ABSTRACT
While the shared objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world has always implied an element of irreversibility, the term as such has not been consistently used in important disarmament texts before. This article provides legal reflections on the topic of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament. It intends to demonstrate how current treaty-based instruments, evolving prohibition norms, and safeguards can contribute to higher levels of irreversibility. The possibility of a withdrawal, even when a strong clause makes it difficult under a certain treaty, as well as the danger of a violation of a treaty, remain a major challenge to irreversibility. Only strong sanctions by the international community can make such a behaviour as costly and unattractive as possible, thereby minimizing the probability.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 The focus on re-constitution is in line with the definition provided by Elbahtimy in this Special Issue (Elbahtimy Citation2023).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Thomas Hajnoczi
Thomas Hajnoczi is a member of the European Leadership Network’s Senior Network. He held the post of Director for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation twice in his career in the Austrian Foreign Ministry. His last post abroad was Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva (including the CD). He was closely involved in bringing about the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the EWIPA Political Declaration. He is pursuing his engagement for human security and disarmament by advising think tanks and NGOs.