Quashing protests abroad: The CSTO’s intervention in Kazakhstan*

ABSTRACT

The Collective Security Treaty Organization’s military intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022 quashed the unfolding nonviolent protest movement in the country. Nonetheless, the intervention raised few concerns with regard to the prohibition of the use of force in international law. Among states and scholars, the invitation issued by the Kazakh president was regarded as sufficient to justify the intervention. This article critically assesses this understanding. The intervening states limited the Kazakh people’s right to self-determination and violated protesters’ human rights. Against this backdrop, the authors develop an argument for why international law prohibits states from intervening in another state in order to quash nonviolent protest movements. While the intervention in Kazakhstan serves as the primary example, the argument also applies more broadly and is of particular importance as nonviolent protest movements have a central role in spreading democracy and advancing human rights.

KEYWORDS:

• Use of force in international law
• intervention by invitation
• protest movements
• Kazakhstan
• right to protest
• Collective Security Treaty Organization

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Julius Bayón, Julia Emtseva, Felix Herbert, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Christian Marxsen, Alvaro Paúl, Cindy Wittke, and two anonymous peer-reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft. An earlier draft was presented at the Research Forum of the European Society of International Law in Tartu, Estonia, on 28 April 2023.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Sultan Sakhariyev, ‘Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)’ in Sergey Sayapin and others (eds), International Conflict and Security Law (TMC Asser Press, 2022) 617.

2 Seyfullah Hasar, ‘Kazakhstan: Another intervention by invitation that played out as expected’, Opinio Juris (7 February 2022) https://opiniojuris.org/2022/02/07/kazakhstan-another-intervention-by-invitation-that-played-out-as-expected/; Julia Emtseva, ‘Collective Security Treaty Organization: Why are Russian troops in Kazakhstan?’, EJIL: Talk! (13 January 2022) www.ejiltalk.org/collective-security-treaty-organization-why-are-russian-troops-in-kazakhstan/.

3 Diana Kudaibergenova, ‘Art and Protest in Kazakhstan’ (2022) 121(837) Current History 271, 271–2, 273–5. Kazakhstan had been one of the few states in the post-Soviet space that had not experienced widespread protests after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some therefore argued that Kazakhstan was immune to ‘color revolutions’: see generally Nurseit Niyazbekov, ‘Is Kazakhstan Immune to Color Revolutions?’ (2018) 26(3) The Social Movements Perspective, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 401. This thesis was proven wrong by the increasing protests after 2019, also referred to as the ‘Kazakh Spring’: see Diana T Kudaibergenova and Marlene Laruelle, ‘Making Sense of the January 2022 Protests in Kazakhstan: Failing Legitimacy, Culture of Protests’ (2022) 38(6) Post-Soviet Affairs 1.

4 Elizabeth Wilson, ‘People Power Movements and International Human Rights: Creating a Legal Framework’ in Maciej Bartkowski (ed), ICNC Monograph Series (ICNC Press, 2017); Elizabeth Wilson, “‘People Power” and the Problem of Sovereignty in International Law’ (2016) 26 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 551; Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, ‘Civil Resistance in Public International Law’ (2019) 35 Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional 373; Danny Auron, ‘The Derecognition Approach: Government Illegality, Recognition, and Non-Violent Regime Change (2013) 45 George Washington International Law Review 443; Florian Kriener and Elizabeth Wilson, ‘The Rise of Nonviolent Protest Movements and the African Union’s Legal Framework’ (2021) 10 ESIL Reflection 1.

5 Florian Kriener, ‘Gewaltfreie Protestbewegungen als Legitimitätsquelle? Eine Replik’ (2020) 80 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 881.

6 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 246.

7 Institute de Droit International, Rhodes Resolution (2011); Eliav Lieblich, ‘Why Can’t We Agree on When Governments Can Consent to External Intervention? A Theoretical Inquiry’ (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 5.

8 Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press, ‘Understanding Protests in Authoritarian States’ (2020) 40(2) SAIS Review of International Affairs 16.

9 Susan Stewart, Democracy Promotion and the ‘Colour Revolutions’ (Routledge, 2012).

10 Ibid; Michael McFaul, ‘Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution’ (2007) 32(2) International Security 45, 48, 51.

11 Tom Ginsburg, ‘How Authoritarians Use International Law’ (2020) 31(4) Journal of Democracy 44; Tom Ginsburg, Democracies and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2021) chapter V.

12 President of Russia, ‘Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development’ (4 February 2022) www.en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770.

13 Hanna Duggal and Alia Chughtai, ‘Maps and charts to understand Kazakhstan’s protests’, Al Jazeera (7 January 2022) www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/7/maps-and-charts-to-understand-the-protests-in-kazakhstan; “‘Prompt, independent, impartial investigations” needed in Kazakhstan: UN rights office’, UN News (11 January 2022) https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109572.

14 Valerie Hopkins and Ivan Nechepurenko, ‘Russia-allied forces to intervene as unrest sweeps Kazakhstan’, The New York Times (5 January 2022) www.nytimes.com/2022/01/05/world/europe/kazakhstan-protests-gas-prices.html?searchResultPosition=15.

15 Emily Couch and Sher Khashimov, ‘How Western media framed Kazakhstan’s protests’, Foreign Policy (2 May 2022) https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/02/western-media-kazakhstan-protests/.

16 Diana T Kudaibergenova and Marlene Laruelle, ‘Making Sense of the January 2022 Protests in Kazakhstan: Failing Legitimacy, Culture of Protests’ (2022) 38(6) Post-Soviet Affairs 8.

17 Dan Bilefsky, ‘Revolt in Kazakhstan: What’s happening, and why it matters’, The New York Times (5 January 2022) www.nytimes.com/2022/01/05/world/asia/kazakhstan-protests.html.

18 Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, ‘What is behind the protests rocking Kazakhstan?’, Al Jazeera (5 January 2022) www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/5/explainer-what-is-behind-the-protests-rocking-kazakhstan.

19 Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Longtime president of Kazakhstan surprises region by resigning’, The New York Times (19 March 2019) www.nytimes.com/2019/03/19/world/asia/kazakhstan-nazarbayev-resigns.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer.

20 ‘Freedom in the World 2020 – Kazakhstan’, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-world/2020.

21 Kudaibergenova and Laruelle (n 16).

22 Paddy Ryan, ‘By intervening in Kazakhstan, Russia strengthens its hand in China’s energy market’, Atlantic Council (20 January 2022) www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/by-intervening-in-kazakhstan-russia-strengthens-its-hand-in-chinas-energy-market/; Pikulicka-Wilczewska (n 18).

23 Valerie Hopkins, ‘Kazakhstan’s former leader speaks out on unrest that gripped the country’, The New York Times (18 January 2022) www.nytimes.com/2022/01/18/world/europe/kazakhstan-nursultan-nazarbayev-video.html.

24 Kudaibergenova and Laruelle (n 16).

25 Crisis Group, ‘Behind the Unrest in Kazakhstan’ (14 January 2022) www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kazakhstan/behind-unrest-kazakhstan.

26 Pikulicka-Wilczewska (n 18).

27 Official Website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s Address to the People of Kazakhstan’ (7 January 2022) https://akorda.kz/en/president-kassym-jomart-tokayevs-address-to-the-people-of-kazakhstan-801221. The state of emergency was declared on 5 January in Kazakhstan’s capital Nur-Sultan and Almaty, and extended to the entire country the next day.

28 James Marson and Thomas Grove, ‘Kazakhstan’s president gives security forces order to shoot to kill without warning’, The Wall Street Journal (7 January 2022) www.wsj.com/articles/kazakhstan-leader-gives-security-forces-order-to-shoot-without-warning-11641548642.

29 Hopkins and Nechepurenko (n 14).

30 Othmara Glas and Friedrich Schmid, ‘Altbekannte Reformversprechen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (12 January 2022) www.faz-corporate.de/faz-portal/document?uid=FAZ__FD12022011250001180285059&token=32e25d4d-ba67-4566-a321-b33653788941&p._scr=faz-archiv&p.q=Kasachstan±Proteste±Gewalt&p.source=&p.max=10&p.sort=&p.offset=0&p._ts=1653915013684&p.DT_from=01.01.2022&p.DT_to=01.05.2022&p.timeFilterType=0.

31 Pikulicka-Wilczewska (n 18).

32 ‘Kazakhstan: President gives shoot-to-kill order against protesters’, Deutsche Welle (7 January 2022) www.dw.com/en/kazakhstan-president-gives-shoot-to-kill-order-against-protesters/a-60354912. ‘Kazakh president orders security forces to shoot to kill after days of violent protests’, NBC News (8 January 2022) www.nbcnews.com/news/world/kazakhstan-president-shoot-kill-order-protests-violence-rcna11317.

33 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of freedom of peaceful assembly and association; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; the Working Group on Enforced of Involuntary Disappearances; the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (18 January 2022) Communication AL KAZ 1/2022, 1; Abdujalil Abdurasulov, ‘Kazakhstan unrest: “If you protest again, we’ll kill you”’, BBC (21 January 2022) www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60058972.

34 Shaun Walker, ‘Kazakhstan protests: government resigns amid rare outbreak of unrest’, The Guardian (5 January 2022) www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/04/kazakhstan-president-declares-state-of-emergency-in-protest-hit-areas.

35 Crisis Group (n 25).

36 Twitter (5 January 2022) https://twitter.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1478728771867918337?s=20; Crisis Group (n 25).

37 Official Website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev Held a Session of the Security Council’ (6 January 2022) https://akorda.kz/en/president-kassym-jomart-tokayev-held-a-session-of-the-security-council-705318.

38 Sakhariyev (n 1).

39 The Treaty entered into force on 20 April 1994. See ‘Collective Security Treaty Organization: 2002–2021’ (2023) https://en.odkb-csto.org/25years/.

40 Treaty on Collective Security (1992) 1894 UNTS 309, Article 3.

41 North Atlantic Treaty (1949) 34 UNTS 243.

42 Treaty on Collective Security (n 40) Article 4.

43 Official Website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (n 37).

44 Bruce Pannier, ‘How the Intervention in Kazakhstan Revitalized the Russian-led CSTO’ (2022) Foreign Policy Research Institute 16; Crisis Group (n 25).

45 Pannier (n 44) 11; Kudaibergenova and Laruelle (n 16) 13.

46 Crisis Group (n 25).

47 Florian Kriener, ‘Invitation – Excluding ab initio a Breach of Art. 2 (4) UNCh or a Preclusion of Wrongfulness?’ (2020) 79(3) Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 643, 643–6.

48 Chairman of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO Mr. Pashinyan, Facebook (5 January 2022) www.facebook.com/nikol.pashinyan/posts/470296684451638.

49 UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8967 (16 February 2022) 6 (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vershinin); Statement by Putin, President of Russia: ‘peacekeepers’, cited in Valerie Hopkins, ‘Russian troops will stay to finish job in Kazakhstan, Putin says’, The New York Times (10 January 2022) www.nytimes.com/2022/01/10/world/europe/putin-russia-kazakhstan.html?searchResultPosition=1; UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.8967 (16 February 2022) 20 (Armenia: ‘organization’s collective peacekeeping forces’, Ambassador of Armenia, Mr. Margaryan), 23 (Belarus: ‘collective peacekeeping forces of the CSTO’, Ambassador of Belarus, Mr. Rybakov).

50 Treaty on Collective Security (n 40) Article 4.

51 Official Website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (n 37).

52 Nicaragua (merits) (n 6) para 191.

53 Karl Zemanek, ‘Armed Attack’ (October 2013) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para 10.

54 Josh Satre and Ryskeldi Satke, ‘Demonstrations in Kazakhstan: From Energy Price Hike to Political Crisis, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’, ACLED (13 January 2022) https://acleddata.com/2022/01/13/demonstrations-in-kazakhstan-from-energy-price-hike-to-political-crisis/.

55 Pikulicka-Wilczewska (n 18).

56 Hopkins and Nechepurenko (n 14).

57 ‘Kazakhstan president confirms takeover of Almaty airport’, Deutsche Welle (5 January 2022) www.dw.com/en/kazakhstan-president-confirms-takeover-of-almaty-airport/a-60335623.

58 Zholdas Orisbayev, ‘Piecing together the unrest in Kazakhstan’s third-largest city’, Eurasianet (19 January 2022) https://eurasianet.org/piecing-together-the-unrest-in-kazakhstans-third-largest-city.

59 Special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and others (n 33) 7.

60 Cf Kudaibergenova and Laruelle (n 16) 9.

61 Emily Couch and Sher Khashimov, ‘How Western media framed Kazakhstan’s protests’, Foreign Policy (2 May 2022) https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/02/western-media-kazakhstan-protests/; Kudaibergenova, ‘Art and Protest’ (n 3).

62 Kudaibergenova and Laruelle (n 16) 8.

63 George Krol and Anoushka Ramesh, ‘Russia, China, and Protests: Caught Between Two Powers, Kazakhstan Navigates Internal Dissent’ (2022) 23(1) Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 65, 65–6.

64 Hopkins (n 49); Oliver Hegglin, ‘The CSTO and its Deployment in Kazakhstan’, Human Security Centre (8 February 2022) www.hscentre.org/asia-and-pacific/csto-deployment-kazakhstan/.

65 See Stewart (n 9).

66 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945) 1 UNTS 16, Article 51; Nicaragua (merits) (n 6) para 195.

67 UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX), UN Doc A/RES/3314(XXIX) (14 December 1974) annex.

68 Nicaragua (merits) (n 6) para 195; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (merits) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 146. See also, in its advisory opinion on the construction of a aall, the ICJ builds on the understanding that an armed attack must originate from outside the state’s territory: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (advisory opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 139.

69 Christian Marxsen and Anne Peters, ‘Dilution of Self-Defence and its Discontents’ in Christian Marxsen and Anne Peters (eds), Self-Defence against Non-State Actors (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 1, 2.

70 Laura Visser, ‘Intervention by Invitation and Collective Self-Defence: Two Sides of the Same Coin’ (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 309; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self Defence (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 244–5.

71 Visser (n 70).

72 Joshua Kucera, ‘CSTO agrees to intervene in Kazakhstan unrest’, Eurasianet (5 January 2022) https://eurasianet.org/csto-agrees-to-intervene-in-kazakhstan-unrest; Hegglin (n 64). The Kazakh government and the CSTO argued that the protests were directed from abroad and involved cross-border operations. However, the states did not substantiate this claim or present any evidence thereof. Their argument stands in contrast to the proclamations of the protest movement and the assessment of international observers.

73 Chairman of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO Mr. Pashinyan (n 48); UN Doc S/PV.8967 (n 49), p. 5 (Secretary General of the CSTO Mr Zas), p. 20 (Representative of Armenia), p. 6 (Representative of Russia); Statement by Putin, President of Russia cited in Hopkins (n 49).

74 The Chairman of the CSTO referenced the address by the President of Kazakhstan and referred to a threat to the national security and sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan when arguing why the CSTO decided to send its forces to Kazakhstan in accordance with Article 4 Collective Security Treaty (Chairman of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO Mr. Pashinyan (n 48)).

75 There is an ongoing debate whether an invitation qualifies as a legal justification or whether an invitation excludes a use of force from the scope of Article 2 para 4 of the UN Charter: see Federica Paddeu, ‘Military Assistance on Request and General Reasons against Force: Consent as a Defence to the Prohibition of Force’ (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 227–69; Patrick M Butchard, ‘Territorial Integrity, Political Independence, and Consent: The Limitations of Military Assistance on Request under the Prohibition of Force’ (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 35–73; International Law Association, Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (2018) 18.

76 Olivier Corten, ‘Intervention by Invitation: The Expanding Role of the UN Security Council’ in Christian Marxsen and Anne Peters (eds), Armed Intervention and Consent (Cambridge University Press, 2023) 109.

77 Emtseva (n 2).

78 Corten (n 76) 110.

79 Nicaragua (merits) (n 6) para 246.

80 Corten (n 76) 104.

81 Benjamin Nußberger, ‘Military Strikes in Yemen in 2015: Intervention by Invitation and Self-Defence in the Course of Yemen’s “Model Transitional Process”’ (2017) 4(1) Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 126.

82 See, e.g. the discussion regarding the right to self-determination during a foreign intervention in Georg Nolte, Eingreifen auf Einladung (Springer, 1999) 221–60.

83 Karine Bannelier and Theodore Christakis, ‘Under the UN Security Council’s Watchful Eyes: Military Intervention by Invitation in the Malian Conflict’ (2013) 26(4) Leiden Journal of International Law 860; Theodore Christakis and Karine Mollard-Bannelier, ‘Volenti non fit injuria? Les effets du consentement à l’intervention militaire’ (2005) 50 Annuaire français de droit international 102.

84 Olivier Corten, The Law against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2nd edn 2021) 291; Bannelier and Christakis, ‘Under the UN Security Council’s Watchful Eyes’ (n 83) 860; Christakis and Mollard-Bannelier, ‘Volenti non fit injuria?’ (n 83).

85 Cf Chiara Redaelli, Intervention in Civil Wars (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021) 99–103.

86 See n 83.

87 A close reading of state practice in this regard suggests that there are certain additional criteria for the legality of intervention by invitation. It does not, however, limit or even link these criteria to the purpose of the action: see Veronika Bilkova, ‘Reflections on the Purpose-Based Approach’ (2019) 79 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 681, 682. For an overview of the state practice in regard to the purpose-based approach, see also Gregory H Fox, ‘Invitations to Intervene after the Cold War’ in Christian Marxsen and Anne Peters (eds), Armed Intervention and Consent (Cambridge University Press, 2023) 256.

88 Bilkova (n 87) 682.

89 Christian Marxsen, ‘Conclusion: Half-Hearted Multilateralisation of a Unilateral Doctrine’ in Christian Marxsen and Anne Peters (eds), Armed Intervention and Consent (Cambridge University Press, 2023) 322; Bilkova (n 87) 682.

90 Hopkins (n 49).

91 Bilkova (n 87) 682.

92 Corten (n 76) 107; Bilkova (n 87) 683.

93 Corten (n 76) 107.

94 Kriener (n 5) 886–7.

95 Florian Kriener, State Support to Nonviolent Protest Movements in International Law (Nomos, forthcoming 2024).

96 Satre and Satke (n 54).

97 Special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and others (n 33) 7.

98 Kudaibergenova, ‘Art and Protest’ (n 3).

99 Accordingly, military operations by invitation of another state with the purpose of fighting an armed insurgency cannot serve as precedent for the question analysed in this article. The legal framework regulating those operations is different from the framework for quashing nonviolent protests abroad, and, thus, the situations are not comparable.

100 Nußberger (n 81).

101 Georg Nolte, ‘Intervention by Invitation’ (October 2010) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para 17.

102 Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘Die Anerkennung von Regierungen: Völkerrechtliche Grundlagen und Grenzen im Lichte des Falls Venezuela’ (2020) 80 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 73.

103 Aguilar-Amory and Royal Bank of Canada Claims (Great Britain v Costa Rica) (award) [18 October 1923] RIAA, vol I, 369–99, 380.

104 Cornelia Hagedorn, ‘Tinoco Concessions Arbitration’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), para 11.

105 Jochen A Frowein, ‘Recognition’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), para 5; Aust (n 102) 85 footnote 44.

106 Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Clarendon Press, 1998).

107 Brad R Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Clarendon Press, 1999) 38.

108 Fox (n 87) 207; Anne Peters, ‘Introduction’ in Dino Kritsiotis, Olivier Corten and Gregory H Fox (eds), Max Planck Trialogues on the Law of Peace and War Vol. IV (Cambridge University Press, 2023) 7; Nußberger (n 81) 141–2.

109 Claus Kreß and Benjamin Nußberger, ‘Pro-Democratic Intervention in Current International Law: The Case of The Gambia in January 2017’ (2017) 4(2) Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 239.

110 With regard to the legitimacy of President Hadi in Yemen, Nußberger argues: ‘over time, this rather uncontested (internal) legitimacy has become more open to question; nonetheless, it is beyond controversy that, compared to other conflicting parties, he remains the “most legitimate”’: see Nußberger (n 81) 142.

111 See Julie Dubé Gagnon, ‘ECOWASs Right to Intervene in Cote d’Ivoire to Install Alassane Ouattara as President-Elect’ (2013) 3 Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law 66–8.

112 Armed Activities (merits) (n 68) 168, para 92–105.

113 Jean D’Aspremont, ‘Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy’ (2006) 38 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 877, 894–908.

114 Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology (Oxford University Press, 2000).

115 Some constitutions also provide for other processes through which a state organ acquires the consent of the people. These can be dependent on various factors, including historic and cultural elements. However, elections and referenda are the most common types of acquiring people’s consent.

116 Aust (n 102).

117 Kriener (n 5) 883–4, 901–9.

118 Tom Ginsburg, ‘How Authoritarians Use International Law’ (2020) 31(4) Journal of Democracy 44; Tom Ginsburg, Democracies and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2021) chap 5.

119 For detailed analysis, see Nic Cheeseman and Brian Klaas, How to Rig an Election (Yale University Press, 2019).

120 Anne Peters, ‘Introduction’ in Dino Kritsiotis, Olivier Corten and Gregory H Fox (eds), Max Planck Trialogues on the Law of Peace and War (Cambridge University Press, vol IV 2023) 9; Jure Vidmar, ‘Human Rights, Democracy and the Legitimacy of Governments in International Law: Practice of States and UN Organs’ in Carlo Wilson and Gary Wilson (eds), The Arab Spring: New Patterns for Democracy and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) 62–8; D’Aspremont (n 113) 907; Niels Petersen, Demokratie als teleologisches Prinzip – Zur Legitimität von Staatsgewalt im Völkerrecht (Springer, 2009) 56–8.

121 Kriener (n 5); Solomon A Dersso, ‘The Status and Legitimacy of Popular Uprisings in the AU Norms on Democracy and Constitutional Governance’ (2019) 63 Journal of African Law 107.

122 Elizabeth A Wilson, “‘People Power” and the Problem of Sovereignty in International Law’ (2016) 26 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 551, 583.

123 Kriener (n 5) 905.

124 Ibid, 905–7.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid. See further Florian Kriener, Die staatliche Unterstützung gewaltfreier Protestbewegungen im Völkerrecht (Nomos, forthcoming 2024) section III. For Belarus, see Florian Kriener, ‘Recognition of Protest Movements, What Implications for International Law?’, Minds of the Movement (2 March 2021) www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/nonviolent-movements-and-the-recognition-of-governments-what-implications-for-international-law/.

127 Freedom in the World 2020 (n 20).

128 International Election Observation Mission, ‘Republic of Kazakhstan – Early Presidential Election’ (9 June 2019), ‘Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions’ (10 June 2019). For further analysis, see Christian W Haerpfer and Ksenija Kizilova, ‘Values and Transformation in Central Asia in Transformation and Development – Studies in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Member States’ in Anja Mihr (ed), Transformation and Development (Springer, 2020) 7, 11.

129 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Democracy Index 2021, The China Challenge’ (2022) https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2021/, 15 (accessed date?); Freedom in the World 2020 (n 20) qualifies the Kazakh government as a ‘consolidated authoritarian regime’.

130 Amnesty International, ‘Kazakhstan: Widespread Violation of Basic Rights Spurred Unprecedented Protests’ (5 January 2022) www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/repression-kazakhstan-basic-rights-spurred-protests/ (accessed 16 August 2022).

131 Kudaibergenova and Laruelle (n 16) 8.

132 Corten (n 76) 104; Nolte (n 82) 221–60.

133 For an extensive review, see Tom Sparks, Self-Determination in the International Legal System: Whose Claim, to What Right (Bloomsbury, 2023) chapters II–III.

134 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV), UN Doc A/RES/2625 (24 October 1970) annex, 123.

135 UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX), UN Doc A/RES/3314 (14 December 1974) Article 7.

136 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) Article 20.

137 UN Doc A/RES/2625 (n 133) principle e.

138 Ibid, 123.

139 Ibid (emphasis added).

140 Sparks (n 133) 21.

141 Corten (n 76) 104.

142 Ibid, 104; Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government’ (1985) 56 British Yearbook of International Law 243.

143 Institut de Droit International, Wiesbaden Resolution (1975) Article 2(1).

144 Ibid, Article 5.

145 The term ‘doctrine of negative equality’ was first used in the Report of the Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (25 September 2009) vol II, 277 www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_II1.pdf.

146 Doswald-Beck (n 142) 189; Redaelli (n 85) 92; Bannelier and Christakis, ‘Under the UN Security Council's Watchful Eyes’ (n 83) 862–5; Nußberger (n 81) 130; Erika De Wet, Military Assistance on Request and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 2020) 81; Tom Ruys, ‘Of Arms, Funding and “Non-Lethal Assistance”– Issues Surrounding Third State Intervention in the Syrian Civil War’ (2014) 13(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 21; Corten (n 84) 302. Note that the support for the doctrine by some authors was also influenced by geopolitical reasons: Anne Peters, ‘Intervention by Invitation: Impulses from the Max Planck Trialogues on the Law of Peace and War’ (2019) 79 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 636.

147 Corten (n 76) 106.

148 Institute de Droit International, Rhodes Resolution (2011) Article.3.

149 Ibid, Article 2, para 1.

150 Ibid, Article 3.

151 Olena Sihvo, The Right to Democracy in the Age of Global Constitutionalism (Åbo Akademi University Press 2019) 67–8; Frithjof Ehm, Das Völkerrechtliche Demokratiegebot (Mohr Siebeck, 2013); Kalana Senaratne, Internal Self-Determination in International Law – History, Theory, and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2021) 54; Thomas Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) American Journal of International Law 52; Patrick Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism’ in Christian Tomuschat (ed), The Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 101.

152 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 305.

153 Senaratne (n 151) 54.

154 Jordan J Paust, ’International Law, Dignity, Democracy, and the Arab Spring’ (2013) 46 Cornell International Law Journal 1; Dersso (n 121) 107.

155 Ibid.

156 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Peaceful Protests during Crisis Situations – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule’ (16 May 2022) UN Doc A/HRC/50/42.

157 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 37’ (17 September 2020) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37. Furthermore, the issue also concerns the European Court of Human Rights, which recently published the first guide on its case law concerning the protection of human rights during ‘mass protests’: see ECtHR, Guide on the Case-Law of the European Convention on Human Rights – Mass Protests (2020).

158 Erica Chenoweth, ‘The Future of Nonviolent Resistance’ (2020) 31(3) Journal of Democracy 31/3, 2020, 69.

159 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Global Protest Tracker’ (7 September 2023) https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/protest-tracker.

160 Carothers and Press (n 8) 20.

161 Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, ‘Ratification Status for CCPR’, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CCPR&Lang=en.

162 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn 2013) para 18.09.

163 William A Schabas, Nowak’s CCPR Commentary (N P Engel, 3rd edn 2019) Article 22, para 8.

164 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, para 8.

165 Carothers and Press (n 8) 21.

166 UNGA Verbatim Record, UN Doc A/68/PV.80 (27 March 2014) 3 (Russia); Delegation of Ukraine to the OSCE, ‘Statement in Response to the Statements on Current Political Situation in Ukraine’ (23 January 2014) PC.DEL/24/14; Delegation of the Russian Federation to the OSCE, ‘Statement by Mr. Andrey Kelin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, at the 981st Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council’ (27 January 2014) PC.DEL/42/14; National Security Law for Hong Kong (2020) Article XX. On the HK protests, see KCNA Watch, ‘Stand of Chinese Party and Government Supported: Rodong Sinmun’ (13 August 2019) https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1565764212-956751434/stand-of-chinese-party-and-government-supported-rodong-sinmun/.

167 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Womah Mukong v Cameroon’, Communication No 458/1991 (21 July 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991.

168 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 34’ (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34, para 23.

169 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘M.A. v Italy’, Communication No. 117/1981 (10 April 1984) UN Doc A/39/40, 190; for the ECHR’s equivalent Article 5, see European Commission of Human Rights, ‘Decision by the Commission on the Admissibility of Application No. 250/57’ (20 July 1957).

170 UN Doc A/68/PV.80 (n 166) 3 (Russia); Delegation of Ukraine to the OSCE (n 166); Delegation of the Russian Federation to the OSCE (n 166); National Security Law for Hong Kong (n 166) Article XX; KCNA Watch (n 166).

171 UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37 (n 157) para 15.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid, para 17.

174 Ibid.

175 Official Website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (n 27).

176 UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37 (n 157) para 96.

177 Special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and others (n 33) 8.

178 Ibid, 7.

179 UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37 (n 157) para 96; Special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and others (n 33) 8.

180 UN Doc A/HRC/50/42 (n 156) para 8; Special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and others (n 33) 8.

181 Ibid, para 40.

182 Cf UN Doc A/HRC/50/42 (n 156) para 31.

183 Ibid, para 31.

184 UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37 (n 157) para 80.

185 Special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and others (n 33) 7.

186 Ibid, 7.

187 UN Doc A/HRC/50/42 (n 156) para 31.

188 Ibid, para 32.

189 Jonathan C Pinckney, From Dissent to Democracy: The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions (Oxford University Press, 2020).

190 UN Doc A/HRC/50/42 (n 156) paras 4, 7.

191 Ibid, para 4.

192 Tom Ginsburg, ‘Article 2(4) and Authoritarian International Law’ (2022) 116 American Journal of International Law Unbound 130.

193 ‘Russia defends troops in Venezuela’, Deutsche Welle (26 March 2019) www.dw.com/en/russia-defends-troops-in-venezuela/a-48070760

194 William Loughridge, ‘Nicaragua: Putin’s new client state’, Brown Political Review (14 November 2022) https://brownpoliticalreview.org/2022/11/nicaragua-russias-new-client-state/.

195 Patricia M Kim, ‘Does the China-Solomon Islands security pact portend a more interventionist Beijing?’, Brookings (6 May 2022) www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/05/06/does-the-china-solomon-islands-security-pact-portend-a-more-interventionist-beijing/.

196 Ethan Bronner and Michael Slackman, ‘Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest’, The New York Times (14 March 2011) www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html.

197 As consent in principle can also be expressed through acquiescence, states should not accept the suppression of nonviolent protest movements without comment in order to avoid a behavior that would imply their tacit recognition of such an act: Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United States of America) (judgment) [1984] ICJ Rep 246, para 130.