Evolutionary game analysis of information service quality control of e-commerce platforms under information ecology

Abstract

Due to the information asymmetry and imperfect supervision system, the problem of information service quality of e-commerce platforms is becoming increasingly prominent. Based on the perspective of information ecology, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model including merchants, e-commerce platforms and governments, and analyzes the dynamic process of the three-party game under bounded rationality, thereby characterizing the behavior and optimal strategies of information service quality control. We carry out numerical simulation using data of the Pinduoduo platform. The results show that the cost of each party, control strength of e-commerce platforms, proportion of margin deducted and other factors are important factors affecting the quality of information service; Only when the sum of the costs of passive management of e-commerce platforms, penalties for merchants, and the additional revenue generated from the active management exceeds the cost of the active management of the e-commerce platforms, it ensures effective control over the quality of information service in a stable market environment. Finally, some suggestions are put forward to optimize the e-commerce information service quality control.

Keywords:

• E-commerce platforms
• information service
• quality control
• evolutionary game
• information ecology

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The authors gratefully acknowledge the research support of National Social Science Fund Youth Project (CN) [grant number 19CTQ021].