Societal Verification of Nuclear Disarmament in the 21^st Century: A Workshop Report

ABSTRACT

The idea that citizens, including scientists, and civil society groups be responsible for the monitoring and verification of their state’s compliance with nuclear weapons reduction and prohibition treaties – complementary to state-level and international agency mechanisms – has had various iterations. Each iteration reflected a particular historical moment of nuclear politics and identities, state-society relations, and possibilities for communication and collective action. A 2023 Princeton University Program on Science and Global Security workshop explored contemporary civil-society practices related to nuclear program monitoring and verification given the prevalence of internet connectivity, online publicly available data and tools, and cheap ubiquitous sensing from mobile cameras to commercial satellites. The aim of the workshop was to assess the potential and limits of such societal verification efforts. The workshop had three broad themes: the present context of societies, technologies, markets, and states within which civil-society does nuclear-activity monitoring and verification; how the uneven, hierarchical national and international distribution of power and relevant resources is enabling, shaping, and limiting the potential contributions of civil society to national and global security debates and decision-making; and the factors underlying the trustworthiness of civil-society nuclear-activity monitoring and verification practices and their outcomes as well as the relationship between trust (in data, processes, and institutions) and balanced practices.

KEYWORDS:

• Societal verification
• nuclear monitoring and verification
• nuclear disarmament
• nuclear proliferation
• nuclear arms control
• Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

Acknowledgments

Special thanks go to Sarina Hegli, Christopher Lidard, and Gigi Schadrack for taking thorough notes that formed the basis of work on this report.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sara Al-Sayed

Sara Al-Sayed is a Postdoctoral Research Associate in the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Her research in Princeton centers on how new and emerging information technologies can support data collection, analysis, and secure reporting to empower civil society with regard to nuclear arms control, non- proliferation, and disarmament verification.

Alexander Glaser

Alexander Glaser is an associate professor in the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs and in the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University. He is co-director of the Program on Science and Global Security.

Zia Mian

Zia Mian is a physicist and co-director of Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, which is part of the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs.