Implications of the 2022–2023 Situation in Ukraine for Possible Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia

ABSTRACT

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, and the ongoing (as of this writing) conflict that has followed, has prompted many of the actors responsible for determining military and nuclear weapons strategy and policy to rethink their approaches. In Northeast Asia the combinations of the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, tensions over Taiwan, and other regional disputes with the lessons of the Ukraine conflict have caused the nations of the region that have nuclear weapons, and those that do not but are covered under the US “nuclear umbrella”, to at least consider changes in how nuclear weapons might be deployed and, as a final resort, used. These actors include the United States, China, Russia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. This article compiles and summarizes the opinions of experts from or on each of these nations as to how the Ukraine conflict may influence perception of the utility and possible uses of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. The paper evaluates common changes in perception caused by the Ukraine conflict across the nations of the region, as well as differences, and notes the possible ways in which national changes in perception due to the Ukraine conflict may combine to make the danger of nuclear weapons use in the region even more serious than it has recently been. This article is based on work in the Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA).

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear weapons use
• Ukraine conflict
• nuclear proliferation
• nuclear sharing
• nuclear deterrence

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ “[S]ignaling by rhetoric and/or actions involving some aspect of nuclear operations that nuclear weapons might be used against adversaries” (Zhao 2022).

² Such a possibility was indicated, although later recanted, early in 2023 in a speech by ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol (Mohan 2023). Mohan notes “To be clear, South Korea is not actively pursuing homegrown nuclear weapons. However, the incident demonstrated an increased tolerance for casually suggesting nuclear proliferation”..

³ Japan has, for example, limited domestic supplies and production of munitions, so security people in Japan will need to think through how Japan would be resupplied in the event of a conflict in Northeast Asia.

⁴ Examples of such underlying issues include, but are by no means limited to, great power economic conflict, clashes related to differences in political systems, the impact of internal politics and social movements on external relations between states, regional territorial disputes, nuclear and conventional weapons arms races and disarmament agreements, and conflicts related to the international aspirations of national leaders.

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the Nagasaki University Asia-Pacific Leadership Network .