What Virtue Adds to Value

ABSTRACT

In virtually every corner of ethics—including discussions of value, practical reasoning, moral psychology, and justice—it is common for theorists to suggest that our actions, attitudes, or emotions should be proportional to the degree of value present in the objects or events to which they are responding. I argue that there is a fundamental problem with these approaches: they overlook the character of the agent and what it adds to the equation. I show that a commitment to proportionality is at odds with both ordinary and admirable instances of love, ambition, and forgiveness. To make room for disproportional attitudes and actions, I introduce a novel account of virtue and its relation to value.

KEY WORDS:

• virtue
• value
• proportionality
• emotion
• modus operandi

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The virtues of love, ambition, and forgiveness involve a range of characteristic behaviours, emotions, and dispositions. In this section I focus on emotions and actions that typify them, since they are the aspects of these virtues to which the proportionality principle might be thought to apply.

2 I am grateful to Trenton Merricks and Rebecca Stangl for encouraging me to consider this possibility.

3 Whether it would eliminate them or not depends on whether some infinities can be larger than others.

4 Notice that this defence shifts the object of our valuing attitude. It had started off being something about the project. But this salvage attempt changes it to the good we would achieve by pursuing this project (as opposed to others we might pursue). Those who were attracted to the proportionality principle because they endorse a fitting attitude account of valuing will part ways with our imagined defender of proportionality at this point, because the beneficial outcome of my valuing project P provides the wrong kind of reason for my valuing P.

5 I defend this claim at greater length in Pettigrove [2012].

6 Keller [2020] argues for an account of romantic love like this.

7 At present, both Cawker City, Kansas, and Darwin, Minnesota, lay claim to this title.

8 Tappolet [2012: 220] endorses a response-dependent account of the value properties perceived by emotion.

9 Johnston [1989] introduces response-dependent concepts. In Johnston [2001] it becomes clear that he does not think a response-dependent account is limited to making claims about concepts. There can also be response-dependent properties that correspond to our response-dependent concepts.

10 This is one way to read the argument advanced by Philippa Foot [1985].

11 Zagzebski [2004] appeals to human exemplars to define value concepts. To do the metaphysical job of constituting properties, she sticks with a response-dependent account but it is divine emotions that constitute value properties, rather than the emotions of virtuous humans.

12 Of course, not all of one’s personal style need be captured by virtue and vice concepts.

13 Among moral philosophers it has been discussed most by those working on living with integrity, authenticity, or meaning. See, e.g., Calhoun [2018].

14 The assumption is that approval comes in different flavours. Approving of an excellent backhand in tennis feels different than approving of a self-sacrificing concern for the welfare of others. Some of these flavours of approval we associate with virtues. Others we don’t.

15 I am grateful to Chris Bennett, Adam Carter, Cheshire Calhoun, Jeremy Reid, Luke Russell, Matheson Russell, and Liezl van Zyl for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper and to audiences at the Australian Catholic University, the College of William and Mary, Massey University, Santa Clara University, Victoria University of Wellington, and the universities of Auckland, Glasgow, Sheffield, Virginia, and Waikato for their insightful questions. This paper has benefited considerably as a result of their feedback.