ABSTRACT
Building upon my book, “Nuclear Weapons Free Zones”, I assess the scope conditions for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia. In particular, I evaluate the role of the value of common security for states as a way to cope with nuclear threats, regional economic cooperation, regional institutions, democracy, regional powers, and nonproliferation entrepreneurship. In addition, I offer insights from other regions. While the existing conditions in the Northeast are not currently conducive for a NWFZ, Northeast Asia’s effort should be put into achieving the end of the DPRK nuclear program, the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and perhaps at a later stage, an NWFZ might be considered.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 US President Lyndon Johnson confirmed, in his meeting with Japan Prime Minister Sato, US intention to defend Japan with its nuclear weapons if necessary. But, US-Japan secret understanding in 1960 to allow the possible entries of US aircrafts and vessels into Japan’s territory (irrespective of whether they carried nuclear weapons or not) could be interpreted to imply an US-Japan extended nuclear deterrent. Anyway, it is difficult to determine a single point when the extended deterrence came into effect.
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Exequiel Lacovsky
Exequiel Lacovsky is a research associate at The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the author of “Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: A Comparative Perspective” (Routledge, 2021) and is a member of the “Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia” (PSNA) supported by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).