Irreversibility and Nuclear Disarmament: Unmaking Nuclear Weapon Complexes

ABSTRACT

This article develops a framework for examining “irreversible nuclear disarmament” by drawing on Science and Technology Studies (STS). It argues that maximising the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament is about the “unmaking” of a nuclear weapons complex understood as a large socio-technical system. This entails the discontinuation, or unravelling, of the system’s network of materials, competencies, meanings and institutions, the erosion of tacit knowledge, the discursive reframing of nuclear weapons, and new governance processes to manage discontinuation. The article applies this framework to the experiences of the US nuclear weapons complex in the aftermath of the Cold War to illustrate the ways in which the weapons complex of an established nuclear-armed state could come apart.

KEYWORDS:

• Irreversible nuclear disarmament
• large socio-technical systems
• nuclear weapons complexes
• United States nuclear weapons programme
• science and technology studies

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Hassan Elbahtimy and two anonymous reviewers for their feedback on previous drafts of this article.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Some readers will be sceptical that the UK government as a nuclear-armed state that seems committed to remaining so is serious about examining what nuclear disarmament could and should look like for two main reasons. First, an argument that this is a performative process to show that the United Kingdom is doing “something” on nuclear disarmament and that if the United Kingdom were really serious about it, it would get on with actually disarming. This is a valid criticism (see Harrington 2011). Second, an argument that this is a process to demonstrate a predetermined conclusion that nuclear disarmament is not assuredly irreversible and therefore nuclear disarmament is not possible. This is a less substantive criticism given the investment by the UK government in nuclear disarmament verification and statements that verification and irreversibility do not need to be perfect to enable disarmament processes. See IPNDV (IPNDV 2018) and Browne (2008). Moreover, the UK government is not a homogenous entity and there are those within its offices of state that take the disarmament commitment more seriously than others. But perhaps more importantly, discussions with officials from non-nuclear-armed states (for example at the Wilton Park conference cited above) suggest value in examining what the troika of “verification, transparency and irreversibility” mean in practice in order to lay some of the groundwork for nuclear disarmament and make the most of opportunities to achieve progress when they arise.

² There is a small body of work that applies STS to nuclear studies, including: Flank (1993), Spinardi and MacKenzie (1995), Spinardi (1994), Ritchie (2010), Harrington and Englert (2014) and Walker (2000).

³ South Africa comes close and other scholars involved in the project have examined this case, e.g. Pretorius (2023).

⁴ Thanks to Benoit Pelopidas for this insight.

⁵ For the best discussion, see Collins (2010). He breaks down tacit knowledge into relational, somatic and collective categories.

⁶ Thanks to an external reviewer for this insight.

⁷ On the notion of “invention” in this context, see Ritchie (2018).

⁸ Reframing and stigmatisation can also go beyond specific weapons or other materials, like coal, and target a wider cultural assemblage, such as colonialism or slavery. Extending the role of reframing in this way can encompass the process of diluting a culture of militarism within a society at the maximum end of the spectrum of irreversibility.

⁹ Other work has drawn on STS to examine the South African case of nuclear disarmament, e.g. Flank (1993).

¹⁰ Aspin was at the time Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

¹¹ In 1996 the Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997 also expressed concern about the ability of the Department of Defense to maintain the necessary expertise to sustain the US nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing. See Cohen (1997).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

Notes on contributors

Nick Ritchie

Nick Ritchie is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of York, UK.