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ABSTRACT
Legislative oversight of the executive branch is a fundamental mechanism for ensuring government accountability, good governance, and enhancing democracy. However, formal oversight powers alone are insufficient, and the practical application eventually determines effectiveness. In contemporary times, a distinct set of political phenomena exists, notably the emergence of populism and polarisation, a deep-seated crisis of representation, and a systematic decline in public trust regarding diverse branches of government, coupled with the personalisation of politics and the weakening of political parties. In light of these developments, it is essential to engage in a meticulous examination of the means by which legislatures can enhance their capacity to effectively oversee governments. This article examines the parliamentary committee of inquiry led by Knesset Member Eitan Cabel in Israel from 2017 to 2019, which focused on credit arrangements for large business borrowers. This committee's rigorous investigation into financial system failures makes it an exemplary case of robust oversight in action. The article analyses the Committee establishment, composition, mandate, systematic meeting-planning and questioning process, unique physical setting, report publishing, and other details. The analysis of the Committee's work reveals important insights regarding effective oversight, and isolates the practices which made its work such an augmented performance of legislative oversight. Factors such as the committee's activeness, cooperation, independence, preparation, respectful yet critical approach, transparency, accurate use of media, and precise procedure, created an exceptional performance of legislative oversight. The article concludes that while legislative oversight relies partly on formal mechanisms, it is primarily driven by how political actors apply them, and reveals the importance and centrality of the human factor. This single case analysis, focusing on the committee's oversight practices can inform comparative learning on delivering robust oversight beyond Israel's context, and derive widely applicable insights into key practices for effective legislative supervision of the executive branch.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to express her gratitude to Mr. Guy Elzam for his substantial research assistance.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Bernard Manin, Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge University Press 1997); Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America (W. W. Norton 1989).
2 Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (first published 1748, Cambridge University Press 1989); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (first published 1861, Cambridge University Press 2010).
3 Rick Stapenhurst and others, ‘Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: A World Perspective’ (World bank Institute, 2008) <https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/epdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-7611-9> All online sources were checked on 4 August 2023; Rick Stapenhurst and Riccardo Pelizzo, ‘Improving Democracy and Accountability in Ghana: The Importance of Parliamentary Oversight Tools’ (2012) 25 Governance 335.
4 Kerry Jacobs and Kate Jones, ‘Legitimacy and Parliamentary Oversight in Australia: The Rise and Fall of Two Public Accounts Committees’ (2009) 22 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 13.
5 Jorum Duri and others, ‘Overview of Parliamentary Oversight Tools and Mechanisms’ (Transparency International, 2022) <https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/product/overview-of-parliamentary-oversight-tools-and-mechanisms>.
6 Rick Stapenhurst, ‘Parliamentary Oversight in Small States’ (2020) Parliamentarian 145.
7 Simon Tormey, ‘The Contemporary Crisis of Representative Democracy’ (2014) 1 Democratic Theory 104.
8 Gareth Griffith, ‘Parliament and Accountability: The Role of Parliamentary Oversight Committees’ (2006) 21 Australian Parliament Review 7; Heidi Kitrosser, ‘Accountability in the Deep State’ (2018) 65 UCLA L Rev 1532.
9 United Nations, ‘Trust in Public Institutions: Trends and Implications for Economic Security’ (United Nations, 2019) <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/2021/07/trust-public-institutions/>.
10 Robert Elgie and Gianluca Passarelli, ‘The Presidentialization of Political Executives’ in Rudy B. Andeweg and others (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives (OUP 2020) 358.
11 Lauri Karvonen, The Personalization of Politics: A Case Study of Parliamentary Democracy (ECPR Press 2010).
12 Gideon Rahat and Ofer Kenig, From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?: Party Change and Political Personalization in Democracies (Oxford University Press 2018); Maoz Rosenthal, Israel’s Governability Crisis: Quandaries, Unstructured Institutions, and Adaptation (Lexington 2017); Avital Friedman and Chen Friedberg, ‘Personalized Politics and Weakened Parties – an Axiom? Evidence from the Israeli Case’ (2021) 27 Party Politics 258; Tamar Herman et al., ‘Israel's Democracy Index 2022’ (Israel Democracy Institute, 2023) <https://en.idi.org.il/media/19697/the-israeli-democracy-index-2022.pdf>.
13 Giovanni Sartori, Elementi di Teoria Politica (IL Mulino 1987).
14 Chen Friedberg, ‘From a Top-down to a Bottom-up Approach to Legislative Oversight’ (2011) 17 Journal of Legislative Studies 525; Riccardo Pelizzo, Rick Stapenhurst and David Olson, ‘Parliamentary Oversight for Government Accountability’ (Research Collection School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University, 2006) <https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1136&context=soss_research>.
15 Mill (n 2); Montesquieu (n 2).
16 Morris Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy: Studies in Legislative Supervision (University of Pittsburgh Press 1976) 11.
17 See David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (Yale University Press 1974); Kevin den Dulk and J. Mitchell Pickerill, ‘Bridging the Lawmaking Process: Organized Interests, Court-congress Interaction, and Church-State Relations’ (2003) 35 Polity 421; Andrew D. Martin, ‘Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers’ (2001) 95 Am Pol Sci Rev 361; Nathan W. Monroe and Gregory Robinson, ‘Do Restrictive Rules Produce Nonmedian Outcomes? A Theory with Evidence from the 101st–108th Congresses’ (2008) 70 Journal of Politics 217.
18 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms’ (1984) 28 Am Pol Sci Rev 165.
19 Roy Gregory, ‘Parliamentary Control and the Use of English’ (1990) 43 Parliamentary Affairs 59.
20 Elena Griglio, ‘Parliamentary Oversight under the Covid-19 Emergency: Striving against Executive Dominance’ (2020) 8 Theory and Practice of Legislation 49, 69.
21 Hironori Yamamoto, ‘Tools for Parliamentary Oversight: A Comparative Study of 88 National Parliaments’ (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2007) <http://archive.ipu.org/pdf/publications/oversight08-e.pdf>.
22 Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Global Parliamentary Report 2017: Parliamentary Oversight: Parliament's Power to Hold Government to Account’ (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017) 13 <https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2017-10/global-parliamentary-report-2017-parliamentary-oversight-parliaments-power-hold-government-account>.
23 Walter J. Oleszek, ‘Congressional Oversight: An Overview’ (CRS Research Paper R41079, 22 February 2010) 5 <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41079.pdf>.
24 Daniel Finke, ‘Institutional Conditions for Effective Parliamentary Oversight of European Union Politics’ (2019) 42 West European Politics 1.
25 Mihail Chiru, ‘The Resilience of Parliamentary Oversight during the COVID-19 Pandemic’ (2024) 47 West European Politics 408, 411.
26 Griglio (n 20).
27 Inter-Parliamentary Union (n 22) 28.
28 See, e.g. Miller v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union) [2017] 5 (UKSC) (UK); Kohelet Forum v. Prime Minister (2022) HCJ 6654/22 (Israel SC) (Isr).
29 Inter-Parliamentary Union (n 22) 28–29. For further work stressing the primary role of incentives in legislative oversight, see Bell E. Yosef, Mind the Gap: Typology of the Gap between Theory and Practice in Parliamentary Oversight – Lessons from the Israeli System (under review).
30 Lawrence D. Longley, ‘The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees’ in Lawrence D. Longley and Roger H. Davidson (eds.), Parliamentary Committees: Changing Perspectives on Changing Institutions (Routledge 2012) 1.
31 Inter-Parliamentary Union (n 22) 38.
32 Griglio (n 20) 60; Chiru (n 27) 410; Sven T Siefken and others, ‘Parlamente in der Pandemie: Erste Erkenntnisse aus einem international vergleichenden Forschungsvorhaben’ (2022) 52 Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 878.
33 Martin Loughlin, ‘The Contemporary Crisis of Constitutional Democracy’ (2019) 39 OJLS 435; Philip Norton, ‘Parliaments: A Framework for Analysis’ (1990) 13 West European Politics 1.
34 Sartori (n 13); Friedberg, ‘From a Top-down to a Bottom-up Approach to Legislative Oversight’ (n 14); Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson (n 14).
35 To understand Israel's constitutional nature and history in a broader context, see Suzie Navot, Constitutional Law in Israel (2nd edn., Wolters Kluwer 2016).
36 For further elaboration see Chen Friedberg and Reuven Y. Hazan, ‘The Legislative Branch in Israel’ in Reuven Y. Hazan and others (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society (OUP 2018).
37 Chen Friedberg and Assaf Shapira, ‘Employing the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry as an Oversight Tool: Israel as a Case Study’ (16 November 2023) The Journal of Legislative Studies <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2023.2270271>.
38 ibid 16.
39 The meetings are detailed in the Appendix. All the meetings – except the confidential fifteenth meeting – have an available video online as well as written protocol, available online as well.
40 All the documentation is available at the Committee website, <https://main.knesset.gov.il/activity/committees/credit/pages/committeecall.aspx>.
41 The District Court approved the debt settlement. An appeal to the Supreme Court over the approval was dismissed. The Trustee for Fishman's assets v. Fishman [2020] DC (TA) CA 6730/20 (Isr).
42 Golan Hazani, ‘Eliezer Fishman’s Bankruptcy Ends with a Cut-off of 67%’ (Calcalist, 22 July 2020) (Isr) <https://www.calcalist.co.il/markets/articles/0,7340,L-3840875,00.html>. Unauthorised publications claimed that the original settlement was ninety-two percent of the debt, but public outcry led to a withdrawal of that offer. Eitan Abriel, ‘Will Hedva Bar Promise Today that the Fishman's Settlement will be Finally Buried?’ (TheMarker, 6 June 2017) (Isr) <https://www.themarker.com/markets/2017-06-06/ty-article/0000017f-dbfd-df62-a9ff-dfff25690000>.
43 DK (6 June 2017) 92 (Isr).
44 DK (5 July 2017) 179 (Isr).
45 The Committee's Area of Concern, The Committee of Parliamentary Inquiry into the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers (Isr) <https://m.knesset.gov.il/activity/committees/credit/pages/committeeareasofconcern.aspx>.
46 The Committee of Parliamentary Inquiry into the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers, Final Report (2019) (Isr) <https://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/heb/docs/cc20.pdf>.
47 During the opening meeting of the Committee, Knesset Member Cabel emphasised the importance of attendance. He stated that he will make every effort to ensure that discussions take place on either the first or fifth day of the week, according to the majority's preference. Cabel firmly believes that it is not feasible for discussions to occur simultaneously on Monday and Tuesday. He also mentioned that the Committee will determine ethical rules that all members will sign and be bound by, regardless of whether legislation is passed. Cabel further explained that those who attend at least fifty percent of the debates will be permitted to participate in the votes. He stressed the importance of order and integrity in this process and believes that it is no less significant than the character and ability of the members to explore or communicate with those who will appear before them. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Opening Meeting (26 July 2017) (Isr).
48 n 41.
49 Chagai Amit, ‘Eitan Cabel: TheMarker Top 100 Influencers 2018’ (TheMarker, 2018) (Isr) <https://www.themarker.com/magazine/2018-09-03/ty-article-static-ext/0000017f-edcc-da6f-a77f-fdceefba0000> (‘In October, Cabel will face a substantial challenge. The success of the ‘Fishman Committee’, as the media calls it, and whether it will stay only as a media circus, depends on whether it will yield tangible outcomes directed at the banking system’); see also Racheli Bindman, ‘The MKs Who Failed to Receive Answers from the Banks will Try to Get Answers from Hedva Bar’ (Calcalist, 4 November 2018) (Isr) <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3750523,00.html>; Shachar Ilan, ‘The Tycoons Credit Investigation Committee: The Big Loaners will not be Required to Give Explanations to the Knesset’ (Calcalist, 6 July 2017) (Isr), <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3716616,00.html>.
50 Racheli Bindman, ‘Salinger didn’t Want to be a Part of Cabel's Circus, Rightfully’ (Calcalist, 31 July 2018) (Isr) <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3743446,00.html>; Omer Cohen, ‘No Drama, Please: Salinger Refused to Fall into the Fishman's Committee Trap, and that's a Good Thing’ (Davar, 2 August 2018) (Isr) <https://www.davar1.co.il/141641/>; Amiram Gil, ‘The Tycoons Committee Brings the Primaries to the Capital Market’ (Globes, 22 April 2019) (Isr) <https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001283083>; Zvi Zarchia, ‘Not Only Salinger: Ministry of Treasury Bureaucrats Against the Knesset's Subpoena’ (Calcalist, 2 August 2018) (Isr) <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3743559,00.html>.
51 The dispute centered around the dilemma of balancing the committee's need for appropriate resources to carry out its duties effectively with the need to protect the rights of private entities and avoid the commission's shift from a primarily political entity to a quasi-legal tribunal. For further elaboration, see Dana Blander, ‘Chen Friedberg and Avital Friedman, Parliamentary Inquiry Committee as an Oversight Mechanism on the Executive Branch’ (Israel Democracy Institute, Policy Research 140 2019) (Isr) 11 <https://www.idi.org.il/books/29753>.
52 The Chairperson Cabel stated in the third meeting:
I would like to emphasize to those who pray for elections but are not present in the Knesset that I have already informed both the Committee's management and my fellow members of the Knesset about this. Assuming that the Knesset convenes or resumes after recess and decides on a dispersal, it will take a while. In the initial month, we will embark on a marathon where every Sunday will entail a morning session, a session in the afternoon, and discussions on Thursdays in the morning. We will have approximately ten discussions, give or take one or two, and with the help of God, we will be able to conclude all the processes in that month.
53 ibid 8.
54 This term does not appear in the Knesset's ROP, which adhere to the term ‘discussions’.
55 It should be noted that in Israel, the ‘Shabbat’ (Saturday) is the official day of rest, and Sunday is a workday. The Knesset plenary usually works on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. See ROP 19(a)(1), and the committees’ work is structured accordingly.
56 The Knesset Members are often members of three or even more committees simultaneously. See Chen Friedberg, ‘How to Perfect the Knesset Work as a Legislating and Oversight Branch? Central Recommendations’ 15 (Israel Democracy Institute 2018) (Isr) <https://www.idi.org.il/media/10123/how-to-improve-the-knesset-as-a-legislative-and-oversight-body-key-recommendations.pdf>.
57 During certain gatherings, the members of the committee partitioned amongst themselves the assorted subject matters that the committee aimed to scrutinise in order to simplify the proceedings. To illustrate, during the meeting that was attended by delegates from Bank Hapoalim, a particular section of an audit report produced by the Bank of Israel was focused on.
58 During the opening meeting of the Committee, Knesset Member Kish expressed his concern over the potential impact of broadcasting Committee meetings on the course of the Committee's work. He asserted that the presence of cameras may lead to a form of populism, which could compromise the integrity of the Committee's proceedings. Kish acknowledged that all members of the Committee might be susceptible to this influence and cautioned against the temptation to prioritize personal gain over the committee's objectives. The Inquiry Committee on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Opening Meeting (26 July 2017) (Isr).
59 There were, however, some exceptions. During the meeting with Bank Hapoalim, Knesset member Dov Hanin engaged in a conversation with the Bank representatives. He posed several inquiries to the bank's representatives and raised various allegations that had emerged in the Bank of Israel audit report. When he did not receive satisfactory responses, Hanin began to raise his voice and demand answers from the delegates. However, when Hanin went beyond the scope of his questions and attempted to speak before the Committee, Chairperson Cabel intervened and urged him to ask his questions according to the outline of the discussion. Another instance occurred during the Committee meeting with Bank Leumi representatives, where one member of the Committee attempted to ask a question during the opening statement of the bank's representative. Cabel promptly intervened and clarified that Committee members would not interfere during the fifteen-minute period allotted for bank representatives to make their opening statements. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the Conduct of Bank Hapoalim Regarding Large Business Borrowers Protocol (4th meeting, 21 October 2018) (Isr).
60 The Committee News, ‘At the Last minute: Salinger Startled and Decided that She Won't Appear Before the Investigation Committee’ (The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers 31 July 2018) (Isr), <https://main.knesset.gov.il/activity/committees/credit/news/pages/pr_310718.aspx>.
61 The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the Conduct of the Capital Market, Insurance and Savings Authority regarding Large Business Borrowers Protocol 4 (3rd meeting, 31 July 2018) 3 (Isr).
62 Basic Law: The Knesset is the normative source of the power to summon individuals to face the committees and deliver relevant information. Article 21(b) does not include the private sector:
Provisions may be laid down in the Rules of Procedure regarding the authority of the Committees to summon an office holder or functionary in the Civil Service, a local authority, a religious council, a corporation established by law, or a government corporation, and to require him to provide information at his disposal on the activities of the body in which he serves, […].
63 Zvi Zarchia and Rachali Bindman, ‘Rosek Aminah at the Knesset: “We Can't Talk About Specific Loaners;” Kish: “We Will Consider a State Commission of Inquiry”’ (Calcalist, 28 October 2018) (Isr), <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3748542,00.html>.
64 Chairperson Cabel said during the meeting:
I would like to direct my attention to Mr. Moshe Barkat, the Commissioner of Capital Markets, as I believe he is currently present and observing our proceedings. It is important that I remind him of the request that was issued by the Committee's legal counsel to their own legal representative. Specifically, I requested different data concerning funds' credit, loans, investments and fees. The reason for stopping the publication of this information is unknown to us, and I asked that the legal representative inform us of when and why this publication was stopped. This information is crucial to the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements to Large Business Borrowers, and it is of utmost urgency that we receive it. Despite our efforts, we have not yet received the necessary material, even after I personally contacted Mr. Moshe Barkat on Wednesday. He explained that I should have contacted him directly in advance, and that had I done so, we would have received the material by now. However, the material has still not been received and we are currently missing vital information for our discussion.
65 The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Examining the Conduct of the Capital Market, Insurance and Savings Authority regarding Large Business Borrowers Protocol 4 (3rd meeting, 31 July 2018) 4 (Isr).
66 The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Opening Meeting (26 July 2017) 2.
67 The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the Conduct of the Financial System in Credit Arrangements for Large Business Borrowers: Publication of the Inquiry Committee Report 6 (16 April 2019) (Isr).
68 Yosef (n 29).
69 In Israel, see Friedberg and Hazan (n 38) 309; Noa Kwartaz-Avraham, ‘The Interface Between the Knesset and the Government in Governmental Legislative Process’ (Israel Democracy Institute, Policy Research 147, 2020) 37 (Isr), <https://www.idi.org.il/books/32214>.
70 Friedberg, ‘How to Perfect the Knesset Work as a Legislating and Oversight Branch? Central Recommendations’ (n 58) 18.
71 Article One: Strengthening Congressional Oversight Capacity: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on the Modernization of Congress of the H.R., 117 Congress (2021), <https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg48604/CHRG-117hhrg48604.pdf>.
72 Current research supports the argument concerning the centrality of legislative oversight for coalitions. See Daniel Finke and Annika Herbel, ‘Coalition Politics and Parliamentary Oversight in the European Union’ (2018) 53 Government and Opposition 388; Shane Martin and Richard Whitaker, ‘Beyond Committees: Parliamentary Oversight and Coalition Government in Britain’ (2019) 42 West European Politics 1464.
73 In certain states, the opposition's responsibilities concerning government oversight are explicitly defined, and appropriate measures are established to fulfill this aim, such as allocating specific seats for opposition representatives on particular committees or requesting certain information to be provided to the leader of the opposition prior to its public release. For different constitutional and legislative examples, see Inter-Parliamentary Union (n 22) 28–29.
74 Gary W Cox, ‘On the Effect of Legislative Rules’ (2000) 25 Legislative Studies Quarterly 169.
75 Friedberg and Shapira (n 39) 8.
76 Yosef (n 29).
77 Iddo Porat, ‘Court Polarization: A Comparative Perspective’ (2023) 46 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 3, 3 (‘Polarization is on the rise around the globe. Political views are driven to the poles, and moderate views are weakened’).
78 Namkje Koudenburg and Yoshihisa Kashima, ‘A Polarized Discourse: Effects of Opinion Differentiation and Structural Differentiation on Communication’ (2022) 48 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 1068.
79 See the case of former MK Stav Shafir who created antagonism among the different ministries: The Special Committee for Governmental Information Accessibility and Publicity, ‘The Chair of the Personal Debt Committee in the Ministry of Interior Refused to Face the Committee’ (Committee News, 9 November 2016) (Isr) <https://main.knesset.gov.il/activity/committees/govinfo/news/pages/%d7%94%d7%95%d7%93%d7%a2%d7%94-%d7%95%d7%a2%d7%93%d7%94-%d7%9c%d7%97%d7%99%d7%95%d7%91-%d7%90%d7%99%d7%a9%d7%99-08112016.aspx>; Zvi Zarchia, ‘Shafir Says on the Ministry of Finance CEO: He Think He Runs the State and Can Threaten People; Folkman: You're Lying’ (Calcalist, 28 November 2018) (Isr) <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3750851,00.html>.
80 Interview with former Knesset Member Eitan Cabel (Oct. 2, 2022, Tel Aviv).
81 See, for example, Knesset Member Yariv Levin, formerly the minister of tourism and the minister responsible for the interaction between the Knesset and Government, speaking in the House Committee in June 2022:
In my view, we have unfortunately failed in our duty of parliamentary oversight of the various Knesset committees overseeing government ministries. As a former tourism minister, I experienced firsthand the lack of supervision from the Economic Affairs Committee, which was responsible for overseeing my office. It took significant effort on my part to persuade the chairman to hold audit hearings on my office twice in a five-year period. This highlights the challenge of ensuring that committee heads prioritize their supervisory responsibilities. It is our responsibility to hold government ministries accountable through our supervisory committees. If we fail to set discussions and require ministers to present information, we cannot later claim that our voices were ignored or that we were not considered. The 24th Knesset's House Committee, Meeting No 106 16 (7 June 2022)
82 Mayhew (n 17).
83 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘The Role of Courts in Improving the Legislative Process’ (2015) 3 Theory and Practice of Legislation 295, 298–99.
84 While the agent-principal problem was theorised through economy studies, Kiewiet and McCubbins have imported its rationales into political studies. D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (The University of Chicago Press 1991).
85 Thomas Saalfeld, ‘Members of Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: Agency Relations and Problems of Oversight’ (2000) 37 EurJPolRes 353, 354–55.
86 Oleszek (n 23) 42–45.
87 All the Committee's products and meetings are available at the Congress website. Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress, <https://www.congress.gov/committee/house-select-committee-on-the-modernization-of-congress/hlmh00>.
88 Barbara Sinclair, ‘Can Congress be Trusted with the Constitution? The Effect of Incentives and Procedures’ in Neal Devins and Keith E. Whittington (eds.), Congress and the Constitution (Duke University Press 2005) 297.
89 Victor Goldfeld, ‘Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group Politics: Ensuring Minimal Deliberation through Judicial Review of Congressional Process’ (2004) 79 NYU L Rev 367, 373.
90 For elaboration on blind spots and political burdens of inertia in the legislative process, see Rosalind Dixon, ‘Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited’ (2007) 5 ICON 391, 402–03.
91 Stacy G. Ulbig, ‘Policies, Procedures, and People: Sources of Support for Government?’ (2002) 83 Social Science Quarterly 789, 789; see also Amy Gangl, ‘Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluating of the Lawmaking Process’ (2003) 25 Political Behavior 119, 119–20. In this study, an experiment demonstrated that individuals emphasised the legislative process significantly when it was portrayed as balanced and inclusive and had multiple viewpoints. Conversely, when the procedure was depicted as closed and partial, its legitimacy was notably lower. Those who valued the process as impartial and incorporating diverse perspectives also placed higher importance on its legitimacy. Consequently, they believed their viewpoints were well represented, the procedure was unbiased, and the policymakers' objectives were noble. Remarkably, these findings were valid irrespective of the subject matter of the discussion.
92 The organizations' written arguments are available here: <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Credit/documents/CreditDoc100319.pdf>.
93 The organization written arguments are available here: <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Credit/documents/CreditDoc181218-2.pdf>.
94 Monroe and Robinson (n 17).
95 Friedberg and Hazan (n 38) 303.
96 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘Parliamentary Activity, and Legislative Oversight During the Coronavirus Pandemic – A Comparative Overview’ (Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 20-06, 2020) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3566948>.
97 Friedberg, ‘How to Perfect the Knesset Work as a Legislating and Oversight Branch? Central Recommendations’ (n 58) 15.
98 For instance, in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy, the average is one committee; in Belgium, Ireland, and Switzerland, the average is 1.5; in Finland, the standard is 2. The research, which focused on Europe, found that amongst all the countries examined, only in Austria, the average number of committees is higher (an average of 4 committees for each legislator). ibid.
99 Basic Law: The Knesset, art. 24, SH 69 (Isr); see E. Fast, ‘Attendance at Parliamentary Sessions and the Quorum Rule’ (1982) 17 ILR 197.
100 Israel Democracy Institute, Quorum Requirement in Plenum and Committees (Israel Democracy Institute, 15 February 2002) (Isr) <https://www.idi.org.il/parliaments/8873/9026>; Gonen Ilan, ‘The Quorum Requirement: Discussion and an Offer for a Reform’ (ICON-S-IL Blog, 4 July 2021) (Isr), <https://israeliconstitutionalism.wordpress.com/2021/07/04/%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%AA-%D7%A7%D7%95%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%93%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%99-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%A6%D7%A2%D7%94-%D7%92%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%9F/>.
101 Friedberg and Shapira (n 39) 5.
102 Meghan Benton and Meg Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees: The Select Committees in the British House of Commons’ (2013) 66 Parliamentary Affairs 772.
103 Zvi Zarchia and Racheli Bindman, ‘The Cabel Committee Bashed the Regulators But Neglected the Banks’ (Calcalist, 17 April 2019) (Isr), <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3760577,00.html>; Stella Corin Liber, ‘There is a Parliamentary Committee, There are Conclusions, But What about Some Accountability?’ (Globes, 16 April 2019) (Isr), <https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001282482>; Barak Gonen, ‘Fixed Match: Even at the Eliezer Fishman Affair No One Took Care for the Public Interest’ (MakorRishon, 5 December 2021) (Isr), <https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinion/429417/>; Zvi Zarchia, ‘Cabel's Tycoons Committee Absolve the Banks of Responsibility’ (Calcalist, 20 March 2019) (Isr), <https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3758648,00.html>; Irit Avishar and Amiram Barkat, ‘The “Tycoons Committee” Against the Bank of Israel: Sever and Continuous Deficiencies in the Supervision over the Banks’ (Globes, 16 April 2019) (Isr), <https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001282388>.
104 Blander, Friedberg and Friedman (n 53) 34.
105 Basic Law: The Knesset, art. 22, SH 69 (Isr).
106 Knesset Rules of Procedure, art. 135 (Isr).
107 Sven T. Siefken and Hilmar Rommetvedt (eds.), Parliamentary Committees in the Policy Process (Vol. 1) (Routledge 2021) ch 2.
108 Griglio (n 20).
109 Friedberg and Shapira (n 39).