Google blog, ‘Alliance de la Presse d’Information Générale and Google France sign agreement on the use of online press publications’, 21 Jan 2021, <https://blog.google/intl/fr-fr/nouveautes-produits/explorez-obtenez-des-reponses/apig-google/>.
65 Caitlin Chin, ‘How to Balance the Scales between Newspapers and Technology Giants’, Center for Strategic and International Studies 5 May 2022, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-balance-scales-between-newspapers-and-technology-giants>.
66 CMA and Ofcom (n 14) Appendix D.
67 Whereas this article does not aim to cover all the details about metrics and methods to calculate a fair share, it is crucial to remark that even when the negotiation may take place, it may be halted due to the lack of a common metric.
68 Recital (54) of the Directive observes that ‘publishers of press publications are facing problems in licensing the online use of their publications to the [information society service providers], making it more difficult for them to recoup their investments’.
69 Recital (55).
70 Recent research brings empirical evidence in support to the statement that a well-functioning press is essential for the democratic institutions: Pengjie Gao, Chang Lee and Dermot Murphy, ‘Financing Dies in Darkness? The Impact of Newspaper Closures on Public Finance’ (2020) 135 Journal of Financial Economics 445; Jonas Heese, Gerardo Pérez-Cavazos and Caspar David Peter, ‘When the Local Newspaper Leaves Town: The Effects of Local Newspaper Closures on Corporate Misconduct’ [2021] Journal of Financial Economics.
71 Recital (54), stating that ‘A free and pluralist press is essential to ensure quality journalism and citizens’ access to information’. On the different functions of journalism in a democratic society, see Lombardi (n 12) 45.
72 Recital (54).
73 Newman and others, ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020’ (n 1) 27.
74 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment on the modernisation of EU copyright rules accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market SWD (2016) 302, 162.
75 European Commission (2016), ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Promoting a fair, efficient and competitive European copyright-based economy in the Digital Single Market’, COM(2016) 592 final, 14 September.
76 See below Section 5.12.
77 Sometimes jeopardising the role of investigative and local journalism that are crucial for the attainment of these objectives.
78 In Germany, Google had already renounced to display snippets from news published by some of the most popular national newspapers, following a lawsuit, see ‘News zu News bei Google’ (n 64).
79 See Williams (n 65); Mullin (n 65); Posada de la Concha, Gutiérrez and Hernández (n 65).
80 Sections 87(f)(g)(h) of the German Copyright Act (1965) and Article 32(2) of the Ley de Propiedad Intelectual 21/2014.
81 Article 11 now Article 15 CDSM Directive. Amongst the many, see Raquel Xalabarder, ‘Press Publisher Rights in the New Copyright in the Digital Single Market Draft Directive’ [2016] CREATe Working Paper 2016/15; Giuseppe Colangelo and Valerio Torti, ‘Copyright, Online News Publishing and Aggregators: A Law and Economics Analysis of the EU Reform’ (2019) 27 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 75; Moscon (n 58); Reto Hilty and Valentina Moscon, ‘Modernisation of the EU Copyright Rules – Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition’ [2017] Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 17-12 <SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036787n>; Alexander Peukert, ‘An EU Related Right for Press Publishers Concerning Digital Uses. A Legal Analysis’ 22 [2016] Research Paper of the Faculty of Law, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888040>; Christophe Geiger, Oleksandr Bulayenko and Giancarlo Frosio, ‘The Introduction of a Neighbouring Right for Press Publisher at EU Level: The Unneeded (and Unwanted) Reform’ (2017) 39 European Intellectual Property Review (EIPR); Gustavo Ghidini and Francesco Banterle, ‘A Critical View on the European Commission's Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market’ <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3168070> accessed 25 August 2022. See also the letter signed by multiple scholars warning against the introduction of a new ancillary right for news publishers, ‘Academics Against Press Publishers’ Right’ (IVIR) <https://www.ivir.nl/academics-against-press-publishers-right/> accessed 12 June 2020.
82 Hilty and Moscon (n 117) 81.
83 ibid 82.
84 ibid 82–83.
85 Colangelo and Torti (n 117) 85–86.
86 ibid 81.
87 European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment on the modernisation of EU copyright rules’, SWD(2016) 301 final, 160; also cited by ibid 9.
88 ‘Academics Against Press Publishers’ Right’ (IVIR) 1 <https://www.ivir.nl/academics-against-press-publishers-right/> accessed 12 June 2020.
89 ibid.
90 ibid.
91 Richard Danbury, ‘Is an EU Publishers’ Right a Good Idea – Final Report on the AHRC Project: Evaluating Potential Legal Responses to Threats to the production of News in a Digital Era’ 72 <https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/sites/www.law.cam.ac.uk/files/images/www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/documents/copyright_and_news/danbury_publishers_right_report.pdf>; R Danbury, ‘Why Article 15 of the Directive on Copyright in the Single Digital Market Is a Bad Idea (Opinion)’ (2021) 43 European Intellectual Property Review 695; Robert P Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property: (Harvard University Press 2011) 19.
92 Danbury, ‘Is an EU Publishers’ Right a Good Idea – Final Report on the AHRC Project: Evaluating Potential Legal Responses to Threats to the production of News in a Digital Era’ (n 130) 73.
93 See Section 2.3 above.
94 William Patry, How to Fix Copyright (Oxford University Press, USA 2011) 146.
95 ibid 148.
96 Pew Research Center (n 11); Sara Atske, ‘4. Journalists and the Public Differ on How Journalists Are Doing, How Connected They Are’ (Pew Research Center's Journalism Project, 14 June 2022) <https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2022/06/14/journalists-and-the-public-differ-on-how-journalists-are-doing-how-connected-they-are/> accessed 5 June 2023; Jigsaw Research and Ofcom, ‘News Consumption in the UK: 2022’ (2022) <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0027/241947/News-Consumption-in-the-UK-2022-report.pdf>.
97 See Mediatique report for the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Overview of recent dynamics in the UK press market, April 2018, available at <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/720400/180621_Mediatique_-_Overview_of_recent_dynamics_in_the_UK_press_market_-_Report_for_DCMS.pdf>, and Pew Research Center, ‘State of the News Media: Digital News Fact Sheet’ (2019) <https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/> accessed 2 June 2020. ibid.
98 Public Interest News Foundation, ‘Index of Independent News Publishing in the UK’ (2022) 11 <https://www.publicinterestnews.org.uk/_files/ugd/cde0e9_482883de647c46acb5ae4a0166d6d048.pdf>. ibid.
99 Nielsen and Ganter (n 13) 81 ff.; Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Local Journalism: The Decline of Newspapers and the Rise of Digital Media (Bloomsbury Publishing 2015); C Hendrickson, ‘Local Journalism in Crisis: Why America Must Revive Its Local Newsrooms’ [2019] The Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Local-Journalism-in-Crisis.pdf>; Heese, Pérez-Cavazos and Peter (n 100). Nielsen and Ganter (n 13) 81 ff.; Nielsen; Hendrickson; Heese, Pérez-Cavazos and Peter (n 100).
100 For more information about the abuse of economic dependence in Europe, see Mor Bakhoum, ‘Abuse without Dominance in Competition Law: Abuse of Economic Dependence and Its Interface with Abuse of Dominance’, Abusive Practices in Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018); Alice Rinaldi, ‘Re-Imagining the Abuse of Economic Dependence in a Digital World’ (2020) 4 Eur Competition & Reg L Rev 253; Pranvera Këllezi, ‘Abuse below the Threshold of Dominance? Market Power, Market Dominance, and Abuse of Economic Dependence’, Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? (Springer 2008); Sangyun Lee, ‘A Theoretical Understanding of Abuse of Economic Dependence in Competition Law’ [2022] Available at SSRN 4134583; Jan Blockx, ‘Belgian Prohibition of Abuse of Economic Dependence Enters into Force’ (2021) 12 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 321; Patrice Bougette, Oliver Budzinski and Frédéric Marty, ‘Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn from an Industrial Organization Approach?’ (2019) 129 Revue d’economie politique 261.
101 On the ‘fear factor’, but with specific reference to authors, Recital (76) of the CDSM Directive states ‘Authors and performers are often reluctant to enforce their rights against their contractual partners before a court or tribunal. Member States should therefore provide for an alternative dispute resolution procedure that addresses claims by authors and performers, or by their representatives on their behalf, related to obligations of transparency and the contract adjustment mechanism. For that purpose, Member States should be able to either establish a new body or mechanism, or rely on an existing one that fulfils the conditions established by this Directive, irrespective of whether those bodies or mechanisms are industry-led or public, including when part of the national judiciary system. Member States should have flexibility in deciding how the costs of the dispute resolution procedure are to be allocated. Such alternative dispute resolution procedure should be without prejudice to the right of parties to assert and defend their rights by bringing an action before a court.’
102 For instance, in 2017, the Wall Street Journal, after blocking users from reading articles for free, witnessed a 44% decrease of visits to their website from Google searches ‘WSJ Ends Google Users’ Free Ride, Then Fades in Search Results’ Bloomberg.com (5 June 2017) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-05/wsj-ends-google-users-free-ride-then-fades-in-search-results> accessed 14 February 2020.
103 Although for the latter an ECJ decision established a violation of EU procedural rules determining its invalidity, see C-299/17 – VG Media.
104 Law 2019-775 of 24 July 2019.
105 See The Local ‘“We Can Be Proud:” France Becomes First Country to Adopt EU Copyright Reform’ (24 July 2019) <https://www.thelocal.fr/20190724/french-parliament-adopts-eu-copyright-reform> accessed 12 December 2019.
106 Google, ‘Nouvelles règles de droit d’auteur en France: notre mise en conformité avec la loi.’ (Le blog officiel de Google France) <https://france.googleblog.com/2019/09/comment-nous-respectons-le-droit-dauteur.html> accessed 10 June 2020. For more details on the cases, see also Emmanuel Reille, ‘France: Anti-Competitive Practices – Enforcement’ (2021) 42 European Competition Law Review; David Tayar and Jalil El Khanchoufi, ‘The Neighbouring Rights Saga (France): Google Fined€ 500 Million for Breaching Interim Order to Negotiate in Good Faith With News Agencies and Publishers’ (2022) 13 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 355.
107 Autorité de la Concurrence, Agence France Presse, interim decision 20-MC-01 of 9 April 2020.
108 ibid paras 190 ff.
109 Para 173 ff.
110 ibid para 239.
111 ibid para 217.
112 For more details, see ibid para 93.
113 This was not the first time for Google to impose take-it-or-leave-it agreements for free access to websites’ information. In 2012, according to an FTC Report, Google imposed a blanket agreement to its U.S. counterparties that gave it full and free access to third parties’ data feeds, see FTC, Memorandum on Google Inc., File No. 111 0163, at 18 30 (8 August 2012) 32.
114 Paris Court of Appeal, decision 8 October 2020, n° 20/08071.
115 Decision 21-D-17 of 12 July 2021.
116 Although press associations have then been able to negotiate license agreements with Google to the satisfaction of their members, see ‘Exclusive: Google's $76 Million Deal with French Publishers Leaves Many Outlets Infuriated’ Reuters <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-france-copyright-exclusive-idUSKBN2AC27N> accessed 9 November 2022.
117 Or paid to delay the enforcement of such copyrights, such as in the case of the Google News Initiative, Sundar Pichai, ‘Our $1 Billion Investment in Partnerships with News Publishers – Google News Initiative’ (Google, 1 October 2020) <https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/google-news-initiative/google-news-showcase/> accessed 30 November 2021.
118 For their powers and the issue of coordination between the EC and the national competition authorities, see Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L001.
119 T-70/89 British Broadcasting Corporation and BBC Enterprises Ltd v European Commission (Magill) ECR 1991 II-00535., para 25.
120 See eg. AG Gulmann observing that ‘The cases again raise the fundamental issue of the balancing of two conflicting interests, on the one hand the concern to protect industrial and commercial property rights based on national law and on the other the concern for undistorted competition which it is one of the Community' s tasks to ensure.’ Opinion of Mr Advocate General Gulmann in Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities (Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P _European Court Reports 1995 I-00743). For more on the intellectual property-competition law relation, Valentine Korah, Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules (Hart Pub 2006); Ioannis Lianos and Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘New Challenges in the Intersection of Intellectual. Property Rights with Competition Law. A View from Europe and the United States’ (2013) 4 CLES Research Paper series <https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10045063/>; Robert Pitofsky, ‘Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property’, Dominance and Monopolization (Routledge 2017); Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust an Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law (Aspen 2009); Michael A Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law (Oxford University Press, USA 2011).
121 See, with regard to trade marks, the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-10/89 HAG GF [1990] ECR I-3711, paragraph 13.
122 Shubha Ghosh, ‘Intellectual Property Rights: The View from Competition Policy’ (2008) 103 Nw. L. Rev. Colloquy 344.
123 Case T-442/08 CISAC v Commission [2013] ECLI:EU:T:2013:188.
124 See Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P (Magill) Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities.ECR 1995 I-00743, Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co KG ECR 1998 I-07791, Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] ECR I-5039 and – Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission (2007) ECR II-3601.
125 Case 395/87 Ministère public v Jean-Louis Tournier [1989] ECR 02521.
126 Case T-442/08.
127 Case 262/81 Coditel SA and others v Ciné-Vog Films SA and others [1982] ECR 03381.
128 Case C-52/07 Kanal 5 Ltd and TV 4 AB v Föreningen Svenska Tonsättares Internationella Musikbyrå (STIM) upa [2008] ECR I-09275; and Case 395/87 Ministère public v Jean-Louis Tournier [1989] ECR 02521. In the Kanal 5 case, the court argued that ‘Article 82 EC must be interpreted as meaning that, by calculating the royalties with respect to remuneration paid for the broadcast of musical works protected by copyright in a different manner according to whether the companies concerned are commercial companies or public service undertakings, a copyright management organisation is likely to exploit in an abusive manner its dominant position within the meaning of that article if it applies with respect to those companies dissimilar conditions to equivalent services and if it places them as a result at a competitive disadvantage, unless such a practice may be objectively justified’.
129 Article 102 (2) (a) TFEU.
130 The case law on discriminatory abuses mostly concerns price discrimination, for example Case C-525/16 MEO – Serviços de Comunicações e Multimédia SA v Autoridade da Concorrência ECLI:EU:C:2018:270.
131 Recital (61).
132 Article 5 (8) Draft Legislative Decree for the implementation of the Directive 2019/790, 13 July 2021.
133 Opinion n. S4297.
134 Art. 43-bis, para 10.
135 ibid.
136 Article 9 of the Law no. 192 of 18 June 1998.
137 With the exception of Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Poland and Portugal, which, by 15 February 2023, failed to fully transpose the Directive.
138 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ‘Mandatory News Media Bargaining Code: Concepts Paper’ (2020) 7 <https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20-%20Mandatory%20news%20media%20bargaining%20code%20-%20concepts%20paper%20-%2019%20May%202020.pdf>. For a critical overview of the reform see Tai Neilson and Baskaran Balasingham, ‘Digital Platforms and Journalism in Australia: Analysing the Role of Competition Law’ (2022) 45 World Competition.
139 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (n 177) 9.
140 ibid. For a critique of the current formulation of the Code and why it may fail to protect all press publishers in Australia, see T Neilson and B Balasingham, ‘Big Tech and News: A Critical Approach to Digital Platforms, Journalism, and Competition Law’ in J Meese, & S Bannerman (eds), The Algorithmic Distribution of News: Policy Responses (Palgrave Global Media Policy and Business, 2022), and B Balasingham and T Neilson, ‘Digital Platforms and Journalism in Australia: Analysing the Role of Competition Law’ (2002) 45 World Competition 295–318.
141 For instance, the previous Spanish and German copyright reforms adopted two diametrically opposed stsances on this last regard, with the art 32(2) of the Ley de Propiedad Intelectual 21/2014 establishing the inalienability of the right and the ss 87(f)(g)(h) of the German Copyright Act providing for the possibility to renounce to the enforcement of this right.
142 Nielsen and Ganter (n 13) 10–11.
143 See examples in Courtney C Radsch, ‘Frenemies: Global Approaches to Rebalance the Big Tech v Journalism Relationship’ (Brookings, 29 August 2022) <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/08/29/frenemies-global-approaches-to-rebalance-the-big-tech-v-journalism-relationship/> accessed 22 December 2022.
144 Zsuzsa Detrekői, ‘Tackling News Media Underfunding: From Copyright Reform to Cutting the (Platform) Middleman’ [2022] Internet Policy Review <https://policyreview.info/articles/news/tackling-news-media-underfunding-copyright-reform-cutting-platform-middleman/1617> accessed 2 May 2023.
145 For example, the Australian mandatory news media bargaining code provides for a system of registrations, managed by the ACMA, whereby only registered media can apply for negotiations.
146 Article 2(4) CDSM Directive. For an examination of the definition of ‘press publication’ under the CDSM Directive, see Furgal (n 88) 889.
147 Recital (6).
148 See supra.
149 Lawrence M Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Raymond J Deneckere, ‘Bargaining with Incomplete Information’ (2002) 3 Handbook of game theory with economic applications 1897; William Samuelson, ‘Bargaining under Asymmetric Information’ [1984] Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 995.
150 CMA and Ofcom (n 14) 29–30. See also paragraphs 32–39 of CMA (2020) Online platforms and digital advertising market study Appendix S: the relationship between large digital platforms and publishers.
151 ibid 27–29. See also paragraphs 25–31 of CMA (2020) Online platforms and digital advertising market study Appendix S: the relationship between large digital platforms and publishers.
152 In this sense, the DMA may help where it addresses audience data and transparency in online advertising markets, at Article 5(9) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act) OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1–66.
153 As, for instance, in France (see supra Section 3) or in Germany and Spain (see supra Section 1).
154 The belief here is that regulators made a mistake by relying on the neo-classical economic assumption that businesses and consumers make rational choices about the information they consume, generate and disseminate. This assumption allows the market to determine supply and demand without outside interference. Instead, regulators should encourage publishers, digital platforms and consumers to prioritise and read public interest journalism, without infringing on their freedom of expression and information. This can be done through the adoption of a specific ‘choice architecture’ and the use of ‘nudges’, rather than forcing a specific information agenda. See Claudio Lombardi, Reconceptualising Media Pluralism: A Behavioral Perspective on the Competition-Centric Paradigm and its Implications for Public Interest Journalism, Ascola 2023 Conference paper.
155 Jonathan Heawood, ‘Platforms Don't Owe Publishers a Living, but They Do Owe Them Compensation’ (Media Voices, 21 March 2023) <https://voices.media/platforms-dont-owe-publishers-a-living-but-they-do-owe-them-compensation-heres-why/> accessed 2 May 2023.
156 N Newman and others, ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021’ (Reuter Institute for the Study of Journalism 2021) 10 ff. <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-06/DNR_2020_FINAL.pdf>; N Newman and others, ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2022’ (Reuter Institute for the Study of Journalism 2022) 9 ff. <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2022-06/Digital_News-Report_2022.pdf>.
157 See, on ‘algorithmic curation’ Lombardi (n 12) 15 ff.
158 For example, the Google News or Google Search layouts, or the Facebook News Feed where news content often appears as an isolated entry alongside entirely various sorts of content (mostly that produced by the user's ‘friends, family, and groups’).
159 CMA and Ofcom (n 14) 31.
160 The main way to protect corporate branding is through trademarks. However, newspapers content is not easily covered by trademarks. In general, courts decline to accept single work titles as trademarks since the title identifies the works rather than the source.
161 CMA and Ofcom (n 14) 31.
162 Susan Athey, Markus Mobius and Jeno Pal, ‘The Impact of Aggregators on Internet News Consumption’ (National Bureau of Economic Research 2021) 17.
163 OECD, ‘Competition Issues Concerning News Media and Digital Platforms, OECD Competition Committee Discussion Paper’, (2021) 83 <https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-issues-in-news-media-and-digital-platforms.htm>.
164 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (n 14) 298–299.
165 Pew Research Centre, ‘Newspapers Fact Sheet’ (Pew Research Center's Journalism Project) 29 June 2021, available at <https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/newspapers/> accessed 23 August 2022.
166 Lombardi (n 12).
167 This paper does not aim to give a definition of public interest journalism for the application of copyrights or competition law. However, for a general overview of public interest journalism, see Lynette Sheridan Burns, Understanding Journalism (SAGE 2012) 55 ff; Andrea Carson, ‘Explainer: What Is Public Interest Journalism’ (2017) 14 The Conversation.
168 Ula Furgal, ‘The Emperor Has No Clothes: How the Press Publishers’ Right Implementation Exposes Its Shortcomings’ [2023] GRUR International 9.
169 For example, in France with the establishment of La société des Droits Voisins de la Presse (DVP) and Alliance Presse (AP). The latter has, for instance, successfully negotiated license agreements with Google, see ‘Agreement between the General Press Alliance and Google’ <https://www.culture.gouv.fr/Presse/Communiques-de-presse/Accord-entre-l-Alliance-de-la-presse-d-information-generale-et-Google> accessed 24 August 2022. For other examples, see also Sulina Connal, ‘Google Licenses Content from News Publishers under the EU Copyright Directive’ <https://blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/google-licenses-content-from-news-publishers-under-the-eu-copyright-directive/>.
170 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1–19. Certain EU Member States, such as France, Germany, and Denmark have already enacted laws allowing news publishers to form alliances, share information, or collectively negotiate.
171 Lombardi (n 12) 50–51.
172 With the 9th amendment approved on 9 March 2017 and entered into force on 9 June 2017.
173 The new Section 30 (2b) recites: ‘§ 1 shall not apply to agreements between newspaper publishers and periodicals publishers, in so far as the agreement allows the parties to strengthen their economic base for intermediary competition. Sentence 1 shall not apply to editorial cooperation’.
174 Similarly to the Australian News Media Bargaining Code, see Treasury Laws Amendment (News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code) Act 2021 (C2021A00021). A somewhat similar solution has been proposed also in the UK, see CMA and Ofcom (n 14).
175 CMA and Ofcom (n 14) 29–30.
176 Which is what Recital (54) CDSM Directive commits to achieve.
177 Richard H Thaler, Cass R Sunstein and John P Balz, ‘Choice Architecture’ in E Shafir (ed) The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy (Princeton University Press, 2013).
178 Lombardi (n 176).
179 Newman and others, ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2022’ (n 156).
180 Whilst not defying it as ‘service of general economic interest’, the CDSM directive gives emphasis to the role of public interest journalism in democratic society, thus highlighting its important role to enhance the public good.
181 Harold Demsetz, ‘Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint’ (1969) 12 The Journal of Law and Economics 1.
182 In law, this is an issue discussed by Neil K Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy (University of Chicago Press 1994).
183 CMA and Ofcom (n 14); ‘Canada Reveals Its Australia-Style Big Tech News Media Bargaining Code’ <https://pressgazette.co.uk/canada-news-code-australia/> accessed 25 August 2022.
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Claudio Lombardi
Claudio Lombardi, Lecturer, University of Aberdeen, School of Law, director Eurasian Centre for Law, Innovation, and Development, KIMEP.