Commentary on Glen Pettigrove’s ‘What Virtue Adds to Value’

ABSTRACT

I focus on Pettigrove’s attack on the ‘proportionality principle’ of value, according to which our actions and attitudes ought to be proportioned to the degree of value present in an object, action, or event. I compare Pettigrove’s strong rejection of this principle with Aristotle's less radical view. There is no room in Aristotelian theory for a phronetic decision that does not take account of overall value. Yet how phronesis operates is clearly no mere utility calculus. What is clear is that phronesis does not only attach itself to individual virtues in individual agents; it acts as a conductor of the whole virtue orchestra. Aristotle’s phronesis theory seems to bring him close to ‘proportionality principle’ territory. However, on a closer look, the whole idea of maximization is totally alien to Aristotelian virtue ethics. I explain how Aristotle's solution to the problem Pettigrove addresses lies in his individuality-adjusted account of virtue.

KEYWORDS:

• Pettigrove, Glen
• Aristotle
• proportionality principle of value
• friendship
• individuality-adjustments

Notes

1 I only had access to the commentaries by Pinsent and Stangl when writing this piece. I apologize to readers if points made below happen to overlap with issues raised by other commentators.

2 Notably, Pettigrove does not directly attack an impartiality principle, but that was a target of Williams’s [1981] critique, mentioned above.

3 Mine happen to be primarily developmental and educational; I have no idea how to teach moral learners to internalize and apply ‘self-effacing’ moral theories.

4 Pettigrove might possibly consider his modus operandi account consistent with Aristotle’s view because arguably, for the latter, flourishing is not fundamental in the sense that it serves as a ground for virtue; rather, a flourishing life just is a virtuous life. However, this over-simplifies Aristotle’s view. While virtue is an essential component of the flourishing life, such a life requires various internal and external necessities in addition to virtue. With some of those necessities, such as good health and good friends, Aristotle is not even entirely consistent as to whether those are best seen as preconditions or constituents of flourishing—or both.